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"BLOOD RED"

ARMY

Whose fault?

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Beshanov V.V.

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Why was the regular Red Army destroyed in a matter of weeks in the summer of 1941? Whose fault was it not possible to defeat the enemy "with little blood, with a mighty blow"? Why, until the very end of the war, our losses were many times higher than the German ones, and for each success we had to pay with huge blood, so that the Red Army was nicknamed "blood red"? Why was the Victory achieved at such a high price? To all these questions, the most complex and painful in our history, there is a simple and clear answer, known to Stalin: "Cadres decide everything!"

This book irrefutably proves that it is in the personnel issue, in the low level of professional training of the Soviet generals and officer corps, that the causes of all the tragedies and catastrophes of the Great Patriotic War should be sought. Because cadres really decided everything!

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INTRODUCTION

"Major and serious atrocities are often referred to as brilliant and, as such, are recorded on the tablets of History."

M.E. Saltykov-Shchedrin

First a ghost appeared - the ghost of Communism. The phenomenon was first recorded in 1848 by the outstanding scientist-mediums Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, armed with the most advanced and unmistakable theory of their own. The ghost wandered around Europe, shaking the chains borrowed from the proletariat, assured that the workers had no fatherland, offered them

"unite", enroll in the ranks of the grave-diggers of the bourgeoisie and "destroy everything that has hitherto guarded and secured private property." The prophecies of the communist Spirit were expounded by two classics of Marxism in the famous Manifesto.

The manifesto, "with brilliant clarity and brightness", outlined a new, communist "world outlook", called on all the oppressed to forcibly overthrow the existing social and political system, establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, and destroy classes and private property. Following this, according to the authors, sooner or later, Communism inevitably had to come - the highest and final stage in the development of human society, heaven on earth: factories - for the workers, land - for the peasants, women - in general

use.

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The international proletarian anthem - "International" - defined a clear program of action and the ultimate goal of the communist movement:

We will destroy the whole world of violence To the foundation, and then

We are ours, we will build a new world, Who was nothing, he will become everything.

True, along with passages about the "conquest of democracy", the Manifesto slipped terms like: "expropriation", "Despotic intervention", "confiscation of property" - of course, exclusively in relation to "exploiters", but also "industrial armies", in which, for the convenience of building a new world, it was proposed to mobilize the liberated proletarians.

It is preferable to make a revolution in advanced industrial countries where the proletariat is most concentrated and organized. Therefore, for a long time communists of all stripes, including Russian Social Democrats, tried to rouse the workers to a just cause in some Germany or Switzerland. But the weakest link "in the imperialist chain" was the Russian Empire.

On October 25, 1917, left-wing radicals seized power in Russia.

They immediately christened the coup d'état, carried out with German money by the bayonets of the "internationalists" and sailors stupefied with idleness, "proletarian dictatorship", their own power - "the power of the workers and peasants" and, on behalf of the latter, began to exterminate both those and others, and all those who disagree.

The post-October history of the world's first socialist state shows that all policy was built in accordance with the three points of the "International": destruction, construction, appointment to office.

What relation to the proletariat did the writer V.I. Ulyanov (Lenin), Caucasian abrek I.V. Dzhugashvili (Stalin), Polish militant F.E. Dzerzhinsky, cosmopolitan journalist L.D. Bronstein

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(Trotsky) or Yekaterinburg mafioso Ya.M. Sverdlov - it's hard to say.

Why did they do all this?

In order to eat to satiety of chum salmon caviar, which even 20 years later Trotsky, driven by Stalinist wolfhounds into the Mexican outback, recalled with nostalgia: "...it is not only in my memory that the first years of the revolution are colored with this unchanging caviar"?

What's next?

Rob all the citizens? Restore feudalism in a single country? On the mountain for all the bourgeoisie to inflate the world fire? What difference does it make, the main thing is the Power itself. Lenin wrote to the members of the Central Committee a day before the coup: "The seizure of power is a matter of insurrection; his political goal will become clear after the capture".

The leader of the French Revolution, Georges Danton, explained clearly: "A revolution is simply a redistribution of property." Simply put, the basis of the worldview of any revolutionary is Sharikov's "select and divide."

Indeed, in the first place in Lenin's program of action was the item on the "expropriation of the expropriators." It means total robbery. In the future, the population was promised a bright future, toilets made of gold and cooks who would run the state. In the meantime - "plunder the loot", destroy the "world of violence."

The simplest thing is to destroy. True-believing Marxists, defenders of the oppressed and destitute, saviors of the Fatherland, confidently determined what exactly needed to be destroyed.

The "world of violence" included: the monarchy, the state apparatus, the clergy, the army and navy, the capitalists, the nobility, the merchants, works of art, masterpieces of architecture, "bad" books, bourgeois writers, poets and philosophers, scientific trends, peasants (the rich and middle peasants, kulaks and sub-kulakists), the intelligentsia and much more that determined the foundations of statehood and constituted national pride.

As a result, a lot had to be destroyed and destroyed, because those "who were nothing, but became everything" had rather specific views in the complete absence of such "bourgeois" concepts as conscience and morality:

"We do not believe in eternal morality and expose the deceit of all fairy tales about morality... For us, morality is subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat."

Under the noise of general robbery with the help of the Cheka and the "overflowing energy of the masses", the Bolsheviks quickly established the "highest form of statehood" in the country - Soviet power.

But what could Lenin and Co. offer the country instead of a monarchy or a bourgeois republic?

In April 1918, in the article "Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Power", Vladimir Ilyich briefly outlined his model of an ideal society:

"The first step in the emancipation of the working people ... is the confiscation of the landed estates, the introduction of workers' control, the nationalization of the banks. The next steps will be the nationalization of factories and factories, the forced organization of the entire population into consumer societies, which are at the same time societies for the sale of products, the state monopoly of trade in grain and other necessary products ...

... FROM labor service as applied to the rich, the Soviet government will have to move, or rather, at the same time will have to set the task of applying the relevant principles to the majority of working people, workers and peasants.

Ever since Khrushchev's revelations of the cult of personality, we have been told that Lenin drew up the recipes for building communism, while Stalin hid them and perverted Lenin's ideas. Slander! No one hid anything, on the contrary, they were forced to take notes in the lessons on the history of the Party: forced organization, grain rations and labor service are the main conditions on the way to the liberation of the working people from "capitalist penal servitude".

Further more interesting:

"As for punitive measures for non-compliance with labor discipline, they should be stricter. Punishment up to and including imprisonment is necessary. Dismissal from the factory can also be applied, but its character is completely changed. Under the capitalist system, dismissal was a violation of the civil deal. Now, when labor discipline is violated, especially when labor service is introduced, a criminal offense is already committed (!), And a certain punishment should be imposed for this. Those guilty of violating discipline "should be able to find, prosecute and punish mercilessly."

Here it is, the emancipation of labor! Later, Stalin, developing the positions of the "founder", assigned the peasant to the collective farm, the worker to the enterprise for life, and how he knew how to "find" and "punish"!

Naturally, the most advanced party headed by the "leader of the world proletariat" must, naturally, carry out the proletarian dictatorship and organize forcibly. But how! This is what they fought for!

Couldn't there be less dictatorship? It is impossible in any case:

"... unquestioning obedience to a single will is, of course, necessary.

And our whole task, the task of the Party of Communists ... is to stand at the head of the exhausted and wearily looking for a way out of the masses, to lead them along the right path, along the path of labor discipline, along the path of coordinating the tasks of holding a meeting on working conditions and the tasks of unquestioning obedience to the will of the Soviet leader. leader, dictator at work...

...I need an iron hand...

Submission, and, moreover, unquestioningly, to the sole orders of Soviet leaders, dictators, elected or appointed ... endowed with dictatorial powers."

That's the whole "dictatorship of the proletariat."

(Karl Friedrichovich Marx und Engels, denouncing capitalist exploitation, wrote: "The masses of workers,

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trained in a factory, organized like soldiers, like the rank and file of an industrial army, they come under the supervision of a whole hierarchy of non-commissioned officers and officers. They are not only slaves of the bourgeois class, they are daily and hourly enslaved by the machine, by the overseer, and above all by the individual bourgeois manufacturer himself.

The latter, according to the classics, is especially offensive. But as soon as an individual factory owner is exchanged for an individual proletarian dictator and named people's commissar, the workers are no longer slaves, but the most free people, and even the owners of this factory and these machines.)

Where, under such sensitive guidance, was the "exhausted mass" to go? What is the end goal?

Here is the answer:

"If we were able to implement state capitalism (!) in a short amount of time, this would be a victory. Only state capitalism, only a thorough organization of accounting and control, only the strictest organization and labor discipline will lead us to socialism. And without this there is no socialism...

State-monopoly capitalism is the most complete material preparation for socialism, it is the threshold of it, it is that step on the historical ladder between which (the step) and the step called socialism there are no intermediate steps.

In other words, the writer Vladimir Soloukhin (1924-1997) formulated the same thing: "To carry out full accounting and control over every gram and over every piece of anything produced in the country. Everything that is produced in the country, to keep in your hands, and then distribute as you wish. Thanks to such control and distribution, to keep in submission and labor service all the people living in the country, without exception, the entire general population. So that it obeys the same will as one person. This is what socialism is. That is the highest and most massive form of slavery.

And according to Lenin, the first phase of communist society. Ordnung. Yes, he was thinking German.

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Oh yes, and "plus the electrification of the whole country."

Of course, all sorts of "henchmen and hangers-on of the bourgeoisie", frightening the people, painted socialism as a monotonous, monotonous, gray barracks. But that's why they are both "lackeys of the money bag" and "serfs of the exploiters."

In fact, people have nothing to fear.

Firstly, no exploiters for you, but only your own red dictators, who care about the people day and night.

Secondly, under socialism there will be "a great change from forced labor to labor for oneself, systematically organized on a gigantic national (to a certain extent, international, world) scale."

Thirdly, the proletarians, rationally and strictly paternally ruled by dictators, will be able to compete in work, "to show themselves, develop their abilities, discover talents."

Fourthly, during non-working hours, everyone will go together to subbotniks and rallies, where it is allowed to call on brothers in the class to work even better and be thrilled by the word "Hege-MON".

Fifthly, the population "without exception" will run the state: "Our goal is to perform state duties free of charge after the 8-hour lesson of productive work has been completed." For example, the turner defended the shift at the machine, issued a plan and - to the ministry, to manage.

Finally, somewhere far away, communism will enter its highest phase. To do this, it is only necessary to free the working people of the whole world and forcibly organize them according to the Marxist scheme. After that, the state will wither away by itself, complete freedom, general prosperity and abundance will come. It is only unclear where the tribe of red dictators, which has bred on a planetary scale, will go.

- Oh, Petka, do you know what kind of life will come? No need to die!

Oddly enough, but for some reason, very, very many were not inspired by the idea of building a giant electrified "zone". Even allies in the seizure of power - anar

AND

Histists and bombers-Socialist-Revolutionaries - recoiled from the Bolsheviks and were immediately enlisted in the "contra".

Not scary. For the sake of the world revolution and the happiness of the proletariat, Vladimir Ilyich was ready to exterminate 90% of the population of Russia. No wonder Trotsky admired him so much:

"Lenin has a firm hand. And around him is a strong core of people like him, resolute and irreconcilable people.

True, according to the leaders themselves, among these resolute people there were quite a few - 90 people out of every 100 - scoundrels, crooks, "talentless and shameless commissars" and other "communist bastards" worthy of being hanged "purely on a stinking rope". But it was precisely these that were required: "The Party is not a boarding school for noble maidens, some bastard is valuable because he is a bastard."

Like the Kharkiv Chekist Ivanovich, who completely subordinated morality to the interests of the class struggle: "It used to be that my conscience would speak in me, but now it's gone - my comrade taught me to drink a glass of human blood: I drank it - my heart turned to stone."

At leisure, having drunk blood, the "merry monsters" of Bolshevism poured out their souls in poetry:

There is no greater joy, no better music, Like the crunch of broken lives and bones.

That's why, when our eyes languish

And passion begins to boil in my chest, I want to draw a line on your sentence One intrepid: "K. wall! Shot!"

That is why the story of a town called Chevengur, told by the writer Andrei Platonov (1899-1951), is not a novel or hyperbole at all, but a true chronicle of the establishment of the "highest form of statehood" in some kind of Astrakhan, Arkhangelsk or Syzran.

"We must start socialism as soon as possible. — The local chairman of the revolutionary committee burns with enthusiasm. - First of all, it is necessary to eliminate the flesh of non-labor elements ...

After a short life in Chevengur, Chepurny's heart began to ache from the presence of a dense petty bourgeoisie in the city. And then he began to suffer with his whole body - for comm

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Nism soil in Chevengur was too narrow and littered with property and wealthy people; but it was necessary to immediately put communism on a living basis... After serving as chairman of the revolutionary committee for two months, Chepurny was exhausted - the bourgeoisie lives on, there is no communism...

And then Chepurny wanted to end his torment and summoned the chairman of the Cheka, Piyusya. "To clear the city for me of the oppressive element!" Chepurny ordered.

"You can," Piyusya obeyed. He was going to kill all the inhabitants in Chevengur, to which Chepurny agreed with relief.

- You know - it will be kinder! he persuaded Piyusu. "Otherwise, brother, all the people will die on the transitional steps. And then, the bourgeoisie are still not people: I read that a man, as he was born from a monkey, so he killed her. Just remember, since there is a proletariat, why the bourgeoisie? It's downright ugly!

(Entry from Korolenko's diary dated March 29, 1918: "A conversation with the deputy head of the Cheka of Ukraine about the mass reckless executions: "Comrade Korolenko, but this is for the good of the people!" And he looks at me inquisitively.)

Piyusya was personally acquainted with the bourgeoisie: he remembered the streets of Chevengur and had a clear idea of the appearance of each house owner. In addition, Piyusha knew their way of life and subsistence and

agreed to kill any of them manually, even without the use of weapons. From the day he was appointed chairman of the Cheka, he had no peace of mind and was irritated all the time: after all, every day the petty bourgeoisie ate Soviet bread, lived in his houses and was a quiet bitch across the revolution.

(It is enough to read Lenin's instructions to representatives of the Soviet authorities in the localities and it is easy to imagine how in the same way the Presovnarkom toiled with his whole body in the Kremlin from the presence of the bourgeoisie in the country, how the "unrighteous thousand" in other people's egg-pods did not give him rest, as he convinced Chairman of the Cheka Dzerzhinsky "immediately put communism on a living base": shoot, massacre

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shoot and shoot, "not allowing idiotic red tape."

What is worth only one circular about decossackization:

"To carry out mass terror against the rich Cossacks, exterminating them without exception; carry out a merciless mass terror against all Cossacks in general ... "

Or instructions from E.B. Bosch - "an active participant in the struggle for Soviet power":

"Hang, by all means hang, so that the people can see, at least 100 notorious kulaks, rich people, bloodsuckers. Make it so that for hundreds of miles around people see, tremble, know ...")

However, after the wholesale destruction of the "natural" bourgeoisie, there are still many people left in the city, almost all of them are not members of the Bolshevik party cell. And communism did not advance in Chevangur.

"I believe," Prokofy reasoned, "one thing: since Karl Marx did not say about residual classes, they cannot exist. And they are - go out into the street: either a widow, or a clerk, or a reduced head of the proletariat. How to be, tell me, please!

And I suppose, since, according to Karl Marx, they cannot exist, they should not exist.

And they live and indirectly oppress us - how is it? ..

I proceed as follows: it is necessary to withdraw the remnants of the population from Chevangur as far as possible so that they get lost ...

Chepurny sniffed the tobacco with a puff and for a long time felt its taste.

Now he felt good: the class of residual bastards will be taken out of the county, and communism will come to Chevangur, because there is nothing to be."

Since the "residual bastard" could not and did not want to go far, she had to be shot from machine guns. Finally, the dream of the pre-revolutionary committee came true: "There are eleven people left in the city ... The sun has already risen high, and communism must have set in in Chevangur in the morning."

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This is the Leninist method of building communism: shoot and hang, hang and shoot, until the "masses" become absolutely submissive, manageable, infinitely in love with their native Soviet power and "the most humane person."

One of the main specialists in the "liquidation of the flesh of non-labour elements", a member of the collegium of the Cheka M.I. Latsis (Jan Sudrabs) instructed his colleagues through the Red Terror newspaper:

"Do not look for incriminating evidence in the case; whether he rebelled against the Soviets with weapons or in words. Your first duty is to ask him what class he belongs to, what is his origin, what is his education and what is his profession. All these questions should decide the fate of the accused."

And the comrades Eyduks, Orlovs, Kedrovs, Ivanovichs, Shulmans, Saenkas, Roza Schwartz, Rebekah Meisel and other Bela Kuns voluptuously clicked their revolver triggers, ready day and night in a revolutionary cocaine frenzy "to make holes in the backs of their heads", "to waste ", "send to Dukhonin's headquarters", "spank", "clatter", "exchange", "seal".

Since almost the entire thinking and creative part of Russia rose up against these criminals and outcasts, this part of the nation had to be exterminated. The first item of the program for building a brighter future, as is known, was fulfilled and overfulfilled. This did not require special knowledge, but only certain qualities of the organizers and performers.

"Well," the Leader sighed with satisfaction, "we have conquered Russia, now we must learn to govern Russia."

Building a "new world" proved to be much more difficult. First, it turned out that the "conquerors" themselves do not know what, in fact, should be built. Secondly, there were not enough workers, peaceful days, materials and raw materials, production areas, knowledge, and experienced specialists. At the same time, in the conditions of the continuous "aggravation of the class struggle", it was necessary to wage a continuous struggle against the harmful

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lyami, spies, alien elements, loafers, carriers, devastation, lice, etc.

In addition, in an extremely short time it was possible to destroy really everything "to the ground", but communism did not come. Therefore, it took a lot to create anew, and this had to be done by a "new" person, who also had to be "produced". The old specialists, the intelligentsia - "shit", according to Lenin's definition - were not suitable for building a bright future.

However, Lenin himself was of little use for this, therefore, almost immediately after the end of the Polish campaign, which buried hopes for a revolution in Europe, he became homesick and died.

All he could do was destroy, crush, expropriate "with the most frenzied and merciless energy". All that really fascinated him until the last days was the increase in "mass character" and the principled justification of terror. Lenin never engaged in any creative activity, even in a minimal amount, in his life. He did not plant a tree, he did not build a house, he did not raise a child. All that was left of him was his "case" and his body. And on the edge of the grave, he continued to shake his strong fist: "We will return to terror!"

Sleep, Ilyich, you are my beautiful, Bayushki-bayu.

Quietly shines a clear moon

To your mausoleum...

The banner of struggle for universal happiness was taken up by the faithful Leninists.

Part |

LEADERS

"And some people claim that after all, in that big war, we won mainly because it was Stalin who led us, and if not for Stalin, it is not known whether we could

if only we could deal with the enemy and defeat him... No matter what, I can't agree with such an interpretation of events, because it is a slavish point of view. Only slaves who cannot rise from their knees and look beyond the master's head definitely need someone who would think for them, organize everything for them, who can be blamed in case of misfortune and who can be credited with success in case of luck. It's slave psychology."

N.S. Khrushchev

Who determined the state policy in the Land of Soviets?

All the most important state and military posts, of course, were occupied by active participants in the October Revolution and the Civil War. Professional suitability was not taken into account. The point "who was nothing, that will become everything" was fulfilled literally.

On November 1, 1917, Russia learned the names of its new rulers, the People's Commissars of the Workers' and Peasants' Government.

The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars was the "leader of the world proletariat" V.I. Ulyanov-Lenin (1870-1924), who wrote "writer" in the profession column.

People's Commissar for Internal Affairs - A.I. Rykov (1881-1938). After graduating from the gymnasium, Alexey Ivanovich entered the law faculty of Kazan University, but, according to his recollections, "I didn't have time to

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sit on the student bench, as he got into jail. Then followed the party underground, new arrests, prisons, exiles, and escapes.

Of course, having spent almost six years in jail, plus three years in the northern regions, Rykov studied "internal affairs" only from the inside and did not understand anything about police work, like any other: "I lived to be 30 years old and don't know how to fix your passport. I have no idea what it's like to rent a permanent apartment somewhere."

People's Commissar for Agriculture V.P. Milyutin (1884-1937) was the son of a village teacher. He joined the Bolshevik Party at the age of sixteen. Twice he tried to get a higher education, but the revolutionary activity was very distracting - eight arrests. In the meantime, he composed two Marxist pamphlets on agriculture, which is why he was considered a major specialist in it.

People's Commissar of Labor A.G. Shlyapnikov (1885-1937) was the only "worker" in the Council of People's Commissars, because in his youth, before emigration, he managed to stand at the machine and even "dreamed of becoming a metal turner." However, buzz turned out to be much more interesting. The ability to mobilize the masses erupted quite early: "While working at the Semyannikovsky plant, I took an active part, according to my age, in the strike, grouping the boys of all workshops, ships, joiners, to drive out those workers who did not want to participate in the strike. We filled our pockets with nuts, cuttings, and all kinds of pieces of iron; those who did not obey the general decision on the strike were showered with a hail of iron fragments, nuts, bolts, and this forced them to join the general movement. Education was "lower".

The Committee on Military and Naval Affairs was headed by an officer expelled from the army, editor of soldiers' newspapers V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko (1883-1939), ensign N.V. Krylenko (1885-1938), sailor P.E. Dybenko (1889-1938).

Trade and industry were entrusted to the son of the clerk V.P. Nogin (1878-1924). After graduating from the city school, he served for some time as an office boy, then worked as an apprentice in a dye-house, attended Marxist circles, and was an agent of Iskra. From twenty

years

Viktor Pavlovich wandered through prisons and emigration: "Recalling the past somehow, he counted the number of prisons known to him by sitting in them. He counted 50 such prisons." Intensified self-education in places of imprisonment allowed him to "go on the literary road as a self-taught person", and at the same time master all the subtleties of managing industry and trade.

People's Commissar of Education A.V. Lunacharsky (1875-1933) was born into the family of a Poltava official. In his youth, Anatoly Vasilyevich spent about a year in Zurich, combining attendance at lectures at the university and party gatherings. Then there were eight months in the Taganka prison, three years of exile, emigration, revolutionary journalism, shying away from Marxism to God-seeking, from Bolsheviks to Mensheviks and back. Companions considered him a very enlightened man. Lunacharsky was a type of narcissistic chatterbox, able to deliver endless empty speeches on any occasion and on any topic, but organically unadapted to any organized activity.

People's Commissar of Justice G.I. Oppokov-Lomov (1888-1938), the son of a bank clerk, studied for one year at the Faculty of Law of St. Petersburg University, but gave up - the revolution started.

To the eternal party journalist, translator of Capital and other Marxist works I.I. Skvortsov-Stepanov (1870-1928) was assigned to lead the financial department.

The People's Commissariat of Food was headed by the son of a Polish nobleman, who graduated from Moscow University, I.A. Teodorovich (1875-1937). He is from the same cohort of party theorists and journalists.

L.D., who graduated from the real school, became the Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Bronstein-Trotsky (1879-1940), party theorist, publicist and orator, active participant in the revolution of 1905-1907, chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, one of the main organizers of the October Revolution.

People's Commissar of Posts and Telegraphs N.P. Avi

lov-Glebov (1887-1942), son of a Kaluga shoemaker, "party professional" from the age of 19, graduated from a party school in Bologna. And he has behind him arrests, exile, emigration, prison universities. Least of all in his life he was interested in telegraphs.

The briefcase of the Chairman of Nationalities Affairs was handed over to another son of a shoemaker, a half-educated seminarian, who organized the robbery of the Tiflis Bank to replenish the Bolshevik cash desk, the author of heroic poems and the work "Marxism and the National Question", wonderful, but then little known in the party Georgian I.V. Dzhugashvili-Stalin (1877-1953).

In general, all as one members of the "workers' and peasants'" government were professional revolutionaries, that is to say, "writers." None of them had other professional skills.

During the appointment to the highest state positions, the party experience, the facts of persecution and repression by the "bloody tsarist regime" for revolutionary activity were of great importance. At one time, such "prominent Bolsheviks" as V.I. Lenin, I.V. Stalin, V.V. Kuibyshev, V.M. Molotov, M.V. Frunze, A.S. Bubnov, N.I. Bukharin, G.E. Zinoviev, L.B. Kamenev, A.I. Krinitsky, A.I. Rykov, A.I. Stetsky, S.I. Syrnov.

Most, in addition, were arrested, were in prison, were in exile. The number of deportations and imprisonments was a matter of special pride and a clear indicator of merit.

One of the peculiar champions, Yakov Davidovich Drabkin (1874-1933), better known under the pseudonym of the party Sergei Ivanovich Gusev, without a doubt, was one of the most active revolutionaries. In his profile, in particular, it is indicated:

"Participated in economic strikes 53 times, political strikes 20 times, 73 times in total; in street political demonstrations - 5 times, student movements - | times, underground circles — 19 times, illegal mass rallies — 75 times, May Day meetings — 6 times, armed

uprisings

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and partisan speeches - 4, party conferences - 2, party congresses - 4 times. He spent 2 years in prison | month, administrative exile - 6 years 3 months, in political emigration - 1 year 6 months. With what care everything is counted!

First People's Commissar of Justice G.I. Lomov wrote:

"Our position was extremely difficult. There were many excellent, highly qualified workers among us, there were many devoted revolutionaries who traveled all over Russia in all directions, passed in shackles from St.

Each of us could list almost all prisons in Russia with a detailed description of the regime that exists in them. We knew where they beat them, how they beat them, where and how they put them in a punishment cell, but we did not know how to govern the state and were not familiar with either banking technology or the work of ministries.

At first it could be consoled by the fact that the first self-proclaimed Workers' and Peasants' Government was also called Provisional. But not for long, only until the execution of peaceful demonstrations and the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly on January 5, 1918.

According to the memoirs of the old party member A.V. Shotman (1880-1939), he dissuaded Lenin from taking power, because he did not see among the Bolsheviks people capable of governing the state.

"Nonsense! Ilyich said. - Any worker will master the Ministry in a few days, no special skill is required here, and there is no need to know the technique of work, since this is the business of officials, whom we will make work in the same way as they now make workers work specialists".

And he appointed Shotman as Deputy People's Commissar.

Since then, it has become a tradition in the Land of Soviets: it is not the place that paints the people's commissar, but the people's commissar the place. A faithful Bolshevik, endowed with the confidence of the party, can lead anything, "no special skill is required here."

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How could such honored fighters for the proletarian cause as the godfather of all Chekists F.E. Dzerzhinsky or shoemaker L.M. Kaganovich? And if anyone doubted the correctness of the plans and sabotaged plans, Felix Edmundovich shot them right away, and Lazar Moiseevich (in addition, successively people's commissar of the heavy, fuel and oil industry) declared them enemies of the people and handed them over to the heirs. Iron Felix, that is, he also shot, but indirectly.

Was not an exception in the list of "old Bolsheviks" according to the milestones of the path traveled by V.A. Antonov Ovseyenko, who from the age of seventeen was carried away by the ideas of the proletarian revolution. After graduating from the cadet

Corps, he entered the Nikolaev Military School. However, having completed the "course of a young soldier", he refused to take the oath of allegiance, citing "an organic disgust for the military." For this, Vova, shocked by the "insulting situation" of the barracks, was sentenced to ten days in a guardhouse, and then returned to his father. After poking around as a laborer and a coachman, a year later Antonov entered the cadet school, where he enthusiastically engaged in anti-government agitation and was eventually caught with subversive literature. The most remarkable thing about this story is the ending: released by an officer. Served only six months, moved to an illegal position.

Further lines of the biography contain concepts common to people in his position: a circle, a military committee, agitation, illegal work, arrests, prisons, emigration, and the like. Only everything related to creative activity is missing. But a man sentenced by the tsarist court to death, replaced by twenty years hard labor, could not be incapable of holding the highest posts in the country: the commander of the troops of the Petrograd military district, the troops of Ukraine and the head of the Political Directorate of the RVSR (commander), plenipotentiary and Consul General (diplomat!), People's Commissar of Justice of the RSFSR (and jurist).

One of the most prominent figures in the party is M.K. Muranov (1873-1959) - never studied anywhere, in the column "education" he wrote "self-taught". But he was endowed with the right to

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dispose of the fates and lives of people. His position - a member of the Supreme Court of the USSR - demanded only one thing - to be merciless "towards the enemies of the revolution."

High state and military posts were held by N.I. Muralov (1886-1938). On November 23, 1917, he, an ordinary soldier of the autorot, became the commander of the troops of the Moscow Military District, later he was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Armies, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, a member of the Presidium of the State Planning Committee of the RSFSR, and so on. His main specialty is an agronomist, which he acquired at an agricultural school.

An active participant in the revolutionary movement in Russia, V.V. Kuibyshev (1888-1935) was considered one of the most prepared to occupy the highest government posts. He received his education in the cadet corps, studied for several months in the first year of the Military Medical Academy, and for several weeks at the Faculty of Law.

Therefore: "Valery Vladimirovich was one of the most educated people of his time. His economic works are still of considerable value. He was also a capable writer. He was versed in technology, medicine, natural science. He worked as chairman of the State Planning Commission, deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

Adventure bomber L.B. for For less than six years, he managed to head the People's Commissariats of Trade and Industry, Communications, Foreign Trade, while at the same time being the plenipotentiary in England and France. Krasin is the head.

The biography of the theorist, organizer and practice of the Red Terror M.I. Latsis. An old Bolshevik, conducted illegal and legal party work, had an arrest and was in tsarist exile. The lack of education was not an obstacle to occupying high party and state posts. According to Latsis, in principle, those who "can

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literacy", "ours" could not be. In the future, the fiery Chekist did not change his views:

"The junkers, the officers of the old time, the teachers, the students and all the young students—after all, these are all petty-bourgeois elements in their vast majority, and it was they who constituted the combat

formations of our opponents, of which the White Guard regiments consisted.

In 1932, the retired executioner, who had a diploma of a public teacher, was appointed director of the Institute of National Economy named after G.V. Plekhanov.

The modest fellow Lomov (aka Oppokov) also got used to it, got into the taste of leading people. Having surpassed the subtleties of justice, he switched to economic work and headed the State Planning Commission. Only Skvortsov Stepanov, perhaps the only one, refused to do something other than his own, citing incompetence in financial matters.

There are two classes outside the law in a normal state:

Criminal

And ruling.

During the revolutions

They change places -

In essence, there is no difference.

However, they did not intend to manage anything, they did not plan to build anything, and, moreover, they did not want to learn anything. After the conquest of Russia, another cherished goal burned the soul—to free the rest of the proletariat from the oppression of capital. The most important of all programs was Lenin's "Military program of the proletarian revolution": having seized power in one country, it is necessary, armed in every possible way, to oppose other states. For "the free union of nations in socialism is impossible without a more or less long, stubborn struggle between the socialist republics and the backward states."

What is Russia! Russia is just a springboard for conquering the world, or at least the Eurasian continent. As befits an "incomparable genius," Ilyich thought big: "I don't give a damn about Russia. I am a Bolshevik." I really wanted to

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with bayonets to bring happiness to all working people, to give the land in Grenada to the peasants, to wash galoshes in the Indian Ocean.

Thus, from the very beginning, the Bolsheviks declared war on the whole world of "unbridled imperialism." And in the first years of the existence of Soviet power, its main goal was to advance the revolution to the West, South East, the creation of the World Republic of Soviets. All the riches of the completely plundered country were thrown into fanning chaos in war-ravaged Europe. Flows of gold and weapons went through the Bolshevik emissaries to Germany, Hungary, Austria, Finland, Sweden.

| October 1918, Lenin demanded that Trotsky and Sverdlov create an army of 3 million people by the spring to "help the international workers' revolution." And therefore, to rake out ten times more grain from the Russian peasants, "clear all the stocks both for us and for the German workers" (note that before that we had been raking bread for ourselves and for the Kaiser for half a year), increase the conscription tenfold, do not spare Denet: "Don't save. Spend millions, many millions."

In March 1919, at the initiative of the Leader, the Comintern was created - the headquarters of the world revolution, a subversive organization with practically unlimited financial resources. Post-war hardships, the pathogenicity of the bacillus of Bolshevism spread in a favorable environment, weapons and money allocated without any account did their job. In the spring of 1919, the Hungarian and Bavarian Soviet Republics arose. Here it is, the "global fire", rejoiced in the Kremlin.

After all, Germany, with its mighty industry and organized proletariat, was considered the most "suitable" country for Marxist experiments.

"Soviet Germany," Trotsky dreamed, "united with Soviet Russia, would immediately be stronger than all the capitalist states put together!"

Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Comintern GE. Zinoviev (1883-1936) announced in print that literally in a year all of Europe would be communist:

"The struggle for communism will already be transferred to America, but

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maybe to Asia, and to other parts of the world" (from numerous statements it is clear what the process of "building communism" consisted of: and where the Bolsheviks are in power, there is communism. Why not Chevangur?) .

The Red Army, having barely established Soviet power in Ukraine, made the first attempt to break into Europe through Galicia and Bessarabia, but was first detained by the Poles and the Grigoriev rebellion, and then defeated by the troops of A.I. Denikin (1872-1947). Without waiting for help, the Bavarian and Hungarian republics fell under the blows of "reaction". The failed leader of the Red Magyars, Bela Kun (1886-1939), surfaced in Moscow and subsequently became famous for the wild Crimean reprisals against Russian officers and the "hostile population". The people's commissars of Soviet Hungary who were sent to prisons were exchanged for captured Hungarian officers.

The "military program" gave the first failure. In Russia itself, the Civil War flared up in full force, the people had already drunk enough of the "proletarian dictatorship". Ilyich and his comrades had to put aside global plans for a while and get down to work on "cleansing the Russian land from all kinds of harmful insects." Europe at that time developed immunity and fenced itself off from the infected Soviet of Deputies with a cordon sanitaire of national states that arose under the Treaty of Versailles.

In the summer of 1920, a new attempt was made to convey to the Germans, French and British the "red truth of the Bolsheviks" - through the "corpse of white Poland". The war with the notorious "White Poles" was declared "the most just that history has ever known".

In July, the troops of the Western Front reached the Vistula and bypassed Warsaw from the north. The future government of "socialist Poland" rode in the wagon train: Yu. Markhlevsky (1866-1925), F. Dzerzhinsky (1877-1926), F. Kohn (1864-1941), E. Pruchniak (1888-1937), I. Unshlikht (1879-1938). Moscow printing houses promptly printed their portraits with biographies in Polish. The question of the sovietization of Poland seemed to Lenin already resolved and not essential in itself. These days he telegraphed to Stalin:

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"Zinoviev, Kamenev, and also I think that the revolution should be encouraged at once in Italy. My personal opinion is that for this it is necessary to Sovietize Hungary, as well as the Czech Republic and Romania."

With each new verst that turned out to be under the red boot, appetites grew a thousandfold, breathtaking prospects struck one's head. The Second Congress of the Comintern formulated the minimum program as follows:

"The Red Army, the main weapon of the working class, must be prepared in such a way as to fulfill its offensive mission on any sector of the front. The boundaries of this front in the nearest future are determined by the boundaries of the entire continent of the Old World.

However, this campaign failed miserably.

Firstly, due to the arrogance of the front commander M.N. Tukhachevsky (1893-1937), who believed that in war "revolutionary courage and energy dominate everything else."

Secondly, Europe did not wait indifferently to be made happy, and, having "mobilized all the black forces", provided the Polish political leader J. Pilsudski (1867-1935) with all possible material and military assistance.

Thirdly, the Polish "proletarian" did not recognize class brothers. "The revolutionary committees of the Volga and Don divisions proclaimed Soviet power in Russian and in jargon. For the majority of Poles, the question looked simple: Poland first, and then we'll see which one," recalls a participant in the events.

On August 14, the Poles suddenly (who would have expected!) launched a counteroffensive, which led to a crushing defeat of the entire Western Front. Those of the liberators who were not taken prisoner had to run 800 kilometers, all the way to Minsk. The cavalry corps of G. Guy (1887-1937), which broke into Germany, was disarmed there.

The Moscow Sovietizers had to wash their faces, sign a peace treaty with the Poles, declare themselves the winners and pay "defeated" Poland 5 million gold rubles in indemnity.

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Moreover, at that time, the White Guard of the "black baron" Wrangel left the Crimea for the last battle, uprisings broke out in Kronstadt, the main base of the Baltic Fleet, and in the Tambov region.

The "Izvestia" of the insurgent Kronstadt in March 1921 indicated that adventurers had seized power, ready to ruin the country with the entire population for the sake of abstract ideas:

"By the bitter experience of three years of communist rule, we have seen what a party dictatorship leads to. A number of Party generals immediately crawl onto the scene, confident in their infallibility and not squeamish about any means to carry out their program, no matter how it diverges from the interests of the working masses. These generals are inevitably trailed by a pack of adjoining henchmen who have nothing in common not only with the people, but with the party itself. A class of parasites is being created, living at the expense of the masses, concerned about their own well-being, or those who provide them with a secure life.

And no matter what party is in power, it will not escape the role of a dictator, because, no matter how extremely socialist it may be, they will have programmatic and tactical points worked out not by life, but created within the walls of their offices. .

But neither the "counter-revolutionary rebellions" nor the death famine that broke out in Russia had any effect on the "program points" of the Leninists. Sailors and peasants were conspicuously cruelly brought to submission with the help of artillery pieces, machine guns, airplanes, poisonous gases and concentration camps.

And hunger in general turned out to be very useful. Under the pretext of fighting him, it was possible to carry out an action to confiscate church valuables "with merciless determination", at the same time shooting a fair number of "representatives of the Black Hundred clergy." The gigantic wealth of monasteries and lazeles, estimated at several hundred million rubles, had long been a dream of Ilyich. Lenin was delighted with the "combination": "A wonderful thing is revolutionary violence and dictatorship, if they are used when it should be and against whom it should be."

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True, they did not buy a crumb of bread, not a gram of flour with this money. We bought from the bourgeoisie 60 thousand sets of leather uniforms for the valiant Chekists, supplied them with weapons and

gold bars of the Kemalist Turks, paid for the installation of a monument to Marx in the center of London, and thought hard about helping India with gold and rifles.

In 1922, an even more terrible famine and cholera epidemic reigned in the country. In the reports of the OGPU it was reported that in the Samara province "...starvation is observed, corpses are being dragged from the cemetery for food. It is observed that children are not carried to the cemetery, leaving them for food..."; in the Tyumen province "in the Ishim district, out of 500,000 inhabitants, 265 thousand are starving ... Cases of starvation are becoming more frequent ..."

Lenin, who had already begun to be tormented by "kondrashki", at that time was treated by starvation, declaring to the doctors "that he would never eat caviar again." The budget of the Comintern in 1922 amounted to over three million rubles. The cynical red-handed Nikolai Bukharin (1888-1938) later recalled with pleasure: "... we have stripped the church like a stick, and we are conducting our world propaganda on its "holy values", without giving a single shish of them to the starving."

In 1923, the Soviet leadership allocated 300 million gold rubles for the implementation of the "German October". Suitcases with currency and "diamonds for the dictatorship of the proletariat" went to the crisis-shaken Weimar Republic (inflation in the country robbed by the victors reached such a height that a wheelbarrow of German marks was required to buy a loaf of bread). G.L. went to work illegally in Western Europe. Pyatakov, K.B. Radek, V.V. Schmidt and other prominent figures of the party, students of the Military Academy of the Red Army, Chekists. They formed the "Red Hundreds", wrote instructions for the "All-German Cheka", distributed weapons and money to the communists, fascists, anarchists, national socialists.

Today it is "fascist" and "Nazi" - abusive words, but at that time Lenin was very impressed with the energy and fighting enthusiasm of the socialist Benito Mussolini (1883-1945), and N.I. Bukharin between the fascists and the Bolsheviks

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didn't see the difference. Fascism, in the opinion of the "most valuable and prominent theoretician" of the party, "is the full application of Bolshevik practice and especially Russian Bolshevism: in the sense of the rapid gathering of forces, the energetic action of a very tightly knit military organization ... and the merciless destruction of the enemy when it is necessary and when the circumstances call for it.

I mean, gangs of the same kind. Well, he, the theorist, knows better.

Funds were spent generously and uncontrollably, plundered by the millions. The uprising in Berlin on November 7, 1923, on the day of the sixth anniversary of October, and the "direct assistance of the proletarian dictatorship" to the German and Italian revolutions were to be the apotheosis of violent subversive activity. By order of Trotsky, cavalry corps began to advance to the western borders of the USSR.

True, the pragmatic Stalin was skeptical about the project: "If now the power in Germany, so to speak, falls, and the communists pick it up, they will fail miserably. This is "at best". And in the worst case, they will be smashed to smithereens and thrown back."

But the head of the Comintern, G.E., was completely delighted. Zinoviev: "The crisis in [Germany is growing very rapidly. A new chapter of the German revolution begins. This will soon pose enormous challenges for us... I am convinced that we will soon have to make decisions of a world-historic nature."

An did not break off this time either. For some reason, the working class of Germany did not support the communists; there were no large-scale battles. Government troops under the leadership of General von Seeckt, who received dictatorial powers, quickly dispersed the "workers' governments" of Saxony and Thuringia, "drowned in blood" the armed uprising of the Red Army soldiers of Thälmann in Hamburg and the "beer putsch" of the Nazis Adolf Hitler in Munich. Another

the adventure failed. As well as the armed uprising of the "proletarians" in Bulgaria. And how the attempted coup d'état in Esto in November 1924

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nii, which was supposed to end with the proclamation of a "revolutionary government" and the invitation of the regular units of the Red Army.

Europe resisted the invasion. The Bolsheviks failed to take this fortress. I had to take a peaceful respite. In the autumn of 1923, a global, almost tenfold, reduction of the Red Army began, its transfer to the militia-territorial principle.

Lenin, "the mountain eagle of our party", by this time led a vegetative existence, and on January 21, 1924, he passed away. To bury it in the ground, according to Zinoviev, "would be too unbearable." Therefore, Ilyich was embalmed and a personal pyramid was taken to the imperishable body on Red Square. Petrograd, the "cradle of the revolution," was renamed Leningrad.

The solution of the daunting task of building socialism in a single country went to I.V. Stalin. He was one of the first to understand that there had been a rollback of the "revolutionary wave" and it was time to somehow settle down in the occupied territories. Russia, squeezed dry, lay in ruin and desolation. The economy collapsed, industry did not exist, transport was paralyzed, the small proletariat was almost destroyed. Commodity relations existed only in the form of natural exchange. In the battles of the Civil War, hunger and disease, according to various estimates, perished from 8 (the official figure of the Soviet era) to 15 million people, the population of Moscow has halved.

The crazy money generously thrown into the furnace of the revolutionary steam locomotive has run out. "In order to win the Civil War, we robbed Russia," Trotsky said frankly.

There was no army either. A special commission of the Central Committee, having studied the state of affairs in the Red Army, at the beginning of 1924 issued a verdict: "We do not currently have the Red Army as organized, trained, politically educated and provided with reserves of power."

We have arrived... There is a stop in the Commune.

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To begin with, it was necessary to restore at least some semblance of a normal life, to provide for the simplest human needs. How to do this, none of the fiery revolutionaries knew and was not interested in such base questions.

Therefore, as early as 1921, the Bolsheviks were forced to trumpet a "temporary retreat" with gnashing of teeth: to announce the New Economic Policy (NEP), to allow the "residual classes"—the petty and middle bourgeoisie, private property and wage labor; abolish the surplus appropriation, take a course towards a "link" between the city and the countryside, reanimate the market so that the people, while the authorities are engaged in the creation of "distribution and supply apparatuses", feed themselves.

As Stalin explained, it would be foolish to shoulder "the incredible burden of finding a job and providing the means of life, artificially created, for millions of new unemployed. NEP, by the way, is good because it saves the proletarian dictatorship from such and similar difficulties.

In the RCP(b) itself, meanwhile, a struggle was unfolding for the Supreme Chair in the pyramid of red dictators, which, from the first days of the revolution, the deceased Leader had lovingly rebuilt for himself. Strengthening the machine of unquestioning obedience, he managed to hold the Tenth Party Congress, consisting

which came in March 1921, a resolution on the prohibition of all factionalism and the dissolution of all groups formed on any platform other than the Bolsheviks. This resolution marked a natural transition from "mercilessly decisive and draconian measures to increase self-discipline and the discipline of workers and peasants" to the application of such measures to party members.

Without Lenin, of course, it was necessary to rally even stronger. And most importantly, do not break the "machine" itself, all members of the Politburo were united on this issue.

Trotsky presented the party as a kind of communist order of samurai. Stalin wrote about "a kind of order of the sword-bearers", soldered together by a single will and unparalleled iron discipline: "The party is the unity of the will, except

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expecting all sorts of factionalism and breakdown of power in the party." But there were enough people who wanted to become a "grand master". The "chapter" consists entirely of authoritative leaders, the old party guard:

Leader of October, founder of the Red Army, chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, People's Commissar of Communications, incendiary speaker and heroic hero Comrade Lev Davidovich Trotsky-Bronstein.

The leader of the Comintern and the Leningrad party organization, who shared a bed with Lenin in a sacred hut, Comrade Grigory Evseevich Zinoviev.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the RSFSR, the first after Lenin, Comrade Alexei Ivanovich Rykov.

Chairman of the Council of Labor and Defense Comrade Lev Borisovich Kamenev-Rozenfeld, associate of Ilyich, keeper of his personal archive.

The leader of the trade unions, Comrade Mikhail Pavlovich Tomskey, is a hardened sub-police who suffered for ten years for the cause of the proletariat in prisons and exile (five years of hard labor, really just "for belonging to a party"?).

The favorite of the party and also a leader, Comrade Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin. As a child, this child prodigy imagined himself to be the Antichrist and interrogated his mother - "a very intelligent woman, extremely honest, hardworking, doting in children and highly virtuous - if she was a harlot, which, of course, plunged her into the greatest embarrassment." Through stubborn self-education, "working hard in libraries", Kolya Balabolkin grew into a big theoretician, for example: "Proletarian coercion in all its forms, from executions to labor conscription ... is a method - a nistic humanity from the human material of the capitalist epoch".

Or a member of the Central Committee who was reformed from an anarchist into a faithful Bolshevik, GL. Pyatakov, who even scared Lenin with HIS "outstanding will and outstanding abilities

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mi". Georgy Leonidovich came up with a universal Bolshevik key to solve any tasks:

"When thought clings to violence, which is fundamentally and psychologically free, not bound by any laws, restrictions, obstacles, then the area of possible action expands to gigantic proportions, and the area of the impossible shrinks to extreme limits, drops to zero. The boundless expansion of the possible, the transformation of what is considered impossible into the possible, is what characterizes the Bolshevik Communist Party. IN

this is the true spirit of Bolshevism. This is the feature that most profoundly distinguishes our party from all others, making it a party of "miracles".

Just some kind of superman! The bloody way of the "miracle worker"-bespredelschik eventually ended with a "wall", but the epitaph in the current encyclopedias touches: "Unreasonably repressed".

Streets and institutions were pasted over with their portraits, calendars were decorated with photographs of "creators and leaders", cities were named after them. New geographical names appeared on the map of the Soviet Union - Trotsk, Zinoviev, Kamenev.

The candidacy of the "gray mediocrity", the close-minded provincial, the "half-educated seminarian" Stalin, who did not become famous for his theoretical research, who commanded only the Secretariat, as a contender for the post of "Grand Master", was not quoted among the "marshals of Ilyich".

"... His past activities remained virtually unknown not only to the masses of the people, but also to the party. No one knew what Stalin said and did until 1917 and even until 23-24... Zinoviev treated Stalin with caution and patronage. Kamenev - a little ironically, "said Lev Davidovich.

Lev Borisovich Kamenev considered General Secretary Lev Borisovich Kamenev to be the "leader of the county scale".

"Nothing," Nikolai Bukharin nodded condescendingly, "

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we need such people, and if he is ignorant and uncultured", then "we will help him".

They, having forced Stalin into the post [General Secretary, and fiercely opposed Lenin's recommendation to select a more tolerant comrade, were going to use him, a "figure of the second or third plan", as an ally in the fight against the undoubted "prince" Trotsky .

And Koba - a true conspirator, a practical underground worker - bred these fiery tribunes like boys. He had already concentrated immense power in his hands, but they did not understand this and did not heed the warnings. He rearranged the cadres, the very ones who, as you know, decide everything, and they were ornate at the meetings and flaunted in the presidiums, hoping that the "barbecue man" would do the dirty work for them. They believed in the power of great ideas and their inflated authority. Stalin, on the other hand, understood the power of the bureaucratic apparatus, which made it possible legally, democratically, through a well-prepared vote (Lenin masterfully mastered this technique, and Iosif Vissarionovich knew how to learn) to make the necessary decisions, which turned into an indestructible law by virtue of party discipline. When the Leaders of the "planetary scale" realized their mistake, turned out to be too late.

But first, the "ruling troika" - Zinoviev, Kamenev, Stalin - in full agreement did one common thing: a bouncer from the saddle of Leon Trotsky. Nothing personal, just for the sake of party unity. The method chosen was the simplest. All the theoretical views, ideas, statements of the "demon of the revolution" were declared "Trotskyism", everything that he proposed was anti-Party sedition, all his supporters were "Trotskyists". Of course, Trotskyism was in "irreconcilable contradiction" with Leninism, was a "bias to the side".

True, if you carefully reread the "three features of Trotskyism", then Trotsky's main heresy is his claims to primacy, "distrust of the leaders of Bolshevism, an attempt to debunk them", otherwise there is no difference.

In the campaign organized against him, Trotsky

played on points. The ideologist of the permanent revolution was bored with the apparatus fuss. He was not interested in building something there in a single country, he wanted great achievements, grandiose tragic roles on the historical stage. He lived in the past. His ideological comrades-in-arms were similarly unadapted to peaceful life, they were disgusted with everyday systematic work. One of these complained about life: "... instead of preparing a secret revolutionary struggle, I found myself busy preparing a consular career ... Instead of being an agitator or organizer of an uprising, I will be an official."

This is the tragedy of the "world conflagration" fanatics. But just recently they knew other, glorious times. For example, in 1919, the Bolshevik emissary Ya.S. Reich: "Lenin's instructions were brief: 'Take more money, send reports and, if possible, newspapers, but in general, do what the situation will show.' Then the Leninist banker Ganetsky "gave out | 1 million rubles in German and Swedish currency and took me to the pantry of the secret party cash desk... Gold and jewels lay everywhere: precious stones, taken out of the setting, lay in heaps on the shelves, some -something obviously tried to sort and quit. Ganetsky pointed the lantern around and, smiling, said, "choose." He piled a suitcase full of stones, but he didn't take the gold: it was cumbersome. They didn't ask me for any receipts for the stones — for the currency, of course, I issued a receipt" (however, "comrade Thomas" stole millions of the currency issued against receipts).

Now, instead of engaging in subversive activities, leading the masses behind them, burning people's hearts with the verb, overthrowing oppressors, destroying thrones, expropriating other people's property, not thinking about their daily bread, a cohort of romantic revolutionaries was invited to go to service and earn a salary. It is not surprising that the return to normal life, concern for the interests of the USSR alone, when the bourgeoisie still rules around, seemed to them a reaction, Thermidor

(Ernesto Che Guevara, who was bored in Cuba liberated from the dictatorship of Batista, abandoned all his ministerial portfolios and laid down his head in the fight against imperialism in the jungles of Bolivia, was a person of a similar warehouse).

In addition, "in any political struggle of a large scale, one can eventually open the question of a steak. The bureaucracy countered the prospect of a "permanent revolution" with the prospect of personal well-being." That's what they fought for, for a better life. That's why they took power. The revolution has won, it's time to share material wealth.

The degree of access to them depended on the position held, place in the party hierarchy, and career success. At the same time, local power was transferred from the emergency organs of wartime into the hands of the first party secretaries. And Comrade Stalin was in charge of their appointment. He became their leader, painstakingly, with the help of V.M. Molotov and L.M. Kaganovich, building his own pyramid of power, carefully selecting and placing people personally devoted to him who do not claim political leadership. Functionaries. Nomenclature. They, like the bulk of the Bolsheviks, did not give a damn about the oppressed of all countries without exception.

There were many people devoted to Stalin. "But this was a special kind of devotion," Trotsky denounced. — Not the devotion of the students to the teacher who enriched their thoughts, but the devotion of the people whom the leader brought out of nothingness and to whom he helps to provide privileges.

bathroom position.

Either Leva was really so naive, or he was pretending. Those who did not have enough beef steak joined the Trotskyists: offended "heroes" of the Civil War, commissars of volost councils of people's commissars pushed aside from the helm, chairmen of sham republics, revolutionary committees, Chechens, other "red dictators" who tasted the "joy" under the crunch "breaking lives and bones."

The offended fighters, who received a donut hole as a reward for "their selfless devotion", demanded the continuation of the revolution, accusing the party elite of rebirth.

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Trotsky tried to come out under the banner of a fighter for inner-party democracy, against the ban on factional struggle of opinions. He argued that factionalism is inevitably connected with the life and development of the party. He was beaten with the resolution of the Tenth Congress, accusations of Bonapartism, decisions of the plenums, where the decisive votes belonged to the cadres placed by Stalin and Molotov. And the "iron people's commissar" himself in the robes of a democrat looked unnatural. He understood this very well and preached it himself: Marxist socialism is a totalitarian system, the party bureaucracy is its main support, and the mythical "proletarian dictatorship" is a slogan that makes it possible to justify violence and terror, dear to the heart of Marxists, unrestricted by any laws.

Lenin wrote: "Without the 'apparatus' we would have perished long ago. Without a systematic and stubborn struggle to improve the apparatus, we will perish before the foundation of socialism is created. Stalin, in his article "On the Discussion," quite reasonably pointed out that all the cries of the opposition about democracy are only the desire of the party nobles, who have been corrupted and moved away from the trough, to regain their former influence:

"In the ranks of the opposition there are people like Beloborodov, whose "democratism" is still remembered by the Rostov workers; Rozengolts, whose "democratism" did not fare well with our watermen and railroad workers; Pyatakov, from whose "democratism" the whole Donbass did not shout, but howled; Alsky, whose "democratism" is known to all; The bull, from whose "democratism" Khorezm still howls. Does Sapronov think that if the current "party pedants" are replaced by the above-named "dear comrades", democracy within the party will triumph? Let me be allowed to doubt it a little."

Stalin took an advantageous position: he was for collegiate leadership, he was a fighter against the "cult of personality." He asks from the podium: "Is there a Central Committee whose unanimous decisions are respected by the members of this Central Committee, or is there only a superman standing above the Central Committee, a superman for whom laws are not written?" He demands that personal ambitions be subordinated to common interests: "Trotsky did not understand that the party had you

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the feeling of strength and dignity grew, that the party feels like a master and it demands from us that we know how to bow our heads before it when the situation requires it.

Of particular importance in this battle was the struggle for the Armed Forces, where Trotsky had enormous authority. Most of the key positions in the central military establishments were occupied by people who were nominated by him during the Civil War and who were loyal to him. In all the barracks, Red Army clubs, red corners, banners and posters were hung, where Trotsky was called the leader and leader of the Red Army, at meetings of military personnel he was elected to the honorary presidium, enrolled in the lists of the unit as an honorary Red Army and adopted resolutions and toasts were sent to the address, his biography and military victories were studied at political classes.

The leadership of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic was entirely Trotskyist and did not hide the fact that the army had its own opinion on internal party squabbles. Thus, Antonov-Ovseenko, the head of the Political Directorate of the RVSR, Antonov-Ovseenko, the hero of October, who led the storming of the Winter Palace and the arrest of the Provisional Government, at the end of December 1923, on behalf of "comrades working in the army", sent a letter of threatening content to the Presidium of the Central Control Commission and the Politburo of the Central Committee, in which he warned that the military could "gain a voice and call to order" presumptuous leaders ":

"There is already talk among the military communists that it is necessary to support Comrade Trotsky by everyone, as one ... Instead of a serious analysis of serious issues, the Party and the whole country are fed with personal attacks, suspicions, bilious slander, and this is elevated into a system, as if in this and

consists of a widely proclaimed new course... I know that this warning voice of mine will not make the slightest impression on those who are frozen in the consciousness of their infallibility by the history of selected leaders. But know that this voice is symptomatic. He expresses the indignation of those who throughout their lives have proved their selfless devotion to the party as a whole, to the interests of the communist revolution.

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The response was immediate. The Party Plenum, urgently convened on January 12, 1924, recognized "this work of the opposition in the Red Army as especially dangerous, since this work creates a hostile mood among a part of the military communists against the leading body of the party, the Central Committee." The XIII All-Union Party Conference that followed demanded that party work be intensified in the army, and "for attempts to conduct factional work in the ranks of the Red Army ... punish especially severely." Zinoviev, who fell into hysterics, demanded the immediate arrest of Trotsky. However, such actions were fraught with dangerous consequences, and Leo did not make sudden movements, laid to bed with "cryptogenic fever."

The February Plenum of the Central Committee noted "the presence in the army of serious shortcomings that threaten the army with collapse" and set the task of improving and strengthening the Armed Forces. Already on March 2, Antonov Ovseenko, as a factionalist undermining the authority of the Central Committee in the army, was removed, and his place was taken by the head of the Agitprop (department of agitation and propaganda) A.S. Bubnov (from the old guard, by profession, it's easy to guess, a writer; the list of merits in the fight against tsarism includes 13 arrests and 4 years in prison; after the revolution, he established Soviet power in Ukraine, received the Order of the Red Banner "for personal courage and mobilization fighters to cleanse Kronstadt of counter-revolutionary bands").

Andrei Sergeevich was known for having repeatedly participated in various opposition groups and factions, for which at one time a commissar in the North Caucasus Military District was removed from the candidates for membership in the Central Committee of the PKK. But few people knew that Bubnov (not a Stalinist, but rather a Bukharinite) was a fierce opponent of Trotsky, which is why in May 1922 Stalin dragged Bubeshka, who had outlived his erroneous views, from Rostov to Moscow and gave a chance, providing a responsible post.

On March 11, 1924, the permanent deputy people's commissar and deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, failed physician Ephraim Sklyansky (1892-1925) was dismissed. He was accused of being and the price he headed

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The RVSR minesweeping group is not coping with its duties and is not engaged in systematic military work. The reason was the report of the commission S.I. Gusev on the results of the check of the Red Army, which came to the conclusion that the army was not combat-ready.

M.V. was appointed to the vacant positions. Frunze is a creature of Zinoviev. Soon, Mikhail Vasilyevich combined two more responsible posts - chief of staff of the Red Army and head of the Military Academy of the Red Army. A new composition of the Revolutionary Military Council was formed. Trotsky remained the chairman for the time being, but the council turned out to be significantly "improved" by his opponents: S.M. Budyonny, K.E. Voroshilov, G.K. Ordzhonikidze, S.S. Kamenev, M.M. Lashevich, M.N. Tukhachevsky.

In April, Chekist I.S. Unshlikht headed the Office of the Chief of Supplies of the Red Army. In May, the convinced Trotskyist N.I. Muralov was replaced by Voroshilov as commander of the Moscow Military District. The commission, chaired by Bubnov, purged the teaching staff of the academies and dismissed 199 "elements alien to Soviet power or lacking a sufficient professional level."

At the [X All-Crimean Regional Party Conference, the new head of the PUR demonstrated that he had firmly returned to "Lenin's positions" and justifies the trust. Criticizing the compromise solution of the Crimean communists, who considered the anti-Trotsky

campaign by internal Moscow affairs, Bubnov declared: "You justified the opposition by this and accused the leading comrades, that is, the main group of the Central Committee of the party ... Trotskyism must be beaten mercilessly and directly."

At the same time, the ruling troika cut military spending. The army was literally begging. The Revolutionary Military Council reported that "the appropriations made to the army for February and March put the army in a completely difficult situation, worsening its current situation even more." In response, the government expressed its intention to further reduce the military budget even "due to

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significant reduction in the combat effectiveness of the Red Army during the summer period".

In August, the Revolutionary Military Council adopted a special resolution stating that reducing the budget to 380 million rubles would inevitably lead to a reduction in the size of the army, and "an army of such a size, i.e. amputated by 1/3, in no case can it meet the tasks of defense, bearing in mind the real forces of possible enemies. The government replied that "it is not a matter of the procedure for issuing appropriations and not a lack of credits, but the organizational side of the matter, organizational defects." Like, you don't know how to run a business. The 610,000 armed forces had to be reduced by another 50,000 men.

Moreover, the introduction of the NEP made it possible to largely restore the economic potential of the country, and 1924 turned out to be very successful in this sense. That is, the collapse of the army in a growing economy was dictated solely by the logic of internal party struggle. Immediately after the elimination of Trotsky, money for the army was found.

Work to oust Trotsky's supporters from the military department took on a mass character in the course of one of the main measures of the military reform—the introduction of unity of command. A number of prominent commanders - Fedko, Fabricius, Latsis, Dybenko, Yakir, Vostretsov... - applied to the Central Committee with a memorandum "On the results of the construction of the Red Army by the 6th anniversary of its existence", in which they asserted that a sufficient number of commanders devoted to Soviet power grew up in the troops, able to do without the guardianship of the commissars, who turned into a brake on military development and were mainly engaged in squabbles and denunciations. Well, writing denunciations is the most direct duty of a commissar, but they decided to slightly limit their powers of authority.

Stalin forwarded the letter to Bubnov. The subtlety is that just a year before this, it was Andrei Sergeevich who fundamentally objected to the order of the Revolutionary Military Council No. 511, which allowed the absence of a commissar even with a non-party boss and thereby "unjustifiably narrowed the role of commissars in the Red Army." Party then

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I had to correct the premature initiative of Comrade Trotsky. Now, however, it's a completely different matter!

"Having carefully weighed everything, Bubnov proposed not to speed up the introduction of unity of command, but to stretch the process in time, not to give all commanders indiscriminate trust, but to approach each individually, depending on the level of training. At the same time recertify the entire command and political staff. And at the same time, as it turned out, recalculate, since the Headquarters of the Red Army did not have generalized information about the number of commanders, as well as a system for accounting for personnel in the army.

In June 1924, a commission of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on military issues was set up under the chairmanship of Bubnov. Within the framework of the commission, a special subcommittee was formed, which had exclusive powers to check the business, professional qualities and political views of the entire commanding staff. Members of the commission determined the suitability

each commander and commissar for the role of a one-man commander based on two criteria: belonging to the Bolshevik Party and the ability to carry out educational work among subordinates. It is clear that Trotsky's supporters could not possibly be "skillful conductors of the party's policy".

In December 1924, the plenum of the Revolutionary Military Council approved the instructions presented by Bubnov on the practical implementation of unity of command and entrusted its implementation to the Litupravlenie of the Red Army. The instruction recommended considering the introduction of unity of command not as the liquidation of the political staff, but as a way of combining the functions of party leadership, political education and military training in one person. Simply put, each commander had to become, first and foremost, a commissar. The second option is to make a commissar a commander.

Therefore, the plenum adopted a resolution in which it was noted that unity of command must be introduced in two forms. Complete unity of command was assumed when the commander was a member of the party and was invested with its confidence. Under such a commander, a deputy for political affairs was appointed. Incomplete unity of command was introduced when the commander was

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non-partisan or recognized as "insufficiently prepared" politically. In this case, a pure-blooded commissar remained with him. On May 6, 1925, the Central Committee adopted a resolution "On unity of command in the Red Army", which approved the work done in this direction and gave directive instructions on the gradual transition to unity of command, without reducing the role

political composition.

Bubnov pointed out: "One should not think that when we nominate candidates for responsible positions as one-man commanders, we aim at such a valuable institution as the commissars of our army. After all, a huge percentage of non-Party commanders remain in the army. With full confidence in him, we nevertheless cannot allow the transfer of leadership of political work to him, and even more so of party work ... The great army of political instructors must be preserved and strengthened. At the same time, steadily increase the Party stratum among the command staff. The Bubnovsky five-year plan provided for 100% membership in the party of commanders of regiments, divisions and corps and at least 60% of company commanders.

The introduction of unity of command while maintaining the "great army of political officers" gave the party apparatus, headed by the secretary general, unlimited possibilities for appointing, moving and dismissing the commanding staff of the army and navy (they worked thoughtfully, even at the end of 1928, half of the commanders were still "incomplete" one-man commanders), which ultimately ensured Stalin a complete victory in the struggle for the army.

It must be said that Lev Davidovich did not particularly resist. After the end of the Civil War, the brilliant leader of the class struggle withered away in an atmosphere of "ideological settledness", often and tastefully fell ill, suffering from a mysterious illness, avoided party sabbaths and public discussions, only occasionally wrote letters to the Central Committee, published articles in "Pravda" and, while relaxing in the resorts, "assimilated confidence in his historical correctness with his whole being."

In the autumn of 1924, the People's Commissar delivered a long article

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"Lessons of October", in which he blamed Zinoviev and Kamenev for their old sins, recalled his own merits in organizing the October Revolution and tried to present himself as Lenin's only and natural successor. It is not difficult to foresee the reaction of the supporters of the troika: each wrote an article where Trotsky's behavior was no longer factional, but anti-Party, and his Menshevik past was pointed out. And in general, it turned out that Lev Davidovich not only was not in any way an outstanding figure in the Russian

revolution, but, on the contrary, all his conscious life he did nothing but harm Lenin and Leninism.

You, Lyova, squandered the lessons of October in vain.

Extensive work unfolded to debunk the imaginary merits of the "leader of the Red Army", to oust the idea of Trotsky as an outstanding military leader from the consciousness of the commanding staff and the Red Army. In November 1924, a meeting of the heads of political agencies chaired by Bubnov adopted a resolution demanding that the already approved topics of political studies be changed. Instead of memorizing slogans like "Leader of the Red Army Comrade. Trotsky" in the new program of political education was instructed to study the activities of the Bolshevik Party as the organizer and inspirer of all victories, including in the fight against Trotskyism, which is a variety of Menshevism. Portraits of the "idol of the Red Army men" were taken out of the barracks.

At the top of its voice, hiding nothing, the party pointed to the true creator and immediate leader of the Red Army - Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. It was from his brilliant head that the plans for the defeat of Kolchak, Denikin, Wrangel and other Yudenichs arose, and from his valuable instructions the front commanders drew inspiration. A whole Institute of His Name began work on the collection "Lenin and the Red Army". And here Bubnov showed ingenuity: having understood who actually ordered the music, he managed to remove from participation in editing the book a member of the Politburo, the creator and director of that very

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institute of Lev Kamenev: "To people prone to perverting Leninism, A.S. Bubnov was afraid to entrust the publication of the works of the LEADER.

As evidence of the outstanding military-theoretical knowledge of the "brilliant strategist and tactician", Lenin's excerpts from Clausewitz's writings, statements and directives, which played "a decisive role in the defense of the Soviet Republic".

Lenin's thoughtfulness on a military theme was replicated and extolled: "...an armed uprising is a special kind of political struggle, subject to special laws, which must be carefully considered...". And now I've already thought about it: "Prepare seriously, intensely, steadily for the defense of the fatherland, for the defense of the socialist Soviet republic!"

In all companies and subdivisions equal to them, the red corners were renamed Leninsky, all barracks and parade grounds were decorated with a memorable slogan for every serviceman: "Learn military affairs in a real way."

The most faithful student recited almost in rhyme:

"Remember, love, study Ilyich, our teacher, our leader.

Fight and defeat enemies, internal and external - according to Ilyich.

But everyone was surpassed by the former manager of the Council of People's Commissars, pushed into "scientific work" V.D. Bonch-Bruyevich (1873-1955): "Where he walks, everything is spiritualized with new life, winter gives way to spring, ice covers melt, snow irrigates the ground, and under his feet beautiful, fragrant flowers grow and bloom, and his path is framed by flowering broad-leaved lilies."

The new instructions demanded intensified work on explaining the merits of the life-giving fragrant Ilyich in the victory of October and the history of his principled struggle against Trotskyism: "The Party will not allow anyone to distort Lenin's precepts!" From the "demon of the revolution" Trotsky's "Jew" was inspiredly molded.

The object of persecution, surrounded on all sides, in controversy

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did not enter again. On January 15, 1925, he wrote a statement asking "in the interests of the cause" to quickly remove him from the post of people's commissar, expressing his readiness to work "where the party sends him," and continued to nurture his favorite fever. Well, well, Stalin threw up his hands: "If, after each attack by Trotsky on the party, he begins to throw himself into a fever, then the party is not to blame." Let's take note of the statement.

At the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), assembled two days later, in response to the numerous demands of senior political workers and military party organizations, it was decided to release the "revisionist" Trotsky from the duties of chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council and People's Commissar for Military Affairs. On January 26, by a decree of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, Frunze was appointed to these positions, Voroshilov became his deputy. Muralov, who commanded the troops of the North Caucasian district, was not forgotten either: he was recalled to the capital and given a sham POSITION FOR "particularly important" assignments under the Revolutionary Military Council.

Immediately after Trotsky was excommunicated from the leadership of the army, the War Department received large additional appropriations and significantly increased the salaries of all commanding officers. At the same January plenum, Stalin offered to support in every possible way the request of the new people's commissar for additional funding:

"We have a certain liquidationist mood in regard to the army... I must state in the most categorical manner that this liquidationist mood must be resolutely liquidated... we must meet, resolutely and irrevocably, the demands of the Military departments".

The anti-Trotskyist campaign, however, did not lose its intensity. Already on January 3] a circular from the Political Directorate of the Red Army was sent to the troops, in which the political bodies were ordered to continue their work to eradicate and expose Trotskyism among the personnel. In fact, this work did not stop until 1941.

Prominent Trotskyists removed from key posts were not repressed, God forbid! The time has not yet come. They were sent to economic or diplomatic work.

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Sklyansky, for example, was appointed to chair the board of the Mossukno trust, Antonov was appointed plenipotentiary to Czechoslovakia, and the leader of the Red Cossacks, Primakov, was appointed military adviser to China.

The ousting of the names of Trotsky and his team from the consciousness of the military personnel was facilitated by the widespread propaganda of the merits of his successor. The biography of Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze (1885-1925), an old Bolshevik (two death sentences, eight years in hard labor), a military nugget, famous for his victories over Kolchak and Wrangel, began to be studied without fail in the system of political training of army and navy personnel. His activities were praised in the periodical press, his articles and speeches were published. Frunze was increasingly called one of the most prominent commanders of the Civil War, an outstanding practitioner of military organizational development. In the speeches and publications of Stalin and his supporters, the incompatibility of the views of Trotsky and Frunze on the main measures of military reform was strongly emphasized.

Frunze dreamed of creating a new theory of proletarian military art, Trotsky was sarcastically interested: "Can Marxism teach how to weave bast shoes?" Trotsky just suggested that we create a training program for a Red Army soldier, deal with everyday issues in the army. He believed that in the conditions of the devastation that prevailed in the country, with the practically absence of normal funding, more could not be done. Frunze insisted that reform was necessary, but

First of all, it is necessary to develop a unity of views on the main issues of army building and military art. He came up with a trivial, but too profoundly learned thought for the red pioneers: it turns out that every decent state, even the Soviet one, should have a military doctrine, and devoted the theoretical work "The Unified Doctrine and the Red Army" to this problem.

Frunze called the military doctrine "the doctrine adopted in the army of a given state, which establishes the nature of the organizational development of the armed forces, the methods of combat training

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troop formations, their driving on the basis of the views prevailing in the state on the nature of the military tasks lying before it and the methods for their solution, arising from the class essence of the state and determined by the level of development of the country's productive forces.

In other words, we must first figure out what kind of war we are going to prepare for, "should we establish ourselves on the idea of passive defense of the country, without setting and pursuing any active tasks, or should we have these latter in mind. The answer to this question determines "the entire nature of the organizational development of our armed forces, the nature and system of training single fighters and large military formations, military-political propaganda, and the entire system of education of the country."

For Frunze, a convinced Marxist, the answer is clear. They did not allow thoughts about the peaceful coexistence of two different types of states:

"There can be only one state of long, stubborn, desperate war to the death between our proletarian state and the rest of the bourgeois world.... there will be a good environment."

If you get to the bottom of the original source, here Mikhail Vasilyevich quotes verbatim the resolutions of the Second Congress of the Comintern. Based on the foregoing, the political part of the military doctrine "cannot be active in the highest degree."

Conclusion: the unconditional militarization of the entire life of the state is necessary, "the energy and will of the country must continue to be directed towards the creation and strengthening of our military power", the consciousness of every inhabitant "should be saturated with the idea that our country is still in a position of besieged fortress and will be in it as long as capital reigns in the world", the propaganda apparatus must prepare "that psychological environment of the universe

native attention, care and concern for the needs of the army..."

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All institutions, organizations, branches of industry, science, education, medicine — EVERYTHING must be built and proceed in their work from the perspective of the coming WAR.

The Bolsheviks were well aware that their communism could finally win only when there were no territories free from it on the globe, when all of humanity, or those very ten percent of undestroyed percent, would be driven into the barracks, lit by "Ilyich's lamps" human material." Marx wrote about it. Lenin wrote about this:

"Final victory can only be won on a world scale... We live not only in a state, but also in a system of states, and the existence of a Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. In the end, either one or the other will win. Until that end comes, a series of the most terrible clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable.

Stalin perfectly understood the essence of the problem when he pointed out: "One of two things: either we consider our country as the base of the proletarian revolution ... Or we do not consider our country the base of the revolution, we do not have the data for building socialism, to build we cannot create a socialist society—and then, in the event of delaying the victory of socialism in other countries, we must put up with the fact that the capitalist elements of our national economy will gain the upper hand, the Soviet power will disintegrate, and the party will be reborn. That is why the loss of an international revolutionary perspective leads to the danger of nationalism and degeneration." In the end, that's what happened. But, as we see, in 1924-1925, none of the Soviet leadership was going to give up the revolutionary perspective.

The essence of the theoretical differences between Trotsky and Stalin was only that the former was impatient to conquer the world at once, "permanently", since he believed that "only after the victory of the proletariat in the most important countries of Europe" is it possible "a genuine rise of the socialist economy in Russia", and the second advocated that

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accumulate strength, create a "base" in the USSR and carry out a gradual escalation of revolutions.

Stalin predicted:

"It is most likely that the world revolution will develop through the revolutionary falling away of new countries from the system of imperialist states... But it is also undoubted that the very development of the world revolution, the very process of falling away from imperialism of a number of new countries, will take place the sooner and more thoroughly. the more fundamentally socialism will be strengthened in the first victorious country, the sooner this country will turn into a base for the further development of the world revolution, into a lever for the further disintegration of imperialism.

Thus, at this stage, the "military program" was to turn the country into a powerful springboard for the further export of the world revolution and to wait / create a "favorable environment" when we were "forced to go on the attack." Stalin already understood: no one but him is capable of solving this grandiose task - there are only windbags all around.

Trotsky "did not believe in the peasantry," saying that, petty-bourgeois in class essence, they would not follow the proletariat into socialism, "turn away" from it. And so the working class, "with state power in its hands, with the counter-revolution behind its back, with European reaction before it, will throw out to its brethren all over the world the old rallying cry, which this time will be the cry of the last attack: "Proletarians of all countries, unite!" Stalin also did not believe in the peasantry, but he could not say that the dispute was not about the peasantry, but about power. Therefore, he accuses the opponent of distrusting the peasantry, which in fact is "our third ally": "The peasant is our ally, and such an ally who gives us direct help right now, gives us an army, bread, etc. ... and we must be able to appreciate this ally right now, especially now."

And most importantly, it's time to achieve monolithic unity, put an end to the "factional bacchanalia" and work out a specific program for further actions, it's time to start

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deed: "We cannot move forward without knowing where to move, without knowing the purpose of the movement. We cannot build without prospects, without the confidence that, having started building a socialist economy, we can build it. Without clear prospects, without clear goals, the Party cannot direct construction." In the end, either we can build socialism, or "we are not able" and must "honestly and openly step down from power and lead the course towards organizing a new revolution in the USSR in the future."

It is not surprising that Frunze's unified doctrine received the full approval of the party leadership. True, Mikhail Vasilievich himself did not have to put it into practice. October 31, 1925

he died in the ward of the Botkin hospital after a seemingly simple operation for a stomach ulcer appointed by the decision of the Politburo. As the newspapers reported, a "joyful smile" froze on the face of the deceased - before his death, he was read an encouraging note from his beloved comrade Stalin. After Frunze's death, they were unanimously canonized. As a sign of mourning, by order of the Revolutionary Military Council, military parades on the day of the eighth anniversary of October were even cancelled.

Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov (1881-1969), an unconditional Stalinist cadre, became the new people's commissar for military and naval affairs and chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the republic, his deputies Mikhail Mikhailovich Lashevich (1884-1928) - from the Zinovievites, and Iosif Stanislavovich Unshlikht - this is his Human.

Thus, using the main measures of the military reform to transfer the army under its direct influence, the Central Committee of the RCP (b), headed by Stalin, created a fundamentally new system of political and administrative leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces. The dominant position in this structure was occupied by the political leadership, and this state of affairs persisted until the very end of the existence of the Soviet Union.

In conditions when, with the introduction of unity of command, the affiliation of the commanding staff to the Communist Party

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became the determining criterion for career advancement, the role of party organizations and political agencies in resolving personnel issues has significantly increased. The status of the Political Directorate of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR was fundamentally changed. His boss A.S. Bubnov in April 1925 became the secretary of the Central Committee of the party. The Political Directorate itself was withdrawn from the Revolutionary Military Council, became the Political Directorate of the Red Army and received the rights of a department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. As a result, the entire vertical of army political agencies and party organizations was now directly connected to the central party apparatus, headed by Stalin. All organizational ties between the army political agencies and party organizations with local party committees were eliminated.

As a result, a qualitatively new, strictly hierarchical party structure was created in the Military Department in a short time, not subordinate to either territorial party bodies or top military leadership, being directly and directly under the control of the Party Central Committee, and ultimately its [General Secretary - I.V. Stalin. The positions of Trotsky and his supporters in the army were dealt a crushing blow. Most importantly, for the foreseeable future, the possibility of activity in the Armed Forces of any other political force, except for the Communist Party, was excluded. The Party's leadership of the Armed Forces became the "basis of the foundations of military construction" for all subsequent decades.

In 1925, Stalin was already a recognized helmsman and the only interpreter of Lenin's teachings (in all his speeches, densely interspersed with quotations, the incantation sounded: "So spoke Lenin"). Songs about him were not yet sung, but in April the city of Tsaritsyn was renamed Stalingrad.

Zinoviev, who considered himself the rightful heir to the throne, realized with surprise that Stalin turned out to be a master of political intrigue, outplaying him in all respects. Having lost all his self-satisfaction, "In fact, there is no troika, but there is Stalin's dictatorship. Ilyich was a thousand times right," Zinoviev and Kamenev rushed to Trotsky,

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fall for the deceit of the "Asian". In fact, the Secretary General, he himself admitted, had such a sweet manner: "Mark a victim, prepare everything, mercilessly take revenge, and then go to sleep." But who cares about the cries of the losers.

At the 15th Party Congress, held in December 1925, Zinoviev, who made his final report for the last time, criticized Stalin, his methods of leadership, and the ways he proposed.

development of the national economy of the country. Following him, Kamenev demanded the resignation of the General Secretary. Lured Stalinist "Parteigenossen" did not support the proposal, and a month later Lev Borisovich was transferred from the Politburo members to candidates. The delegates were especially impressed by Stalin's statement that no one would allow the leaders "to break with impunity and sit on the party's head. There will be no bows to the leaders." (Exclamations: "That's right." Applause.)

Another statement, significant: "For us, for the Bolsheviks, formal democracy is a dummy, and the real interests of the party are everything," they passed on deaf ears.

According to the proven methodology, Zinoviev and Kamenev were ranked among the "new OPPOSITION", hindering the construction of socialism in the country and perverting the holy teachings of Leninism.

Warmia process was similar. The military communists did not support the oppositionists anywhere, some unhealthy doubts arose only in the Leningrad military district. A commission of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, headed by the indefatigable Bubnov, headed there. Having convened a party conference, he actually repeated Stalin's theses:

"You say that the disciples of Lenin, the former leaders of our party, fell under the wheel? So much the worse for the leaders and so much the better for the party, which finds the strength to go past such leaders who do not follow Lenin. This only shows the strength of our party!"

In the summer of 1926, Zinoviev, who had fallen out of the ruling pack, began to cry out that the Trotskyists "correctly warned" about the danger of the degeneration of the party and the "threatening growth of the apparatus regime." Trotsky, having found allies, perked up and declared that he was grossly mistaken in considering the opportunist

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mi Zinoviev and Kamenev. Somewhat belatedly, he saw that "the opportunist shifts were brought about by the group headed by Comrade Stalin."

"The addition of castrated forces," Stalin chuckled through his mustache, but he drew organizational conclusions.

In July, the Joint Plenum of the highest bodies of the party withdrew Zinoviev from the Politburo, and S.M. became the first secretary of the Leningrad provincial committee. Kirov (1886-1934). The October Plenum recalled "Grishka Interplut" from Comintern work and recommended that the ECCI release the unprincipled factionalist from the post of chairman of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. At the same time, a decision was made to expel Trotsky from the Politburo, and Kamenev from the list of candidates for the supreme body of the CPSU (b). At the same time, Lev Borisovich was dismissed from the post of chairman of the STO and made people's commissar of trade. The main Stalinist competitors were withdrawn from political circulation.

Invaluable help in defeating the "oppositional Trotskyite-Zinoviev bloc" was provided by Stalin's new allies—Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsy, and their supporters. All the most important decisions, despite the existing political and economic disagreements, were now taken by the friendly "two". Friend Joseph decided, friend Kolya theoretically substantiated.

In the autumn of 1926, Comrade Stalin was declared the leader of the world communist movement. Bukharin became the political leader of the Comintern. On September 27, 1927, Trotsky was expelled from the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Following this, at the November meeting of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev were expelled from the party. The last two were reinstated in membership twice more and expelled again twice - Stalin's game of cat and mouse; in general, from the rostrum, he always spoke out against the exclusion, or, as he expressed it, cutting off, comrades in the party. At the same time, the well-known military leaders Muralov and Lashevich, Georgy Pyatakov, as well as the excessively talkative Carlos Radek, who blurted out about the construction of socialism in a single

country: "Shchedrin's Pampadura has the only pampadour that liberalism builds in one county." Iosif Vissarionovich was greatly offended by this "vulgar giggle" and unambiguous hints.

Two months later, hefty agents of the GPU wrapped the stubborn Lev Davidovich in a fur coat, carried him out of the house in their arms and took him to the station. His path lay in Central Asia, and soon beyond the borders of the USSR.

The famous historian and writer of the "new emigration" A.T. Avtorkhanov (1908-1997) claimed that Stalin did not want to let Trotsky go abroad, "until he was assured by the head of the OGPU Menzhinsky that whether Trotsky would be in Alma-Ata, in the Lubyanka or in Madagascar, for him departments do not matter. "Trotsky will be with us everywhere," Menzhinsky reassured Stalin. As you know, he was not mistaken."

Buried in Mexico, Trotsky, characterizing the General Secretary, wrote:

"There was not even a shadow of that generosity of rich natures in him, which rejoices in the talents and successes of another. In someone else's success, he always felt a threat to his goals, a blow to his personality. With the strength of a reflex, he immediately took up a defensive, and if possible, an offensive one. position...

What Stalin, this outstanding mediocrity, never forgave anyone for was spiritual superiority. He entered into the list of his memory all those who, in any degree, surpassed him, or at least did not treat him with attention.

From the moment the "opposition bloc" was crushed, Stalin was definitely annoyed by Bukharin and his "schoolboy". The point is not even so much in the bad character of Iosif Vissarionovich - it is not at all serious to talk about the spiritual superiority of Bukharchik - but in the fact that there is one step from leadership in the development of fundamental theoretical issues of socialist construction to claims for political leadership. Too popular, independent and irresponsibly talkative Bukharin began to interfere.

At this time, Stalin adopted the theses of Trotsky

and Zinoviev, whom he himself not so long ago condemned and smashed, and advocated accelerated industrialization and collectivization. At the beginning of 1928, when discussing the situation in the national economy, in connection with the difficulties that arose with the development of industry and in the procurement of grain, a clash of opinions began in the Central Committee on the question of methods for resolving problems. Bukharin and his supporters were against emergency measures in the course of collectivization and industrialization, against the "military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry." The Stalinists denounced their opponents for not understanding the "mechanics of the class struggle."

Here Nikolai Ivanovich, like his previous comrades, "saw the light", began to seek advice from the disgraced "Kamenyuga" and printed the article "Notes of an Economist" - fortunately he was the editor-in-chief of Pravda. This betrayal infuriated Stalin. The November Plenum of the Central Committee condemned the theoretical views of the Bukharin-Rykov group, aimed at slowing down the rate of development of industry and curtailing the construction of collective farms. Thus began the struggle against the "right" ukon.

In January and April 1929, the United Plenums again considered and condemned the "capitulatory" platform of the "Rights" - Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy. The naive Bukharchik babbled something about personal friendship, saying that all his old Bolsheviks did not agree on their opinions - it happens. Why are we fighting guys? There was a time when Stalin wrote: "Kiss Bukhashka on the nose for me," but the logic of the political struggle is inexorable. "We don't have a family circle," Joseph snapped.

Vissarionovich is not an artel of personal friends, but a political party of the working class. There is nothing, you bastard, to conspire with yesterday's Trotskyists and deviate from the "general line".

"Friends" were accused of factionalism, attempts to put together an anti-party bloc and were relieved of all their posts. Following this, they were removed from the Politburo, completely removed from political activity. Zinoviev and Kamenev were sent to Kaluga. Stalin bluntly declared that the time of leaders was over: "If we proclaimed

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If we have one set of laws for the leaders and others for the "common people" in the party, then we will have nothing left of either the party or party discipline."

Of the entire composition of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), mentioned in Lenin's will, only one person remained on the political Olympus. Trotsky wrote: "The gray figure unexpectedly separated at a certain moment from the Kremlin wall - and the world for the first time recognized Stalin as a ready-made dictator."

The only surprise was that it was Stalin who turned out to be this dictator. Everything else is a pattern that the young Lev, an ardent opponent of Bolshevism, deduced back in 1904 - the party of violence can only evolve in one direction:

"The apparatus of the party replaces the party, the Central Committee replaces the apparatus, and finally the dictator replaces the Central Committee."

A terrorist regime of the party apparatus was established in the party and the country, headed by the sole leader, Comrade Stalin, the leader of the world proletariat, a brilliant strategist, the best friend of scientists, children and athletes.

Now it is possible to seriously engage in the creation of the "base of the world revolution." Stalin directed all his energy, all his will to the creation of his hitherto unknown, according to Avtorkhanov's definition, ideocratic Empire.

The introduction of the New Economic Policy made it possible to restore the economic potential of the country in the shortest possible time. In 1923, industrial production more than doubled the level of 1921 in terms of its volume, amounting to 39% compared to 1913. Agriculture, freed from the charms of surplus appropriation, amounted to 75% of the pre-war level. The lifting of the external blockade made it possible to start economic contacts with European countries, although they never became strong. The sales crisis of 1923 was successfully overcome, and in 1924 economic indicators grew slowly but surely.

In 1926, Stalin announced that the country had entered "in

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the first period of the new economic policy, in the period of direct industrialization" and that "it is necessary to have a developed industry, because industry is the foundation, the beginning and the end of socialism, socialist construction...". On April 13, while reading a report to the Leningrad activists, the Secretary General proclaimed a course towards industrialization:

"Consequently, the next and main task is to accelerate the rate of development of our country, to move forward with all our industry, using available resources, and thereby accelerate the development of the economy as a whole ... But in order to renew our industry on the basis of new technology, this requires, comrades, large and very large capitals. And we have little capital, as you all know... We need to transform our country from an agrarian country into an industrial country, and the sooner the better. But all this requires a lot of capital."

It was really problematic with capital. No one wanted to lend money to the Soviets. Of course. Lenin and his government, which seized power with German money and not without the help of the German General Staff, independently withdrew from the war, concluded a separate peace with the Kaiser, supplied him with bread and gold, released almost two million captured soldiers to their homeland, thereby designating themselves as actual allies of Germany. In addition, the Bolsheviks renounced all pre-war agreements and obligations, that is, first of all, from the need to repay billions in debts on loans, and at the same time pocketed the gold reserves of Romania. After that, they were proudly offended by the Entente, which sought to "strangle the Soviet power."

Who in the international arena is interested in dealing with lawless people who finance subversive organizations around the world in order to destroy the "world of capital". Just in May 1927, Great Britain broke off diplomatic relations with the USSR when it became clear that the entire general strike of British miners was financed by Comintern agents. The scandal was huge. (I wonder how the West will react today if the Russian

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will the President refuse to pay Yeltsin's debts, start supplying weapons to Iran, Palestine, North Korea, finance Al Jihad, and at the same time ask the West for new loans for the development of the military-industrial complex?)

Speaking at a meeting of Moscow party activists on April 13, 1928, Stalin confirmed that the capitalist countries were ready to normalize relations with the Soviet Union, provided that the royal debts were paid and the policy of "supporting the liberation movement of the working class of other countries" was abandoned. But it's a matter of principle:

"... WE cannot make these and similar concessions without giving up ourselves - that is why we must be prepared for the fact that international capital will continue to arrange all sorts of dirty tricks for us in the future ... "And we must continue to "conduct a liberating foreign policy."

The impossibility of obtaining investments in the West forced the Soviet leadership to accept the idea of self-reliant economic autarky. However, the ever-living Ilyich, who was going to fight with the whole world, put forward this idea back in the spring of 1918 in an outline of a plan for scientific and technical work:

"The greatest guarantee for the present Russian Soviet Republic of the possibility of independently supplying itself with all the main types of raw materials and industry."

But all this required "big capital". Where to get them? Stalin explained: we do not have colonies, we are not going to rob anyone, we cannot agree to enslaving concessions with foreign firms. There remains "the fourth path of industrialization, the path of own savings for the cause of industry, the path of socialist accumulation."

Moreover, Iosif Vissarionovich categorically rejected the proposal of the left revolutionaries to exploit the countryside as "colonies": "This policy has nothing in common with the policy of the party, which is building the cause of industrialization on the basis of economic cooperation between the proletariat and the peasantry." He pounded in every pub

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in a personal speech about the danger of kindling the class struggle in the countryside and insisted on using exclusively economic methods of pressure on the kulak: "It may seem that the slogan of kindling the class struggle is quite applicable to the conditions of the struggle on this front. But this is not true. For here we are not interested in kindling the class struggle. For here we can and must do without inflaming the struggle and the complications connected with it... The slogan of inflaming the class struggle on this second front is not our slogan."

The restoration of industry was carried out mainly due to the export of raw materials. Steam locomotives and industrial equipment were imported. Treasures of the Hermitage, the Kremlin, museum collections were sold for the sake of acquiring foreign currency. To the bewildered questions of Western buyers, for whom masterpieces by Botticelli or Titian were removed and wrapped directly from the walls: "Don't you feel sorry?" — Smiling Anastas Mikoyan (1895-1978) answered: "Nothing, after the victory of the world revolution, all this will be ours" (as you know, Lenin in 1923 offered to sell the Soviet part of Sakhalin to the Japanese. We did not agree on a price).

The possibilities of an individual primitive peasant economy could not ensure the planned pace of reconstruction. At the 15th Party Congress held in December 1927, Stalin pushed through decisions on accelerated industrialization "in order to catch up and overtake the advanced capitalist countries" and the creation of large collective farms in the countryside.

There is no talk yet about the forcible planting of collective farms. For the time being, it is a matter of "gradually, but steadily, not in the order of pressure, but in the order of demonstration and persuasion, to unite into large farms on the basis of social, comradely, collective cultivation of the land, with the use of agricultural machines. and tractors, with the use of scientific methods of intensification of agriculture".

For the time being, the course towards mass collectivization remained only a declaration: "big capital" is needed for cars and tractors, with the "show" the party members always had

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difficulties, the bulk of individual peasants did not express a desire to voluntarily unite and "comradely" cultivate the land. Only the Bolshevik methods of "persuasion" remained, but the General Secretary, while he was fighting Trotsky, was "not interested in fomenting the class struggle."

Back in the winter and spring of 1928, Stalin said:

"Talking that we are allegedly canceling the NEP, introducing a surplus appraisal, dispossession of kulaks, etc., is counter-revolutionary chatter, against which a determined struggle is necessary," and he expressed the hope that in three or four years the collective farms would be able to ensure at least a third of the supply of grain: "NEP is the basis of our economic policy and remains so for a long historical period." Moreover: "No one now benefits from the new economic policy as much as the Soviet government."

However, the desire to quickly raise the economic level of the country inevitably led to the idea of the Great Leap Forward. In addition, the Great Depression was beginning in the West, which shook the world market and created "the conditions for a new revolutionary upsurge." It seems that a "favorable situation" was brewing in Europe. In order to provide timely assistance to the proletariat of the "backward" countries, a developed military-industrial complex and a powerful army were urgently needed, and for this - the final solution of the peasant question, the implementation of a complete state monopoly in agriculture, bringing to a logical the end of Lenin's idea of the forced organization of the "majority of the workers and peasants."

By the way, Vladimir Ilyich, who conceived the grain monopoly, grain rations and labor armies even before taking power, considered the "Decree on Land" a mistake, a concession made to please the Left Social Revolutionaries who helped carry out the October Revolution. The farmer's way of development of agriculture was rejected by all "red professors" unconditionally. The farmer, our "fist," is a class enemy. In addition, the products produced, even with the help of tractors and scientific methods, this world-eater, "spider and vampire"

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certainly wants to sell for a profit. This was confirmed by the crisis, in the Bolshevik way - sabotage, grain procurements in 1928 (comrade Stalin then drove around Siberia and

demonstrated to the local apparatchiks his understanding of "economic measures of influence" on the peasants who did not want to hand over bread at state prices, proposing to mold Art. 107 of the Criminal Code on speculation, confiscate bread and shuffle overly soft-bodied prosecutorial staff: "You will soon see that these measures will give excellent results ...").

Any, even the smallest private owner, independent producer, by the mere fact of its existence, "gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie". Collective farms were invented for this, in order to seize grain centrally, preferably for free, load it with songs into the bins of the motherland and not depend on "kulak whims".

In April 1929, having ideologically defeated the former "left communists" who now turned out to be "right deviators," the Soviet leadership abruptly changed course, proclaiming a "general offensive of socialism along the entire front."

The "year of the great turning point" meant the curtailment of the new economic policy, continuous forced collectivization, a return to emergency measures, and the suppression of any resistance with an iron fist. FROM "gradual and steady" consolidation of small farms to "steady", shock and super shock rates of socialization of private property in the countryside using the entire arsenal of "persuasion" means. In general, the Bolsheviks decided to again primitively rob the farmer peasant.

They explain that there was no other way out: the aggressiveness of imperialism, as usual, continuously increased, the "kulaks" grew rich, impudent and "organized undermining" against the Soviet government, and it was time for all the people to be reminded that the concession made to capitalism in 1921 year, was only a temporary retreat, the accumulation of strength before a breakthrough into a brighter future.

The need to use the most extreme measures was justified by the theory of escalation invented by Stalin.

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class struggle as we successfully move towards socialism:

"Socialism is successfully attacking the capitalist elements, socialism is growing faster than the capitalist elements, the share of capitalist elements is therefore falling, and precisely because the share of capitalist elements is falling, the capitalist elements feel mortal danger and intensify their resistance...

This is a regrouping of the forces of the class enemies of the proletariat, with the aim of defending the old against the new. It is not difficult to understand that these circumstances cannot but cause an intensification of the class struggle.

If the enemy does not surrender, he is destroyed. Like a class. If it gives up, too. (It's interesting how people change. Maxim Gorky, who had not yet been bought with giblets, wrote on November 20, 1917:

"The working class cannot fail to understand that Lenin, in his skin, on his blood, produces only a certain experience... transport, prolonged bloody anarchy, followed by no less bloody and gloomy reaction. In 1933 he will sing of the wonders of the White Sea Canal and its bosses.)

In December 1929, Stalin announced a turn from the policy of "limiting the exploitative tendencies of the kulaks to the policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class." There were, according to official statistics, 5 million kulaks in the country, and about 13 million candidates for them, the so-called "prosperous" peasants. In order to suppress the resistance of the unfinished capitalist elements, to dispossess and exterminate them, it was necessary to recognize the admissibility of emergency measures. Temporarily, of course.

"A real war began to exterminate the peasantry," recalls A.G. Avtorkhanov. - Propaganda swearing at the "kulaks" did not leave the pages of Soviet newspapers, starting already from the US Party Congress (1919). Stalin, on the other hand, announced the "liquidation", that is, the confiscation of property and land from

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five million peasants (for starters) and their eviction to the Siberian tundra without shelter, clothing and food, and without exception - from infants to very old people. Even in the dark eras of slavery and the slave trade, children, mothers and the elderly were spared. Stalin spared no one. Such a reprisal against the peasantry was considered so incredible that at first we thought that Stalin said this for the sake of a red word or simply blurted out too much out of negligence

Separate peasant outbursts in connection with the "emergency measures" at the grain procurements in the autumn of 1929 develop into menacing clouds of peasant revolts throughout the country — in Central Russia, the Urals, Siberia, Turkestan, the Caucasus ... A second edition is taking place peasant revolution of 1905, but without the support of the workers of the city, with the silence of the intelligentsia, with the indifference of the outside world ... Men with pitchforks rush at the first, for them outlandish, Soviet tanks (the first "baptism of fire" Soviet tanks receive in the war against their own of the people), women on the bayonets of the Chekists, children cry hysterically over the bodies of their dead parents, and tanks, cannons, machine guns and bayonets ruthlessly and with some kind of terrible plannedness "collectivize" some, liquidate others."

As soon as the Bolsheviks did what they loved, victories followed victories, and the head was spinning from success. A little more than a year has passed, and half of the peasants (more than 10 million families) signed up for collective farms: "We have more than doubled the five-year collectivization plan." The advantages of the collective-farm system were so seductively explained to the Peizans that they were thrown into the collective farms "not in separate groups, as was the case before, but entire villages, volosts and districts, even districts."

Those who did not want to unite in large farms, even the most unportable ones, in accordance with the established systematics, were enrolled in the subclass of "kulakists".

The writer Mikhail Sholokhov, in a personal letter to Stalin, described the process of handing over grain to the collective farms of a single Veshensky district of the North Caucasus Territory:

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"Since the falling curve of grain receipts by the deadline did not ensure the fulfillment of the plan by the deadline, the regional committee sent a special commissioner, comrade Ovchinnikov, to the Veshensky district (the same one who once came to establish an "additional" yield). Ovchinnikov smashes the district leadership and, tapping on the holster of his revolver, gives the following instruction: "Bread must be taken at any cost! We will press so that the blood spurts! Firewood to break, but to take bread "...

And they began to "break firewood" around the district with great zeal and take bread "at any cost". By the arrival of the newly appointed Secretary of the Republic of Kazakhstan Kuznetsov and the Chairman of the RIC Korolev in the district, there were already the fruits of Ovchinnikov's suggestion:

1) On the Pleshakovsky collective farm, two representatives of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Belov and another comrade, whose last name is unknown to me, asked the collective farmers where the bread was buried, for the first time they used the method of "interrogation with predilection", which subsequently spread throughout the region. At midnight, the komsodom was summoned to the komsodom, one by one, the collective farmers, at first they were interrogated, threatening to torture, and then they used torture: they put pencils between their fingers and broke their joints, and then they put a rope loop around their neck and led to the hole in the Don to drown.

2) At the Grachesky collective farm, during interrogation, the representative of the Republic of Kazakhstan hung the collective farmers by the neck to the ceiling, continued to interrogate the half-suffocated, then led them to the river on a belt, kicked them along the way, put them on their knees on the ice and continued the interrogation.

3) At the Likhovidsky collective farm, the authorized representative of the Republic of Kazakhstan at a brigade meeting ordered the collective farmers to stand up, placed an armed villager at the door, who was charged with the duty of ensuring that no one sat down, but himself went to dinner. Had dinner, slept, came in 4 hours. The assembly stood under the protection of the village. And the commissioner continued the meeting...

After Ovchinnikov left for the Verkhne-Donskoy region, Sharapov began to direct the work. Sharapov judged the work of a commissioner or secretary not only by the amount of bread found, but also by the number of families thrown out of their homes, by the number of roofs uncovered during searches and ruined

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ovens. "He felt sorry for throwing the kids out into the cold! Slobbered up! Kulak pity overcame him! Let them squeak and die like puppies, but we will break sabotage!" - Sharapov scolded the secretary of the cell of the Malakhov collective farm at the bureau of the Republic of Kazakhstan for showing some hesitation in the mass eviction of the families of collective farmers on the street ... Expulsion from the party, arrest and starvation threatened any communist who did not show enough "activity" in terms of the use of repression, because in the understanding of Ovchinnikov and Sharapov, only these methods were supposed to produce bread... no one was interested in these statistics and is not interested; just as no one is interested in the number of deaths from starvation...

But eviction is not the main thing. Here is an enumeration of the methods by which 593 tons of bread were produced:

- 1) Mass beatings of collective farmers and individual farmers.
- 2) Planting in the cold. The collective farmer is stripped to his underwear and put barefoot in a barn or barn. Time of action - January, February. Often, whole teams were planted in barns.
- 3) In the Vashchayevsky collective farm, the legs and skirts of the collective farmers were doused with kerosene, lit, and then extinguished: "Tell me, where is the pit? I'll set it on fire again!" In the same collective farm, the interrogated woman was put in a pit, half buried, and the interrogation continued.
- 4) On the Lebyazhensky collective farm, they stood against the wall and shot past the head of the interrogated from shotguns.
- 5) In the same place: they rolled them up in a row and trampled them with their feet.
- 6) At the Arkhipovsky collective farm, two collective farmers, Fomina and Krasnova, after a night of interrogation, were taken three kilometers to the steppe, stripped naked in the snow and let in, ordered to run to the farm at a trot.
- 7) In the Solontsovsky collective farm, a human corpse was brought into the room by the commander, they put it on the table and in the same room the collective farmers were interrogated, threatening to be shot.
- 8) In the Verkhne-Chirsky collective farm, the commanders put the interrogated barefoot on a hot stove, and then they beat them and took the barefoot ones out into the cold ... "

And so on - up to "method" No. 16.

The Bolshevik Party is a party of miracles, and the violence of races

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expands the realm of the possible to gigantic proportions. How did Ovchinnikov, Belov, Sharapov and other representatives differ from foreign occupiers? "Mother, egg!" spoke without an accent? Faith in the bright ideals of communism? As one of the heroes of the Strugatsky brothers said: "If in the name of an ideal a person has to do meanness, then the price of this ideal is shit."

For some reason Sholokhov thought, but rather was "naive", that the robbery that reigned in the villages was a consequence of the "excesses" of the local leadership, and asked to send "genuine communists" to the region.

Stalin answered him that the communists in Veshenka are the most genuine, they are just trying very hard to "curb the enemy", and writers, before getting into politics, "must be able to see the other side. And the other side is that the respected grain growers of your region (and not only your region) carried out the "Italian" (sabotage!) and were not averse to leaving the workers, the Red Army - without bread. The fact that the sabotage was quiet and outwardly harmless (without blood) does not change the fact that the respected grain growers, in fact, waged a "quiet war" with the Soviet government. A war of extinction, dear comrade. Sholokhov.

Dear Mikhail Alexandrovich drank bitter and composed Virgin Soil Upturned.

In response to questions from the working people about the twists and turns of domestic policy, Stalin patiently explained that the petty proprietor was always the enemy, but earlier, two or three years ago, it was impossible to dispossess him of the kulak, since the kulak fed the proletariat and the Red Army; "there was nothing to replace kulak production." Now that we have decided to go over to collective farming, now it is possible to rob it, now it is absolutely necessary. Is it possible to accept "kulaks" into the collective farm? Answer: under no circumstances should a "sworn enemy of the Soviet regime" be allowed into the collective farm. And do not call for the army, even for the construction battalion.

What to do with them? Firstly, the most malicious (according to the classifier of the OGPU - the 1st category, "counter-revolutionary kulak activists"), undoubtedly, will be shot. second

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ry, how many "great construction projects" are around and how there are not enough working hands.

After all, in the significant April 1929, the HUT party conference approved the first five-year plan. Justifying it, Stalin explained:

"We are 50-100 years behind the advanced countries. We have to run this distance in 10 years. Either we do it, or we will be crushed."

They staked on the accelerated development, first of all, of the advanced branches of heavy industry (the production of means of production), which could become the basis for the industrialization of other areas of the economy. And here, as the Shakhty case and other similar cases showed, it was impossible to do without emergency measures. So the masses of dispossessed kulaks came in handy (during the three months of 1930, more than half a million "kulaks of the 2nd category" were evicted to remote and uninhabited areas), "saboteurs", unfinished enemies of the people who did not realize the delights of comradely cultivation of the land, and other capitalist elements, hindered the advance of socialism. Inept planning, their own incompetence, failures in the economy and agriculture were blamed on them.

It was they, the gratuitous labor force, who mastered the Far North and the Far East, dug canals, built factories and power plants, mined nickel and apatite, washed gold, along the way, were reformed under the guidance and vigilant guard of wonderful people — Chekists.

For the sake of a great goal, all property and passports were taken away from the collective farmers. And in order not to feel deprived of the care of the Soviet government, in return they gave the Law on strengthening criminal liability for theft and plunder of collective farm property of August 7, 1932. In the first year and a half alone, 125,000 "respected grain growers" were arrested and convicted under the "law of three spikelets", of which 5,400 people were shot.

The "victorious proletariat" received a seven-day working week without the right to dismiss and a propiska system, teenagers were attached to the machine from the age of 14 and benefited

whether the extension to them of all measures of social protection on an equal basis with adults, up to "towers".

The USSR skillfully used the global economic crisis to purchase equipment, technologies and specialists abroad. During the years of the first five-year plan, about 95% of Soviet industrial enterprises received Western assistance. Everything could be bought from the ruined, "decaying capitalists", from oil refining equipment to secret tanks, engines, guidance systems, aircraft and torpedoes. Cooperation with Western firms and the use of cheap labor from the Soviet population made it possible to lay the foundation for modern heavy industry.

True, at the same time in 1932-1933 there were more than two thousand armed uprisings against forced collectivization, an unprecedented famine "happened" in the plundered village (only in Ukraine, about 20% of the entire rural population died, it was even worse in Central Asia).), but these counter-revolutionary attacks could not prevent the movement "at full speed along the path of industrialization." As for the endless series of corpses on both sides of the canvas, this is just "the spent human material of the capitalist era."

But what were the achievements! During the five-year period, more than 1,500 plants and factories were built, including automobile, aviation, tractor, steam locomotive, artillery, ammunition, weapons, heavy industry was created, new deposits were developed, the fuel and energy base was improved, new economic centers in the Urals. The military-industrial complex developed at an accelerated pace.

These successes looked especially impressive against the backdrop of the economic crisis that engulfed the countries of Western democracy. Thus, the level of French industrial production for most of the 1930s was below 1913. By 1933, industrial production in the United States fell to 64% compared with the level of 1929, in England - to 88%, in Germany - to 65%. Miro

The whole trade was reduced to 65%. The number of unemployed in the capitalist world was 30 million people. True, cannibalism was not observed there.

In the same memorable year of 1929, the Soviet Union, "considering the likelihood of an attack," began to deploy an unprecedented program (five-year plan) of military construction. The main directions of development of the Soviet Armed Forces were determined in the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of July 15, 1929 "On the state of the country's defense". In November, the post of head of armaments of the Red Army was established, which was entrusted with the responsibility and management of issues of technical re-equipment of the armed forces. I.P. was approved as the first head of armaments. Uborevich, from July 1931 - M.N. Tukhachevsky.

In the summer of 1930, at a meeting of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, the plan for the construction of the Red Army was considered and approved. The rearmament on a mass scale of the army and navy with the latest models of military equipment was envisaged; the creation of new technical arms; modernization of old systems; motorization and organizational restructuring of the old military branches; training of technical personnel and mastery of new equipment by personnel. The share of military spending in the state budget has steadily increased. In 1930-1931, Soviet industry annually produced 1911 artillery pieces, 174 thousand rifles, 41 thousand machine guns, 860 aircraft. Since 1931, mass production of T-26 tanks and the famous BT series began.

In June 1930, Stalin, frightening party members with the growing likelihood of external intervention, argued: the deeper the economic crisis experienced by world capitalism,

the more he wants to attack us and resolve "all contradictions, taken together, at the expense of the USSR." Then the well-known saying, instantly rhymed by songwriters, sounded:

"We don't want a single inch of foreign land. But we will not give even a single inch of our own land to anyone."

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In Voroshilov's speech, the no less famous program directive of the Red Army sounded: "We must build things in such a way as to achieve victory in the upcoming war "with little bloodshed and conduct this war on the territory of the country that will be the first to raise a sword against us."

In the 1920s, during a period of heated debate about military doctrine, Trotsky argued that the best course of action for the Red Army was a strategic defense and even a retreat inland to buy time to mobilize all forces and means. And only then, "having behind us space and numbers, we calmly and confidently outline the line where the mobilization provided by our elastic defense will prepare a sufficient fist for our transition to the offensive." In this regard, Lev Davidovich proposed to delete from the resolutions the declaration copied from the French charter (it began with the statement: "The French army ... does not recognize any other law than the offensive"), that the Red The army will be the most offensive of all the armies.

The strategy of a defensive war was put forward by the professor of the Military Academy A.I. Verkhovsky (1886-1938), who was not concerned about the Bolshevik grief for the heavy lot of the "oppressed" in other countries. A former officer of the Russian General Staff, he argued that a defensive battle provides major political benefits and allows you to build up forces, that it is better for the Red Army to prepare Poltava for the enemy than to dream of Cannes: "From this point of view, "It is more profitable for us to give Minsk and Kiev than to take Bialystok and Brest."

The Marxist Frunze suggested throwing out the most harmful arguments glorifying defense, and "except for the most necessary, do not carry out any defensive work, and it is better to spend money on repairing the barracks." He believed that future wars, due to the class contradictions tearing capitalism apart, "will approach our civil war in type", their essence will be maneuver operations on a large scale, therefore the Red Army must be educated "in the spirit of the greatest activity, prepare

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to the completion of the tasks of the revolution through vigorous, resolutely and boldly carried out offensive operations, "and the entire military mass" must learn the art of quickly and systematically carrying out march maneuvers. Retreat is a purely secondary type of combat operations, "a concept that is wholly included in the concept of an offensive."

True, Frunze did not yet plan to "maneuver" exclusively on foreign territory and, in order to fight a technically superior enemy, he considered it necessary to conduct a systematic and systematic preparation of "possible theaters" for waging a guerrilla war.

The concept of strategic defense was resolutely rejected as incompatible "with the spirit of the Soviet military doctrine", nevertheless, in the general complex of measures to prepare for war, it was planned to determine the future areas of partisan operations behind enemy lines and in its own border zone in peacetime. In future areas of hostilities, it was supposed to create a network of partisan cells, clandestine bases and warehouses with everything necessary for combat work.

| On August 1931, the Council of Labor and Defense, while adopting a large tank program, indicated that technical advances in the field of tank building in the USSR "created strong prerequisites for a radical change in the general operational-tactical doctrine." In 1932, the tractor and locomotive-building factories of the USSR produced 3,032 tanks and tankettes (France, the most powerful

land power, for 17 post-war years produced about 280 new tanks, England - about 80 tanks and 325 tankettes, Germany for obvious reasons - not a single combat vehicle), aviation - 2490 aircraft (USA - 1396, England - a little more than 1000) .

The formation of the first mechanized corps (about 500 tanks, over 200 armored vehicles, 60 guns each), separate mechanized brigades, tank and mechanized regiments began. The resolution of the Revolutionary Military Council, adopted on December 1, 1932, authorized the creation of mass airborne troops.

"A stupid fairy tale," proudly broadcast from the podium of the mausoleum

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Kliment Efremovich, - is the writing of the warmongers that the Bolsheviks are afraid of war. No, the Bolsheviks are not afraid of war, they do not want it and use all their strength to avoid it. But if, nevertheless, the imperialists attack us with war, we will fight with all the passion inherent in us, with all the brutal strength of 150 million free people. We know that all working people are behind us, we know that we will win."

At the same time, the history of the October Revolution and the Civil War was being rewritten. In 1929 Voroshilov published the book "I.V. Stalin and the Red Army", where he sang, in particular, Stalin's plan to defeat Denikin. In 1930, under the editorship of A.S. Bubnova, S.S. Kamenev iRP. Eideman published a major three-volume work "The Civil War of 1918-1921", in which Trotsky's activities were mentioned only as one of the reasons for the failures and defeats of the Red Army. Finally, in the festive order of the Military Council dated February 23, 1933, everything was put in its place:

"With the name of comrade. Stalin, the best Leninist, the leader of the Bolshevik Party, the leader of all working people, armed struggle, victories and the building of the Red Army are closely connected. During the years [of the civil war, the party always sent comrade. Stalin to the most dangerous and decisive fronts for the life of the proletarian revolution.

Subsequently, all Soviet general secretaries, checking their lives according to Stalin, certainly wanted to be listed as great commanders. It is clear that their wishes always found a response in the hearts of pocket historians-borzo-writers and court marshals. Thirty years later, S.M. Budyonny will fondly remember the young commissar of the 74th regiment of the 19th rifle division. At the same time, painstaking researchers, throwing the portrait of the mustachioed leader into the wastebasket and replacing it with the portrait of the bald leader, will get to the bottom of the fact that:

"It was he, Khrushchev, who was one of those under whose leadership the Red Army thwarted the black plan of the American

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to save the Kanan, British and French imperialists with the help of the Entente fleet from the complete defeat of Denikin's army. And he is "one of the active creators of the Red Army and the organizers of the victory of the young Republic of Soviets over foreign interventionists and internal counter-revolution." Along the way, they will remember the military "talents" innocently killed by the dictator - Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich ... Ten years later, the "martyrs" will again fade out of history, and the "inflexible" Marshal G.K. Zhukov will remember how he dreamed of meeting and reflecting alone with the famous political worker L.I. Brezhnev.

By the 1970s, the picture of the Civil War in Russia had been smeared over, rewritten and again smeared over so many times that on the epic canvas, besides Lenin, one could hardly see five or six figures of "legendary generals" – Budyonny, Frunze, Kotovsky, Chapaev, Shchors... That, perhaps, is all that the people know of several thousand commanders of the Red Army of the highest and middle levels.

By the beginning of the 1930s, Stalin's first independent steps in the international arena as the leader of the world proletariat date back. Having removed the Bukharinites from the leadership of the Comintern and the national parties, Iosif Vissarionovich appointed his secretary Molotov as the political leader, who quickly brought proper order among the violent freeloaders of the internationalists, turning this shop from the headquarters of the world revolution into "the office of Comrade Stalin on party affairs. Clara Zetkin was very offended: "The Comintern has turned from a living political organism into a dead mechanism that, on the one hand, swallows instructions in Russian, and on the other hand issues them in various languages ..." — a suitcase with "pebbles", and — "do not spare millions". |

The General Secretary's favorite hobby was the slogan: "The Party is strengthened by purifying itself."

In his speech at the historic Joint Plenum of 1929, he, in particular, noted that in Europe

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conditions for a new revolutionary upsurge. In this regard, the communists of different countries, along with the well-known task of "undermining and loosening" capitalism, face a more urgent one – intensifying the struggle against the right deviation and cleansing from social democratic traditions. The Social Democrats, at every step deceiving and luring the proletariat with promises, in the opinion of the leader, WERE the "social pillar of capitalism", worse than the fascists. Hence the struggle against the Social Democracy "is one of the main tasks of the sections of the Comintern."

All national communist parties received in November a directive from the ECCI to break all ties with the Social Democrats, expose their "fascist" nature and form revolutionary trade unions. As D.3 admitted later. Manuilsky:

"The question was that, ignoring the fight against fascism, we focused our fire on the Social Democrats and believed that by fighting the Social Democrats, we were all the more crushing fascism."

As a result, while the communists and socialists squabbled with each other, less than a year later, the National Socialist Party of Germany legally, democratically won the elections to the Reichstag. In January 1933, its leader, Adolf Hitler, "the unknown soldier of the world war", became Chancellor and very soon turned the heads of both the Communists and the Social Democrats.

Some people argue that this is exactly what Stalin wanted by assigning the Fuhrer the role of the icebreaker of the revolution. Although it's incredible. Iosif Vissarionovich did not live in exile, did not know foreign languages and the processes taking place in Europe, did not understand the mentality of Western leaders well. He placed any event outside the USSR in the Procrustean bed of class struggle and dissected it with the scalpel of Marxism. Therefore, making individual decisions, introducing into them his own likes and dislikes (well, he did not like the Poles, even more the British, but the Germans and Americans were impressed), he almost always made mistakes in foreign policy issues. What he indirectly admitted to the writer Emil Ludwig: "Based on the experience of three

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revolutions, we know that out of approximately 100 individual decisions that have not been verified or corrected collectively, 90 decisions are one-sided ... No, one cannot decide alone."

Based on the turbulent experience of building socialism in a single country and the course of party discussions, we also know that by December 1931, when the interview was given, there could only be two opinions - Stalinist and incorrect, anti-party. Another thing is that obliging propaganda passed off any failures as incredible successes of the wise Stalinist policy or blamed them on the machinations of enemies. In this story, the victory of Nazism in Germany was explained by the betrayal of the Social Democrats, who "cleared the way for fascism." The fascist states indeed directly grew out of social democracy, but the reason for this is the united desire to curb

communist bacillus. Academician Ivan Pavlov argued for a reason: "Before your revolution, there was no fascism."

In January 1934, in the report of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the KhUP to the Party Congress, it was stated with a feeling of deep satisfaction that the five-year plan had been completed in four years - "we have done more than we ourselves expected", that as a result of the struggle of the Soviet people for early implementation of the first five-year plan The Soviet Union was transformed, throwing off the guise of backwardness and the Middle Ages, and became an advanced industrial-collective-farm power. The congress adopted a resolution on the second five-year plan for the development of the national economy for 1933-1937, "directing the material resources of the country, the will of the party and the energy of the masses to complete the technical reconstruction." It said:

"The fulfillment of the second five-year plan will further strengthen the significance of the USSR as a bulwark of the struggle of the international proletariat, will raise even higher in the eyes of the working, exploited masses of the whole world the prestige of the Land of Soviets as the support base of the world proletarian revolution."

Extensive development during the period of creating the foundations of modern industry in the years of the first
the five-year plan was replaced by

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second five-year plan with more systematic industrial construction, intensive development of production capacities and increase in production. True, labor productivity, despite all the reports of the Stakhanovites, remained three times less than in England and Germany, and will never surpass it. The congress ended with a storm of applause, the singing of the "Internationale" and shouts of "Long live Stalin."

By this time, collective farms united about three-quarters of all peasant farms and about 90% of all sown areas. The petty-bourgeois element in the countryside was finally tamed: the peasant was reduced to the position of a serf, entirely dependent on the favors of the secretaries of the regional committees and representatives.

Bukharin's slogan: "Get rich!" — that is, increase material well-being with your work, the slogan "In essence exploitative", calling for the restoration of capitalism, was replaced by the Stalinist slogan: "Make all collective farmers prosperous". To put it into practice, all that was required was "to work honestly on the collective farm, to use tractors and machines correctly, to use work animals correctly, to cultivate the land correctly, to protect collective farm property", and the state will take care of you, the state will "make you" (The win-win strategy of any dictatorship is to take everything from the people, and then do them good deeds with handouts. The personal translator of the leader, V. M. Berezhkov, recalled how much joy there was when, on January 1935, ration cards were abolished in the cities: "Although we did not believe in a turn for the better, we toasted a "new bright stage" in our lives and, of course, drank to Stalin, who, as promised, led us to the path of abundance. We were taught to thank Stalin for everything that in a normal country, the people should have by right").

Stalin's apologists like to endlessly replicate the reviews of the foreign press about the first five-year plan in the USSR

"The success achieved in the engineering industry is beyond doubt. The praise of these successes in the press and in speeches is by no means unjustified.

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... The USSR is currently producing all the equipment necessary for its metallurgical and electrical industries. He managed to create his own automobile industry. He created the production of implements and tools that cover the whole gamut from the smallest instruments of great precision up to

the heaviest presses. As far as agricultural machines are concerned, the USSR is no longer dependent on imports from abroad" — the newspaper "Rshapala!Titez".

"The four years of the five-year plan have brought with them truly remarkable achievements. The Soviet Union worked with wartime intensity on the creative task of building the foundations of life. The face of the country is literally changing beyond recognition..." — Manop magazine.

"He really solved the most difficult problem for Europe - he eliminated unemployment. He built excellent roads and revived the economy by manufacturing armaments, building barracks, and calling for conscription. No one explained to the people that most of his program included unproductive labor, the results of which could not increase the welfare of the country, since the product of this labor could not be exported ... The purchasing power of the state allegedly grew, because it printed money that could be spent ... "- stop! It seems that this is about Hitler - also a socialist, he was just unfolding his four-year plan.

Of course, no one read the articles themselves, and the first two quotations were snatched from the Stalinist report "Results of the First Five-Year Plan" made at the Joint Plenum on January 7, 1933. It also contained completely opposite reviews, and Iosif Vissarionovich, unlike his current defenders, was not afraid to voice them:

"A review of the present state of affairs in Russia, therefore, leads to the conclusion that the five-year program has failed both in regard to its declared aims and even more fundamentally in regard to its basic social principles"—St.

"Collectivization has failed miserably. She brought Russia to the brink of starvation" - the opinion of MeWoRK Titez.

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If you think about it, the first group of statements does not contradict the second. It's just that some observers wrote about "amazing activity", power plants and blast furnaces, others about the fact that they were erected and stand on bones. While the newspaper Pravda published Comrade Stalin's greetings to the workers and personnel of the "steel stronghold of collectivization" of the Kharkov tractor industry, the Italian consul reported to his superiors in Rome: "...every night in Kharkov they collect 250 corpses of those who died from hunger and typhoid. It has been noticed that a large number of them do not have a liver ... from which they prepare pies and trade them in the market.

In addition, the successes of accelerated industrialization and collectivization are in many respects the successes of Soviet propaganda.

It became somehow even indecent to ask one more question: what for the sake of such sacrifices? To rivet 3,000 tanks every year, which will ingloriously burn out in the first days of the war and be declared obsolete? Or maybe life has become better? Well, yes, Comrade Stalin just announced that "life has become better, life has become more fun", and he cited figures in his report proving that in 1932 "the growth of the national income", compared to 1928, amounted to 85%. But it was impossible to eat this very "people's income": in 1932-1933, Comrade Stalin exported 34 million centners of grain, tens of thousands of tons of meat and dairy products.

Sholokhov's letter about the life of "wealthy collective farmers", summing up the results of collectivization in the Veshensky district, lay on the table of the General Secretary in April 1933:

"In this region, as in other regions, collective farmers and individual farmers are now dying of hunger; adults and children swell up and eat everything that a person is not supposed to eat, starting with carrion and ending with oak bark and all kinds of swamp roots. In a word, the district seems to be no different from the rest of our region... Since the moment of complete collectivization, the sown area has almost doubled...

Of the 50,000 population, no less than 49,000 are starving. Exhausted, swollen from hunger, collective farmers who gave fear

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not 2,300,000 poods of grain, currently eating the devil knows what, they probably won't produce what they produced last year... All this, taken together, leads to the conclusion that the plan for sowing the collective farms of the region is on time, definitely won't do it. But the grain tax will have to be paid not from the area actually sown, but from the control figure of the plan sent by the region. Consequently, the history of grain procurements in 1932 will repeat itself in 1933. Here are the prospects ... "

Stalin's cadres, Stalin's people's commissars, loyal Stalin's disciples, people specially and carefully selected by Stalin led the great achievements and turning points. Like the former ones, they had all the outward attributes of leaders, were decorated with orders, merits, cities were also renamed in their honor, collective farms, enterprises, educational institutions and subways were given their name. But, unlike the violent, always arguing on any occasion "Leninist guard", they knew who they owe everything to, who is the Boss in the house.

Joseph Vissarionovich achieved his goal. Separate "mechanisms" of the power machine he designed still required additional running-in and refinement, some "gears" and "bolts" will definitely have to be changed during operation, but on the whole it is pleasing to the eye - how the ranks have aligned, discipline has strengthened, how opinions have become more orderly, what uniformity in thoughts and even in dress. It was no accident that when speaking about the party, Stalin used military terminology:

"In our party, if we mean its leading strata, there are 3-4 thousand top leaders. This, I would say, is the generals of our party. Next come 30,000-40,000 middle managers. This is our Party officers. Next come about 100,000-150,000 of the lowest Party level. This, so to speak, is our party non-commissioned officer."

On February 10, 1934, immediately after the "Congress of the Winners", the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks formed the Politburo of the Stalinist Na-

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boron in the composition: I.V. Stalin (the modest General Secretary of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks), V.M. Molotov (graduated from a real school; chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR), L.M. Kaganovich (self-taught; first secretary of the Moscow Party Committee, secretary of the agricultural department of the Central Committee; as chairman of the Central Commission for checking the party ranks, he led the purge of the party that took place in 1933-1934), M.I. Kalinin (two classes of a rural school; chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR), S.K. Ordzhonikidze (paramedic school; people's commissar for heavy industry), K.E. Voroshilov (one class of a rural school; People's Commissar of Defense), S.M. Kirov (technical school; first secretary of the Leningrad Provincial Committee and the North-Western Bureau of the Central Committee), A.A. Andreev (two classes of a rural school; People's Commissar of Railways), S.V. Kosior (elementary factory school; General Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine), V.V. Kuibyshev (university semester; Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Deputy Chairman of the SNK and STO).

Candidates: A.I. Mikoyan (graduated from the theological seminary, studied at the theological academy for less than a year, there, having changed his outlook, he joined the party; People's Commissar of Supply), G.I. Petrovsky (two classes of the "exemplary school" at the city gymnasium; chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee), P.P. Postyshev (self-taught; secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine), Ya.E. Rudzutak (two classes of the parish school; People's Commissar of the RKI of the USSR and chairman of the Central Control Commission), V.Ya. Chubar (technical school; chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine).

Later, the following were introduced into the Politburo: A.A. Zhdanov (real school), R.I. Eikh (elementary school), N.I. Yezhov (he wrote: "unfinished lower"), N.S. Khrushchev (workers' faculty).

Most of the "members" and "candidates for membership" in the column "education" had the most miserable record, and, with all the ability to work "miracles", it remained beyond their strength to correctly write a short letter or note for many of them. task. When appointed to the highest posts, such a criterion as literacy, in principle, did not matter. "In itself, the literacy of the population does not speak of its culture," argued the Small Soviet Encyclopedia.

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pedia," because the literate may not use their skills to acquire knowledge for years." So Comrade Voroshilov, who headed the Armed Forces, was illiterate, but terribly cultured - he loved opera (and opera singers) and reading aloud.

Of course, education is not the most important thing for a politician. Politics is not a profession, but a desire for power. But politicians, in the sense of people fighting for power, they were not. There could be only one politician, the rest - only conductors of his decisions in life, tools. (Although there should be a limit to militant ignorance. Stalin was considered a tough and smart politician, but the amendment "for a fool" was not provided for in his machine of absolute power. The whole world shuddered when a man who could hardly write a word climbed to the top of the totalitarian pyramid "Khrushch", and began brandishing a thermonuclear baton, promising to "bury capitalism." In the simplicity of his soul, Nikita Sergeevich believed it was quite possible to win a nuclear war: the Americans are still kaput, and the Soviet people somehow get better - there are a lot of people and territories, not so seen.)

None of the above persons can be called an outstanding political figure, just like Molotov - an outstanding diplomat, and Voroshilov - an outstanding commander. Among them were really outstanding organizers, outstanding overseers, highly experienced apparatchiks, and they were all executioners, bound by mutual responsibility.

Thus, Lazar Kaganovich (1893-1991) — a copy, only much larger, of those described in Sholokhov's letter of grain procurement commissioners — at the January Plenum of 1933 complained that leaders at various levels did not widely use such a tried and tested educational tool as execution, and called for tougher repression. Criticizing the vicious prosecutorial and judicial practice in the field, he urged to think, first of all, not about the observance of laws, but about the unquestioning implementation of party resolutions.

And

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government. Vyacheslav Molotov (1890-1986) personally signed thousands of death sentences.

In the revolution, they did not win special laurels, but each was "an irreconcilable fighter of the party against Trotskyism, the right opposition and other anti-party trends and groups, the most devoted disciple and assistant of Comrade Stalin in the struggle to unite the party ranks, to strengthen the Leninist-Stalinist unity of the party" ; everyone had merit in organizing the genocide and returning the peasantry to serfdom, everyone, without flinching in the face, could absorb the delicacies laid down according to their position to the cries of the dying of hunger

right outside the windows spets-dining room.

Ordzhonikidze wrote to Kirov: "... the cadres who went through the situation of 1932-1933 and withstood it were tempered like steel. I think that with them it will be possible to build a State that history has not yet known.

No one tried to indulge in theoretical philosophizing - not a hat for Senka (they got so out of the habit that for forty years after Stalin's death they didn't come up with anything new in "scientific communism", except for the "developed socialism" that burst in 1991 with a bang ;

Khrushchev's program to catch up and overtake America in 10 years was announced by Stalin in 1939). At meetings of the Politburo, they could discuss issues, argue and swear among themselves, but the Secretary General always spoke last. He drew a line beyond which the conversations ended.

Trotsky wrote:

"He directed his attention to people of a primitive disposition, low culture, strong will and weak intellect... To cope with people who surpassed him, he selected an apparatus from people who obeyed him."

The entire Stalinist "generals" Lev called "the kingdom of arrogant mediocrity." All mistakes, blunders, miscalculations naturally stemmed from militant ignorance, incompetence, cruelty, lack of experience, inability to think at the level of major leaders and the desire to fulfill the Leader's instructions at any cost.

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One falcon Lenin, another falcon Stalin, And all around the falcons flew in a flock ...

Energy, determination, strong will, widely practiced methods of intimidation and coercion allowed them to manage any assigned business. According to the Stalinist methodology, they rebuilt the structures they led, selected and placed personnel, and prepared the country for war.

Just in January 1934, Comrade Stalin pointed out:

"Things are obviously moving towards a new war... Nomes are not afraid of threats and are ready to respond with a blow to the blow of the instigators of WAR... And those who try to attack our country will receive a crushing it was for them to poke their pig's snout into our Soviet garden."

At the same time, there is no doubt that the foreign proletariat and "numerous friends of the working class of the USSR" will not fail to seize the opportunity and strike at the rear of "their oppressors who have started a war against the fatherland of the working class of all countries."

In reality, "the world's first socialist state" was not threatened by anyone. The conclusion of non-aggression treaties with Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Poland in 1937 secured the northwestern borders from their possible anti-Soviet union and made it possible to conclude a Soviet-French non-aggression pact on November 29 of the same year. In September 1934, the USSR joined the League of Nations. On May 2, 1932, France signed a mutual assistance treaty with the Soviet Union, although without a military convention.

But the events in Europe and the Far East testified to a deep crisis in the Versailles system of international relations. In 1931 the Japanese army invaded Northeast China, and in 1932 occupied Manchuria.

Germany at the beginning of 1935 announced the abandonment of military restrictions. On March 10, the creation of the Air Force was officially announced in Berlin, and on March 16, the introduction of general military

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Indian duty. On June 18, an Anglo-German agreement on naval armaments was concluded. In October, the Italians invaded Ethiopia. A strong Germany was needed by British politicians to limit French hegemony on the Continent. Paris flirted with Rome. Moreover, both the British and the French viewed fascism as a counterbalance to Bolshevism. All the great powers were spinning the flywheel of the arms race on the eve of a new fight for the redivision of the world.

The main goal of the foreign policy of the Soviet state was the global reorganization of international relations by "rocking" the capitalist camp, preventing the consolidation of the great powers, promoting, if possible, the inevitable inter-imperialist conflict and using the "opportunity". The further strategy was thought out in 1925:

"Our banner remains the old banner of peace. But if the war breaks out, then we will not have to sit idly by, we will have to come out, but to come out last. And we will come out in order to throw a decisive weight on the scales, a weight that could outweigh "(from Stalin's speech at the January Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks).

From 1935, Stalin began the concrete preparation of the country for a future war.

On May 15, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to create the Defense Commission of the Politburo to lead the preparation of the country for war with the powers hostile to the USSR (Germany, Japan and Poland, in the first place; France and England, in the second). It included Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze. The commission's work was based on the principle: "We will beat the enemy on his own territory."

By the end of 1935, the transition from the mixed territorial-personnel principle of staffing the Red Army to a single personnel principle was basically completed. Short-term training camps of personnel in the conditions of saturation of the army with modern equipment no longer made it possible to provide

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the required level of training of fighters and commanders. A logical measure, in connection with the transformation of the army into a personnel one, seems to be the introduction on September 22 of personal military ranks. The resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR stated:

"Especially responsible tasks in the training and education of the Red Army masses, assigned to the commanding staff as a whole, and the leading role of commanders in battle require the establishment of military ranks that clearly reflect the military qualifications of each commander and commanding person, their service record and merits, their power and authority as commanders and chiefs of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army. In November, by a special decree, five of the most outstanding generals were awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union.

The Red Army in this period was already an impressive force. The total strength of the Soviet Armed Forces by 1935 was 1,200 thousand people, including 980 thousand in the ground forces. There were 4,400 tanks, tankettes and armored vehicles, over 6,000 aircraft in service. Organizationally, they were consolidated into 87 rifle and 32 cavalry divisions, 2 separate rifle, 12 tank and 3 rifle and machine gun brigades, 2 tank regiments, 4 tank battalions of the RGK.

Enormous work was done to prepare for a "small war": a network of sabotage groups was created in cities and on railways, detachments capable of deploying into large partisan formations were formed and comprehensively prepared, and secret warehouses of food, explosives, weapons and ammunition were laid. . Bridges, large pipes, depots, water towers, high embankments and deep excavations were prepared in advance for explosions. So, to | January 1930, in the border zone of the South-Western Railway, up to 200 km deep, from the personnel of the border troops and the paramilitary guards of the railways, in addition to the subversive teams of two railway regiments, more than 60 partisan subversive teams with a total number of about 1400 people were trained.

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century. Special mine tubes, niches and chambers have been equipped on the railway and at facilities. Similar work was carried out in the Belorussian and Leningrad districts.

The plan developed by the Headquarters of the Red Army in the early 1930s to repel "foreign intervention" provided for the deployment of guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines from the first days of the war, including outside the Soviet Union. To this end, in addition to the 3rd Special Purpose Airborne Brigade, 33 full-time and non-staff special-purpose battalions were created in the Moscow and border districts.

In accordance with the task set by the Defense Commission, Soviet strategists began to draw up new plans. They considered Polysha in alliance with Germany to be a likely adversary. Czechoslovakia was considered as a possible ally.

"For the next period of time," wrote M.N. Tukhachevsky, "to beat the enemy on his territory" means to beat the Polish-German forces on Polish territory.

In order to pre-empt the enemy's deployment, disrupt the mobilization and transfer of forces, the war must "flare up unexpectedly" and begin with the immediate entry into Western Belarus and Ukraine of the Soviet invasion armies, supported by strong aircraft:

"Thus, invasion operations disrupt the terms of enemy concentration if the war began without a pre-mobilization period, which strikes at the Polish mobilization; Finally, invasion operations most reliably ensure their own strategic concentration...

Invasion operations are undertaken precisely because the strategic concentration is delayed and it must be ensured by an advance invasion.

Following this, having completed the strategic deployment, the Belorussian and Ukrainian fronts from the line [native-Slonim-Luninets-Lvov go over to a joint offensive, and it is preferable to deliver the main blow from

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area south of Polissya "to the center of Poland", where the decisive clash will occur.

Various options for military operations were played out during the war games in April 1936 and January 1937. According to all calculations, it turned out that the available forces and means of the Red Army were not yet enough to defeat the Polish-German forces "in foreign territory": the number of divisions should be increased at least one and a half times and it was desirable to beat the opponents one by one - the young Wehrmacht was already considered dangerous adversary. But in any case, invasion operations must remain in force:

"They ensure the gain of time by disorganizing the areas of concentration planned by the enemy. In addition, invading operations immediately transfer military operations to the territory of the enemy.

Invasion operations with the massive use of aviation, large mobile formations and airborne troops were practiced and perfected in the maneuvers of the Kiev (1935), Belorussian and Moscow (1936) and other districts.

It is worth noting that Germany could not attack the USSR first, even in alliance with Poland. In 1935-1937, the power of the Nazis hung on a thread, twisted from the well-fed complacency of France and the impudence of Hitler. In March 1936, villainously carrying out the remilitarization of the Rhineland of his own country, the Fuhrer literally played Russian roulette, bringing War Minister Werner von Blomberg to the state of a "hysterical servant".

Meanwhile, the process of "arming the proletariat" continued with tripled vigor. During the two five-year plans, the USSR was radically transformed and became a powerful military and economic power. The country reached a high level of economic autarky, which made it possible to purposefully prepare for the struggle for strengthening Soviet influence in the world.

Military construction reached a special scale during the second five-year plan. If the total industrial growth for 1933-1937 was 120%, then in the military-industrial

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complex - 286%. The share of military spending in the country's budget jumped from 11.7% to 21%. About 40% of the estimate of the People's Commissariat of Defense was spent on the purchase of weapons and equipment.

The average annual productivity of the aviation industry in 1935-1937 reached 3,578 aircraft, the armored industry - 3,139 combat vehicles (the British army had 375 tanks in 1936), and the artillery industry - 5,020. The production of rifles crossed over a million a year. But these figures did not satisfy the War Department, whose funding became so generous that they did not have time to spend the money - the industry could not cope with orders. The number of armed forces exceeded one and a half million people.

Comrade Stalin was personally in charge of all issues of armament. He regularly summoned the chief designers, plant directors, discussed the characteristics of types of weapons, set production plans and immediately gave counter plans. "Without the approval of I.V. Stalin," Marshal Zhukov testifies, "not a single type of weaponry or military equipment was accepted into service or removed from service."

Iosif Vissarionovich, who had a colossal memory, capacity for work and extensive erudition, but at the same time a purely civilian person, decided for himself what the Red Army needed and what not. He, of course, consulted with specialists, who, by the way, changed quite often. But he decided for himself: to adopt this weapon - to remove this weapon from service, to remove the rear gunner from the attack aircraft - to put the rear gunner on the attack aircraft, to erase this constructor into camp dust - to get it out of the ground and entrust the responsible government task
nie.

That's all you can see! Even the "Military Historical Journal" raised the question of "inefficiently spent financial resources." What is it about? The fact that in 1934-1936 "practically all the tanks that rolled off the assembly line were obsolete", almost two billion rubles were spent on the production of scrap metal, "which is comparable

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apart from all the expenditures on education in the USSR during this period".

For example, during these three years more than 3,600 T-37A and T-38 two-seat amphibious tanks with 8 mm frontal armor, 40 horsepower engines, armed with one 7.62 mm machine gun were riveted (in general, they were in production 1933 to 1939). As the experience of hostilities in Poland and the Finnish campaign showed, these machine guns on caterpillars sank more readily than they swam, and on rough terrain they lagged behind the infantry and were "not able to walk on the slightest bit of mud." Nevertheless, the "scouts", suitable only for parade passes, were in service until 1941 and disappeared absolutely uselessly, as if there were none. Not a single tanker left memoirs: "I fought on the T-37."

Or what was the point of producing 11,000 T-26 tanks with bulletproof armor during the natural revolution in military technology? Yes, simply because the scale we have is socialist, the country is large. Vaughn, Zhukov will complain that he lacks 25,000 tanks of the latest design, and will receive these tanks. Like any dictator, Stalin had a penchant for megalomania, he liked big guns, big ships, armadas of tanks and planes. He understood that a lot of everything was needed to win: one hundred thousand military vehicles, one hundred thousand bombers, more chemical weapons (in a quarter of a century, another "faithful Leninist", to thunderous applause, would squander money countless, saw ships, change guns for missiles, will open and close the lunar project; he will be declared a half-wit, Stalin a genius).

However, at the age of 60, with an unthinkable workload of various affairs, it is difficult not only to penetrate, but even to understand the essence of such problems as radar, hydroacoustics, radio communications, cryptography, or what kind of thing is this - the fission of uranium? But the system was so arranged that there was no one else to think, and no one was allowed to make government decisions.

It has long become a commonplace saying - all the generals go

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prepare for the last war. The thinking of Stalin and most of the Soviet generals was shaped by the unconventional experience of the Civil War and the stereotype of a class approach.

Iosif Vissarionovich considered the war itself to be less complicated than collectivization, the main thing was to prepare thoroughly and place personnel correctly. He did not take military professionals seriously. Stalin's telegram to Lenin dated June 16, 1919 is very characteristic.

of the year:

"Marine experts argued that taking Krasnaya Gorka from the sea upsets marine science. I can only bemoan so-called science. The rapid capture of Krasnaya Gorka is explained by the most rude interference on the part of me and civilians in general in operational affairs, which went as far as canceling orders by sea and land and imposing their own. I consider it my duty to declare that I will continue to act in this way, despite all my reverence for science.

With each passing year, Iosif Vissarionovich's confidence in his military talents only grew stronger. And that is to say, the most illustrious generals of the country learned from him the science of winning.

"I cannot but briefly recall one of the classic lessons that was given to us from the commanding heights of the Tsaritsyno fields by the great strategist of class battles, comrade Stalin," marshal A.I. Yegorov, who himself commanded the fronts and led the conduct of strategic operations. But where is Egorov up to the "giant of thought": "Combat operations carried out by comrade Stalin are an indelible lesson in our minds as examples of classical military art of the era of the CIVIL WAR."

The most important thing on the eve of the Great War is to bring order to the house, to turn the USSR into a single military labor camp, cemented by faith and fear.

On May 15, 1935, another "organ" was created - the Special Commission of the Politburo for Security - to guide

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elimination of "enemies of the people". It included Stalin, Zhdanov, Yezhov, Shkiryatov, Malenkov and Vyshinsky. This commission was to be guided by Stalin's slogan: "In order to successfully beat the enemy at the front, one must first destroy the enemies in one's own rear." The goal is to ensure the creation of "moral and political unity of the Soviet people".

For any dictator, eliminating political rivals is the number one concern.

Iosif Vissarionovich went to the top for fifteen years, overcoming the resistance of real enemies, ideological opponents, stubborn and doubting. By their intrigues, he explained all the difficulties and all the failures. He used to look for enemies everywhere and found them everywhere. Enemies were among the "Leninist Guard", right and left opposition, engineers-saboteurs, military men, diplomats, traitor peoples and in their own families. Like Marat, he could say: "No earthly force can prevent me from seeing traitors and exposing them, probably due to the higher organization of my mind."

Lenin recommended killing not only enemies, but also accomplices and those who could be accomplices, "doubtful and vacillating." Once started, it was time to finish the job, and at the same time clean the ranks. Too many offended people have accumulated - leaders removed from the helm, deprived of the opportunity to rule by the military, relegated to the background of the "old Bolsheviks", "imagining themselves irreplaceable", arrogant and snickering party nobles, simply "staggering". They corresponded, met, discussed something, and even conceived. Undoubtedly, there were those who slept and saw Comrade Stalin in a coffin in white slippers.

The results of the vote at the last congress proved the existence of a hidden opposition. In the face of a new danger, the "faithful disciples" rallied even closer around the Leader. In the summer of 1936, Stalin began a systematic purge of the top echelon of the party. Nikolai Yezhov (1895-1940) was already trying on his famous mittens.

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As a result of the painstaking work of correctly oriented NKVD investigators, a picture emerged of a grandiose conspiracy that entangled all structures. It was headed by Zinoviev and Kamenev, expelled from the party three times, sentenced to 10 years, but never disarmed. Secret threads stretched abroad, to Trotsky, to whom else. The "conspirators" had already carried out the assassination of Kirov and were now planning to seize the Kremlin, physically eliminate Comrade Stalin and members of the Politburo, the list is attached. After that, Trotsky enters Moscow and "restores capitalism".

The long-broken Zinoviev confessed everything at once and declared his readiness to do everything "in order to earn forgiveness, indulgence." It was necessary to tinker with Kamenev, but he quickly gave up. On August 19, an open trial took place in the House of Unions in the case of the United Trotskyist-Zinoviev Center. Fifteen people were brought to trial, famous party members - Zinoviev, Kamenev, Smirnov, Mrachkovsky, Reinhold...

The process went like clockwork. Under the weight of "irrefutable evidence," all the accused confessed to terrorist activities, repented, and unanimously demanded that they be shot. "My perverted Bolshevism turned into anti-Bolshevism," Zinoviev lamented, "and through Trotskyism I came to fascism. Trotskyism is a variety of fascism."

They were killed on the night of August 26th. Then their children were killed. To the stormy applause of the nomenclature, which has not yet realized the full depth of the Leader's plan.

"Destroy this bastard! It is not a matter of annihilating ambitious people who have reached the height of the greatest crime, it is a question of destroying the agents of fascism who were ready to help kindle the fire of war, facilitate the victory of fascism, in order to get at least a specter of power out of its hands, - denounced Karl Radek (1885 —1939). "People who have taken up arms against the lives of their beloved leaders of the proletariat must pay with their heads for their immeasurable guilt. Trotsky, the main organizer of this gang and its affairs, has already been nailed to history.

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her to the pillory. He cannot escape the verdict of the world proletariat."

For the sake of a pogrom publication, the arrest of Karl himself was decided to be postponed for a while, he knew how, scoundrel, burn with the verb.

"There are not enough words to fully express my indignation and disgust. These are people who have lost the last features of their human appearance. They must be destroyed, destroyed like carrion that infects clean, cheerful air," Georgy Pyatakov choked with indignation.

Antonov-Ovseenko burst out with an article in Izvestia about "a special detachment of fascist saboteurs with whom there can be only one conversation - execution!" and glorified "Comrade Stalin,

who sees the future with an eagle eye, ensures unity, turned the USSR into a mighty granite cliff".

Vladimir Alexandrovich forgot about his Trotskyist past, so he will soon be reminded.

Chekists have already pulled out participants in future political trials for face-to-face confrontations, together with the accused they edited the testimony, perfected the wording, and invented details. The bloody dwarf Yezhov described the mechanics of the consequence with delightful immediacy:

"Before giving the protocol to the accused for signature, it was first looked through by the investigator, then handed over to higher authorities, and important protocols even reached the people's commissar. The People's Commissar made instructions, said that it was necessary to write it down like this, and not like that, and then the protocol was given to the accused to sign.

On January 23-29, 1937, another trial of Lenin's comrades-in-arms took place - the case of the "parallel Trotskyist center". It was attended by the old Bolsheviks, the repentant and forgiven oppositionists, the honored leaders of the party of "miracles" Pyatakov, Radek, Serebryakov, Sokolnikov, Muralov and others - a total of 17 people. As it turned out, they also killed Kirov, engaged in espionage, sabotage and training of terrorist groups,

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made plans for the defeat of the Soviet Union in the war with Germany, spoiled the clean air and dreamed of restoring the "capitalist order".

At the trial, they all confessed so readily that the famous German writer Lion Feuchtwanger (1884-1958), who was present in the hall, subsequently wrote: everything that happened with the maximum degree of accuracy.

To the very point: Radek, dejected by the literary mediocrity of the investigator, scribbled protocols on himself with his own hand, Pyatakov wildly fantasized about how he secretly flew by plane to Oslo to establish contact with Trotsky and negotiate German intervention.

Having meticulously sorted everything out, the court sentenced 13 people to death, four were "imprisoned" and killed a little later, in the camps.

Having betrayed all his friends and students, N.I. Bukharin wrote:

"The fact that the bastards were shot is excellent: the air immediately cleared ... Koba! I saw how the spirit of Ilyich rests on you.

Bukharin's turn will come, morally he was already a dead man, "a little soul burdened with a corpse", writing letters of love to Stalin at his leisure, poems about a happy life in the USSR and an appeal to the "Future Generation of Party Leaders":

"I ask the new, young and honest generation of party leaders to read out my letter at the Plenum of the Central Committee, to justify and reinstate me in the party. Know, comrades, that on the banner that you will carry in a victorious march towards communism, there is also my drop of blood."

"These are the bastards we worked with... And if it weren't for these repressive methods, they wouldn't be so afraid - you also need to keep in mind," Molotov, who lived to a ripe old age, threw up his hands.

"But now they say that the prosecution did not have any facts, except for the confession of the accused that is not yet

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proof of guilt, "felix Chuev, who spoke with him, doubted.

"What more proof of guilt is needed," replied Molotov, "when we already knew that they were guilty, that they were enemies!"

At one time, Bukharin himself formulated: "In a revolution, the one who breaks the skull of another wins." Comrade Stalin turned out to be quicker, he never turned his back. He, a true revolutionary, indefatigably perforated the back of his head. To whom a bullet, to whom an alpenstock. That's why he won. And the air became cleaner and more cheerful.

Across the country, "where people breathe so freely," a full-scale hunt for "enemies of the people" and members of their families unfolded. The Center lowered quotas for shooting people through the administrative chain in every republic and every region. From the seats they shouted: "Not enough!" — and put forward counter plans. "Dear Comrade Stalin," complained the first secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee. - Ukraine sends you 17-18 thousand arrested people every month. Moscow approves 2-3 thousand. Please take action. Your loving Nikita Khrushchev.

The repressive machine was gaining momentum. Party members and non-party members, workers and peasants, schoolchildren and professors, atheists and clergymen, housewives and members of the Central Committee of the party, artists and Chekists perished in the bloody meat grinder.

At the February-March Plenum of 1937, the General Secretary made a famous report: "On the Shortcomings of Party Work and Measures to Eliminate Trotskyists and Other Double Dealers":

"It must be remembered: no successes can annul the fact of capitalist encirclement... As long as there is capitalist encirclement, there will be sabotage, terror, sabotage, spies sent into the rear of the Soviet Union... We must smash, discard the rotten theory that that with each advance we make our class struggle will fade away..."

Delegates - members of the Politburo, party bosses and chief

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you of the national economy zealously, in a race, reported on successes in exposing pests. They, the owners of a new life, always liked this business, so far they had fun.

The stenographers recorded bouts of joyful animation. Evening session | March 1937. Here is the speech of People's Commissar for Water Transport Pakhomov:

"Recently, they just started to check the personnel and already such a bouquet. Serdyuk is the head of the Dnepropetrovsk shipping company, Khandozhko is the deputy head of the Yenisei shipping company — I name the names of people who have already been exposed and arrested. (Laughter) Zimin is the head of the mechanical ship service, Kuvshinov is the deputy head of the Upper Volga Shipping Company, Bovin is the head of the Control Center of the Upper Volga Shipping Company, Samartsev is the deputy head of the Upper Volga Shipping Company. Head of the Moscow-Oka Shipping Company. (STALIN. Bovin was also arrested?) He was also arrested, he also turned out to be a bastard. (Molotov. Properly arrested?) Correct. (MOLOTOV. Didn't you know before?) No, I didn't.

I'm not going to take up your time by reading out a large list, I have this list for 77 people (laughter), of which 2/3 have been arrested. (STALIN. Not enough.) Comrade. Stalin, I told you that this is only the beginning. (Laughter of the whole hall.) ...

We must work in a new way, and for this we MUST first of all uncover all pests. How can they be revealed? If we take this fact and really consider it, consider in a new way why this happened, then we will go all the way and reveal one or two more bastards, I assure you. And as soon as we catch two or three bastards, these two or three bastards will give another two or three bastards. (Laughter.)".

From the speech of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Yezhov:

"For example, in the State Bank of the USSR, we uncovered a fairly powerful Trotskyist organization of up to 20 people... (VOICES FROM LOCAL. Great! Wow)... In terms of the People's Commissariat of Light Industry, we are, in essence, just turning around. Although 141 active pests and saboteurs have already been convicted in our country. Of these, a fairly significant group was shot."

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Pests were hiding everywhere. Explosions in mines, accidents - sabotage and "wrecking labor protection", lack of funds - "wrecking instructions for lending to agriculture", sewerage does not work - "wrecking project preparation". Along the way, they admitted to their own incompetence:

"We need, comrade business executives, to thoroughly dig and find out where the secrets are in projects, and enterprises, and workshops, and units ... So, in order for us not to have wrecking things, for this we must, firstly, know ourselves and be able to truly understand all matters, and secondly, take under real control, under real verification, those decisive things that we need.

Stalin (he is preparing for war, providing a "reliable rear", Molotov explained the Great Terror in this way) carefully observed this bacchanalia, conducted a selection: with whom it would be possible to "go on reconnaissance", whom it was time to lower into the basement, who else would be useful. On the desk of the General Secretary are no longer Lenin's volumes—theoretical disputes are long over—but the history of the deeds of Ivan the Terrible:

"In such a slow and sure way, all local charters were destroyed. Veche disappeared, the squad turned into court servants, depending in everything on the personal disposition of the prince. The prince himself and his power rose to an unattainable height, and the greatness of this power was evident to everyone, for there was a flat field around. In the margins - Stalin's notes: "Teacher ... teacher ..."

Immediately after the end of the Plenum, the general directive of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks followed, which stated that "now the weakness of our people is not their technical backwardness, but political carelessness, blind trust in people who accidentally received a party card, the need testing people not by their political declarations, but by the results of their work".

Not immediately, but it dawned on the party boyars that in the right to a bullet they were equalized with all happy Soviet people:

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"The top was gripped by fear. Everyone competed in cursing former friends and lied to each other, to father, and mother, and children, just to demonstrate loyalty to the "mustachioed". People were waiting for arrest from day to day and lied even to themselves, even in diaries, hoping that they would be read on investigation."

The change of personnel, which acquired the character of mass repressions, led to the fact that many leaders stopped thinking altogether, because any initiative is punishable, in an atmosphere of "wild hunting" it is mortally dangerous. An atmosphere of fear was instilled in society, paralyzing the will and leading to moral degradation. The party "generals" and the party "officers" fell into madness from the devotion and horror that overwhelmed the feverish brain.

Candidate member of the Politburo P.P. Postyshev: "...everywhere and everywhere he began to shout that there were no decent people anywhere, that there were many enemies... Often Postyshev called representatives of district committees to him, took a magnifying glass and began to examine student notebooks. The covers of all notebooks were torn off, because Postyshev saw a fascist swastika on the cover in the ornament!

But neither proletarian origin, coupled with a complete lack of education, nor merit in the collectivization of Ukraine, nor diligence in carrying out the Great Purge will help Pavel Petrovich. And with a magnifying glass, it must be admitted that he came up with a good idea. Every secretary of the city committee, district committee, party committee will acquire a magnifying glass in the Soviet country; everyone will look for and find — in children's notebooks, in drawings of fabrics, on money (the first Soviet money was just printed with a swastika) — secret fascist signs inflicted by the ubiquitous enemy agents. They would all be sent to Germany for illegal work, red stars on the Reichstag at night daub.

After each cleansing wave, the "leaders" became smaller, thinner in neck, became shorter in stature, poorer in mind. Party workers at all levels made up the most illiterate stratum of the Soviet "intelligentsia". On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, 70% of the secretaries of district and

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city committees of the party, as well as party committees of organizations and enterprises had only complete or incomplete lower education. Leaders at the level of the Union and Autonomous Republics, regional committees and regional committees differed little from their junior associates and accomplices: half of them had a general education in the amount of four years of primary school.

(The initial period of the war will once again confirm the well-known truth: executioners cannot be defenders. Party and Soviet workers scurrying to the east will become the most mobile "ground units", far surpassing the notorious tank groups both in speed and in terms of transport equipment. They will abandon secret documents, favorite magnifiers, ungrateful people, their duties to carry out mobilization activities, but they will not forget to take their wives, mistresses, chests of drawers and ficuses in tubs. Just a few examples, in just two weeks of the memorable summer of 1941:

"Leading officials of the Grodno, Novograd-Volynsky, Korostensky, Ternopilsky districts fled in a panic long before the withdrawal of our units, and instead of taking out material values, they took out personal belongings using the transport at their disposal..."

"In Pinsk, in a panic, they themselves blew up artillery warehouses and oil depots and announced that the Germans had blown them up with bombs, and the head of the garrison and the regional party committee fled to us in Luninets ..."

In Vitebsk a week before the arrival of the Germans:

"The regional executive committee dissolved its departments. Most of the workers and their families left. District councils also do not work and do not restore any order in the city. Now there is not a single institution in Vitebsk. Which would work. Everything closed and self-liquidated, including the regional court, people's courts, regional prosecutor's office, regional health, trade unions, etc. Grevoga and panic were intensified by the fact that it became known in the city that the responsible workers of the regional organization were evacuating their families themselves with property, having received on the railway. e. stations are independent carriages, and the wives of these respondent workers from the NKVD, the regional executive committee, party organs and others

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began to leave work on their own. So, for example, they left the telegraph, the telephone network, hospitals and other institutions...

... the chairman of the Vitebsk City Council, Azarenka, loaded a barrel of beer into a truck prepared by him in order to get drunk on the road, as he usually does in the city in his service ... "

"It should be noted that a number of workers of party and Soviet organizations left the districts to the mercy of fate, they are fleeing along with the population, sowing panic. The Secretary of the RK Klb)U and the Chairman of the RKK of the Khmel'nitsky region on 5.7 left the region and fled.

Together with the population is a strong word. Where do people get trucks and "independent wagons"? The secretary tribe left the population to the mercy of fate.

They will return only after three years, they will declare all those who remained in the occupied territories to be second-class people, "under the influence of fascism". And then for five decades they will sing about their "leading and guiding role", fill up the counters with waste paper about underground regional committees "in action" and about how "a party ticket made a fighter twice as strong.")

In March 1938, the last open political spectacle was staged in Moscow—the trial of the "Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights and Trotskyists." The main roles were played by N.I. Bukharin (in prison enlightenment descended on him - he realized the supreme expediency of Stalinist terror: "... there is some big and bold political idea of the General Purge: a) in connection with the prewar period, 6) in connection with the transition to democracy (?), this purge captures all a) guilty, 6) suspicious, c) potentially suspicious..."), N.I. Rykov, A.I. Yagoda, N.N. Krestinsky, A.P. Rozengolts, M.A. Chernov, I.A. Zelensky.

And these non-humans also killed Kirov, survived Gorky, Menzhinsky, Kuibyshev (his brother commander Nikolai Kuibyshev, commander of the troops of the Transcaucasian

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th VO, also a "conspirator", is already in prison, his turn will come in August), planned to cut the Politburo, distorted the right policy of collectivization, dreamed of returning the free Soviet peoples under the "capitalist yoke", cooperated with German, Polish, Japanese, British intelligence, the nationalist underground, the military conspirators, the wreckers from the NKVD, blew up something and handed cartridges to Fanny Kaplan when she shot at Lenin. In general, they spoiled Soviet power wherever they could.

During collectivization, more than half of the 33 million horses in the country, 70 million heads of cattle and pigs, died. So, the people's commissar for agriculture, Chernov, who organized three factories "for the production of infectious drugs" and almost left the red cavalry without horses. He and his accomplices "specially inoculated erysipelas and swine fever." Rozengolts organized the "sabotage export of cast iron" to Japan, from which the Japanese military made shells on the heads of peaceful Soviet citizens. Chairman of the Central Union I.A. Zelensky added glass and other "food items" to oil and

nails.

And with such a "bouquet" of articles, the head of the conspiracy, Bukharin, hoped that they would save his life, send him to serve his term "in Pechora and Kolyma, in a camp where I would set up a university (!), institutes (!!), an art gallery (!!!), zoo- and photo-museum (?)".

On March 15, 1938, he was radically cured of chronic infantilism. The military collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR sentenced 18 members of the "bloc" to death, three were given 25 years conclusions.

The last representatives of the tribe of the "old Bolsheviks" were sung by the Attorney General of the USSR A.Ya. Vyshinsky (1883-1954):

"The whole country, from young to old, is waiting and demanding one thing: to shoot the traitors and spies who sold our homeland to the enemy like filthy dogs! Our people demand one thing: crush the damned reptile!

Time will pass. Graves of the hated traitors for

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grow weeds and thistles, covered with eternal contempt of honest Soviet people, of the entire Soviet people. And above us, above our happy country, our sun will still shine brightly and joyfully with its bright rays. We, our people, will continue to walk along the road cleansed of the last evil spirits and abominations of the past, led by our beloved leader and teacher - the great Stalin - forward and forward, towards communism!

Happy is the person who was born in the Soviet century.

In 1939, a completely different party ruled the Soviet Union. Gone are the days when anyone had the courage to object, ask questions, just open their mouths in the presence of the Great Pilot. Of the fifteen people's commissars of the first set of the Council of People's Commissars, who shared their portfolios after the capture of the Winter Palace, three remained alive - Trotsky, Avilov-Glebov (both already sentenced) and Stalin; naturally, four people managed to pass away into the other world.

At the April meeting of the party activists of the Kyiv Special Military District, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Commissar 1st rank L.3. Mehlis shared his impressions about last congress:

"At the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks there were neither opposition speeches nor vilely disguised speeches. Even outwardly, the congress looked different - Bolshevik organization, smartness, efficiency characterize the work of the congress. During the work of the congress, people did not hang out in the lobbies and smoking rooms. We listened attentively to the speakers, the audience caught every word of the speakers and quickly reacted.

The delegates listened with special love and attention to every word of the leader of our party, Comrade Stalin. There are no words that could express that warm feeling, that love, those glances that extended from the hall to the leaders of the party and government, to that person, with whose name our victorious struggle is inextricably linked - to the great comrade Stalin ...

In its unity, in its solidity, in its solidarity and single purposefulness, the 18th congress of couples

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tii occupies an outstanding place in the history of Bolshevism. For many years we have not succeeded in creating such a situation in the Party... The great leader of the Party, Comrade Stalin, the leaders of the Party and the government, were all unanimously elected by the congress to the Central Committee."

He is no longer human. Later N.S. Khrushchev recalled: "We are used to: since Stalin proposes, then there are no questions - a God-given proposal; everything that God gives is not discussed, but thanked for it" (in a good mood, the Kremlin god patted the secretary of the Moscow regional party committee on his shaved head and called his "little Marx", Nikita Sergeevich blushed and blossomed with a happy smile).

It is clear that such a large-scale conspiracy could not have been carried out without the participation of the military in it. On February 23, 1937, People's Commissar Yezhov informed the Plenum that the leaders of the anti-Soviet organization of the right, which was headed by the center consisting of Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, Uglanov and Schmidt, planned not only to carry out a series of terrorist and sabotage acts, but also plotted "the overthrow of the Stalinist regime" through a palace coup, "which could be carried out by one of the red generals."

Another option is to prepare for the defeat of the USSR in a war with Germany or Japan, which, of course, could not be achieved without the help of a "particularly conspiratorial" military organization. Molotov confirmed: "The military department is a very big deal, its work will not be checked now, but somewhat later, and it will be checked very strongly."

Repressions shook the Red Army more than once. In the mid-1920s, a purge of commanding officers and political workers suspected of sympathy for the Trotskyist opposition was carried out. A few years later, measures were taken to purge the Red Army from former officers of the old army. In November 1928, already 72% of the Red commanders were from workers and peasants. Only with | November 1929 to December 31, 1931 from the army

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4473 personnel and 5600 variable persons were seized.

The matter was not limited to their dismissal from the armed forces. A number of conspiracy cases were put together, according to which more than three thousand commanders were convicted. A wave of arrests swept through the army in connection with the assassination of Kirov. During the period from December 1, 1934 to January 20, 1935, 43 servicemen were arrested in the Moscow Military District alone "for the open manifestation of counter-revolutionary sentiments". 131 people were dismissed from the Military-Political Academy, many of them were subsequently expelled from the party and arrested. The vigilant authorities never let the army out of their sight, but the peak of terror came in 1937-1938.

According to the note of the army commissioner of the 2nd rank E.A. Shchadenko, with | March 1937 by | On March 1938, 21,268 servicemen were dismissed from the Red Army, including 17,413 people for political reasons, 5,329 of them were arrested and convicted. Thus, during this period, "only" a little more than 1% of the list of the armed forces was calculated. But what a "percentage" it was! Terror has never touched the leaders of such a high rank. At the head of the Trotskyist military conspiracy were the marshal and the commanders of the troops of the most important districts!

The first to be exposed, arrested and shot in June 1937 was the "Tukhachevsky gang". Marshal Voroshilov, even before the trial of the "traitors", by a secret order brought to the attention of the personnel of all companies, squadrons, batteries and squadrons about the exposure by the NKVD of a fascist military organization that had "the desire to liquidate the Soviet Union and restore the yoke of landowners and capitalists in the USSR who prepared the assassinations of party and government leaders, sold military secrets to enemies, and undermined the "defense power of our Motherland."

Then everything went on a knurled track: "And as soon as we catch two or three bastards, these two or three bastards will give another two or three bastards." As a result, dozens of counter-revolutionary organizations were revealed that metastasized all

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branches of the armed forces, all branches of the armed forces. And began firing on their own.

In 1937-1938, three deputy people's commissars of defense, the people's commissar of the Navy, 16 district commanders of troops, 25 of their deputies and assistants, 5 fleet commanders, 8 heads of military academies, 25 chiefs of staff of districts, fleets and their deputies, 33 corps commanders, 76 division commanders, 40 brigade commanders, 291 regiment commanders, two deputy chiefs of the political department of the Red Army, head of the political department of the Navy, and a number of other commanders and political workers.

Since perestroika, for a long time, from book to book, from one television program to another, the phrase wandered:

"Three marshals of the Soviet Union out of five, two army commissars of the 1st rank out of two, two commanders of the 1st rank out of four, 12 commanders of the 2nd rank out of 12, two fleet flagships of the 1st rank out of two, 15 army commissars of the 2nd rank out of 15...", and so on. Who counted, according to what formula - is no longer understood. It is also not clear what historical period was meant and who was included in the category of "repressed". Some credibility was given by the fact that the marshals were counted correctly. But it also follows from this that the period covered fits into the years 1935-1939, which deprives all other calculations of any meaning.

Let's start with the fact that in 1935 five people were awarded the title of commander of the 1st rank. Of these, one died a natural death in 1936 and was buried with the highest honors, two - Yakir and Uborevich - were shot in 1937. Subsequently, four more military commanders became commanders of the 1st rank, and three were shot. The three remaining - Shaposhnikov, Timoshenko, Kulik - in 1940 became Marshals of the USSR,

There was only one army commissar of the 1st rank - the head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, Jan Gamarnik. Gamarnik shot himself. This title was later awarded

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Petr Smirnov, Yefim Shchadenko and Lev Mekhlis. The first was shot, and the other two felt great.

There were nine commanders of the 2nd rank of the "first wave". In 1936, I.I. Vatsetisi A.I. Sedyakin. In 1937, seven were repressed, Ivan Fedko was sent for promotion, and S.K. was awarded the title of commander of the 2nd rank. Timoshenko. In 1938-1939, three more were arrested.

During the same period, the "diamonds" of the commander received M.P. Kovalev, I.S. Konev, K.A. Meretskov, S.I. Kulik, G.M. Stern, I.V. Tyulenev, I.R. —Apanasenko, O.I. Gorodovikov, A.D. Loktionov, Ya.V. Smushkevich, D.G. Pavlov, N.N. Voronov, V.D. Grendal, I.V. Smorodinov, V.N. Kurdyumov and others. These were imprisoned and shot already in the ranks of generals. Therefore, "twelve out of twelve" does not work. The same confusion with the commissioners.

In total, they shot: marshals - 3, army commanders of the 1st rank - 5, fleet flagships of the 1st rank - 2, army commanders of the 2nd rank - 10, army commissar of the 1st rank - 1, army commissars of the 2nd rank - 15, military jurist - 1, commanders - 60, corps commissars - 25, commanders - 136, brigade commanders - 221, brigade commissars - 34.

In the festive report "XX Years of the Red Army and the Navy" in February 1938, Voroshilov stated:

"After the destruction of the fascist military gang and the cleansing of its ranks from corrupt, treacherous abominations, the Red Army became immeasurably stronger, even more than ever monolithic and soldered around the party of Lenin-Stalin, around our worker-peasant Government". However, in his personal notes, Kliment Efremovich wrote about something else: "The authority of the army in the country has been shaken... The authority of the command staff has been undermined... collapse.

The army was completely decapitated. The entire command of the Navy was killed, the entire "clip" of the commanders of the military districts and their deputies, starting from 1924, with the exception of Voroshilov and Shaposhnia

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kov, the leadership of the General Staff and departments, the teaching staff of military educational institutions. The rotation of command, the leapfrog of movements inevitably led to a decrease in the level of combat readiness of the troops.

The newly appointed military commanders, first of all, uprooted the "wrecking" undertakings of the previous ones. So, in Transbaikalia in 1937-1938, five commanders of the district were replaced. Army General M.I. Kazakov recalled how in July 1937, after one year of study, he was released early from the academy and sent to the Central Asian District:

"Literally a few days after my arrival, the commander of the troops of the district commander I.K. was recalled to Moscow. Gryaznov never returned. He was replaced by Oka Ivanovich Gorodovikov, who had previously been Gryaznov's deputy. Then no more than two months post

the commander was occupied by A.D. Loktionov, then - L.G. Petrovsky, and at the end of the year commander I.R. Apanasenko. I have the best memories of the chief of staff, brigade commander A.K. Malyshev. Unfortunately, we worked together for a very short time. At the beginning of March 1938, quite unexpectedly, Malyshev was removed from the post of chief of staff of the district, and I was appointed in his place. Almost simultaneously with this, a number of other replacements took place in the governing department of the district ...

The frequent change of commanders did not bring anything good. Some of them did not start with creative activity, but with the reorganization and destruction of everything that had been created before them. This had a very negative effect on the solution of the tasks that confronted the troops, and most importantly, on the mood of the command staff. It took a lot of effort to restore people's confidence, efficiency".

Of course, it is possible to train new commanders in three years no worse than, for example, Dybenko. What if there is a war tomorrow? Apparently, Stalin was not going to fight yet. According to the observation of Konstantin Simonov, the Leader had already imagined that "he could plan history".

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The strengthening of political supervision, the elimination of unity of command and the restoration on May 10, 1937 of the institute of military commissars did not increase the combat effectiveness of the army. But how could one manage without them, because "the commissar is the eyes and ears of the party and the government." The Czechoslovak attache, Colonel F. Dastich, wrote about this:

"For me, the theory is completely intolerable that, due to the peculiarities of Russian psychology and the Soviet system, the Red Army is able to operate effectively on a basis that is unacceptable for the armies of other states. I have carefully studied the system of political commissars... It cannot mean anything other than the division of command POWERS.

Moreover, in addition to the presence of sensitive ears and keen eyes, in everything else the commissars demonstrated blatant illiteracy. In the act of accepting cases of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda by its new head in the fall of 1940, it was noted that the general educational level of the political staff is low: only 6.2% have a higher education, and 71.5% have a lower secondary education. It was another set of vigilantes with magnifying glasses in their hands, who understood less about military affairs than the commissars of the Civil War.

Military intelligence, a nest of spies, was defeated. During 1937-1938, 182 people were arrested there. The head of the political department of this department, Ilyichev, informed L.3. Fur fox:

"You know that, in essence, we have no intelligence ... There are no military attaches in America, Japan, England, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Finland, Iran, Turkey, i.e., almost in all the main countries."

In the end, they destroyed all the people who held the post of head of Soviet military intelligence from March 1924 to July 1940. The last pre-war head of the Intelligence Agency was the professional commissar F.I. Golikov (1900-1980). It was he who, on March 20, 1941, reported to Stalin that "the most possible date for the start of hostilities against the USSR will be the moment after the victory over England or after the conclusion of an honorable agreement with her.

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Germany of the world. Rumors and documents that speak of the inevitability of a war against the USSR this spring must be regarded as disinformation coming from British and even, perhaps, German intelligence."

They curtailed and completely ruined all the work done in preparation for the guerrilla war. Firstly, they were still going to fight on foreign territory, and we will not give up our own land. Secondly, and most importantly, in people who had specific skills

sabotage and subversive activities, Stalin saw not the defenders of the country, but a threat to the regime he had established.

The Chekists, unraveling the tangle of a military conspiracy, "irrefutably" proved that the traitors Uborevich and Yakir conducted demolition training in their districts and undermined important objects on the instructions of the Germans, preparing for the defeat of the Red Army in the coming conflict. The commanders received instructions from the commander of the Berlin Military District (?), General von Rundstedt. Therefore, the workers of the General Staff, the NKVD, the secretaries of the regional committees, who were preparing for the "small war", the commanders of the Red Army, who had received special training, were quickly repressed. They destroyed the network of partisan schools, along with their leaders and trainees, and disbanded partisan detachments and groups. Most of the "Red Partisans" were arrested as bandits preparing secret bases for foreign invaders. survived not many.

"All the bases and partisan detachments prepared in advance in case of war were liquidated, the cadres of partisans were destroyed, and everyone who was related to this case," recalled professional saboteur I.G. Starinov - was considered as an enemy of the people or an accomplice of the enemy of the people.

As a result, when it broke out, the deployment of guerrilla warfare was delayed by a year, and this was a complete improvisation, incomparable with the opportunities lost, destroyed by one's own hands. And the "small war" was led by loyal, but little understanding of it comrades, like

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Ponomarenko, Voroshilov or Zhukov (Georgy Konstantinovich, apparently recalling his youth and personal experience of suppressing the Antonov rebellion, in his instructions to the partisans recommended that the first thing to do when occupying settlements was to set up patrols and take hostages from among the local population).

The arrests of high-ranking military leaders entailed a chain reaction of terror in relation to their subordinate employees, the elimination of the "sabotage" areas in military science supervised by them, in the creation of new types of weapons, the seizure of "sabotage" textbooks, instructions and theoretical works. The mechanized corps were disbanded.

The repressions in the armed forces pursued the same goal as the repressions in the party: on the eve of the "decisive battle" to create a mechanism obedient and loyal to Stalin, making the command staff an obedient puppet in the hands of the political leadership. Military leaders with ambitions, hesitant, thinking, incomprehensible, and therefore doubtful, were removed from the army. Military talent or, conversely, military mediocrity did not play a role. Which, of course, did not contribute to the development of the breadth of thinking among the new nominees. But that's exactly what they didn't need. Stalin needed only absolute obedience, he presented his army as a multimillion-strong, obedient to a single will, mechanized horde led by unreasoning, blindly betrayed "Stalin's commanders."

Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov wrote:

"Stalin decided, the rest were left to act in accordance with this ... People who are accustomed not to act independently, but only to wait for orders and instructions from above, so as not to hesitate to carry them out, will be of little use if a harsh hour comes. Fear of punishment and irresponsibility live side by side. The work of the military apparatus is not proceeding according to plan, but as if spasmodically, in jerks. Fulfilled one order - and waiting for the next. What if it doesn't arrive on time?

The repressions also had foreign policy consequences. It was clear to any outside observer that the mass destruction of the command staff of the Red Army could not but cause damage

her fighting ability.

Potential allies once again pondered whether it was worth dealing with the Soviets at all. How can one trust a government whose members organize sabotage, train derailments, political assassinations, or prepare to defeat their own army in a future conflict with "foreign aggressors"? The People's Commissar of Communications blows up mines. The People's Commissar for Agriculture "artificially spreads epizootics", destroys livestock and spoils crops. In the People's Commissariat of Defense serve entirely spies and conspirators. And even the head of the Artek pioneer camp, together with the main pioneer-nerve, are plotting a grandiose sapper-sabotage operation to bring down Mount Ayudag on the head of comrade Molotov, who admires the beauties of the Crimea. A criminal organization of homosexuals, which had built a nest under the roof of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, was plotting something completely utterly utterly absurd against members of the Politburo.

In the spring of 1937, a decision was being prepared in Paris on negotiations with the USSR at the level of the General Staffs. However, after the first arrests in the top Soviet military leadership, Lieutenant Colonel L. Simon, the French military attache to Moscow, in a report dated June 14, recommended not to rush things:

"In this state of affairs, it seems prudent, before embarking on military negotiations, to wait for signs of a certain internal calm to appear in the USSR ... If the official explanations do not correspond to reality, then what is the price of a regime that seeks to destroy energetic and knowledgeable people who served him for almost twenty

years...

Of course, one would like the execution of eight military leaders to be justified by serious motives, but the history of the Bolshevik regime suggests that the true motives were undoubtedly less serious than one might imagine. Indeed, one should not forget that in Russia a person

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The physical life has never had much value. The words themselves do not have the meaning given to them in Western Europe. Such is the case with the words "freedom" and "democracy", which are used here rather out of cunning and which do not correspond to the idea put into them by us.

... even now, Mr. Stalin looks like a figure who, if necessary, can pursue an opportunist policy and is perfectly able to appropriate the concepts of his destroyed opponents. That is why it is so difficult to foresee the orientation that he will choose and which, quite probably, is known only to himself.

In Paris, they agreed with Simon's analysis and decided to postpone the establishment of military contacts with an unpredictable partner.

The new attaché, General Auguste-Antoine Palasse, only confirmed the French leadership's opinion that in the event of a war with Germany, significant military assistance should not be expected from the Soviet Union. At the end of June 1938 Palasse wrote:

"1) The Red Army probably no longer has high-ranking commanders who would participate in the world war except as soldiers or non-commissioned officers.

2) The military doctrine developed by Tukhachevsky and his entourage, which the manuals and instructions declared wrecking and canceled, no longer exists.

3) The level of the military and general culture of the cadres, which had previously been very low, especially fell due to the fact that the highest command posts were transferred to officers who were quickly promoted to command a corps or army, jumped several steps at once and were chosen either from young people whose training leaves wish for the best and whose intellectual qualities excluded a critical or non-conformist position, or from among the military, not

values that were in the public eye during the Civil War and subsequently pushed aside, which allowed them to avoid any contact with the "enemies of the people". Under the current conditions, promotion in the Red Army is a kind of diploma of incompetence.

4) Purge, spreading down the stairs,

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deeply disorganizes military units and badly affects their training and even the conditions of their existence. In this regard, the increasingly numerous complaints about the poor maintenance of military equipment are very indicative...

5) The incessant movement of officers, against which the Soviet command resolutely opposed since 1930, as a result of the purge, became more numerous than ever ...

6) The establishment of the institution of military commissars, the efforts made to put at the head of military units officers who served in areas remote from each other and unfamiliar with each other, and more and more direct supervision by the organs of state security puts cadres of the Red Army into the position of the impossibility of useful work and deprives them of any initiative and enthusiasm for the cause.

7) Even discipline is undermined by criticism from subordinates, who are pushed and encouraged to do so, by their superiors, who are constantly suspected that tomorrow they will turn out to be "enemies of the people".

This unfortunate situation, which inflicted more serious damage on the Soviet cadres (at least in the high command) than the world war, makes the Red Army almost unusable at the present time. The Soviet authorities are aware of this and are making unrelenting efforts to train new cadres as soon as possible. However, despite the creation of numerous new schools and the intensive sending of officers to refresher courses, in order to heal the worst wounds from the catastrophe caused by the purge, in all likelihood, it will take years.

Hitler came to the same conclusion. Confirmation of their correctness for him was the course of the Winter War of the Soviet Union with Finland. When planning the Eastern campaign, the Führer, as an important strategic factor, included in the calculations a low professional level the Soviet command.

According to Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky:

"Without the thirty-seventh year, perhaps there would have been no war at all in the forty-first year. That Hitler decided

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to start a war, the defeat of the military personnel, which we had, played a big role."

Stalin, confident in the miraculous method, and in the future regularly arranged bloodletting for the military. In total, in 1936-1940, approximately 43,000-44,000 servicemen were repressed for the counter-revolution, including about 10,000 middle-level and higher command and control personnel.

Thus, on the eve of the war:

"Under the leadership of I.V. Stalin, the Bolshevik Party defeated the enemy agents and thus timely destroyed all possibilities for the emergence of a "fifth column" in the USSR. The defeat of the enemies of the people was of great importance for strengthening the defense capability and was tantamount to winning a major battle.

Whether it was a column or not, Stalin completely removed the problem of opposition: when, with his arrogance, he brought the country to the brink of death, no one dared even utter a word at the Master.

Where the Bolsheviks are on the alert, there the enemies are at a dead end.

Today's neo-Stalinists have come up with an absolutely wonderful theory: the Great Saint Joseph Stalin and his apostle Lavrenty Beria lived in the Soviet country. All the rest, including the inner circle, turned out to be stupid, bastards and self-seekers. Everything that Comrade Stalin did was right and brilliant, everything for the good of the people. And if it weren't for millions of external and internal enemies, rivers of milk with jelly banks would flow into the USSR. Therefore, the terror of the 1930s was an absolutely necessary, far-sighted action. However, with some excesses: |

"Unfortunately, the objectively necessary liquidation of the fifth column in the country was not without serious shortcomings. Foreign intelligence agents infiltrated into state security agencies in a number of cases were able to arrest and convict innocent people. By doing this, they pursued two goals: to inflict damage on party cadres, compromise

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mark the punitive policy (!) of the Soviet government in the liquidation of the fifth column in the country" (from the political biography of I.V. Stalin, prepared by his grateful descendants).

So, the seasoned residents of the Abwehr and the defenders compromised, you understand, the policy of "liquidation" in order to splatter the white clothes of St. Joseph with innocent blood.

Interestingly, but Kolya Yezhov and his colleagues, who are they? Sneaking agents or "innocent people"?

Along with the successes in industrialization and collectivization, there was another reason for pride: "there were no exploiters left on the sacred Soviet land", which means, the Secretary General announced at the 18th congress, socialism in the USSR had already been built, a new phase had begun — a gradual transition to communism.

For a successful "transition", according to Marxist-Leninist theory, the proletariat had to defeat, expropriate and destroy the exploiters on a world scale. Stalin believed that he was already sufficiently well prepared to intervene in European affairs. The USSR had a powerful economy, a developed military-industrial complex and a well-armed one and a half million army. It is no coincidence that at a meeting of Moscow and Leningrad propagandists, Stalin declared:

"There are times when the Bolsheviks themselves will attack: if the war is just, if the situation is suitable, if the conditions are favorable. They are not at all against an offensive, not against any war. The fact that we are shouting for defense is a veil, a veil. All states are in disguise."

At the same time, he especially emphasized Lenin's idea that the victorious proletariat of one country "will be compelled by the force of circumstances to undertake a campaign against other backward, reactionary capitalist countries in order to help the proletariat of these countries to free themselves from the bourgeoisie."

The Kyiv military propagandists explained the same thing to L.Z. Mehliis:

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"If we try briefly, but intelligibly, so that the broad masses understand, to formulate the essence of the Stalinist theory of the socialist state, then it must be said that this is the theory of the liquidation of the capitalist encirclement, that is, the theory of the victory of the world proletariat

revolution. The Stalinist theory of the socialist state opens the semaphore of the revolution and calls the world proletariat to the last decisive battle ... The Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, an international army according to the ideology prevailing in it, will help the workers of the aggressor countries to free themselves from the yoke of fascism and liquidate the capitalist encirclement about which Comrade Stalin spoke and repeatedly reminded us.

On steel bayonets and Voroshilov's volleys, on the mighty wings of the Soviets, we will carry the liberation of the working class of the capitalist countries and hoist the banner of communism on the remaining five-sixths of the globe!

The socialist ship is powerful, omnipotent, invincible. He is not afraid of bad weather and storms. The great helmsman Stalin is leading this ship to the last and decisive battle, to the assault on capitalism, to the world Commune.

Did Lev Zakharych flog the gag?

An attempt to promote the "revolutionary falling away of new countries from the system of imperialism" was undertaken in 1938 during the Czechoslovak crisis, when Germany announced its claims to the Sudetenland inhabited by "Aryans". The Soviet Union had an agreement with Czechoslovakia on military assistance, but with one caveat: assistance was to follow only if France also provided it. The French did not want to fight, and they, together with the British, persuaded the government of Czechoslovakia to make concessions in the name of maintaining peace in Europe. Then on April 26, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council M.I. Kalinin publicly stated: "... the pact does not forbid each of the parties to come to the rescue without waiting for France."

In the western regions of the USSR were concentrated 30 infantry, 10 cavalry divisions, | tank corps,

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3 tank and 12 aviation brigades. Then another 30 rifle and 6 cavalry divisions, 2 tank corps, 15 tank brigades were put on alert. At the same time, other mobilization activities were carried out. 328,000 people were called up from the reserve, and the dismissal of tens of thousands of demobilized people was delayed.

Stalin privately conveyed to President Beneš that he was ready to provide military assistance if Czechoslovakia "in the interests of self-defense" began hostilities against Germany. On September 20, the Soviet government reaffirmed its readiness to fulfill its allied obligations.

However, everything ended with the signing of the Munich Agreement. Stalin was clearly shown his place in the affairs of European politics. The Versailles system ceased to exist. Its collapse could not but lead to another clash between the great powers.

As soon as the implementation of the Munich Agreement was completed, on October 24, 1938, Germany proposed to Poland to settle the problems of Danzig and the "Polish Corridor" on the basis of cooperation within the framework of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Thus, Germany would solve for itself the problem of rear cover from the east in anticipation of the final occupation of Czechoslovakia, would revise the German-Polish border established in 1919, and would significantly strengthen its positions in Eastern Europe.

Poland, continuing its policy of balancing between Berlin and Moscow, in October began sounding the USSR for the normalization of Soviet-Polish relations. On November 4, Moscow offered to sign a communiqué on the normalization of relations, which was signed on November 27. Berlin never received a response to its proposals.

England and France, believing that the process was under control, accelerated rapprochement with Germany, not excluding the process of recognizing Eastern Europe as a zone of German INFLUENCE.

However, Germany, hoping to become the leading force on the continent, sought recognition from the "watching" Europe.

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claiming the status of a world power, which was impossible without a show of force or even defeat of these countries. By March 1939, it became obvious to the German leadership that although Germany's influence in Eastern Europe had increased significantly, it still had not become decisive.

The final elimination of Czechoslovakia allowed Germany to demonstrate its strength to its eastern neighbors, making them more accommodating, and significantly reduce the danger of an anti-German alliance in Eastern Europe. According to Berlin, the solution of the Czechoslovak question would lead to the neutralization of Poland, the economic subordination of Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia. The return of Memel would lead to German control over Lithuania and the strengthening of German influence in the Baltics.

This would provide a rear for the war in the West, which was seen in Berlin as the first stage in securing German hegemony in Europe. Based on this, in the autumn of 1938, the German leadership set a course for the normalization of relations with the USSR

Assessing the current international situation, A.A. Zhdanov at the Leningrad party conference, recalling that the USSR is "the strongest, most independent power," declared that fascism - "it is an expression of world reaction, the imperialist bourgeoisie" - threatens mainly England and France. Under these conditions, England would very much like "Hitler to unleash a war with the Soviet Union," so she remains on the sidelines, counting on "strike the heat with someone else's hands, wait for the situation when the enemies weaken, and take it away." According to Zhdanov, this maneuver was unraveled by Moscow, which will "accumulate our forces for the time when we will deal with Hitler and Mussolini, and at the same time, of course, with Chamberlain."

In the report of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the 18th century to the Party Congress, Stalin formulated the tasks of Soviet foreign policy in the conditions of the beginning of a new imperialist war and the desire of England, France and the United States to direct German-Japanese aggression against the USSR.

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The Soviet Union must "continue to pursue a policy of peace and strengthening business ties with all countries; to be careful not to let our country be drawn into conflicts by provocateurs of war, who are accustomed to rake in the heat with the wrong hands; strengthen in every possible way the combat power" of its armed forces and "strengthen international ties of friendship with the working people of all countries interested in peace and friendship among peoples."

From the context of the speech, it becomes clear that the "warmongers" are countries pursuing a policy of non-intervention: England, France and the United States. Under these conditions, the goal of the Soviet leadership was to use the crisis and the contradictions of the great powers to further strengthen its influence in the world with the prospect of finally resolving the issue of the existence of a capitalist society. And events grew like an avalanche.

On March 15, 1939, German troops entered the Czech Republic.

On March 26, Polysa finally rejected the German proposals for a territorial settlement.

On March 28, the USSR declared its interests in Estonia and Latvia.

On April 28, Germany terminated the Anglo-German naval agreement and the non-aggression pact with Poland, and on April 30, unofficially informed France that either London or Paris

convince Poland to compromise, or Germany will be forced to improve relations with Moscow.

Italy at that time, in violation of the Anglo-Italian agreements, occupied Albania. The process of "appeasement" got out of control. A new ally was needed to contain German expansion. England and France were forced to start probing the position of the USSR.

On April 1, Moscow told London that "we consider ourselves unbound and will act in accordance with our interests."

Thus, in the course of the political crisis in Europe, two military-political blocs emerged: Anglo-French and Italian-German, each of which turned out to be

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interested in an agreement with the USSR. In April 1939, Germany, Britain and France simultaneously addressed Moscow with various flattering proposals. Stalin was in no hurry. He got the opportunity to choose with whom he negotiated, since in the changed conditions everyone was interested in negotiations with him. The brewing war in Europe opened up new prospects for strengthening the influence of the Land of Soviets on the continent. On April 4, People's Commissar Litvinov, guiding the Soviet plenipotentiary in Germany about the general principles of Soviet policy, noted that "it is impossible to delay and stop aggression in Europe without us, and the later they turn to us for our help, the more expensive they will pay."

1] April 1939, Germany undertook a sounding of the position of the USSR in order to improve relations, but the Soviet side preferred to take a wait-and-see attitude. On the same day, England asked the USSR how it could help, if necessary, Romania. On April 14, France offered the USSR to exchange letters of mutual support in the event of a German attack on Poland and Romania. At the same time, Paris invited Moscow to submit its own proposal for cooperation. On the same day, England invited the USSR to declare support for its Western neighbors in the event of an attack on them. Finally, on April 17, the Soviet Union offered the Anglo-French to conclude a mutual assistance pact. Active diplomatic games began between all interested parties.

Negotiations between England and France with the USSR, which lasted five months, reached an impasse. Both sides pathologically did not trust the other and did not want to bind themselves with specific obligations, mired in the intricacies of the protocol and the interpretation of international law. At the same time, they quietly probed Berlin for improved relations, division of "spheres of interest", non-intervention in business.

In addition, the Western partners were not too afraid of the Wehrmacht and had a low opinion of the combat power of the Red Army. Another stumbling block was Poland, which vociferously rejected any alliance with Moscow,

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demanding guarantees from the West, carried out partial mobilization and, at the same time, secretly flattered Berlin.

"Like a prostitute," the women present here will excuse me," the conductor of Stalinist thoughts to the masses, Mekhlis, ironically from the rostrum, "passes from hand to hand, so Poland surrendered to France, then struck up a serious romance with Berlin. Now the Polish madam has announced that she has taken a firm stand and is looking for a serious partner, always with funds. Let's see what comes out of this."

England and France categorically did not want to fight, they counted on major political and economic concessions to appease Hitler and channel German aggression to the East, let the Aryans fight the Bolsheviks until they were blue in the face. The British bombed Berlin

proposals for cooperation and division of "spheres of interest", promising to stop negotiations with the USSR and at the same time blackmailing the Germans by the very fact of negotiations – all in the spirit of traditional British policy:

"England is a professional warmonger, but a double-dealer, but a clever double-dealer. Its policy is simple - to destroy its potential opponents by proxy, dragging them into a war with anyone, especially the Soviets, and I will come to an end with the strongest and I will dictate.

The Führer had already firmly decided that private British concessions did not solve the problem in principle and that a small victorious war was needed to gain hegemony in Europe. To do this, it was necessary to isolate Poland politically, provide guarantees for the non-intervention of England and France in the German-Polish conflict, and, in extreme cases, secure a rear and reduce the threat of an economic blockade by an agreement with the Soviet Union. At a May meeting with the leaders of the Wehrmacht, Hitler stated bluntly: "Further successes cannot be achieved without bloodshed."

On July 29, 1939, the Fuhrer offered Moscow to take into account Soviet interests in the Baltics and Eastern Europe in exchange for the rejection of the treaty with France and England.

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Stalin, who feared an Anglo-German conspiracy, became very interested in this idea. He soberly assessed the situation and considered it more profitable to sign an agreement with Germany in order to bargain for his share, to provide Hitler with a "green light" in the war with the West, and to "come to the end of the strongest" himself.

Too many of the peace fighters really passionately wanted war: Germany, Japan, the United States, and no doubt the Soviet Union. The war in Europe suited the American "Uncle Sam" as well as possible. Hitler, believing in the "blitzkrieg" strategy, hoped to defeat his opponents one by one. Stalin and Roosevelt - choose a favorable moment for themselves and resolve the dispute about influence in the world in their favor. The Japanese Mikado and the Italian Duce had their own plans. The world was doomed.

On August 23, the "super-diplomat" I. Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow, and in the course of negotiations with Stalin and Molotov, on the night of August 24, a Soviet-German non-aggression pact and a secret additional protocol were signed that determined the spheres of interest of the parties in Eastern Europe (It is interesting that in London on the same day they unsuccessfully waited for the arrival of Hermann Goering with a similar mission). Finland, Estonia, Latvia, part of Poland, Bessarabia were assigned to the sphere of interests of the USSR (Soviet historians concealed the existence of secret protocols for almost half a century, blaming "bourgeois falsifiers" for all the sins. After the papers were found, the same honest-eyed people began to convince me that there was nothing special in these protocols, everyone did it, only, it seems to me, one of two things: either you are engaged in historical science or the protection of state secrets.).

The military missions of England and France left Moscow with nothing.

According to Trotsky, among other things:

"The alliance with Hitler gave Stalin the satisfaction of that feeling that dominates him over all others: the feeling of revenge. Conduct military negotiations with the Nazis during

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the presence in Moscow of friendly military missions of France and England, to deceive London and Paris, to announce unexpectedly a pact with Hitler—in all this one can clearly see the desire to humiliate the government of England, to avenge England for the humiliations to which it subjected the Kremlin during the period when Chamberlain developed his unsuccessful romance with Hitler.

But what can I say, Adolf Aloizovich really was a likeable, understandable person, not like all sorts of Deladier. And what is the closeness of worldviews:

"Those who claim that the revolution is not over are fools. Unfortunately, there are people in our movement who understand revolution as constant chaos... The main thing is the selection of capable people who, with blind obedience, implement government orders. The party is a kind of order... The Fuhrer must be alone... The unity within the movement must be unprecedentedly strong. We have no right to fight among ourselves... Therefore, no unnecessary discussions!"

And how famously the Fuhrer organized the Night of Long Knives for his "old fighters"! Whatever you say, Hitler is "the great strategist of the revolution." Ribbentrop later recalled that among the Kremlin Bolsheviks he felt like in a circle of old party comrades.

Both dictators were satisfied with themselves and each other.

"Now the whole world is in my pocket!" Hitler pounded his fist on the table. He had already given the order to attack Poland.

"It seems we managed to carry them out," Stalin said with satisfaction. He was already counting the political profits.

The Soviet Union managed to stay out of the European war, while gaining a significant free hand in Europe, more room for maneuver between the warring factions in its own interests, and the opportunity to shift the blame for the breakdown of negotiations on London and Paris. By signing the pact, Stalin and Molotov themselves set the date for the start of the Second World War.

As a final argument, England 25 August

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1939 signed an agreement on mutual assistance with Poland. Further concessions meant for London and Paris a voluntary renunciation of the status of great powers. But that didn't stop Hitler. | September German troops invaded Poland. A few days later England and France entered.

Everything went according to Stalin's plan. In a conversation with the leadership of the Comintern on September 7, 1939, the Leader assessed the current situation as follows:

"A war is going on between two groups of capitalist countries for the redivision of the world, for dominion over the world! We don't mind if they fight well and weaken each other. Not bad if the position of the richest capitalist countries is shaken by the hands of Germany. Hitler, without understanding or wanting to do this, is undermining the capitalist system..."

We can maneuver, push one side against the other, so that we better tear ourselves apart. The non-aggression pact helps Germany to some extent. The next moment is to push the other side."

As for Poland, "the destruction of this state in the present conditions would mean one less bourgeois fascist state! What would be bad if, as a result of the defeat of Poland, we spread the socialist system to new territories and populations?"

It is clear that such goals of Soviet foreign policy were not advertised, on the contrary, everything was done to convince world public opinion that the Soviet Union strictly adheres to the position of neutrality and is only very concerned about its own security.

On September 17, 1939, the Red Army began the Liberation Campaign in Poland. The two Soviet fronts rushing to the aid of the Slavic brothers included about 600 thousand people, more than 2,000 aircraft and about 4,000 tanks. The Germans have already announced the capture of Warsaw and received a congratulatory telegram from Molotov, the time has come

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and Moscow to snatch its share. By the end of September, the Polish state — “the ugly offspring of the Treaty of Versailles” — ceased to exist, to the delight of the working people of the whole world. The Brothers in Arms celebrated the victory with joint parades and banquets.

Until August 1940, the Soviet Union, exercising its “right” and spreading the socialist system, committed aggression against five more states. They say that the Red Army soldiers were greeted there with flowers. They meet by clothes. In the Sudetenland, given over to be “torn to pieces” by Germany, the Wehrmacht was also greeted with flowers, the soldiers called the operation the “flower war”, and in Ukraine in 1941 they received quite a few bouquets.

Rather than being nostalgic for bouquets, it is better to remember how the Red Army was shot in the back in 1941, how they were escorted out in 1991 and how grateful they are to this day. It's funny to listen to the speeches of the deputies of the current Russian State Duma that the Balts themselves called us, organized revolutions themselves and should be grateful to Moscow for the unique opportunity to “reunite with the peoples of the Great Country of Soviets” and take part in building communism. Maybe, after all, to clarify with the Baltic states themselves what they think about this? Or is it still “all our war, wherever it takes place, is a progressive and just war”?

Happy Soviet life turned out to be attractive only from the facade. The sovietization of the new “territories and populations” was carried out using proven Bolshevik methods: nationalization, forced collectivization, dissolution of all political and public organizations, persecution of the church, deportation, executions of unnecessary classes AND “any other bastards.”

It broke only in Finland, it was the only one that did not succumb to the Kremlin's blackmail and put up courageous resistance, losing part of the territories as a result of the Winter War, but defending its independence. Already after the war, Molotov in a conversation with the Yugoslav communist M. Gila

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Som remarked with regret: “Ah, Finland is a nut.”

The occupation of neighbors on the basis of a secret agreement with Hitler is still considered in Russia to be a matter of life and absolutely necessary for ensuring the security of the USSR. In addition, this is “favorable for mankind, because Lithuanians, Western Belarusians, Bessarabians, whom we delivered from the oppression of landlords, capitalists, policemen and all other bastards, consider themselves happy,” and it is reasonable from the point of view of a springboard for further conquests. with purpose to make happy the Germans, and the Czechs, and the Poles, and the Danes.

Trotsky repeatedly emphasized the limitations of the Stalinist mind in long-term forecasts:

“Stalin is characterized by contempt for theory. The theory takes reality on a large scale. Common sense takes reality on a small scale. That is why Stalin is extremely sensitive to any immediate danger, but is not able to foresee the danger rooted in great historical trends.

Indeed, Stalin could not even imagine that he would be cruelly deceived, the new territories would not in the least increase the “defense capability” of the country, since they were not intended for that, but the flock brought to obedience to him, a celestial, would have to be called his “brothers and sisters” and raise not for the Liberation Campaign, but for the Patriotic War.

But while Joseph Vissarionovich was becoming more and more convinced of his own infallibility, of his ability to fool Hitler.

By the autumn of 1940, it became clear to both friendly sides that there was nothing more to share. At the negotiations in Berlin, Molotov unsuccessfully tried to bargain with the Fuhrer for Finland, Romania, Bulgaria and the Black Sea straits.

Hitler was not going to give up key positions in the Balkans, he had already made the "most important decision of his life": in order to defeat England, it was necessary to crush the Soviet Union. On December 18, the Fuhrer signed a directive on the implementation of the Barbarossa plan.

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Comrade Stalin never changed his mind at all. The two most aggressive regimes were in imminent clash with each other.

Soviet military planning of military operations against Germany began in October 1939, almost immediately after the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Borders, according to which Stalin traded Lithuania for Hitler for a piece of former Polish territory.

Until June 1941 five variants of the plan for the operational use of the Red Army were developed. The creative process gained particular intensity from the second half of 1940, and at the end of July, the drafting of a document entitled "Considerations on the Fundamentals of the Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and East in 1940-1941." has been completed. The plan was to concentrate the main efforts in the direction of Warsaw and East Prussia.

In the spring of 1940, Hitler "turned his back" and launched an invasion of France. It seemed that this was the case to "break the skull", it couldn't be more convenient: the Wehrmacht ran into the impregnable Maginot Line, bled in battles with the largest land army in Europe, and then the Red Army came to the aid of countries groaning under the Nazi boots - GOM.

Immediately after the signing of peace with the Finns, the accelerated transfer of Soviet troops that had passed the combat school to the western border began. By the end of June, the USSR could field 84 rifle and 13 cavalry and mechanized divisions against Germany, reinforced by 17 tank brigades (200 tanks each). The German land army at that time had 12 infantry divisions near the Soviet borders. Of these, 9 were Landwehr.

Molotov spoke frankly about the intentions of the Soviet leadership in a narrow circle:

"Today we support Germany, but just enough to keep her from accepting peace proposals until the starving masses of the warring nations

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will not part with their illusions and will not rise up against their leaders...

At this moment, we will come to the rescue, we will come with fresh forces, well prepared, and on the territory of Western Europe ... a decisive battle will take place between the proletariat and the decaying bourgeoisie, which will decide forever the fate of Europe.

Is it by chance (although Stalin did almost nothing and did not say a single word for nothing) by the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of May 7, 1940, general and admiral ranks were introduced in the Red Army, which is quite natural for any professional army. But for the Red Army, these titles were a fundamentally new phenomenon.

Previously, the word "general" had to be associated among the red fighters with images of class enemies, "organizers of the counter-revolution, executioners of freedom", now with "faithful sons of

socialist homeland, skillful educators of subordinates. An important reason for making such a decision was the fact of the "acute military-political situation".

To the surprise of the whole world and the extreme dismay of Stalin, the campaign in the West did not drag on. Hitler, demonstrating an example of "blitzkrieg", defeated France in forty days. On June 22, 1940, the Fuhrer surrendered in the Compiègne Forest. Comrade Stalin, learning about this, swore obscenely and decided to prepare more thoroughly.

After additional study, by September 18, 1940, the Soviet General Staff prepared a new version of the plan, which assumed the possibility of using the main forces of the Red Army, depending on the situation, in the North-West or South-West directions. These options for the deployment of Soviet troops received the names "northern" and "southern" respectively. Geographically, the Pripyat River basin almost exactly in the middle divided the Western theater of operations - hence the two main directions.

On October 5, 1940, these plans were given to Stalin and Molotov

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were reported. During the discussion, the General Staff was instructed to finalize the plan, taking into account the deployment of an even stronger main grouping as part of the Southwestern Front. As a result, it was planned to increase the number of troops here by 31% in divisions, by 300% in tank brigades and by 59% in air regiments. On October 14, 1940, the "southern" version was approved as the main one.

For the offensive, it was more advantageous, since it ran through more convenient terrain, cut off Germany from the main allies and oil sources, and brought Soviet troops to the flank and rear of the enemy. Whereas a strike in the north led to a head-on collision with the main forces of the German army and required a breakthrough of fortified areas in very difficult terrain.

A series of operational-strategic games played on the maps led to the final rejection of the "northern" option. In March 1941, a new plan for the strategic deployment of the Red Army was adopted. South Poland was chosen as the main direction of the Soviet offensive. On one of the pages of the plan, where tasks were set for the Southwestern Front, there is an eloquent note: "The offensive will begin on 12.6."

The main forces of the German were also supposed to meet in the southwestern direction. Our strategists were sure that the Wehrmacht would concentrate the main forces south of Brest. Since the time of Tukhachevsky, it was believed that the very idea of a campaign against Moscow and the military defeat of the USSR by the Nazi army was fantastic. If Hitler decides to fight, he will try to chop off Ukraine.

The development of the Red Army in 1939-1941 was in fact a covert mobilization deployment, since according to the system of mobilization deployment adopted in the summer of 1939, the number of formations and units in peacetime was brought to the wartime level, which simplified the process of mobilization and reduced it. terms and should have contributed to a higher degree of combat effectiveness of the mobilized troops. Most of the planned

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The tank forces had already been formed or were completing their formation by the summer of 1941.

Since the strategic deployment plan and the concept of the first operations were designed for the complete mobilization of the Red Army, they were closely linked to the mobilization plan approved by the government on February 12, 1941. The mobilization deployment was to lead to the creation of a wartime army of 8.9 million men. Mobilization was planned to be carried out by echelons within a month.

The first echelon, which included 114 divisions, fortified areas on the new border, 85% of the air defense forces, airborne troops, over 75% of the air force and 34 artillery regiments of the RKG, was supposed to complete mobilization within 2-6 hours from the announcement of mobilization.

The main part of the troops deployed on the 10th-15th day, the full mobilization of the armed forces was envisaged on the 15th-30th day. The main task of the Soviet divisions near the border was to cover the concentration and deployment of their troops and prepare them for going on the offensive.

On March 8, the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars was adopted, according to which it was envisaged to carry out covert mobilization of 903.8 thousand reserve servicemen under the guise of training camps. This measure made it possible to call up 805.2 thousand people by the beginning of June.

In the spring of 1941, the Wehrmacht turned south, to the Balkans and the Mediterranean, carried out a landing operation on Crete - a rehearsal for landing on the British Isles, and demonstrated preparations for Operation Sea Lion.

Stalin decided it was time to start the "rose".

In April, the covert strategic deployment of the Red Army began, which was supposed to be the final stage of preparations for war.

It was precisely from April, when the Wehrmacht was engaged in the conquest of Yugoslavia and Greece and did not threaten the country of the victorious proletariat in any way, that Stalin began to fear "provocations" in a panic. Prior to that, they were completely "succumbing" without fear of any "complications". For example, Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov says:

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"In late February and early March, German planes again violated Soviet airspace several times. They flew with amazing audacity, making no secret of the fact that they were photographing our military installations... I proposed to the Main Naval Staff to instruct the fleets to open fire on violators without any warning. Such a directive was transmitted on March 3, 1941. On March 17 and 18, German planes were fired several times over Libau...

Rereading the reports from the fleets now, I find reports among them, and in particular from the commander of the Northern Fleet A.G. Golovko that anti-aircraft batteries open fire on German aircraft flying over our bases. By the way, Stalin, having learned about my order, did not object, so in fact these days there was already a war in the air in the fleets: anti-aircraft gunners drove away German aircraft with fire, and our pilots fought them on their obsolete "seagulls" ... it's silly to engage in the persuasion of a bandit when he climbs into your house.

After one of these cases, I was summoned to see Stalin. In the office, besides him, Beria was sitting, and I immediately understood where the wind was blowing from. I was asked on what basis I gave the order to open fire on the intruder aircraft. I tried to explain, but Stalin cut me off. I was severely reprimanded and ordered to cancel the order immediately.

On April 1, the Main Naval Staff issued a new directive: "Do not open fire, but send your own fighters to land the enemy on airfields."

It was in April 1941 that a full-scale process of concentration in the western districts of 247 divisions allocated for the war with Germany (81.5% of the available forces of the Red Army) began. After mobilizing the reservists and bringing their numbers to full strength, they would have numbered over 6 million people, about 70 thousand guns and mortars, over 15 thousand tanks and 12 thousand aircraft.

On April 12, four armies from the internal districts began to advance to the western border, and three more armies were preparing to advance, which were supposed to complete

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concentration by July 10. These armies, uniting 77 divisions, constituted the second strategic echelon.

On June 12-16, the General Staff ordered the headquarters of the western districts to begin, under the guise of exercises, the covert advance of the second echelons of the covering armies and the reserves of the districts, which were supposed to take up to July concentration areas 20-80 km from the border. In total, there were 114 divisions in the troops of the first operational echelon.

It is clear that these preparations were surrounded by a veil of the strictest secrecy and supported by a powerful disinformation campaign. For example, it follows from Halder's diaries that the Germans never revealed the presence in the Bialystok ledge of a Soviet shock group (10th Army) consisting of two rifle, one cavalry and two mechanized corps - almost 1,500 tanks. But what can I say, if the presence of Russian tanks T-34 and KV, adopted for service in 1939, participating in the war with Finland, turned out to be a surprise for the Germans.

The camouflage regime extended even to the Comintern, which was denied permission to publish an appeal to May 1941 with a thorough analysis of the international situation on the grounds that this "could show our cards to the enemy." In general, in April-June 1941, the Soviet leadership pursued such a cautious foreign policy that this gave a number of authors a reason to talk about the policy of "appeasement of Germany." Say, Stalin was afraid of Hitler. Even tougher:

"Stalin knew that in the spring and summer of 1941 the army was not ready for war... The unpreparedness of the army for war was the reason for Stalin's desire to delay the start of the war. In the end, he convinced himself that there would be no war in 1941."

Here is a strange thing: Stalin was afraid to "provoke" a German attack and at the same time advanced 77 divisions of the second strategic echelon to the west, in direct violation of secret agreements he ordered the formation of the 238th rifle division, "staffed with personnel of Polish nationality and persons I know

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those who speak Polish, who are in the service of the Red Army. For what purpose? For the parade in "liberated" Warsaw? Is this not a "provocation"?

Why would Stalin be afraid? He had full information about the forces of the Wehrmacht and the possibilities of German industry. He had numbers in front of him. He knew that Soviet military equipment was much superior to the German one quantitatively and not inferior to it qualitatively. He believed that in terms of combat training, the Red Army men and their commanders would not yield to the German soldiers and officers.

He was going to attack suddenly, at the most favorable moment, with huge forces. He was well aware that in the event of an action by the USSR against Germany, England and the United States would inevitably become allies. He quite logically reasoned that an attack on the Soviet Union was a suicidal idea that Hitler would never do.

Only one thing could not occur to the "leader of all peoples" - that Hitler did not consider him a serious opponent, just like the "invincible and legendary" Red Army, and was going to defeat the USSR in four weeks. Accustomed to playing his games with the whining "old Bolsheviks", breaking all barriers with his will, dealing with obsequious nonentities, Iosif Vissarionovich made a mistake in the psychoanalysis of the German Fuhrer. Adolf

had its own logic, had its own plans, the spirit of Ilyich on Stalin's forehead did not plunge him into awe, like Bukharin.

How could Stalin know about the "unpreparedness of the army"? With all the opposite.

According to Admiral N.G. Kuznetsova:

"I.V. Stalin imagined the combat readiness of our armed forces to be higher than it actually was. Knowing exactly the number of the newest aircraft deployed on his orders at the border airfields, he believed that at any moment, on a combat alarm signal, they could take off into the air and give a reliable rebuff to the enemy. And was just stunned

the news that our

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the planes did not have time to take off, but died right at the airfields.

At a reception in the Kremlin in honor of graduates of military academies on May 5, 1941, the Leader confidently stated:

"For the time being, we carried out a defensive line — until we re-equipped our army, we did not supply the army with modern means of struggle. And now, when we have reconstructed our army, saturated it with equipment for modern combat, when we have become strong, now we must move from defense to offensive. In defending our country, we must act in an offensive manner. From defense to a policy of offensive action... The war against Germany will inevitably develop into a victorious people's liberation war.

The Soviet leadership explained the victories of the German army in Europe by the weakness of the opponents, German impudence and numerical superiority. With the Red Army, such a number will not work:

"Everything new that has been introduced into operational art and tactics by the German army is not so difficult and is now accepted and studied by its opponents, just as the armament of the German army is not news. On the basis of boasting and self-satisfaction, Germany's military thought is no longer advancing as before. The German army lost its taste for further improvement of military equipment. If at the beginning of the war [Germany had the latest military equipment, now ... Germany's military-technical advantage is gradually decreasing."

That is, from the point of view of Comrade Stalin, the Wehrmacht was nothing special.

By mid-May, the final plan for the future WAR was ready.

This document directly formulated the idea that the Red Army should "preempt the enemy in deployment and attack the German army at the moment when it will be in the deployment stage and will not have time to organize the front and the interaction of the military branches."

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Thus, the main idea of Soviet military planning was that the Red Army, under the cover of troops deployed on the border of the western districts, would complete the concentration of forces intended for war in the theater of operations and go over to a sudden decisive offensive.

Since no documents on the Barbarossa plan were obtained by Soviet intelligence, the war conceived by Stalin was not a preventive one. The "greatest strategist of all time" did not believe in the German attack on the Soviet Union and believed that "in order to wage a big war with

We Germans, firstly, need oil, and they must first conquer it, and, secondly, they need to liquidate the Western Front, land in England or make peace with her.

From this it was concluded that Hitler would move the Wehrmacht either to the Middle East or to the British Isles, but would not risk a protracted and hopeless war for him with the "great and mighty", having England in the rear.

In general, it can be seen that the Soviet plans lacked any connection between the actions of the Red Army and the possible actions of the enemy. From here, the scenario of the beginning of the war emerges: Under the cover of the troops of the western districts, the Red Army is concentrating and deploying in the Western theater of operations, simultaneously conducting private offensive operations. The completion of the concentration serves as a signal for a transition to a general offensive along the entire front from the Baltic to the Carpathians, with the main attack on southern Poland.

German troops in the Soviet plans are designated by the term "concentrating", which means that the initiative to start the war will come entirely from the Soviet side, which is the first to start and finish the deployment of troops in the theater. The transition to the offensive was tied not to the situation on the border, but to the moment of concentration of assigned forces - this is the 20th day of the start of deployment.

The troops were tasked with striking at the German army, for which it followed "the first strategic goal of the actions of the Red Army troops was to defeat the heads of

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German army forces deployed south of the Brest-Demblin line, and reaching the Ostroleka front, the Narew River, Lovich, Lodz, Kretzburg, Oppeln, Olomouc by the 30th day of the operation. The next strategic goal is to have: an offensive from the Katowice region in a northern or northwestern direction in order to defeat the large forces of the center and northern wing of the German front and seize the territory of southern Poland and East Prussia. The immediate task is to defeat the German army east of the river. Wisła and in the direction of Krakow, get off the bunk. Narew, Vistula and capture the Katowice region ... "

To ensure a powerful first strike, the main forces were planned to be deployed in eighteen armies of the first echelon, which included most of the mobile formations. In the rear they deployed seven armies of the second strategic echelon, and behind them - three more armies of the third strategic echelon. The role of shock mobile groupings was to be played by 29 mechanized corps, 1031 tanks each, the formation of which began in June 1940.

By the summer of 1941, the Armed Forces of the USSR were the largest army in the world. By the beginning of the war, there were 5774.2 thousand people in them, of which 4605.3 thousand were in the ground forces, 475.7 in the Air Force, 353.8 in the Navy, 167.6 in the border troops, and in the internal troops of the NKVD. — 171.9 thousands of people.

The ground forces had 303 divisions, 16 airborne and 3 rifle brigades. The troops had 117,581 guns and mortars, 24,488 aircraft and 25,886 tanks. In the first half of 1941, Soviet industry produced 100% of tanks and 87% of combat aircraft of the latest types, having completed the transition to the production of these models only. The annual growth of military production in 1938-1940 was 39%, three times the growth of all industrial production in the country.

In a word, Stalin solved the first of the most important tasks: he turned the USSR into a "base for the further development of the world revolution."

On May 20, the "all-Union headman" Kalinin declared: "Kapi

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the talistic world is full of blatant abominations that can only be destroyed by the red-hot iron of holy war." By the way, the song "Holy War" has already been written, however, the premiere took place earlier than expected.

On May 27, an order was issued to create field front command posts.

At the same time, the Soviet leadership knew about the concentration of German troops near the borders of the Soviet Union, but, apparently, this did not bother him too much. Stalin, and together with him Timoshenko and Zhukov, initiated into the Grand Plan, almost until June 22, believed in the defensive nature of German measures and continued to prepare an offensive operation.

For example, in the report of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Special District of June 5, 1941, the build-up of German troops near the border was noted. But the conclusions emphasized that the reinforcement of the grouping takes place "mainly by artillery and aviation units", while at the same time the Germans "force the preparation of the theater by building defensive structures, installing anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns directly on the state border line, strengthening protection of the state border by field units, repair and expansion of roads, bridges, delivery of ammunition, fuel, organization of air defense measures". It was also said that "anti-war sentiments in the German army are assuming ever wider proportions."

Such reports received by the General Staff were more likely to create the belief that the Wehrmacht was preparing for defense against a possible Soviet invasion, but was not going to attack the USSR itself in the near future.

On June 18, Stalin was given a report from agents from Germany about the deployment of German fighters and the appointment of future heads of the occupied Russian lands. Blinded by breathtaking prospects, the Liberator of Europe passed a resolution: "You can send your source to ..."

The "Kremlin Highlander" had no doubt that the Red Army was stronger than the Wehrmacht and that Hitler should be afraid. be afraid and

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it is only natural to take defensive measures against a Soviet invasion. Marshal Zhukov writes in one of the versions of his immortal memoirs:

"I remember how once, in response to my report that the Germans strengthened their air, intelligence and military intelligence, I.V. Stalin said: "They are afraid of us."

Stalin himself was afraid of one thing - to frighten off the "beast" and was preoccupied with only one thing - to keep the secret until the last moment. Do not reveal your plans ahead of time. Because then it won't be surprise.

The German command at this time was concerned about similar problems. Thus, on June 18, Goebbels wrote in his diary:

"We observe absolute restraint in all matters concerning Russia... We must not allow ourselves to be provoked now."

And no one concludes that Hitler was afraid. Everyone understands that this is a disguise by the aggressor of his vile intentions.

From June 14 to June 19, the command of the border districts was instructed to withdraw the front and army departments to field command posts. The Soviet training was entering the final stage.

K. On June 22, 1941, the grouping of Soviet troops of the first echelon in the West totaled 3,088.2 thousand people, 57,041 guns and mortars, 13,924 tanks, 8,974 aircraft. In addition, there were 1,769 aircraft in the aviation of fleets and flotillas.

By that time, 16 divisions had already arrived from the second echelon - 10 rifle, 4 tank and 2 mechanized divisions, in which there were 201.7 thousand people, 2746 guns and mortars and 1763 tanks.

In the western military districts, 64 fighter, 50 bomber, 7 reconnaissance and 9 attack air regiments were concentrated, in which there were 7133 aircraft. In addition, there were 4 long-range bomber corps and 1 long-range bomber division - total

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1339 aircraft. On April 10, the transition to a new system of organization of aviation logistics began.

In April, five airborne corps were formed in the western districts. On June 12, the Directorate of Airborne Troops was created. At the same time, the rear and hospital units were being deployed. At stationary warehouses and bases, stocks were continuously accumulated.

Until the day "M" was a week and a half.

One can endlessly debate whether Stalin was going to attack first. Both supporters and opponents of this version give a lot of arguments that actually prove almost nothing and disprove nothing.

The dispute, which began about fifteen years ago, reached a dead end due to the lack of documents. The Russian archives continue to keep the secrets of the lost empire, the secrets of Comrade Stalin. Although the very fact that the operational plans of the Red Army for 1941 have not yet been found is suggestive.

In any case, our defensive measures do not impress. For example, from the works of the former chief of staff of the 4th Army of the Western OVO, General L.M. Sandalova follows that no defense was built in the border areas and no one was going to defend themselves: "whoever dared to ask questions about the defense in the Brest direction was considered an alarmist."

However, not only in Brest. Neither the district nor the army plans for covering the creation of rear front and army defense lines provided. Specifically, the troops of the 4th Army were preparing to cross the Bug and advance to the Vistula.

In March-April, the army headquarters participated in the district operational game on cards. In the course of it, a front-line offensive operation on Byala Podlaska was practiced.

Preparation went on in stages in all command units. On June 21, a headquarters exercise of the 28th Rifle Corps was held on the topic "The offensive of the rifle corps with overcoming the river barrier", and a new one was planned for June 22

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exercise: "Overcoming the second strip of the fortified area". This is a "cover army", so she was going to "cover".

Soviet cover plans initially did not provide for opposition to the concentration of troops on the part of the enemy. Thus, the full deployment of the troops of the border districts in the cover zones took, according to plans, up to 15 days. Moreover, in the event of an enemy attack, the troops of the first echelon would obviously not have time to occupy their defense lines on the border.

Sandals again:

"The mutual disposition of the fortified areas and areas of deployment of troops did not provide, in the event of a surprise attack by the enemy, the timely occupation of the fortifications not only by field troops, but also by special Urov units. So, for example, in the zone of the 4th Army, the term for occupying the Brest fortified region was determined by the district for one rifle division - 30 hours, for another - 9 hours, for Urov units - 0.5-1.5 hours. On training alerts, it turned out that these terms were underestimated.

Thus, the Soviet General Staff proceeded from such a variant of the beginning of the war and the situation that had created, in which it would be possible to advance to the border without interference from the potential enemy, take the assigned cover zones, prepare to repel the attack, and mobilize:

"A feature of all army cover plans was the absence in them of an assessment of the possible actions of the enemy, primarily the option of a sudden offensive by superior enemy forces. The essence of a tactical maneuver was that it was necessary to quickly assemble and make a march to the border. It was assumed that in the areas of concentration, time would be given for the final preparation for battle.

Only under the influence of a series of alarm signals a few hours before the German attack did Stalin decide to give the troops the famous Directive No. 1 | "Do not succumb to provocations." In terms of increasing combat readiness

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in anticipation of enemy aggression, the document is completely stupid. But Stalin's hesitations can be understood: literally two or three weeks remained before the start of the "Thunderstorm", maybe the German generals were really trying to open the grouping of Soviet troops by some kind of "reconnaissance battle". I didn't want to show my cards.

Therefore, instead of a directive to bring the troops of the western districts to full combat readiness in case of war, Stalin ordered a short directive with instructions that the attack could begin with provocative actions. He still hoped that he would be able to start diplomatic negotiations and, under their cover, complete the concentration of forces for the offensive. But here, indeed, "history took little time." The directive did not provide for mobilization.

Marshal Baghramyan, reporting that the reception of the first directive at the headquarters of the KOVO lasted about two hours, explains:

"The reader may ask, but would it not be easier, in order to save time, to send a short conditional signal from the General Staff, having accepted which the command of the district could order the troops just as briefly: to put into operation "KOVO-41" (that was the name of our plan covering the state border). All this would take no more than 15-20 minutes. Apparently, in Moscow they did not dare to do this.

That's just the point, the KOVO-41 signal was to be followed by quite definite actions that had nothing to do with repelling aggression. While there was hope - what if Hitler was bluffing, warnings were sent to the troops like "do nothing" and "do not cross the border."

The reason is that, having invested all the talent of the organizer and all his strength into the Thunderstorm plan, Stalin had no other plans. The Soviet General Staff did not plan any defensive operations. There were no plans for defense, "red packages", special "short" signals for this case among the troops. A sudden attack by the enemy with large forces was not even considered theoretically, which means that there were no thought-out decisions on this score.

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At the first stage of the Great War, the fleet was not assigned offensive missions, and the People's Commissar of the Navy, instead of disorienting directives, simply announced "Readiness No. 1" to the fleets. This turned out to be enough for the sailors to meet the war prepared: they knew what had to be done in this case, and they did it. Neither Stalin nor Zhdanov, who was in charge of the fleet, nor Timoshenko and Zhukov could prevent Kuznetsov from fulfilling his direct functional duties.

And one more question. And if Hitler had not attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, what would Comrade Stalin have done? Order armies to load into trains and go back to their districts? It can be further simplified. If the Wehrmacht had made a jump across the English Channel and invaded England, would the Soviet Union have observed the treaty of friendship with Germany in such a situation?

The "treacherous attack" [of Germany] turned out to be so unexpected for the Soviet leadership that, in response to the formal declaration of war, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Molotov managed to squeeze out only the helpless: "We didn't deserve this."

For some time, the Kremlin harbored illusions that the "invincible and legendary" would throw the enemy out of the sacred Soviet land in the shortest possible time. But the miracle did not happen. Stalin, having declared the Patriotic War, and himself the Supreme Commander, tried to direct the military operations by the usual methods: he searched for enemies, shot and shuffled the commanders, tormented them with petty care, appointed commissars again, declared all those captured traitors, his authoritative opinion "overturned military science."

And only when the Germans reached the Volga, and 70 million Soviet people were under occupation, Stalin lost his arrogance, began to listen to the opinion of specialists, and, with his characteristic perseverance and thoroughness, began to study military affairs.

PART II GENERAL LEADERS

"... Instead of military glory, you revel in shame: for there is no good reign without good nobles, and a myriad army without a skilled commander is a flock of sheep, dispersed by the noise of the wind and the fall of tree leaves. Caretakers are not synclites, and dwarfs, crippled in spirit, are not the howl of WATER.

From a letter from Prince Kurbsky to Ivan the Terrible

In April-May 1917, fantasizing about the future world order, the Marxist V.I. Ulyanov dreamed of the general arming of the people, without exception, all citizens and women aged 15 to 65, who would replace the standing army and police, take over the task of protecting the socialist Fatherland, conducting food requisitioning, sanitary control, "educating the masses ". All this without breaking away from production and government. Lenin's "cook" dreamed of an extremely multifunctional social organism.

The first armed formations of the Bolshevik Party were workers' squads and battalions of the Red Guard. They began to be formed at plants and factories immediately after the February Revolution. Along with detachments of agitated sailors and soldiers, they formed the striking force of the October Revolution.

The salaries of the revolutionary proletarians, as well as the entire Leninist Central Committee of the RSDLP (b), as well as other leftist parties, were regularly paid by the German Imperial Bank. The weapons were supplied by the German General Staff. Lenin and his comrades, in order to free all the oppressed and lead them on the right road straight to communism, really needed power. The Germans needed a force that destroyed

the Russian Empire from within, disintegrated the Russian army, led the country out of the war, thereby relieving Germany, suffocating in the stranglehold of a naval blockade, from the hopeless prospect of a war on two fronts. The interests of the partners coincided almost perfectly.

After the capture of the Winter Palace and the distribution of portfolios, the top-priority, most important task of the self-proclaimed government of people's commissars, along with the nationalization of the State Bank, was to conclude a separate peace with Germany. Lenin had to repay debts to those without whose help he would never have ascended the Russian throne, and he still had to sit on it. Otherwise, with the same money, other defenders of the "interests of the working people" could easily topple the fragile new government. Naturally, the tsarist apparatus and the tsarist army, "as one of the most important elements of the state machine of the bourgeois-landowner system," were subject to destruction.

On November 7, 1917, the acting Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant General N.N. Dukhonin (1876-1917), who was in Mogilev, received Lenin's order to immediately begin negotiations "with the command of the Austro-German troops", which was a direct betrayal of Russia's allies. The next day, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs sent a note to all the ambassadors of the allied powers with a proposal to declare a truce on the fronts.

Without waiting for the response of the Entente, on November 9, the Council of People's Commissars removed the commander-in-chief, who had sabotaged the instructions of the Bolsheviks, appointing ensign N.V. Krylenko. It was urgently necessary to "pull the army out of the hands of the reactionary generals." The soldier N.I. Muralov, his headquarters was recruited from ensigns and lieutenants, by some misunderstanding one staff captain crept in there.

At the same time, telegrams flew to all corps and divisions, calling on the masses of soldiers over the heads of the commanders to begin negotiations on a truce on separate sectors of the front and organize fraternization with

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buddy. In Berlin, everyone understood correctly: already at the end of November, the transfer of German divisions to the West began.

On November 21, immediately after the "capture" of Mogilev by the new Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General Dukhonin was torn to pieces by "revolutionary soldiers and sailors" (just at that time, on their way to Brest-Litovsk, a Russian peace delegation led by , according to modern concepts, the international terrorist A.A. Ioffe). And for a long time, killing officers, the defenders of the revolution joked: "They sent me to Dukhonin."

Lenin needed a "peaceful respite" no less than the Kaiser, in order to consolidate his power in a vast country as quickly as possible, break the old state apparatus, and create new power structures to fight the internal "counter-revolution". The essence of what was happening was masked by demagogic slogans about "revolutionary peace" and calls to the proletariat of the belligerent countries to "take the cause of peace into their own hands."

The old army, which numbered about 8 million people, of which more than 6 million soldiers and officers were at the front, interfered with both Wilhelm and Vladimir Ilyich. Therefore, having declared the armed forces "a diseased part of the Russian state organism", the Bolsheviks immediately began to treat them through systematic decomposition and radical destruction. On November 10, 1917, the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars signed a decree on the demobilization of the army. The comfrey troops, who had fought enough, left the front in whole regiments and dispersed to their homes: to divide the land, smash the landowners' estates and police stations, expropriate the expropriators, thereby ensuring the "triumphal march of Soviet power."

In parallel, the formation of a new army apparatus was carried out, the main tasks of which were considered to be the interception of control, "eliminating any possibility of restoring the power of the exploiters."

On November 22, in order to "carry out the fight against the counter-revolution", the Central Revolutionary Field Headquarters was created at the Headquarters, which formed expeditionary detachments.

to help the local Soviets. On December 16, the Council of People's Commissars, in order to "democratize", adopted decrees "On the equalization of all military personnel in rights" and "On the elective beginning and on the organization of power in the army." Ranks, ranks, titles, awards and other distinctions were abolished - everyone began to wear the "honorary title of soldier of the revolutionary army", the election of command personnel was approved, that is, the complete collapse of the regular army. "These measures," confirms the official Soviet historiography, "created the possibility for the unhindered activities of the Bolsheviks. in the masses of soldiers.

Officers who refused to remove their insignia were lynched. In distant Tobolsk, fulfilling a decree, the guards tore off the shoulder straps from citizen Nikolai Romanov.

"General considerations for the formation of the army" were also developed, according to which the new armed forces were to be recruited on a volunteer basis from among the "true champions of freedom and revolution", whose duty is "to live, fighting, and die fighting.

By the end of 1917, in most military units, power passed into the hands of the soldiers' committees, and the Military Revolutionary Committee began to manage the former Headquarters of the Supreme Commander. The command of the troops was carried out simultaneously by two bodies - the reorganized Headquarters of the Stavka and the Revolutionary Field Headquarters.

In mid-January 1918, Lenin proudly reported to the delegates of the emergency Congress of Soviets:

"The old army, the barracks drill army, the torture of soldiers, is a thing of the past. She scrapped, and from it there was no stone left unturned.

Through the efforts of the Bolsheviks, Russia became defenseless against external invasion. A short experience of combat operations revealed low combat capability, poor organization, indiscipline and uncontrollability of the Red Guard "expeditions", "flying detachments", "free squads" and gangs of the Baltic "brotherhood". Soviet government

in decided to start creating a new type of regular army.

The first legal act proclaiming the formation of a "socialist army of workers and peasants" was the "Declaration of the rights of the working and exploited people" published on January 4, 1918, which, together with the oath of allegiance to the Soviet power, the Bolsheviks tried to slip for approval to the Constituent Assembly.

But alas. The deputies did not recognize Soviet power. The intractable "constituent assembly" had to be dispersed, and workers' demonstrations in its support were shot, solely for the good of the proletariat. With this landmark decision, Lenin set a course for unleashing a civil war, but this did not frighten him (he immediately scribbled an article with a characteristic subtitle: "They are frightening with a civil war"). A week later, the Declaration was approved by the 3rd All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

The main task of the "socialist army" was decreed "to ensure full power for the working masses and to eliminate any possibility of restoring the power of the exploiters." And not only Russia was meant. One of the clauses of the resolution stated that the NEW TYPE army "fights for the interests of the working people of the whole world and serves as support for the coming social revolutions around the world."

On January 15, at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars, the Decree "On the organization of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" was considered and adopted. According to this document, which was a genuine victory for democracy, "about 40 non-Russian nationalities, who were not allowed by tsarism to military service, for the first time received the right to defend the socialist

Fatherland". Two weeks later, the Decree "On the organization of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Fleet" was adopted.

Under the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs, the All-Russian Collegium for the Organization and Formation of the Red Army was established, whose responsibilities included the development of new charters and instructions, as well as providing

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torovannyh parts with everything you need. N.I. Podvoisky (1880-1948), N.V. Krylenko (1885-1938), K.A. Mekhonoshin (1889-1938) and other Bolsheviks launched extensive agitational work.

Military departments and headquarters of the Red Army were created throughout the country under Soviets and soldiers' committees. In the active army, the staffs of the Red Army under the soldiers' committees were organized to recruit volunteers. A network of recruiting centers was spread out, and hundreds of agitators stood out from among the Red Army soldiers who carried out mobilization work in the rear and at the front. On January 18, Commander-in-Chief of the Petrograd Military District A.V. Antonov-Ovseenko signed an order on the creation of the first corps of the Red Army, the basis of which was to be made up of St. Petersburg workers.

Citizens of the Soviet Republic at least 18 years of age were admitted to the ranks of the Red Army. The entry of the ranks of the Red Army was organized on the principle of voluntariness and class principles. Volunteers were required to make recommendations from military committees, party, trade union or other public organizations loyal to the Soviets.

The Red Army soldiers were entitled to a monetary allowance in the amount of 50 rubles per month, accurately secured by all the assets of the Reichsbank [of Germany ("to pay for the maintenance of the Red Guard and agitators in the country" in January 1918, the Germans transferred 50 million rubles in gold "to hand them over to representatives of the People's Commissars ").

However, the expected influx of defenders of the socialist Fatherland did not occur. There were not too many willing to participate in a fratricidal war, except for the Red Guard, anarchist sailors, "internationalists", a certain number of people fooled by the ideas of universal equality of workers and peasants and various kinds of criminal elements (the ideas of equality greatly inspired the "exhausted mass" and were fully exploited by the Bolsheviks.

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knew that there could be no equality. "The concept of equality, besides the abolition of classes, is the most stupid and absurd prejudice... We want to abolish classes, in this respect we stand for equality. But to pretend that we will make all people equal to each other is an empty phrase and a stupid invention of an intellectual, "wrote Lenin. These are details that people should not delve into).

Successfully "democratized" soldiers of the cadre army, trying to get home faster, massively self-demobilized, the officers ran away, saving their LIFE.

In the meantime, a spectacle of negotiations was played out for the world and Russian public in the White Palace of the Brest Fortress.

But the conditions put forward by the Germans, which meant for the country the loss of 150,000 square kilometers of territory, were so shameful that even in the Bolshevik Party, bound by an iron hoop of discipline, an irreconcilable opposition to the "obscene world" arose, proposing to declare a revolutionary war on the enemy. At an enlarged meeting of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), only 15 people voted for Lenin's proposal to sign peace, and 48 voted against.

members of the government and the party had no idea about Lenin's deeply secret connections with German intelligence.

Therefore, A.A. Ioffe, and after him L.D. Trotsky dragged out the negotiations in Brest, pursuing two tactical goals. Firstly, it was planned to launch a propaganda campaign in order to protect the leaders from accusations of too obvious sale of the interests of Russia, to impress the masses that the government was stubbornly resisting the demands of Germany, and the peace being concluded was of a forced, violent nature. Secondly, in Petrograd they hoped for the rapid development of the revolution in Europe - what the hell is not joking, but what if, for real, K. Liebknecht will "push" the German imperialists and "get us out of all the difficulties."

To help Ilyich make the right decision and convince overly revolutionary comrades-in-arms that the Germans

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"can attack", the Kaiser's troops went on the offensive on February 18 along the entire front from the Gulf of Riga to the mouth of the Danube. There was no one to stop them. Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, former lieutenant general, and now a "soldier of the revolutionary army" M.D. Bonch-Bruевич reported to the Council of People's Commissars: "Many sectors of the front have been completely abandoned by units and are not guarded by anyone. Under such conditions, the front should be considered only designated... The vast majority of experienced military commanders were either removed during the elections, or left when soldiers of their age were dismissed from service. The vast majority of the soldiers have only one desire to go to the rear... Fortified positions are destroyed, covered with snow, buildings are falling apart; the wood is hauled away for fuel, and the wire is removed to facilitate "fraternization" and trade. The armies are completely incompetent and unable to contain the enemy ... The front of a special army for 120 miles is open.

Encountering no resistance, the German occupied Dvinsk, Polotsk, Minsk, approached Petrograd, captured a huge amount of guns, ammunition and various equipment.

Meanwhile, the performance continued. On the one hand, Lenin and Trotsky loudly announced "The Socialist Fatherland is in danger", a revolutionary headquarters for the defense of Petrograd was organized, a barrier was hastily created in the most important directions from the Red Guard formations and parts of the army and navy, which still retained combat capability.

On the other hand, "Mr. Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars" received confidential instructions from the Russian Department of the German General Staff: "The Headquarters Department has the honor to ask for information about the mood of the detachments sent to Pskov and warns against possible sad consequences if patriotic propaganda is carried out in these detachments and agitation against the German Army.

The Germans took Pskov without a fight. After that, the offensive was suspended and on the morning of February 23, more stringent peace conditions were put forward. This event was the reason for the

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to celebrate February 23 as the birthday of the Red Army, which "stopped the German advance (according to some sources, even "defeated the Germans") near Pskov and Narva".

That the enemy stopped of his own accord follows from Lenin's speech at the Party Congress:

"We assumed that Petrograd would be lost by us in a few days, when the German troops approaching us were at a distance of several crossings from it, and the best sailors and Putilov, with all their great enthusiasm, found themselves alone when unheard-of chaos and panic ensued. , which forced the troops to run to Gatchina, when we were experiencing what

that they took back what had not been handed over, and this consisted in the fact that the telegraph operator came to the station, sat down at the apparatus and telegraphed: "There is no German. The station is occupied by us."

The Kaiser needed not Petrograd (this could cause a wave of patriotic upsurge in the country, which would inevitably wash away the Bolsheviks), but a separate peace, Russian raw materials and a pocket Russian government.

On February 24, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR accepted all the conditions of the ultimatum. On March 3, 1918, a peace treaty was signed between Soviet Russia, on the one hand, and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria, on the other. According to the treaty, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia departed from Russia. In the Caucasus, Türkiye received Kars, Ardagan and Batum. Ukraine and Finland were recognized as independent states. Russia thus lost an area of about 800,000 square kilometers with a population of 56 million people.

As American diplomat E. Sisson commented:

"Germany has made a Russian peace with its own dummy government, falsely called the Council of People's Commissars... Germany has not abandoned the Bolshevik leaders, recognizing their further usefulness for the German world campaign aimed at the internal disorganization of the peoples with whom it is at war. But

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it limited their activity to the boundaries of the closed province into which Great Russia has become."

But within the limits of this vassal "province", the Bolsheviks, under the protection of German bayonets and with the direct participation of German "advisors", could do whatever they pleased. For the sake of such an opportunity, Lenin was ready to give up both St. Petersburg and Moscow. He was ready to "retreat at least to the Urals." And prudently drove the "golden echelons" to the east, and was going to make Nizhny Novgorod the capital. The main thing is to retain power, give up space and gain time: "If you cannot adapt, if you are not disposed to crawl on your belly, in the mud, then you are not a revolutionary, but a talker."

Until November 1918, the world's first state of workers and peasants was, in fact, a German protectorate, whose government "crawled on its belly", biding its time and dreaming of a revolutionary war in Europe.

By the way, in accordance with Article 5 of the peace treaty, the Red Army was also subject to liquidation. The fronts were liquidated, the armies were disbanded, the First Corps of the Red Army had to be disbanded, the position of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was abolished. At the UP party congress, Lenin stated: "We don't have an army, but we have to continue to live next to a predator who is armed to the teeth ..."

Meanwhile, the pacified "predator" did everything possible to speed up the process of establishing the power of the Bolsheviks in the localities. The Germans continued to provide not only financial and material assistance, but also sent military units of the German army to Russia to suppress popular resistance.

Lenin had no doubt that time was working for him. In the spring of 1918, it was clear to the naked eye that Germany's position was unpromising, that she would lose the war anyway, and we must be ready for that day. Remaining a Marxist to the marrow of his bones, Vladimir Ilyich was going to transfer the fire of the world revolution to Europe, "cause an international revolution, make this transition from our revolution, as a narrowly national, to the world revolution."

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In the meantime, it was necessary to "seize the moment", secretly help the allegedly independent Ukrainian Soviet Republic, support the rebel detachments of Makhno and Grigoriev, supply weapons to the Finnish Red Guard, cultivate a new ideological and bacteriological weapon - the "bacillus of Bolshevism", and distribute it to all surrounding areas.

Therefore, having approved the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as a whole, the congress also adopted a secret "Resolution on War and Peace":

"The congress recognizes the adoption of the most energetic, ruthlessly resolute and draconian measures to increase self-discipline and the discipline of the workers and peasants of Russia ... for the creation everywhere and everywhere of organizations of the masses, tightly bound and with an iron unified will, organizations capable of united and self-sacrificing action both in everyday life and especially at critical moments in the life of the people - finally, for comprehensive, systematic, universal education of an adult population, without distinction of sex, military knowledge and military operations.

The congress sees the most reliable guarantee for the consolidation of the socialist revolution, which has triumphed in Russia, only in its transformation into an international workers' revolution.

The congress recognizes it necessary not to publish the adopted resolution and obliges all members of the party to keep this resolution secret.

The spring of 1918 was a time of feverish military construction, which laid the organizational principles of the Red Army for all subsequent years.

Already in March, the Supreme Military Council was formed, which was entrusted with the management of the organization of the cadre army and "all military operations." The council consisted of chairman L.D. Trotsky, military leader M.D. Bonch-Bruевич and three members. To protect the demarcation line with German troops, a line was created

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veil, which consisted of separate Red Army, Red Guard and partisan detachments. The curtains did not so much protect the country "from possible invasions" as they prevented the mass exodus of the population from the northern and central provinces, which was the first to appreciate the charms of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

On March 26, the Supreme Military Council abolished the election of commanders; March 31 - issued an order on the introduction of a new system of military district administration and on the establishment of six military districts on the territory of the European part of the RSFSR.

Since there were few trained commanders with proletarian origins, and Podvoisky liquidated all the cadet and cadet schools back in November 1917, Lenin proposed using former officers of the tsarist army, "but at the same time vigilantly monitor them, placing commissars over them and suppressing their counter-revolutionary intentions."

On April 6, the institution of military commissars was established to oversee the work of military experts and educate personnel in the spirit of devotion to the Soviet regime. According to the regulation, not a single order of the commander of a unit or formation without the signature of the commissar was subject to execution. Commissars were "only impeccable revolutionaries, staunch fighters for the cause of the proletariat and the rural poor", but, as a rule, they knew nothing about military affairs.

By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of April 8, to carry out organizational work on recruiting the Red Army, a local military apparatus was created - volost, district, provincial and district military commissariats. It was planned to start forming 58 infantry divisions with a staff of 36,000 officers and rank and file. In April, Lenin approved a plan for the deployment of a million-strong army on the basis of united states.

The case was in full swing from voluntariness to universal military service. The first step towards its introduction was the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of April 22, which obliged each volunteer to serve for at least six months.

On the same day, by the decree "On Compulsory Education in

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military art" introduced compulsory general training of workers and "peasants who do not exploit the labor of others" in military affairs. All citizens of both sexes (although the participation of women was voluntary) aged 16 to 40, as well as teenagers, were supposed to study in the Vseobuch system - Lenin's dream came true - without interruption from work and study. After eight weeks of classes according to a single 96-hour program, the proletariat was considered liable for military service. The decree provided for "revolutionary responsibility" for evading training in the "art of war".

By the end of April 1918, there were 200 thousand people in the armed forces of the Soviet Republic, plus 36 thousand in the Red Guard detachments. A significant percentage of their personnel were the so-called internationalist soldiers, simply mercenaries.

At the time of the overthrow of the autocracy, there were about 5 million foreign citizens in Russia, including 2.2 million prisoners of war - Austrians, Germans, Turks, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks. These, in fact, enemy soldiers (many participated in the Russian revolution with the permission of the German command) in a campaign with restless Latvian riflemen, impoverished Chinese, just adventurers from all over the world at first, formed the support, the strike force of the Leninist regime, with pleasure and not without profit, established Soviet power in a country given over to complete plunder and desecration.

Eg. Well-armed, soldered by conscious discipline and fellow countrymen, who hated the Empire, under the command of military personnel officers, the regiments of Latvian riflemen became a real find for Lenin, that force without which the Bolshevik government, perhaps, would not have remained in power. At a time when the Russian army was deliberately falling apart, the Latvian regiments were not subject to demobilization. They had to pay for the promised independence with their "international aid".

(By the way, the national question also had its subtleties. The loud declaration of the rights of nations "oppressed by tsarism" to self-determination,

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the collapse of the Russian Empire and the disunity of the peoples, prevented the anti-Bolsheviks from uniting, made the nationalists the allies of Lenin, who promised not to "keep anyone by force".

Of course, for the time being. After all, the interests of the world revolution demanded quite the opposite - global sovietization: "For our part, we do not want secession at all. We want the largest possible state, the closest union possible, the largest possible number of nations... We want revolutionary proletarian unity, unity, not division.")

Already on October 30, 1917, Vladimir Ilyich invited Latvians to establish revolutionary order in Petrograd, and less than a month later, the 6th Tukums Rifle Regiment (over 2,500 people) arrived in the capital. Riflemen participated in the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, in actions to nationalize banks, arrested counter-revolutionaries, guarded important facilities, warehouses, and carried out guard duty. At the same time, to protect people's commissars from the people, by order of the commander-in-chief Krylenko, a Consolidated company of Latvian riflemen (540 people) was formed.

In January 1918, the Bolsheviks headed for the Civil War, but they were sorely lacking reliable units to suppress the flaring up resistance. There was little use for detachments of anarchist sailors who hid in the rear throughout the war and lost their combat capability immediately after recapturing a wine shop from the enemy. Some sailor Zheleznyak was fit to throw out the indignant "intellectuals" with deputy mandates from the Taurida Palace, to carry out expropriations is also a necessary thing, but, as the rumor says, when the "wanderer of the seas" needed to get to Odessa, he left he is to Kherson.

Therefore, in January 1918, the 3rd Kurzeme Regiment of Latvian Riflemen went to the Don to pacify the Cossacks of General Kaledin. At the same time, the 6th Tukums Regiment went north to provide fraternal assistance to the proletariat of Finland. The task of suppressing the "mutiny" of the corps in Belarus
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Neral Dovbor-Musnitsky, who refused to "democratize" the Polish units, readily took over the 4th Regiment. In general, in late 1917 - early 1918, almost half of the Latvian riflemen (about 10 thousand people) took part "in the fight against counter-revolution" outside the territory of Latvia. And not just arrows. Latvian Red Guard detachments were created in Kharkov, Yekaterinoslavl, Odessa, Aleksandrovsk, Vitebsk and other cities.

The February offensive of the German army and the subsequent conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk temporarily curtailed Lenin's territorial appetites. The Germans drove the Red Finns and Red Latvians out of both the Baltic states and Finland. Soviet Latvia ceased its two-month existence. The Riflemen adopted a resolution not to "surrender to German imperialism" and "to join the Russian proletarian army". In practice, they formed the nucleus of this "proletarian" army—eight depleted regiments and the 1st Lettish Communist Detachment. The rest of the Red Army consisted of separate partisan detachments with elected commanders, usually former non-commissioned officers or privates, not connected with each other and practically to no one but a revolutionary conscience.

The Latvians ensured the secret relocation of the government to Moscow, guarded the Kremlin (the consolidated company grew into the 9th Infantry Regiment) and the approaches to the new capital. They were also entrusted with the export of gold reserves and other "values of the Republic" into the interior of the country.

The glorious history of the Chinese battalions, which were formed all over the country, has not yet been written. They also guarded Lenin. And Comrade Trotsky, and other comrades. The Chinese were widely used to carry out punitive actions, executions, and as specialists in torture. There were almost 300,000 Chinese in Russia, during the World War they were massively recruited for various jobs, and they were in almost every major city - Petrograd, Moscow, Perm, Yekaterinburg, Odessa ...

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And the Germans were engaged in food requisitioning (!), in particular on the Don (!!). It's easy to imagine the reaction Cossacks.

It is clear that this army was intended exclusively for "internal use". The number of internationalists who fought for the happiness of the Russian proletariat in the ranks of the Red Army at various times ranged from 250 to 300 thousand people (including more than 40 thousand Chinese mercenaries, about 12 thousand Czech legionnaires), the number of various international formations—detachments, companies, battalions, legions, regiments, brigades, and divisions—goes off scale for five hundred. And how they strengthened the Cheka!

In the spring of 1918, Lenin believed that he had already won the Civil War: "It was necessary to defend this victory (meaning the October Revolution) in the Civil War. It took about three months, starting with the victory over Kerensky ("the fool and the braggart") near Gatchina, continuing

victories over the bourgeoisie, junkers, part of the counter-revolutionary Cossacks in Moscow, Irkutsk, Orenburg, Kiev, ending with the victory over Kaledin, Kornilov and Alekseev in Rostov-on-Don ... Victories on the home front were relatively easy ..."

At the UP congress, the leader declared: "The civil war has become a fact ... The wave of the Civil War was surging all over Russia, and everywhere we won with extraordinary ease ... Finally, in April: "We have conquered Russia ... We must now govern Russia."

And to govern, according to Lenin's understanding, meant to carry out a forced organization of the entire population, to subject it to iron discipline, to establish a comprehensive accounting and control of grain and grain production (and then all other necessary products), to separate the sheep from the goats, to determine each ration and distribute this ration depending on the "usefulness" of a member of society for the Soviet power:

"When it comes to the distribution of food, it is impossible to think that it is necessary to distribute only fairly. And one must think that this distribution is a method, an instrument, a means for raising production. It is necessary to give

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state food support only for those employees who are really needed in conditions of the best labor productivity, and if food is distributed as an instrument of politics, then in the direction of reducing those that are not absolutely needed, and encouraging those who are really needed.

Thus, Vladimir Ilyich intended to govern by terror and famine. In May 1918, having "won with extraordinary ease" in the Civil War, he decided that the time had come to move on to the coveted "third stage of the revolution" — the introduction of a food dictatorship, the subordination of the petty-bourgeois elements to the "will of one person." It was unbearable to look at the mess that had formed all around: "... everyone strove in his own way. Animals roamed, birds flew, insects crawled; but no one wanted to march in step.

On May 13, the Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars "On granting emergency powers to the People's Commissariat for Food to combat the rural bourgeoisie, hiding grain stocks and speculating with them" was approved.

On May 27, a decree "On the reorganization of the People's Commissariat for Food and Local Food Organs" followed, providing for the centralization of the entire food business and the steady implementation of the grain monopoly.

On the basis of decrees, the People's Commissariat for Food received the right to use armed force to seize grain and began organizing food committees and a paramilitary Food Requisition Army. In June, the first food detachments appeared, from which food battalions and food regiments were formed (by the autumn of 1920, there were more than 77 thousand food soldiers in the Food Army).

Lenin, announcing a "crusade" in the countryside, called on the advanced workers to organize "iron detachments" themselves and take control of "any point in the production of grain."

Prodrazverstka was invented by the Provisional Government, but it understood this term somewhat differently and did not throw out the slogan "With machine guns for bread". So

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The government simply declared enemies of the people everyone who hid surplus grain, did not take it to bulk points, but wanted to sell it without fail. That is, all the peasants, except for the poorest, who had nothing to "hide". These lumpens were enlisted as allies of the proletariat and organized according to the decree of || June to the committees of the poor, gave them "unrestricted by any

the laws of power" and allowed to rob everyone else. Kombeds were "strongholds, organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the countryside."

The main enemies, of course, were declared those who had something to take away - the "glutted" kulaks - "the most brutal, the rudest, the wildest exploiters." The very idea that people can live normally on earth, feed themselves by their labor and grow rich, regardless of the existing power, not obeying the "sole orders of the Soviet dictators" and not showing any desire to feed the parasites, caused Lenin to have attacks of furious anger. .

As soon as he did not call them: spiders and leeches, vampires and bloodsuckers, robbers and speculators. They had money, "THEY saved up thousands and hundreds of thousands of money," and they were also going to strangle and slaughter "infinitely many workers" and restore the "power of the landowners"! Therefore, all of them must be killed. The leader had already estimated that there were hardly more than two million "kulaks" in the country, "the kulaks are a minority among the people", there would be enough cartridges for everyone. Ilyich disliked the kulaks very much, he hated them as a class: "A merciless war against these kulaks! Death to them! And food detachments moved into the countryside, and under the protection of German, Hungarian, Austrian and other internationalists.

That's when it exploded. Then, in the summer of 1918, with the "crusade", the rebellion of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (they knew that the confiscated grain went to Germany in echelons), peasant uprisings and the Civil War began. It took on even greater scope in the fall, when the German troops began

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purify occupied territories by transferring power to national governments.

On November 13, 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee solemnly declared that the conditions of the Brest-Litovsk peace "have lost their strength and significance", and called on the peoples "to decide their own fate." The Central Bureau of Bolshevik Organizations in the Occupied Regions, which emerged literally out of thin air, issued an appeal: "We cannot allow the organization of counter-revolutionary elements and the seizure of power... Start organizing Soviets of Workers' Deputies immediately."

Neither in Ukraine, nor in the Baltics, no one was going to organize the Soviets. The flows of refugees from the RSFSR managed to tell a lot about the life of the victorious proletariat in the country. Legitimately elected Provisional Governments came to power in Estonia and Latvia. Skoropadsky's government arose in Ukraine. The Transcaucasian republics — Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan — declared their independence.

But all these governments were bourgeois, from the point of view of the Bolsheviks, "wrong". The real rulers lived in Moscow. Parts of the Red Army moved across the demarcation line to the west and south, in order to ensure the "revolutionary-proletarian unity" of the peoples and provide assistance to the "international workers' revolution". However, during the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, not only the Bolsheviks received a "breathing space": the "armies of the overthrown classes" stood in the way of the proletarian army, small in number, but better organized, with a large number of officers in their ranks.

Actually, only then the Red Army was truly born, although the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on universal military service for all workers aged 18 to 40 was issued on May 29, 1918.

On September 2, 1918, simultaneously with the declaration of the country as a military camp — "The Republic is surrounded by enemies!" - instead of the Supreme Military Council, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic was created under the chairmanship

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L.D. Trotsky. The RVSR was in charge of the active army through the Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Republic. The disbandment of the Red Guard was completed.

11| September, the curtains were eliminated and fronts created in their place. By December, 12 armies were deployed, with 285,000 bayonets and sabers in combat strength (according to Soviet historians, internationalists made up only about 8%, but this is in autumn, and there is a strange thing: Latvian riflemen "do not count"). The total number of armed forces reached 800 thousand people, and by the beginning of 1919 - 1 million 630 thousand. Lenin demanded to bring it up to three million by spring.

It became clear that specialists were indispensable.

The principle of formation of the command staff of the young Red Army was formulated by Lenin. On the day of the Red Officer on November 24, 1918, the leader gave a clear instruction:

"Building a new army, we must take commanders only from the people. Only red officers will have authority among the soldiers and will be able to consolidate socialism in our army. Such an army will be invincible."

However, the vast majority of "red officers" had no military education, and often no education. The formations they led were poorly managed detachments of armed workers, former soldiers and sailors, capable of terrorizing a single area or carrying out guerrilla raids, but did not have "correct intelligence, neither communication with each other, nor the ability to more complex maneuver" and showed complete failure when faced with the armies of the "overthrown classes". In addition, the "commanders in chief" and "commanders" who bred in a multitude did not want to obey anyone.

(S.S. Kamenev, being the head of the Nevelsk section of the Western Veil, described such a formally subordinate detachment: "Many volunteers were from those who, going voluntarily to serve in the Carnal detachment, in fact

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they took refuge from military work, many of them were a vicious element with predatory inclinations.")

"Our central position," wrote Trotsky, "the location of the enemies in a large circle, the possibility for us to operate along internal lines of operations, reduced our strategy to one simple idea: namely, the successive liquidation of fronts, depending on their relative importance ... We had the opportunity to transfer our forces and massage them into shock fists in the most important direction at the moment. However, this advantage could only be realized under the condition of complete centralism in management and command... it was necessary to be able to order, not persuade."

After fierce party disputes, it was decided to build the Red Army on a regular basis, discarding the nonsense about the total armament of the people. A month after the announcement of compulsory military service for workers, the mobilization of former officers and officials was introduced. | October 1918 issued a decree of the Council of People's Commissars on the general mobilization of "persons of the General Staff", except for obvious cripples and "obsessed with serious illnesses."

"Each of the improvised commanders," Trotsky recalled, "needed an officer... A fair percentage of educated officers had... an extremely favorable influence on the general level of command."

In 1918, according to Trotsky, "76% of the entire command and administrative apparatus was represented by former officers of the tsarist army, and only 12.9% consisted of young red commanders, who naturally occupied lower positions."

Altogether, 75,000 former officers served in the Red Army, including more than 500 graduates of the Academy of the General Staff. Among them were those who were forcibly mobilized, there were those who decided to make a career under the new government, but after all, the family also had to somehow be fed in the conditions of "military

communism". The surge of patriotism and the desire to serve the motherland, regardless of the political coloring of the government

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va, among the officers who did not want to participate in the war on the "internal front", caused the German invasion, and then it turned out that the "bird got stuck" and there was no freedom of choice.

There were also those to whom the embodiment of the Bolshevik ideas about the new Russia seemed much more attractive than the ideas of the White movement. They constituted a "small minority" And they did not immediately understand that the main ideas of the Bolsheviks were violence, unscrupulousness, cruelty, and all their slogans and promises were shameless lies. By the way, regardless of whether the officers voluntarily joined the Red Army or were mobilized, a special order required the commissars to monitor them, punish them, "keep on record the families of officers and take them to responsible positions if there is an opportunity in seize the family in case of treason".

As Comrade Latsis taught: "The first duty you must ask him is what class he belongs to, what is his origin, what is his education and what is his profession." Based on the "three questions", any military specialist could be dragged to the basement at any moment, which was done systematically. In case of any failure, the former officers were first accused of treason. Even the Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Republic in the summer of 1919 landed on the bunk. The officers were and remained a class enemy, they were used for the time being, or, to put it in Lenin's language, "they built communism from the bricks that the capitalists picked up against us."

They fought on the side of the "Reds", some for conscience, some for fear, organizing the supply of the Red Army, conducting mobilization activities, commanding armies and fronts, planning operations so that in the end some Primakov could show off in front of the soldiers on white a horse with a hat. It is funny to read the reasoning of S.M. Budyonny like: "Perhaps the weakest point in the Wrangel organization was the generals. I knew Pokrovsky, and Shaatilov, and Ulagai, and others well: we had to beat them in

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1919. They were not very brave warriors, with a narrow military outlook, with limited operational thinking." I wonder where the illiterate Cossack got such "unlimited operational thinking", who was his chief of staff?

All the chiefs of Soviet front-line staffs in 1918-1920 were former officers of the General Staff (where else could they get a competent staff officer?), 53% of army chiefs of staff and 37% of army commanders were also them.

Frunze's deputy was - the tsarist - General F.F. Novitsky, General N.S. served as chief of staff. Makhrov, in the headquarters of Tukhachevsky during the attack on Warsaw - Count N.V. Sollogub. General A.A. Samoilo commanded the 6th separate army, General P.P. Sytin - Southern Front, General V.D. Olderog - East, General A.E. Snesev - by the troops of the North Caucasian Military District and the combined armed forces of Belarus and Lithuania, Colonel V.M. Gitis - Western and Caucasian fronts. Throughout the war, the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic were Colonels of the General Staff I.I. Vatselis and S.S. Kamenev, and their chiefs of staff were Generals P.P. Lebedev and M.D. Bonch-Brukevich.

At the USSh Congress (1919), Yakov Sokolnikov, a member of the Central Committee of the party, reported:

"Where military specialists were involved, where the partisan army was reorganized into a regular army, stability of the front was achieved, military success was achieved. On the contrary, where military specialists have not found a use for themselves ... there they have come to the complete disintegration and disappearance of the armies themselves.

Despite this, many prominent members of the party, for example, Zinoviev, Pyatakov, Stalin, as well as proletarian military leaders who had come forward from the people, like Budyonny and Voroshilov, spoke out against the involvement of class-alien officer corps in military work, expressed their distrust of him, accused him of treason, demanded to "reconsider the attitude" towards military experts. On this basis, even

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the so-called "military opposition" arose. Indeed, forcibly mobilized officers often ran across to the opposite side. So after all, whole regiments of workers switched from red to white, from white to green and back to red, that's why it was the Civil War. The best military unit in Kolchak's army was considered the regiment of Izhevsk workers. But the Marxists saw the difference: the proletarians made mistakes because of their ignorance and lack of consciousness, while the "officers" cheated because of their class origin.

Lenin also fell into doubts, because the logic of the struggle demanded the complete destruction of this "bourgeois stratum". However, the defeat of the Red Army on the Eastern Front, the complete collapse and defeat of the essentially partisan Ukrainian front made a proper impression on Vladimir Ilyich. A flexible tactician and a supporter of iron discipline, he declared the policy of attracting military experts to be the only correct one, called, rejecting "ignorant opinion itself", to learn military affairs from them, of course, under the condition of vigilant control over the officers and merciless suppression of any "counter-revolutionary his inclinations":

"Hundreds and hundreds of military experts are cheating on us and will continue to be cheated on, we will catch and shoot them, but thousands and tens of thousands of military experts work systematically and for a long time, without whom the Red Army could not have been created, which grew out of the accursed memory of partisanism and managed to win brilliant victories in the east... Partisanism, its traces, its remnants, its remnants caused both our army and the Ukrainian army immeasurably more disasters, disintegration, defeats and catastrophes, loss of people and loss of property, than all treason military experts."

As the need passed, they got rid of them, promoting "red officers", graduates of early courses for command personnel, so that by the end of the Civil War the number of former officers of the tsarist army was about 34% and steadily decreased further.

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In the end, using merciless terror and promises of universal equality, the mobilization of all resources combined with unparalleled ferocity, an iron organization based on the basest instincts, slogans of self-determination of nations and discord in the enemy camp, which allowed them to be beaten in turn The Bolsheviks defeated Russia. One of the factors contributing to this victory was the presence of tens of thousands of officers in the service of Soviet power.

But the heroes of the war, hung with orders and "revolutionary weapons", glorified in poetry and prose, were, of course, not they, but the flesh of the flesh of the working people, worker-peasant commanders, mostly former non-commissioned officers and second lieutenants, and commissars in "dusty helmets" who defeated the white hordes armed to the teeth by the Entente. They have created a new proletarian military art, head and shoulders above all others. The generals were now supposed to speak down, there was nothing to learn from them. CM. Budyonny wrote:

"The White Guards had well-trained personnel, they were commanded by experienced military leaders. However, all these gentlemen were beaten by the red fighters, including the cavalry, according to all the rules of military art.

Another nugget strategist is RP. Eideman, a half-educated student of the Forestry Institute, an accelerated ensign who began his military career immediately as division chief, asserted with aplomb: "Denikin's operational thought was too decrepit, reflecting the degeneration of the obsolete system."

The military heritage of the tsarist army was rejected as "backward" and unsuitable for the Red Army. M.N. Tukhachevsky in 1921, in an article for the journal "Military Bulletin", stated:

"We did not inherit from the tsarist army good methods of combined arms training, and we ourselves must persistently develop them in relation to the conditions of the Red Army."

"Tukhachevsky", "Budyonnye" and "Eidemans" did not inherit a lot. For example, "techniques" destroy

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of peoples and classes in their own country, the ruin of masterpieces of architecture. They did not inherit from the tsarist authorities such methods of training and indoctrination of troops, as a result of which millions of soldiers of the most ideological army went over to the side of the enemy, as happened in the Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

In 1921-1922, during the period of the reduction of the Red Army, the "old-regime" generals and colonels were quietly escorted out to teach. In 1924, they were expelled from educational institutions and dismissed from the army; in 1930-1931, the survivors were arrested and imprisoned on charges of a monarchist conspiracy, including such major military specialists and scientists as A.E. Snegarev, A.A. Svechin, A.Kh. Bazarevsky, N.E. Kakurin. Someone was shot. Thus, in Leningrad, the OGPU uncovered an organization of former military officers who, with "counter-revolutionary" goals, kept the banner and relics of the Semenovskiy Life Guards Regiment under the church altar - out of 27 defendants, 11 people were sentenced to the highest measure of social protection, including the last commander regiment Alexei Matveyevich Polivanov (1879-1931).

In 1937-1938, they finished off those who did not have time to die a natural death - A.A. Svechin, 68-year-old P.P. Sytin...

By the end of 1935, the Soviet military hierarchy had taken shape. The top leadership of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and the Navy was represented by forty people of the commanding and commanding staff, approved in new military ranks in accordance with the resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of September 22: five marshals of the USSR, five commanders of the 1st rank, two flagships of the fleet 1st rank, one army commissar of the 1st rank, nine commanders of the 2nd rank, two flagships of the fleet of the 2nd rank, fifteen army commissars of the 2nd rank.

Almost all of them were solid Bolsheviks, heroes of the Civil War, spattered to the top with the blood of their compatriots, tested in ideological battles with

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Trotskyists, right and left opposition and other deviations.

At the top of the pyramid, the five first marshals in Soviet history shone with merit and regalia. The Pravda newspaper wrote about them:

"The best of the best, worthy of the worthy iron tribe commanders of the Red Army. The five marshals embody the incomparable qualities of the sons of the people, the military leaders of the workers and peasants, our commanders. Under their leadership, the regiments of the Red Army have covered their banners with unfading glory, under their leadership the Red Army vigilantly guards the Soviet lands from enemies.

Here is the "iron tribe":

Marshal of the Soviet Union Voroshilov Kliment Efremovich was born in 1881 in the village of Verkhnee, Yekaterinoslav province, into a working-class family. At the age of twelve, Klim went to a rural zemstvo school, where he studied for two winters. The official biography of the "first red officer"

tells of a hungry childhood, poverty and "the craving for education when it is impossible to satisfy it." True, when all the possibilities for satisfaction appeared, the cravings disappeared. Kliment Efremovich never studied anything again.

At the age of fifteen, he began working as a fitter's assistant at the Yuryevsky Metallurgical Plant, where in 1899 he organized a strike of crane operators and foundry workers. The first arrest, dismissal, blacklisting, wanderings in search of work followed. In 1903 he was accepted into the Lugansk organization of the RSDLP. Thus began the path to professional revolutionaries.

After the split of the Social Democrats, Voroshilov resolutely joined the Leninists and, in defiance of the Mensheviks, presented himself at party meetings as "Comrade Antimekov." Energetic, temperamental Klim quickly became a prominent figure in the Bolshevik movement.

During the first Russian revolution, elected chairman of the Lugansk Soviet of Workers' Deputies, Voroshilov led strikes at the Hartmann factory, was engaged in the creation

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combat squads, the delivery of weapons from Finland, organized an underground laboratory for the manufacture of bombs. In 1906 and 1907 he was a delegate [at the Stockholm and London Party Congresses, where he met Lenin, Stalin, Dzerzhinsky. In July 1907, the bomber mechanic was arrested for the third time and received from the bloody tsarist regime three years of exile in the Arkhangelsk province. He fled from exile exactly three months later.

In 1908-1917, Voroshilov conducted underground work in Baku, St. Petersburg, and Tsaritsyn. The work was regularly interrupted by arrests, imprisonment and deportations to remote regions of the empire. After the February Revolution, Kliment Efremovich was a member of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies for a month, and then returned to Lugansk, where he was elected chairman of the city council, city дума and party committee. In November 1917, as a delegate of the Constituent Assembly, Voroshilov went to the capital and, having fallen into the thick of things, became a commissar of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee and one of the founders of the Cheka - the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage .

In March 1918, Lenin, paying for advance payments and ticketless travel in a sealed carriage, signed a separate peace with Germany, according to which Ukraine occupied by the Germans was recognized as an independent state, the further fate of which would be decided "without the participation of the Russian authorities." Austria-Hungary and Germany signed the relevant treaties with the delegation of the Central Rada of Ukraine, which immediately requested German military assistance.

Officially, the Bolsheviks could not prevent this in any way. But they had vast experience in underground work and, formally observing the conditions of the Brest Peace, diligently fanned the flames of the "revolutionary war" in the territories that had separated from the Russian Empire, secretly supporting the rebels Makhno, Grigoriev, Shinkar.

Voroshilov was seconded to Ukraine. There he organized the 1st partisan Luhansk socialist

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a detachment of 600 people and on March 13 moved to battle "with the executioners of the proletarian revolution" - German interventionists and Ukrainian independentists.

Soon the detachment turned into the 5th Ukrainian Army. True, the Germans were not too scared. Just two weeks later, the defeated "army" began to hastily retreat from Ukraine. Voroshilov led his "troops" to Lugansk, from where the "legendary Voroshilov campaign" of the Red partisans with families, trains and convoys with looted goods began through the rebellious Cossack Don to the Volga.

With the beginning of the revolution, the Don people were about to stick their lances into the ground and, leaving the front, dispersed to the villages, but two months of Soviet power and Lenin's decree on the introduction of surplus requisitions outraged them. General A.I. Denikin wrote in his memoirs:

"Screams were heard from all sides, stories about mass atrocities, about the desecration of churches, about arsons and robberies, about the rape of women and children ..."

Therefore, angry "White Cossacks destroyed railways, bridges, blew up water pumps, continuously attacked moving troops and echelons." Nevertheless, at the beginning of July 1918, "a group of troops of Comrade Voroshilov" broke through to Tsaritsyn.

Here was his old acquaintance from the Baku underground, I.V. Stalin. By "procurement" the Bolsheviks understood the forcible, under the muzzles of machine guns, the seizure of food products from the entire population of the country. Those who objected were declared enemies of the people with all the consequences

consequences.

The peasantry and the Cossacks responded to the robbery with mass uprisings. Stalin, having unlimited powers, at the same time appointed himself the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the North Caucasian Military District and the head of the defense of the city from the Cossack units that did not accept Soviet power, General P.A. Krasnov, elected Ataman of the Don.

Iosif Vissarionovich categorically did not trust the military

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experts who served in the headquarters of the district, preferring to periodically drown the former tsarist officers in the Volga. Kliment Efremovich, who hated the "white bone" with all his proletarian gut, immediately became a member of the Military Council of the district and commander of the Tsaritsyn group of troops.

In September 1918, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic ordered the formation of the Southern Front on the basis of the North Caucasian District with headquarters in Kozlov; "military specialist" P.P. was put in command. Sytin. From the troops of the Tsaritsyn and Kamyshin directions, the 10th Army was organized under the command of Voroshilov. The army consisted mainly of partisans driven out from Ukraine, and also, according to the testimony of a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the army, A.I. Okulov, from the elements of "declassified freemen, for which nothing is needed, ONLY" a little cut ": who, for what - it is absolutely indifferent. The huge carts of some units, where thousands of marauders, deserters and loafers hide, like locusts, devastate the surroundings, devour supplies, sow panic and decay ... Partly due to what the 10th Army is doing among the civilian population, and maybe the most it is precisely for this reason that we are waging war among a country that is not friendly... As a result, when our troops approach, the civilian population often arms, puts up desperate resistance to us, and in the event of a defeat, they flee en masse, taking with them everything they can. and hiding and destroying the rest."

Stalin and Voroshilov, modestly calling themselves "the most prominent members of the party" in their correspondence with Moscow, categorically refused to move to Kozlov and obey the "untrustworthy" former general, demanding the right to vote in all military decisions.

The squabble reached Lenin. Vladimir Ilyich took Trotsky's side. As a result, Sytin remained in the post of commander with a personal mandate of the RVSR for "complete independence in matters of a strategic and operational nature." Stalin was recalled in the second half of October

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from Tsaritsyn, Voroshilov was removed from the composition of the Revolutionary Military Council of the front.

The "demon of the revolution", who set about imposing iron discipline in the army, characterized the former locksmith as a concentration of "home-grown opposition of non-commissioned officers and partisans against a centralized military organization and military specialists." Since then, Voroshilov has become Stalin's most faithful ally in the struggle against Trotsky.

In November, due to complete incompetence, Kliment Efremovich was removed from command of the army and appointed to the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs in the hastily formed Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraine. It did not hesitate to publish a manifesto in which it announced the deposition of Hetman Skoropadsky and the "restoration of all the gains" of October.

Following the manifesto, the Soviet troops set off on a campaign, which in January 1919 formed the Ukrainian Front under the command of V.A. Antonova-Ovseenko. For some time Voroshilov commanded the troops of the Kharkov district, in June 1919 he acted as commander of the 14th Army, formed from the remnants of the 2nd Ukrainian Army and the red units driven out of the Crimea and Yekaterinoslav. As reported by V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko:

"Voroshilov was a commander in a certain section of the internal front. At first he had big failures on it, corrected by successes in other areas where he was not in command. He can attribute to himself the success of the fight against Grigoriev only out of a big misunderstanding. The reports of his headquarters about the defeat of Grigoriev near Alexandria turned out to be false ... Voroshilov's statements in the field of his own successes are shamefully exaggerated.

Voroshilov did not have time to show military talents as commander, his army was defeated by the corps of General A.G. Shkuro and thrown back over the Dnieper.

Nevertheless, at the UP Congress of the RCP(b), Kliment Efremovich, who sincerely imagined himself a commander, became one of the leaders of the so-called military opposition, denying

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the need to use military experts. The commanders and commissars who emerged from the ranks during the Civil War argued that in any case, former officers could not be trusted, and only communists should be appointed to high positions.

On November 19, 1919, Trotsky signed an order to create the First Cavalry Army, in which Voroshilov became a member of the Revolutionary Military Council. In this position, he participated in campaigns on the Denikin, Polish and Wrangel fronts, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and the Honorary Revolutionary Weapon. The horsemen, brutalized with blood, terrified the population of the "enemy country", destroyed everything in their path, not distinguishing the reds from the whites. Gusev, Commissar of the Southern Front, telegraphed to the People's Commissariat for Military Enmor:

"Units of the First Cavalry Army terrorize the authorities, rob and shoot residents and even the families of employees in the Red Army, all cattle are stolen ... The results of the outrages are already being felt, those villages that were on the side of the Soviet government and are far from participating in banditry, now, on the contrary, have a terrible hatred for the Red Army and Soviet power.

In March 1921, the commissar of the Southern Group of Forces Voroshilov suppressed the Kronstadt rebellion, for which he received the second Banner on his chest. In the same year, he was elected a member of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party and appointed commander of the troops of the newly created North Caucasian Military District, which at that time was conducting a "continuous struggle against banditry": either the Terek Cossacks who supported Denikin were evicted and shot, and their lands were given to the Chechens, then "mercilessly shot" Chechen nationalists. For these works, Kliment Efremovich was awarded another Order of the Red Banner.

Stalin closely followed the progress of his old friend. At the suggestion of the Secretary General, the commander of the troops of the Moscow District N.I. Muralov was transferred to the North Caucasus, and Voroshilov was appointed in his place. In January 1925, he became deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council.

USSR and People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. After the death of Frunze, on November 6, 1925, Kliment Efremovich headed the armed forces of the country, and in January 1926 he was elected a member of the Politburo. The appointment of Voroshilov caused surprise in the military environment, where they had a low opinion of his military talents. But for Stalin, only one fact mattered: Klim was a proven, most reliable ally.

As the Great Soviet Encyclopedia stated in 1929:

"Voroshilov did not receive systematic military training. For the first time, he became acquainted with military affairs in the fierce revolutionary struggle of the class from whose depths he emerged. The Civil War was the only practical school for him. Only at the end of the military suffering did he get the opportunity to get acquainted with the theory of military affairs. All this left a special imprint on the work of Voroshilov and made him one of the most characteristic, striking and original figures among the military leaders and generals of the October Revolution... Highly developed class instinct, deep adherence to principles, genuine democracy main features of his political profile.

The trouble is that Kliment Efremovich believed that this "School" AND THIS "profile" is enough to defeat any enemy. Therefore, the original and bright leader was not particularly interested in the theory of military affairs, preferring the high art of opera to it.

The propaganda apparatus tirelessly sang the exploits of the "first red officer", he became one of the most popular people in the country. Songs were sung about him, poems were composed, cities and towns were named after him. Artillerymen fired "Voroshilov volleys", pilots ate "Voroshilov breakfasts", Red Army soldiers fought for the right to wear the badge of "Voroshilov shooter" and "Voroshilov horseman", wheat "Voroshilovskaya" was earing in the fields. Voroshilov, in turn, sang of Stalin's strategic genius, dedicating the opus "Stalin and the Red Army" to him.

On July 20, 1934, the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs was renamed the People's Commissariat for Defense. Voroshilov still remained at his post, "successfully implementing Stalin's plans for building a mighty Red Army." On the eve of the eighteenth anniversary of October, Kliment Efremovich received another gift - the city of Lugansk was renamed Voroshilovgrad.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Egorov Alexander Ilyich was born in 1883 in the city of Buzuluk, Orenburg Region, into a petty-bourgeois family, which he subsequently carefully concealed, posing as a proletarian. Graduated from the Samara classical gymnasium.

In 1901, he was called to serve his military service as a volunteer, and then sent to the Kazan Infantry Cadet School, from which he graduated in 1905. During the years of the first Russian revolution, Alexander Ilyich suppressed unrest and peasant uprisings in the Transcaucasus and distinguished himself in punitive deeds, earning the Order of St. Stanislaw, 3rd degree. During the First World War, Yegorov commanded a company, battalion, regiment. He fought bravely: two wounds, three shell shocks, six military awards and St. George's weapons. rose to

lieutenant colonel.

After the February Revolution, Yegorov, an opportunist of pure water, joined the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, adjoining its right wing, agitated for the war to a victorious end, and sharply criticized the irresponsibility of the Bolsheviks. It was not for nothing that the Provisional Government promoted him to the rank of colonel. In October 1917, Alexander Ilyich turned much to the left in his views and moved to the ruling party of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. Therefore, in December he received the post of a member of the collegium of the Commissariat for the demobilization of the old army.

From January 1918 he worked in the military department of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, inspecting the formation and training of Red Army units. In May, he was appointed commissar of the All-Russian General Staff and chairman of the Higher Attestation Commission for the selection of officers for the Red Army. refuge

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A true supporter of the creation of a disciplined regular army, Yegorov, in a report addressed to Lenin, substantiated the need to introduce the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic and create a unified headquarters under him. In July 1918, after a failed rebellion, the Left SRs were outlawed. Outraged, Alexander Ilyich publicly, through the newspaper Pravda, broke with them and signed up with the Bolsheviks.

In August 1918, Yegorov led the red troops who fought against the Cossacks of General P.A. Krasnov on the Balashov, Kamyshin section. In October, the 9th Army of the Southern Front was formed on the basis of these troops. In December, Yegorov replaced Voroshilov as commander of the 10th Army, and in January 1919 he defeated the Cossacks on the outskirts of Tsaritsyn. However, in the spring, the troops of the Caucasian Volunteer Army P.N. came to the aid of Krasnov. Wrangel. On May 25, large White forces crossed the Sal River in the area of the Pletnev farm. Yegorov personally led the counterattack of the 4th (Divisional Commander S.M. Budyonny) and the 6th (Divisional Commander I.R. Apanasenko) Cavalry Divisions. As a result, up to three regiments of white infantry were defeated, and the brave commander received a bullet wound. For this fight, Yegorov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Nevertheless, on June 30, the army of General Wrangel took Tsaritsyn.

On July 9, 1919, Alexander Ilyich was briefly appointed assistant commander and member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front with the simultaneous entry, again instead of Voroshilov, into command of the 14th Army. This army left Kyiv with battles, then defended Bryansk. At the end of September, the South-Eastern Front was separated from the Southern Front, Yegorov began to command the new Southern Front, at the suggestion of Stalin, although the Commander-in-Chief S.S. Kamenev objected to the appointment: "By personal characteristics, he is unlikely to cope with such a difficult task ..." Stalin was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Front.

In connection with the decisive offensive of Denikin's troops on Moscow, the Southern Front was declared the main front of the Republic. On September 20, the red troops abandoned

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Kursk, October 1 - Voronezh, October 13 - Orel. The real threat hung over Tula with its most important military factories and Moscow. The success of the whites was facilitated by the presence of large cavalry formations, which made it possible to maneuver forces, creating superiority in the right directions.

The Bolsheviks were greatly impressed by the forty-day raid of the 4th Don Cossack Corps, General K.K. Mamontov (6000 sabers, 3000 bayonets) on the Soviet rear. Therefore, under the slogan thrown by People's Commissar Trotsky: "Proletarian, on the horse!", the creation of the red cavalry began. Lev Davidovich was one of the initiators of the formation of the Red Cossacks as a mobile strike force along with the Cavalry.

To defeat Denikin, under the leadership of Trotsky and Kamenev, a plan was developed, the essence of which was to deliver flank attacks in converging directions in order to encircle the main enemy forces: from the area northwest of Orel with the participation of the Latvian and Estonian Rifles, the 8th Cavalry Division of the Red Cossacks and from the area east of Voronezh by the forces of the Budyonny Cavalry Corps, along with other cavalry units. The counter-offensive began on October 11 and developed extremely successfully.

The simultaneous victory of the Red troops near Orel and Voronezh marked the beginning of a radical change in the situation on the Southern Front. In November, Stalin and Yegorov turned the Cavalry Corps into the First Cavalry Army, approving Budyonny as commander and Voroshilov as a member of the Revolutionary Military Council. For many years, these four went through life, supporting each other in the struggle for power. In all

In the discussions of the 1920s, Yegorov defended the rightness of Stalin and took care of the promotion of veterans of the First Cavalry.

On January 10, 1920, the Southern Front was renamed the South-Western Front, with Yegorov and Stalin at its head. In February, the troops of the front completely cleared the Ukraine of Denikin. In the spring, in view of the mutual desire of the parties, the war between Soviet Russia and Poland began: the Poles

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The Bolsheviks wanted to revive the Commonwealth "from might to might", the Bolsheviks — to export their trademark product — the proletarian revolution. In March, Lenin demanded from Stalin the speedy liquidation of the whites in the Crimea, because "news has just come from Germany that a battle is going on in Berlin, and the Spartacists have taken possession of part of the city. It is not known who will win, but it is necessary for us to accelerate the mastery of the Crimea in order to have completely free hands, because the civil war in Germany may force us to move west to help the communists.

On April 21, Warsaw signed an agreement with Symon Petlyura (1879-1926), according to which the government headed by him was recognized as the legal authority in Ukraine, and in return ceded Eastern Galicia to Poland up to the border of the Zbruch River. Two days later, a military convention was signed on joint actions of the Polish and Ukrainian armies.

On April 25, the armies of the Southern Polish Front under the command of Jozef Pilsudski went on the offensive, broke through the Soviet Southwestern Front and occupied Zhytomyr, Kazatin, Zhmerinka within three days. On May 6, they took Kyiv, capturing bridgeheads on the eastern bank of the Dnieper.

A month later, the First Cavalry Army of Budyonny, who arrived from the Caucasian Front, broke through the Polish front with a powerful counterattack from the Uman region and liberated Kyiv on June 12. Legionnaires and Petliura's haidamaks, despite the reinforcements transferred from Belarus, just as rapidly rolled back to the west.

On July 4, having received 200 thousand reinforcements, of which more than 100 thousand were deserters caught in the villages, and the 3rd cavalry corps of G.D. Tai, moved forward the troops of the Western Front M.N. Tukhachevsky. The northern Polish front of General S. Sheptytsky rolled back to the line of old German positions without accepting a fight. Twenty days later, the Soviet troops were tasked with "inflicting a final defeat on the enemy and capturing Warsaw no later than August 12."

Yegorov and Stalin also wanted to do something

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great, and they proposed to transfer the main efforts of their front from the Lublin direction to Lvov, promising to deal with it in a week. The Moscow comrades, euphorically estimating the distance to Bucharest, Budapest and Prague, agreed with joy and without any hesitation. From that moment on, the two Soviet fronts, which had previously carried out a concentric offensive against the Polish capital, began to scatter in different directions. The self-confidence of the Soviet strategists was soon punished. At the end of July, the Poles firmly beat the Budennovites near Brody; The main forces of the Southwestern Front were drawn into heavy protracted battles on the outskirts of Lvov. And in mid-August, the "Miracle on the Vistula" broke out - a sudden counterattack on the left flank of Tukhachevsky, ending in the complete defeat of the entire Western Front.

As a result, not only did Yegorov have to withdraw his armies to the east, but Wrangel, who had left the Crimea, occupied Northern Tavria. To fight it, a new front had to be created under the command of Frunze. The Southwestern Front, after the armistice with the Poles on October 18, retreated to the state border line and was abolished at the end of the year.

On December 30, 1920, taking into account "solid theoretical knowledge of military affairs" and experience in commanding fronts, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic ranked Yegorov on the General Staff. WITH

January 1921, Alexander Ilyich commanded the Kyiv military district, in April he took over the Petrograd district. At the same time, from September 1921 to January 1922, he also commanded the Western Front instead of the disgraced and recalled Tukhachevsky.

In February 1922, Yegorov was sent to command a punitive army in the Transcaucasus, with the task of "pacifying" the occupied territories of the recently independent republics. The case was familiar.

"To liquidate banditry in the shortest possible time and to deal with bandits mercilessly and severely," the commander ordered on February 22, 1923, "the population belonging to

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unfriendly to the Soviet power, disarm, arrest accomplices and concealers.

In general, Alexander Ilyich did an excellent job and earned republican orders of the Red Banner from the peoples of grateful Georgia and grateful Azerbaijan. During the period of his command, the Caucasian Army also became a Red Banner.

In May 1924, Yegorov replaced Frunze as commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian and Crimean troops. In 1925, Yegorov was appointed military attaché in China, but in the spring of 1926, Alexander Ilyich was recalled from diplomatic work. For a year and a half, he served as deputy chairman of the Military Industrial Directorate under the Supreme Economic Council. In October 1927, People's Commissar Voroshilov appointed a comrade-in-arms in the Tsaritsyn battles as commander of the troops of the Belarusian Military District.

At the end of 1930, Yegorov was seconded to [Germany to improve his military leadership skills. In April 1931, he took the post of Chief of Staff of the Red Army, which in 1935 was transformed into the [General Staff.

Alexander Ilyich was not fond of theoretical works. He tirelessly strengthened his high position with praises addressed to Stalin, who taught him military affairs, and patron Voroshilov, descending to outright servility. Here is what he wrote in 1931, congratulating the Commissar of Defense on his 50th birthday:

"With what delight I recalled this close joint combat work that took place under the tactical leadership of our beloved leader Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. When you consider that history, in order to solve its problems, will require more people capable of showing great qualities of mind, will, firmness, determination and selfless devotion to the cause of Lenin, and you know that such people, in the person of Joseph Vissarionovich and Kliment Efremo - vicha, our Soviet Union has become even happier, and vivacity, like a living string, fills all the fibers of the body.

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Marshal Budyonny Semyon Mikhailovich was born in 1883 on the Kozyurin farm into a family of landless peasants who had settled on the Don. [Ramota was self-taught. In 1903 he was drafted into the army and participated in the Russo-Japanese War as part of the 48th Don Cossack Regiment. In 1908 he graduated from the St. Petersburg equestrian school, after which he served in the Primorsky Dragoon Regiment. At that time, Semyon Mikhailovich was a dashing fighter, a real "support of the throne." In World War I, he rose to the rank of sergeant major. For exceptional bravery shown in the battles on the German, Austrian and Caucasian fronts, he was awarded the full [E-Orgievsky bow.

Budyonny began his Soviet military career in February 1918 as the leader of one of the red partisan detachments of the Salsky District. Since July, he was an assistant to the commander of the 1st Don peasant socialist punitive cavalry regiment B.M. Dumenko, also a former sergeant-major. In September, the regiment was deployed to the 1st Don Cavalry Brigade,

which became the core of the Consolidated Cavalry Division of the 10th Army of the Southern Front formed in November 1918. The division almost entirely consisted of volunteer peasants of the Don and Kuban, who fiercely hated the "White Cossacks".

In March 1919, in connection with the appointment of Dumenko as assistant to the chief of staff of the 10th Army for cavalry, Budyonny became a division commander and a member of the Bolshevik Party. Upon taking office, the first thing he demanded from the headquarters of the army was a personal car and a new coat "the color of hyke is covered with fur." In May 1919, the 1st Consolidated Cavalry Corps was formed from two cavalry divisions under the command of Dumenko. However, Boris Mokeevich was seriously wounded in the same battle near the Sal River as Commander Egorov. His place was taken by Budyonny, and Semyon Mikhailovich did not miss his chance.

In August, the 10th Army and Budyonny's corps attempted to recapture Tsaritsyn, but were repulsed. As a real combat force, the corps first declared itself during the Voronezh-Kastornenskaya offensive operation Yuzh

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foot front. During the oncoming battles on October 12–19, 1919, the Budyonnovites defeated two White cavalry corps — the 4th Don General K.K. Mamontov and the 3rd Kuban General A.G. Shkuro - and occupied Voronezh. Then, developing the offensive in the Kursk direction, they created a serious threat to the flank and rear of the Volunteer Army, ensuring the success of the troops of the Southern Front near Orel.

A month later, Budyonny's corps was deployed to the First Cavalry Army. It included the 4th, 6th and 11th cavalry divisions, an armored division, armored trains, an air squadron and other units. Thus, a powerful cavalry formation was born, capable of solving strategic tasks, and Budyonny moved into the ranks of the most prominent Soviet military leaders. Old Tsaritsyn acquaintances K.E. became members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the army. Voroshilov and E.A. Shchadenko.

Together with military glory, bandit glory came to the army. The military commissar of the 42nd Infantry Division reported to Moscow:

"There is not a single settlement visited by the Budyonny people, where a continuous groan of the inhabitants would not be heard. Massive robberies, robbery and violence of the Budyonnovites replaced the whites' housekeeping... Chests were broken into, women's underwear, money, watches, tableware and so on were taken away. There were allegations of rape and torture. Horses were brought into the rooms ... The peasants ask - what's the difference: the whites robbed - now the reds are robbing ?!

It is clear that during the Civil War, both sides were engaged in self-supply, showed cruelty, committed violence against the local population. But here, too, the First Cavalry surpassed all others. [Wherever the red horsemen went, everywhere behind them stretched a train of robberies, robbery, pogroms.

K | January 1920, rapidly developing the offensive to the south, the First Cavalry broke into the Donbass, captured Taganrog on January 7, Rostov-on-Don on January 10 and reached the Sea of Azov, dividing the front of Denikin's troops into two parts. To complete the liquidation of the North Caucasian enemy grouping, on January 16, 1920, the Caucasian Front was formed under the leadership of V.I. Sho

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Rina, which included the First Cavalry. However, an attempt to solve the task set by relentless pursuit in the Batay direction failed due to the fact that Semyon Mikhailovich and Kliment Efremovich decided to give their heroic fighters a good rest.

The Rostov robbery eclipsed all the previous ones. "After the occupation of Rostov," wrote Dzerzhinsky, the plenipotentiary representative of the Cheka in the North Caucasus, Ya.Kh. Peters, "The whites fled in panic, went further, beyond Bataysk, but Budyonny's army, instead of pursuing the fleeing enemy, began to engage in robberies and drunkenness in Rostov. Local comrades tell horrors about the pogroms of the Budennovites. But this is not as important as the behavior of Budyonny himself - he can no longer talk to anyone and suffers from delusions of grandeur.

Semyon Mikhailovich, who firmly believed in his genius, permissiveness and impunity, did not take into account anyone, sending all the "commanders" to a known address:

"Send the Revolutionary Military Council-8 to ..., also the commander of the front - a traitor to the revolution, and I send you to ..., and if you want, I will shoot you."

Joying for the Cavalry, Stalin achieved the resignation of the "incompetent" Shorin and convinced Lenin and the new command of the front that the enemies of the revolution were deliberately creating an "atmosphere of hostility and malice" around the First Cavalry. The abundance of wine in Rostov was declared a "provocation of the whites".

In mid-February, when there was nothing left to rob and the last bottle had been drunk, the Budyonnovites set off to conquer the Kuban. The Yegorlyk operation began, during which the largest oncoming cavalry battle in the entire Civil War took place - on February 28, at Belaya Glina, more than 20 thousand horsemen collided in a saber cabin, which ended in the defeat of Denikin's troops. The ensuing mass robberies in the villages as a whole corresponded to the Leninist policy of "decossackization".

However, on the other hand, any commander knows

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that looting corrupts the troops. The meeting of responsible political workers on February 28 concluded:

"Robbery, violence, banditry, arbitrariness, robbery and murder by fighters and political committee commanders, theft of trophies remain unpunished ... By moving forward, the Cavalry destroys the counter-revolution, but by its behavior in the occupied areas it contributes to the revival of the counter-revolution."

The Bolshevik representatives seriously feared that "Budyonnovshchina" would turn into a new Makhnovshchina. The commissars periodically shot the bandits before the formation of the regiments, who, in turn, quietly shot the commissars.

In April 1920, Budyonny led his army in march order from the Caucasian front to the Polish one. In 52 days, the cavalrymen covered 1,500 km and, as part of the Southwestern Front, took part in the Soviet counteroffensive. On June 5, the First Cavalry broke through the enemy defenses, occupied Zhitomir and Berdichev. Then, going to the rear of the 3rd Polish Army, she forced her to leave Kyiv on June 11.

The victory was marked by new pogroms and massacres of prisoners. On August 18, the future writer Isaac Babel (1894-1940), who served in the 6th Cavalry Division, wrote in his diary:

"We go with the military commissar along the line, we beg you not to cut down the prisoners, Apanasenko washes his hands. Sheko mentioned - to chop, it played a terrible role. I didn't look at the faces, they pinned, shot, the corpses were covered with bodies, one was undressed, the other was shot, groans, screams, wheezing... Hell. How we bring freedom is terrible. They search the farm, pull out, Apanasenko - do not waste cartridges, slaughter. Apanasenko always says - kill my sister, kill the Poles... Information about the defense of Lvov - professors, women, teenagers. Apanasenko will slaughter them - he hates the intelligentsia, this is deep, he wants an aristocratic in his own way, a muzhik, Cossack state."

Subsequently, the Soviet offensive stalled. Pilsudski managed to solve the "Budyonny problem". Against

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prepared defense, saturated with obstacles and firing points, dashing cavalry attacks were powerless. Having completed combat practice in the 4th Cavalry Division, K.A. Meretskov recalled:

"The battles were extremely fierce. The cavalrymen turned into infantry: having galloped to the positions of the enemy, they very rarely attacked them in the cavalry formation, but more often they dismounted and under heavy fire, often crawling in a plastuna, acted as huntsmen. We will break through one line of defense, but we will immediately meet with the second, third.

After the failure near Lvov, the battered Cavalry made the transition to the Southern Front to fight against the Wrangelites. In the opposite direction, the "Batu invasion" swept through Ukraine. From the first days of the withdrawal of units from the front, unhealthy moods began to appear in individual groups of fighters: "let's go to clear the rear of the Jews", "let's go to unite with Old Man Makhno", "beat the Jews - commissars and communists". Chairman of the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry G.N. Melnichansky reported:

"In Priluki, 21 people were killed, 12 wounded, and many women and children were raped. According to the stories of the townsfolk, women were raped on the street in front of everyone, many of the prettier girls were taken in the convoy. In Vakhnavka, 20 people were killed, the number of wounded and raped is unknown, and 18 houses were burned." On October 14, the leadership of the Kyiv province complained to the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine: "In Tarashchansk, all residents, Soviet workers and even Soviet institutions were robbed. The total number of those killed is 150 ... "

At the end of October, several hundred soldiers and commanders of the 6th Cavalry Division (this glorious division had a separate venereal company named after Semyon Budyonny) had to be arrested and brought to trial, including the "aristocrat" Apanasenko, one hundred and forty people sentenced to be shot.

During the offensive of the Southern Front, which began on October 28, 1920, the Cavalry Army was introduced into the breakthrough from the Kakhovka bridgehead with the task of cutting off the enemy's escape route to the Crimea through the Chongar Isthmus. Wrangel's troops

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in this battle they were defeated, but the Soviet cavalry acted sluggishly, and the main forces of the Whites managed to escape to the peninsula. In the decisive battles for the Crimea, Frunze did not dare to use the First Cavalry and released it from the reserve only when the outcome of the battle was completely clear. From the end of November, the Budyonnovists were enthusiastically engaged in "squeezing out the surplus appropriation" and fighting the Makhno rebels, while often running from one opposing side to another. So, a friend of the commander, order bearer G.S. Maslakov took away to the Makhnovists a whole regiment.

In May 1921, Budyonny was appointed a member of the Military Council of the North Caucasian Military District. The First Cavalry Army was also relocated there. Semyon Mikhailovich was instructed to liquidate the Kuban rebel army and to pacify the villages that did not want to "de-Cossackize", for which in September the command of all the troops of the Kuban-Chernomorsk region was concentrated in his hands. In his new position, the commander of the army first of all (Order No. [of September 28, 1921) ordered the execution of 56 hostages and warned that "the hornet's nests of the fists of the Soviet government will burn out without a trace with a hurricane of artillery fire."

"He ran to the voivodeship early in the morning, on Mikhail's very day, and immediately decided: "Tomorrow there will be bloodshed." What made him take such a decision is unknown: for he, as a matter of fact, was not angry, but just like that, a beast."

Budyonny worked hard for more than a year, organizing punitive expeditions and demonstrative executions of "accomplices", families of rebels and hostages. Only in the Yeysk department and in just two months, 680 people were shot, of which only 90 were rebels.

At the end of 1922, martial law in the Kuban-Chernomorskoe region was lifted, and Semyon Mikhailovich became the deputy commander of the district. For "active participation in the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat" and personal heroism, the legendary army commander was awarded three orders of the Red Banner on his chest, one order for a faithful saber, and another order for a revolver.

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In October 1923, the First Cavalry Army was disbanded, Budyonny was appointed Assistant to the Commander-in-Chief for Cavalry and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. From April 1924 - inspector of the cavalry of the Red Army. General A.A. Brusilov (1853-1926) recalled:

"By himself, Wahmister Budyonny always treated me very respectfully, it's only a pity that he could barely sign his last name, and others wrote articles and orders for him, even academic officers who managed to obscure their "white bone" "and get along with the communists."

In May 1926, Semyon Mikhailovich was sent to Tashkent to finish off the Basmachi. This business trip of his, when the red horsemen cut down everyone who was taller than a cart, the old men in the villages remembered half a century later. The next achievements in the field of extermination of the counter-revolution were marked by the Uzbek Labor Order of the Red Banner.

In 1928, Budyonny, together with Mikoyan, controlled the progress of grain procurements in Siberia and the Far East. In 1932, "on the job," a completely illiterate commander graduated from the Military Academy of the Red Army. It is unlikely that even knowing the alphabet, he was also the editor of a newspaper called "For the Horse", and the author of works on horse breeding.

True, Semyon Mikhailovich knew the structure of the horse thoroughly and liked to talk from a high rostrum about the importance of the "studding campaign" and the intricacies of the insemination of queens. As the Soviet Military Encyclopedia wrote in 1933.

"Budyonny is waging an uncompromising struggle against the views of individual commanders who underestimate the role of cavalry in modern warfare, resolutely suppressing all "attacks" that weaken the growth and combat training of cavalry. In accordance with this directive, Budyonny is doing extensive work to introduce into the thick of the army the correct views on ensuring the conditions for the further growth of our cavalry - from the most important political issues, from questions of combat training to private questions about forging, bedding material, equestrian sports, etc. .".

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Two cities bore the name of the marshal, the former village of Novo-Nikolaevskaya and a cape on an island in the Arctic Ocean. On the day of his 50th birthday, Voroshilov wrote: "... during the years of the Civil War, many people in our cavalry claimed the "Budyonny" role. But we had and have only ONE Budyonny.

Marshal Tukhachevsky Mikhail Nikolayevich was born in 1893 on the Aleksandrovskoye estate in the Smolensk province into the family of a bankrupt landowner. He graduated from the gymnasium and the cadet corps. In 1912 he entered the Alexander Military School. From a young age, Mikhail felt himself born for great deeds, dreamed of becoming at least a general and was firmly moving towards his cherished goal. In the summer of 1914, after graduating from the School, he was released as a second lieutenant in the Semyonovsky Life Guards Regiment, with whom he went to war with the firm intention of accomplishing "great feats" and becoming a Cavalier of St. George.

As a deputy company commander, Tukhachevsky participated in the battles near Lublin, Ivangorod, Lomzha, was awarded the Order of St. Vladimir with swords, but was captured on February 19, 1915. On the fifth attempt, he managed to escape from the officer camp only by the autumn of 1917, using a military trick: Mikhail Nikolayevich, under the word of honor of an officer, was released into the city for a walk, but instead of seeing the sights of the glorious Ingolstadt, he rushed to the Swiss-German border. He returned home exactly in October. The soldiers elected a resolute second lieutenant as company commander.

In April 1918, Tukhachevsky was hired by the Military Department of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, which dealt with the formation of the Red Army. In April, Mikhail Nikolayevich quite consciously joined the RCP(b). "If Lenin turns out to be able to rid Russia of the rubbish of old prejudices and help her become independent, free and strong, I will follow him," he said, disappointed in the Romanovs, while still in the camp.

In May, Tukhachevsky was appointed military commissar

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Moscow region of the Western Veil, in June was sent to the Czechoslovak (from mid-July the Eastern) Front to fight the 40,000-strong rebellious corps, whose uprising, which began on May 25, swept the Volga region, the Urals and Siberia.

With only a mandate in hand, Mikhail Nikolayevich in the shortest possible time formed his 1st Revolutionary Army from scattered detachments, for the first time mobilizing former officers and establishing revolutionary military tribunals. The rebellion of the commander-in-chief of the Left Social Revolutionary M.A. Muravyov almost cost the young army commander his life. He was arrested and only accidentally escaped execution. Tukhachevsky later wrote of the unfortunate commander:

"The thought of "becoming Napoleon" haunted him, and this definitely showed through in all his manners, conversations and actions ... He was extremely cruel. In general, Muravyov's abilities were many times inferior to the scale of his claims. He was a selfish adventurer, and nothing more.

It's funny that our hero with a contemptuous expression painted his own portrait, that's how he himself was perceived by the eyes of others. One colleague recalled:

"Smart, energetic, firm, but vile to the last degree - nothing is sacred, except for its immediate benefit; by what means it is achieved is indifferent.

"A ruthless and unscrupulous adventurer," wrote A.I. Denikin. And Misha was ill with Bonapartism since childhood: "... he starred in the poses of Napoleon, mastered the arrogant expression faces."

The first major operation developed and successfully carried out by Tukhachevsky was the capture of Simbirsk in September 1918. During the autumn, the Bolsheviks managed to clear the Volga region from the Komuch People's Army (Committee of the Constituent Assembly), since the Czechoslovak troops had already been withdrawn from the battle. In December, in the midst of preparations for the Orenburg offensive, Tukhachevsky was transferred to the Southern Front, where he led the 8th Army. The front was faced with the task of finishing off the army of Ataman Krasnov,

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"occupy the Don region" and punish the Cossacks indicatively.

On January 24, 1919, the Circular Letter of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) on decossackization was issued, demanding to wipe out the rebellious population of the Don, Kuban, and Urals from the face of the earth. The circular prescribed the "extermination" of the Cossack leaders, mass terror "in relation to all Cossacks in general who took any direct or indirect part in the struggle against the Soviet power",

the execution of anyone "with whom a weapon is found," that is, almost all Cossacks without exception, the colonization of Cossack regions. To destroy the Cossacks, a special expeditionary corps was formed, operating under the slogan: "The more we cut, the sooner Soviet power will be established on the Don".

The 8th Army, advancing along the Don, reached the Seversky Donets River by March. Moscow instructions in it were carried out diligently and strictly. As the commander of the group of troops F.K. Mironov, "only on the path of the 8th Army, tribunals shot 8,000 people for the benefit of the social revolution." The further advance of the army was stopped by the beginning of the ice drift and the Cossack uprising that broke out in the rear.

At this moment, Tukhachevsky was again transferred to the Eastern Front, where in April he led the 5th Army defeated by Kolchak. The situation here was critical: the Soviet front had been broken through, the Whites had already occupied Ufa, Bugulma, Belebey and were rushing towards the Volga. Commander of the Eastern Front S.S. Kamenev developed a plan for a counterattack on the flank of the advancing enemy grouping. As part of the offensive that began on April 28, Tukhachevsky successfully carried out the Buguruslan and Belebey operations, which, in combination with the strike of the Southern Frunze group, led to the defeat of the Western Army of General Gaida. Then followed the Zlatoust operation, which was risky by design, with overcoming the Ural ridge and a deep detour maneuver, which opened the road to Siberia for the Red Army in July 1919. On July 24, the Fifth Army entered Chelyabinsk.

Commander for "skillful leadership" of troops and dos

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the "tremendous success" achieved was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. The Omsk operation that unfolded in mid-October, which ended in the complete defeat of Kolchak's troops and the capture of the capital of the "supreme ruler" of Russia on November 14, was distinguished by decisiveness and rapid advance. Tukhachevsky was awarded the highest award at that time - the Honorary Revolutionary Weapon. Mikhail Nikolayevich already imagined himself a venerable commander, explained to the students of the Academy of the General Staff the basics of "class strategy" and, undoubtedly, knowing the works of Napoleon, could repeat after him: "... I believed in myself as in an extraordinary man and imbued with ambition for the accomplishment of great deeds, which until then had been drawn to my imagination. True, at the age of 26, General Bonaparte still only dreamed of getting an army under his command.

The commander, favored by the authorities, was sent south to finish off Denikin. At the end of January 1920, having replaced Shorin, who was displaced at the initiative of the "offended" cavalymen, he took command of the Caucasian Front, which acted against the main forces of Denikin on the borders of the Don and Manych rivers. After the regrouping of forces, the sobering up of Budyonny's cavalry, the Reds launched a general offensive on February 14. Mikhail Nikolaevich successfully coped with the duties of the commander, following the strategy he formulated in everything:

"A civil war, by its very nature, requires decisive, bold offensive actions. Revolutionary energy and courage dominate everything else."

It was his winning formula that never failed. The capture of Novorossiysk on March 26 marked the end of Denikin's Volunteer Army. Tukhachevsky, on instructions from Moscow, began to think over a plan for an invasion of the Transcaucasus, but was suddenly recalled to Moscow, where, at the suggestion of Commander-in-Chief Kamenev, who highly appreciated the "recent operations", he was appointed commander of the Western Front.

Mikhail Nikolaevich developed the plan to defeat the Poles himself, investing all his "commander's finds":

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ramming strike of the "infantry masses", concentration of forces in the chosen direction, deep detour maneuver, bold offensive actions without looking back, without reserves and regardless of the enemy, straight into the "revolutionary bubbling" Germany.

The campaign against the Vistula began on July 4, 1920. "Through the corpse of white Poland lies the path to the world conflagration. On bayonets we will bring happiness and peace to working mankind. To the west! March to Vilna, Minsk, Warsaw!" the commander admonished the red regiments with inspiration. And there was a beat. Did not come out of Mikhail Nikolaevich Bonaparte. The Polish campaign greatly tarnished his reputation as a commander. In addition, blaming the command of the Southwestern Front for his failure, he made himself "magnificent enemies." Actually, this was the end of Tukhachevsky's military career and the punitive career began.

In March 1921, the Kronstadt rebellion broke out.

Enraged enough, having shot at officers and other representatives of the "residual classes", the Baltic sailors discovered with amazement that in the fourth year of the struggle for a brighter future they simply had nothing to feed their revolutionary organisms. And there is no one to rob in Russia. At the same time, the entire base knew about the feasts that the commander of the fleet, Fyodor Raskolnikov, rolled up for his entourage.

Outraged by yet another cut in rations, the garrison held a citywide rally, created a Provisional Revolutionary Committee, put local party members in an investigative cellar, and on March 3 addressed an appeal to all "comrades and citizens", urging them to hold re-elections of the Soviets, to throw overboard the history of the Bolsheviks and exercise the right to a new free life on our own — without commissars, Chekists, food requisitions and "moral bondage":

"Life itself under the rule of the communist dictatorship has become more terrible than death. Here the banner of revolt has been raised for liberation from three years of violence and oppression, the rule of the communists, which has eclipsed the three hundred years of the yoke of the monarchy."

Against the backdrop of widespread peasant riots and strikes

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work the starving workers in Petrograd it was a serious threat. At the disposal of the garrison, numbering more than 25 thousand people, there were warships, including two battleships, up to 140 coastal defense guns, over 100 machine guns.

The government of the commissars immediately declared the recent support of the revolution to be the Black Hundreds and began to gather military formations to Kronstadt, restoring command of the 7th Army and placing Tukhachevsky at its head.

The first assault, undertaken by the Red cadets on March 8, was repelled by artillery fire from battleships and forts with heavy losses for the attackers. To boost the morale of the Red Army soldiers, the Tenth Party Congress, which was taking place at that time in Moscow, sent about 300 front-line delegates to fight against the "Black Hundred-Socialist-Revolutionary counter-revolution".

By March 16, the strength of the 7th Army reached 45 thousand soldiers with 159 guns and 433 machine guns. On the night of March 17, the Soviet units moved across the ice of the Gulf of Finland in an offensive against Kronstadt and broke into the city in the morning of the next day. The commander's order read: "It is cruel to deal with the rebels, shooting them without any regret... do not get carried away with prisoners."

The massacre began. 2103 people were sentenced to death. In addition, several hundred were killed here - Nalda under the walls of the fortress. About 6.5 thousand were sent to camps. About a third of the garrison fled to Finland. The Red troops, according to official figures, lost 3120 people killed and wounded, "but the plans of the counter-revolution were frustrated." Two hundred especially distinguished ones were awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

Literally a month later, Tukhachevsky's talents were needed on the Tambov Front. There, the peasants, robbed to the skin by the native power of the working people, gathered in crowds at the granaries and begged for bread - the most vicious counter-revolution. These hungry crowds, according to the report of Commander-in-Chief S.S. Kamenev, the Red Army soldiers valiantly "shot from machine guns". In August 1920 in Tambov

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in the province, a peasant uprising broke out under the leadership of the former teacher A.S. Antonov (1888-1922), which covered 5 out of 12 counties and spread to the Voronezh and Saratov provinces. The rebels, driven to despair by robberies and violence committed by the food detachments and the eternally drunk Revolutionary Committee, demanded the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, the restoration of political and civil rights of all segments of the population, "without dividing them into classes", the abolition of the food dictatorship, freedom of speech, press, conscience, assembly. By December, the peasant army had more than 20 regiments, consolidated into two armies and a separate brigade.

Martial law was immediately introduced in the Tambov province. The Red troops burned the villages to the ground, the peasants went into the forests and stubbornly shot back the Chekists and party workers. In October, Lenin demanded from the RVS of the Republic, the command of the internal security forces and the Cheka, the "quick and complete" elimination of the Antonovshchina, which threatened to develop into a mass armed uprising of the peasants of all Central Russia. Large forces — 22,000 bayonets, 4,500 sabers, 312 machine guns, 44 guns and 10 armored cars — were thrown into the fight against the "kulaks" under the command of the former staff captain A.V. Pavlova.

In February 1921, a "plenipotentiary commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee for the fight against banditry in the Tambov province" was created under the chairmanship of V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko, in April-May - "command of the troops of the Tambov region." The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks entrusted the Kronstadt hero Tukhachevsky, who on April 27 was placed at the head of the punitive army, to crush the "bandits" and the "Socialist-Revolutionary locusts". In addition to the regular units of the Red Army, the troops of the Cheka, VOKHR and CHON participated in the operations - about 140 thousand people, supported by 103 guns, 21 armored car, 18 aircraft, five armored trains.

The local population stubbornly refused both to surrender their weapons and to extradite the Antonovites. The turning point occurred after the order of the commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee No. 171 of June 11 began to be implemented, according to which

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hostages, if the population did not extradite partisans and members of their families, if bridges and "other national property" were damaged near the village. In general, each paragraph of this document ended with the standard formula "shoot on the spot without trial."

The order was carried out especially coolly in the "malicious bandit" villages. If the execution of the first batch of hostages did not give a result, the next one was immediately taken. For example, after the execution of three parties of hostages in the village of Kulyabovka, Borisoglebsk district, it turned from a "malicious gangster" into a Soviet one. Ten years later, the authors of the "Soviet Military Encyclopedia" will tell that Tukhachevsky's punishers occupied the "centers" of the Antonov movement with the sole purpose of "ensuring the conduct of political explanatory work and the protection of the peasantry." In the "malicious bandit" village of Porevka, Kirsanovsky district, 80 residents were shot during explanatory work.

By the end of June, about 50,000 "kulak-Socialist-Revolutionary elements" and members of their families were sitting in pre-equipped concentration camps on the territory of the Tambov province alone. In July, the commander decided to use chemical weapons: "The forests where the bandits are hiding should be cleared with poisonous gases." In the end, Tukhachevsky drowned the uprising in the blood of the people. As the biographer of the occupying commander wrote:

"On the Antonov front, Tukhachevsky applied new methods to link combat work with the consolidation of Soviet power in the field, and the uprising was liquidated methodically, on schedule, within forty days."

The former nobleman proved his devotion to vile power, after which he quickly went up the hill. In the fall of 1921, Tukhachevsky was appointed head of the Military Academy of the Red Army. In January 1922, he again took command of the troops of the Western Front. In the spring of 1924 he was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of the Red Army. In 1925 — Commander of the Western Military District, as well as a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. In November, he became Chief of Staff of the Red Army. From May 1928 he commanded the troops of the Leningrad Military District. From July 1931 Tukhachev

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he was the head of armaments, deputy commissar for military na- mor and chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. Since 1934 - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense.

Mikhail Nikolayevich was an enthusiast of the technical equipment of the Red Army, theorized a lot, mainly on the topic of future conquests, dreamed of tens of thousands of tanks and aircraft, for which he was awarded the title of "red militarist". Trotsky described him as "a talented, but overly impetuous commander."

Marshal Blucher Vasily Konstantinovich was born in 1890 in the village of Barshchinka, Yaroslavl province. He graduated from the parochial school and went to work in Moscow. Worked as a locksmith. In 1910, he was convicted for calling for a strike and served 2 years and 8 months in the Butyrskaya prison. In 1914 he was drafted into the army. He fought as a private on the Southwestern Front. In January 1915, he came under artillery fire, was seriously wounded, and after being cured, was decommissioned "to its original state." In 1916 he joined the Bolshevik Party.

After the February Revolution, Vasily Konstantinovich enrolled in a reserve regiment stationed in Samara with the aim of conducting anti-war and anti-government agitation. The soldiers liked the idea of pacifism, and on the days of October they went over to the side of the Bolsheviks with the whole regiment, ensuring the establishment of Soviet power in Samara.

But the ataman of the Orenburg Cossacks, General Dutov, did not recognize the "great truth of the Bolsheviks" and took control of a strategically important region that blocked communications with Turkestan and Siberia. For which he was immediately declared an enemy of the people. On November 26, 1917, Lenin ordered "to provide the working people of Orenbuzhye with emergency military assistance" (it is noteworthy that the actions of the general were approved by the Orenburg Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies).

From Petrograd to the Southern Urals, the consolidated Northern Flying Detachment headed for the former midshipman S.D. Pavlova, already famous for being in Mogilev

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raised General Dukhonin on bayonets; Samara singled out a Red Guard detachment, reinforced by an artillery battery and Commissar Blucher. With the arrival of the detachment in Chelyabinsk, the Bolshevik Soviet liquidated the local Constituent Assembly and took power in the city into their own hands. Vasily Konstantinovich was elected head of the military revolutionary committee, and in March 1918 he headed the Chelyabinsk Soviet and the joint headquarters of the detachments operating against Dutov.

The spring passed in battles with the "White Cossacks", during which the red detachments completely destroyed eleven villages, "the most outstanding for their counter-revolutionary nature." The Orenburg chieftain was forced to withdraw his troops to the Kyrgyz steppes. "We already had our victory," but the mutiny of the Czechoslovak corps changed the situation dramatically. On May 27, the Czechs captured Chelyabinsk; on July 7, General Dutov returned to Orenburg.

By mid-July, the entire South Ural grouping of the Reds, numbering about 10 thousand bayonets and sabers, was in the enemy ring. In this situation, some detachments of ideological fighters went over to the side of the "White Cossack counter-revolution". Vasily Konstantinovich proposed to break into the areas occupied by units of the Red Army.

Under the leadership of Blucher and the Kashirin brothers, having covered about 1,500 kilometers with battles, the Consolidated Ural Detachment in mid-September 1918 joined with units of the 3rd Soviet Army. By the way, together with Blucher, the Chinese battalion under the command of Comrade Zhen Fuchen, German and Hungarian detachments left the encirclement. Noting the merits of Vasily Konstantinovich ("The crossing of Comrade Blucher's troops under impossible conditions can only be equated with the crossings of Suvorov in Switzerland"), the All-Russian Central Executive Committee awarded him the newly established Order of the Red Banner No. 1. The combined detachment merged with the remnants of the defeated White 4th Ural division, the 225th rifle regiment was put together from the Chinese. The head of

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Blucher. The army at that time waged heavy defensive battles in the Permian direction.

Vasily Konstantinovich coped with the command successfully, and in January 1919 he was made assistant commander of the 3rd Army, and in April - head of the Vyatka fortified region. After the transition of the Red Army on the Eastern Front to a decisive counteroffensive, the liberation of Kungur and Perm from the Whites, the need for a fortified area disappeared. At the end of the summer, Blucher formed the 51st Rifle Division from the fortress brigades and the Northern Expeditionary Detachment and set out at the head to "catch up" with Kolchak. During the autumn battles in the Tobolsk region, the division demonstrated stamina, and the divisional commander demonstrated the ability to navigate in a difficult situation. On November 11, Blucher's division entered Kolchak's capital Omsk, then pursued the enemy all the way to Lake Baikal.

In August 1920, the 51st division was transferred to the Southern Front, in the Kakhovka region, to fight the "black baron" Wrangel. The division repelled all attempts by the White 2nd Army Corps to liquidate the Kakhovka bridgehead, managing to repel even a massive tank attack, exotic for that war. In the counteroffensive that followed on October 28, Blucher commanded the Perekop shock group, which delivered the main blow from the bridgehead. However, on the move on the shoulders of the enemy, it was not possible to break into the Crimea. Therefore, on November 7-8, the assault took place.

Two brigades of the Blucher division went around the enemy fortifications through the Sivash, and the other two, together with the Makhnovist brigade, took the Turkish Wall head-on. Having an eightfold superiority over the enemy, the Reds crushed the few defenders of the White Crimea and broke into the peninsula. "The last nest of the Russian counter-revolution" was destroyed. For the capture of the Perekop and Ishun positions, the heroic 51st Rifle Division, which had lost three-quarters of its strength, and its commander were awarded the Order of the Red Banner. The surviving Makhnovists were shot down immediately after the assault, what else to do with the bandits. Hunting for the "father" and his "rebel

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army" Blucher worked in the following months together with Budyonny's horsemen.

In the summer of 1921, Vasily Konstantinovich was recalled from Ukraine and appointed Minister of War of the "buffer" Far Eastern Republic invented by Lenin to avoid friction with Japan and Commander-in-Chief of the People's Revolutionary Army created on the basis of partisan formations. Blucher did a lot to ensure that it was an army not only in name, but Moscow also helped - threw one and a half million rubles in gold.

In February 1922, under the leadership of Blucher, the NRA launched a general offensive and inflicted a number of painful defeats on the White Rebels. The assault on Volochaevka and the capture of Spassk, which predetermined the fall of the white Primorye, officially ended military operations.

Civil War. Because of the quarrel that broke out in the camp of the victors, Vasily Konstantinovich did not reach the Pacific Ocean, he was recalled to Moscow.

In August 1922, Blucher was appointed commander of the 1st Rifle Corps stationed in the Petrograd region, and in 1924 he was sent as chief military adviser to China under the revolutionary government of Guangzhou. First of all, the adviser introduced the institution of commissars in the People's Revolutionary Army. He became one of the main developers of the plan and a participant in the Great Northern Expedition of the Kuomintang troops. However, in July 1927, after Marshal Chiang Kai-shek announced his break with the Communists, the Soviet specialists from the Kuomintang army were recalled.

Upon his return from China, Blucher was assistant commander of the Ukrainian military district, but in the summer of 1929, in connection with the conflict on the CER, he was again sent to the Far East. The fact is that officially the Chinese Eastern Railway was under joint management, but in reality it was completely in Soviet hands. The government of Chiang Kai-shek tried to install Chinese representatives on the KVR under the protection of troops. Such arrogance should not go unpunished.

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zannoy - decided in Moscow, and on August 6, the Revolutionary Military Council issued a resolution on the creation of a Special Far Eastern Army. Blucher, an experienced "Far East" and a connoisseur of Chinese tricks, was placed at the head of the ODVA.

On August 18, the Soviet forward detachments "with the greatest restraint" invaded the territory of Manchuria, and at the end of November, the "Chinese militarists" with fuzei were completely defeated by the red regiments, who launched the latest MS-1 tanks. Three rifle divisions, one cavalry brigade and the Amur military flotilla took part in the operation. Irretrievable Soviet losses amounted to 147 people, no one counted the Chinese. For this victory, Blucher was awarded the Order of the Red Star number one, and the Special Far Eastern Army became the Red Banner.

Since then, Vasily Konstantinovich has been governor-general in the Far East, actively participating "in public life and the development of the region's economy." Blucher is some random marshal. He received the highest military rank rather for the responsible position he occupied, given the special status of the Far Eastern Army (it consisted of a fourth of all the country's ground forces), than for real military merit. He did not lead major strategic operations, did not win particularly high-profile victories, did not command anything larger than a division during the war, nothing is known about his role in the reorganization and modernization of the Red Army, not a single work on military theory or history from under his pen failed. Marshal Administrator. Marshal-business executive.

His most original invention is the Soviet version of the Arakcheev settlements - the Special Collective Farm Corps. It was created at the suggestion of Blucher at the height of collectivization in March 1932 with the aim of "strengthening the security of the Soviet Far Eastern borders, developing the richest virgin and fallow lands, providing the population of the Far East and the army with food, significantly reducing the import of bread and meat from Siberia to the Far East. East, to develop the economy of the Far East".

In his "military collective farm" Blucher recorded 60 thousand battles

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tsov and commanders, half of his army. Collective farm soldiers grazed livestock, the commanders comprehended the intricacies of pig breeding, how much it strengthened the "security of the Far Eastern borders" - it is not clear, bread and potatoes still had to be imported. But Vasily Konstantinovich never thought of laying at least some kind of road along the border for the transfer of troops in the event of a military conflict.

Commander of the 1st rank Kamenev Sergey Sergeevich was born in 1881 in Kyiv into a military family. He graduated from the cadet corps, the Alexander Military School and the Academy of the General Staff. He devoted all his time exclusively to service, he did not dream of any revolutions. During the First World War, he was chief of operations of the 1st Army, commander of the 30th Poltava Infantry Regiment, chief of staff of the 15th Rifle Corps. He rose to the rank of colonel.

After the October Revolution, he went to the service of the new government. According to Sergei Sergeevich, the collection of articles by Lenin and Zinoviev helped him to make a choice, which made him "a stunning impression, opened up completely new horizons." Already a former colonel, at first he acted as the elected chief of staff of the 3rd Army, mainly dealing with its demobilization and liquidation, and from May 1918 he led the Nevelsky section of the Western Region of the curtain detachments. In August, he was appointed assistant military leader of the Western Veil.

In September 1918, Kamenev was appointed commander of the Eastern Front, which actually had to be put together anew. There was not even a headquarters, which the previous commander took with him (before that, Vatsetis commanded the front, his headquarters was formed from Latvian riflemen). Under the leadership of Kamenev, the front repulsed the onslaught of Kolchak's army in March 1919, launched a counteroffensive and, having successfully carried out a number of operations, drove the enemy troops back beyond the Urals. According to Trotsky: "Kamenev was undoubtedly a capable military leader, with

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in this period things were going so well in the east that I stopped going there altogether and did not even know Kamenev by sight. Inspired by successes, Smilga, Lashevich and Gusev carried their commander in their arms, it seems, they drank brotherhood with him and wrote rave reviews about him to Moscow. For victories on the Eastern Front, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee awarded the commander with a golden weapon with the Order of the Red Banner.

Meanwhile, in the south, by the beginning of the summer of 1919, the Red Army left Tsaritsyn, Donbass, Kharkov. Having defeated the Ukrainian front, General A.I. On June 20, Denikin issued the so-called Moscow Directive. In accordance with it, the Armed Forces of the South of Russia launched a general strategic offensive against the capital. "Everyone to fight Denikin," called Lenin. At the same time, at the insistence of members of the Central Committee, Vladimir Ilyich decided to change the commander in chief.

In early July, Kamenev was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic. The first task in the new field was the development of a plan for the grouping of forces on the Southern Front. However, the August counteroffensive against the Kuban, organized by the Reds, failed, and a military catastrophe was brewing. Finally, in September, after long disputes among members of the Politburo and the military, Trotsky's proposal was accepted to deliver the main blow through the proletarian Donbass "along the watershed between Denikin and the Cossacks." Ten years later, this will be called "Stalin's brilliant plan to defeat Denikin."

In early October, the Southern Front was urgently replenished with fresh forces, by order of Kamenev, the Latvian and Estonian divisions, Primakov's cavalry brigade of red Cossacks, and Budyonny's cavalry corps were transferred here from other directions. From October 1 to November 18, the troops of the Southern Front, going on the offensive, defeated the Volunteer Army, the 3rd and 4th Denikin cavalry corps and, having wrested the strategic initiative, threw them back in the Oryol-Kursk direction for 165 kilometers.

Later, under the leadership of Kamenev,

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the defeat of Wrangel, the war with Poland. With his participation, the "last pockets of counter-revolution" in Karelia, Bukhara and Fergana were suppressed.

From April 1924, after the reorganization of the central apparatus and the abolition of the post of commander in chief, Kamenev was appointed inspector of the Red Army, and from March 1925 - chief of staff of the Red Army. He held his last position for eight months. Then he again worked as an inspector, head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army, and chief head of the Military Academy for tactics. From May 1927 - Deputy People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs and Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. From June 1934, Kamenev was the head of the Air Defense Directorate and at the same time a member of the Military Council under the NPO of the USSR.

Commander of the 1st rank Yakir Iona Emmanuilovich was born in 1896 in Chisinau in the family of a pharmacist. He studied in Switzerland at the University of Basel and at the Kharkov Institute of Technology.

In 1915-1917, evading mobilization into the army, Iona worked as a turner at the Odessa Military Plant. After the February Revolution, he signed up for the Bolsheviks and conducted anti-war propaganda among the soldiers of the 5th Zaimur Regiment. In December 1917 he was elected a member of the Bessarabian Council, the Gubernia Party Committee and the Gubernia Committee.

In January 1918, Yakir hired a "Red Guard detachment" of 500 Chinese for a moderate fee and declared war on the Romanian occupiers. In the spring and summer, he, by his own admission, did not understand anything in military affairs, a half-educated student, commanded the Tiraspol combined detachment "to combat the Romanian oligarchy". The Chinese Yakiru fell in love immediately and for life:

"The Chinese are steadfast, they are not afraid of anything. A native brother will die in battle, but he won't blink an eye: he will come up, cover his eyes, and that's it. Again he will sit down next to him, in a cap - cartridges and will calmly release cartridge after cartridge ... The Chinese will fight to the last.

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In connection with the offensive of the Austro-Hungarian army, the detachment was forced to retreat through the rebellious Cossack regions to the territory of the RSFSR. For some reason, the Cossacks disliked the Asian internationalists and destroyed almost the entire battalion: "When a Cossack catches a Chinese during the Civil War, he will definitely kill him and mock him."

Joining the ranks of the Red Army, Yakir followed the commissar line. Since June he has been a commissar of a brigade of the Voronezh division, since September he has been the head of the political department of the Southern sector of the curtain detachments, since October he has been a member of the RVS of the 8th Army operating in the Donetsk direction. He hired new Chinese. In the battles with the Krasnov Cossacks for the Liski station in November 1918, he earned a heavy concussion and the Order of the Red Banner No. 2.

In January 1919, during the occupation of the Donetsk region, developing and systematizing the provisions of the circular on decossackization, Yakir issued an order to "shoot on the spot all those with weapons" and "percentage destruction of the male population." A report on the work of the Revolutionary Tribunal in the village of Uryupinskaya has been preserved:

"Death sentences were pouring in batches, and quite often completely innocent people, old men, old women and children were shot... , screaming led to the place of execution. At the place of execution, the convicts were stripped naked, and all this in front of the residents. Women who covered their nakedness with their hands were mocked and forbidden to do so. All those who had been shot were lightly buried near the mill, not far from the village... Near the mill, a pack of dogs spread out, dragging the hands and feet of the executed along the village.

Denikin's troops prevented the completion of the work begun.

In July 1919, Yakir received the 45th Rifle Division under his command. In August-September, he commanded the Southern Group of Forces of the 12th Army (of three divisions) during its exit from the encirclement to Zhitomir and Kyiv. For this transition and

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the export of "all the values of the south of Ukraine" was awarded the second order. The Third Banner was awarded to Yakir for the Polish front, for not taking Lvov. In general, despite the orders, Iona Emmanuilovich did not glorify his name with victories.

In December 1920, he was appointed commander of the 14th Army, but literally a month later the army was disbanded. In 1921-1923, Yakir was the commander of the troops of the Crimean region, the Kyiv military district and the Kiev region, the commander of the 14th rifle corps, and the assistant commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Crimea. From April 1924 - Head of the Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions of the Red Army.

From November 1925, Yakir commanded the troops of the Ukrainian military district. In this post, he ensured the operation to organize the Holodomor in Ukraine and prevent the mass exodus of peasants to cities and other regions organized by "counter-revolutionaries and Polish agents". The party said: "Let them die in their homeland," and the areas doomed to starvation were cordoned off by troops.

"In a week, a service was created to catch abandoned children," the Italian consul reported. "At midnight they were taken by trucks to the freight station on the Seversky Donets... Those who were not yet swollen from hunger and could survive were sent to barracks on Golodnaya Gora or to barns, where another 8,000 souls died on straw - Mostly children. The weak were sent in boxcars outside the city and left to die away from people. Upon the arrival of the wagons, all the dead were unloaded into large ditches dug in advance ... every night in Kharkov they collect 250 corpses of those who died of starvation and typhus."

This took place literally under the windows of Yakirov's office: the headquarters of the district was located in Kharkov.

In 1927-1928, Yakir took a course of study at the academy of the German [General Staff. On May 17, 1935, on the basis of the Ukrainian district, two new ones were formed - Kiev and Kharkov. Yakir moved to Kyiv.
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he was not fond of theory, he was known among the troops as a virtuoso of oral swearing.

Commander of the 1st rank Uborevich Ieronim Petrovich was born in 1896 in the village of Antadrius, Vilna province, into a peasant family. Studied at the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute. In 1916 he completed courses at the Konstantinovskiy Artillery School. As a lieutenant of the 15th heavy artillery division, he participated in the First World War, fought on the Vistula, Neman, in Bessarabia.

After the October Revolution, Uborevich organized Red Guard detachments in Bessarabia. In January-February 1918 he commanded a revolutionary regiment in battles against the Romanian and Austro-German invaders. He was wounded and taken prisoner, from where he fled. From August he commanded the Kotlas heavy howitzer battery, from September - the Nizhne-Dvinskaya brigade, from December to September 1919 - the 18th rifle division of the 6th Army, blocking the way to Vologda. He was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

From October 1919, Ieronim Petrovich commanded the 14th Army and the Shock Group of the Southern Front, which, together with the 13th Army of Gekker, inflicted a heavy defeat on the Volunteer Army near Orel and Kromy, participated in the liberation of Kursk, Kharkov, Poltava, Kherson, Nikolaev and Odessa.

On the occasion of the victories won, a grandiose revelry took place, the echo of which echoed in Moscow. On this occasion, Lenin sent a letter to Ordzhonikidze, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council:

"T. Sergo! I received a message that you + commander 14 were drinking and walking with women for a week ... Scandal and shame! Aya praised you all right and left !! And Trotsky was informed... Answer

immediately:

J) Who gave you wine?

2) How long have you been drinking in RVS 14? Who else did you drink and walk with?

3) - the same - women? ..

5) Is Commander 14 a drunkard? Uncorrectable?.."

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Comrade Sergo did not give up his drinking buddies and was even offended: well, they noted, it's business. In March-April 1920, during the defeat of the White Guards in the areas of Yekaterinodar and Novorossiysk, Uborevich commanded the 9th Army of the Caucasian Front. For the skillful leadership of the troops he was awarded the Honorary Revolutionary Weapon. In April-July, he again commanded the 14th Army in the war with Poland, in July-November he led the military operations of the troops of the 13th Army, which held back the Wrangel troops. For the battles in the Berdyansk-Melitopol region he received the second Order of the Red Banner. He again accepted the 14th Army, fought in Ukraine against "bourgeois-nationalist gangs".

In January-April 1921, as an assistant to the commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Crimea, Ieronim Petrovich was engaged in the liquidation of the "Gulyai-Pole Free People's Anarchist Republic". From the end of April, during the suppression of the Tambov rebellion, he was Tukhachevsky's deputy. He commanded a consolidated group of two cavalry brigades and an armored detachment. In the summer, as commander of the troops of the Minsk province, he smashed the counter-revolution in Belarus.

From August 1921 he commanded the 5th Army and the troops of the East Siberian Military District. In August 1922, Uborevich replaced Blucher as Minister of War of the Far Eastern Republic and Commander-in-Chief of the People's Revolutionary Army. Under his leadership, the Primorsky operation was developed and carried out, which ended with the capture of Vladivostok and was awarded the third order. Then he again accepted the 5th Army. From November 1924 he was deputy commander and chief of staff of the Ukrainian military district.

In 1925, Uborevich was appointed commander of the troops of the North Caucasian District, where the Chechbandits again raised their heads. The new commander, using his own rich experience in suppressing anti-Soviet protests in various regions of the country, prepared and conducted a military operation to "disarm the population of the Chechen Autonomous Region" as soon as possible.

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According to the instructions approved by Uborevich, the troops of the Red Army surrounded the Chechen villages and offered to surrender all available weapons within no more than two hours. In case of non-compliance with the requirements, the settlements were fired upon by artillery and aircraft until the complete surrender of the enemy. After that, the OGPU carried out the seizure of the "vicious and bandit element."

The operation began on August 25 and lasted for two weeks. 101 settlements were subjected to artillery and machine-gun fire, 16 villages were bombarded by air, 119 houses were blown up, more than 300 people were arrested, more than 25,000 rifles, 4,000 revolvers and about 80,000 cartridges were confiscated.

In 1927-1928, Ieronim Petrovich studied military affairs in Germany, after which he replaced Voroshilov as commander of the Moscow District. In 1930-1931 he was

Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and Chief of Armaments of the Red Army. Finally, in 1931, he accepted the Belarusian Military District.

According to colleagues, Uborevich loved practical work in the troops, he felt "military bone".

Commander of the 1st rank Belov Ivan Panfilovich was born in 1893 into a peasant family. I was preparing to become a teacher, but life took a different turn. He went through the First World War, received three St. George's crosses and non-commissioned officer badges. Immediately after the February Revolution, he signed up for the Left Social Revolutionaries, was elected chairman of the regimental committee of the 1st Siberian spare regiment.

At the head of the regiment in October 1917, he established Soviet power in Tashkent. Since January 1918, Belov was the head of the garrison and commandant of the Tashkent fortress. In January 1919, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries acted in the city. Ivan Panfilovich, having shown "exceptional ingenuity", passed on his party comrades and defected to the RCP (b).

For six months, from April 1919, he was the commander-in-chief of the troops

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Turkestan Republic, then commanded the 3rd Turkestan Rifle Division. In June 1919, Chief Division Belov suppressed the "White Guard rebellion" of the Red Army garrison stationed in the city of Verny, in September he led the defense of Andijan.

In August-September 1920, at the head of the Bukhara Group of Forces, Ivan Panfilovich "brilliantly carried out an operation" to seize an independent (this independence was confirmed by the Bolsheviks in March 1918, but two years later it was recognized as "necessary to deal with the Bukhara government") of the adjacent state of the Emirate of Bukhara, organized with the aim of providing "revolutionary fraternal assistance to the Bukhara people in their struggle against the despotism of the Bukhara autocrat", as well as the confiscation of the emir's treasury, which was estimated at 150 million rubles in gold.

Fraternal assistance was accompanied by the barbaric destruction of the largest Muslim center — Old Bukhara (according to the commander of the Turkfront Frunze, "the stronghold of obscurantism and the Black Hundreds"), the destruction of historical monuments, the use of chemical shells, unheard-of crimes of the occupiers and rampant looting. Belov, with his staff, especially distinguished himself during the plundering of the emir's treasury. The representative of the Cheka in Turkestan, comrade Ya.Kh. Peters' eyes widened as he confiscated from only the commander of the Bukhara group a bag of gold ingots, money and silver, so necessary for the world revolution.

"After the surrender of Bukhara," reported a member of the "troika" of the Revolutionary Military Bureau Mashitsky, "arson and incredible robberies and looting began. All the wealth contained in the cellars and storerooms of the Registan was looted, huge fireproof cupboards were smashed, broken... The Krasarmia took part in the robbery, and two echelons with looted property were sent to Tashkent...

A procedure was quickly established, on the basis of which, in memory of the "revolution" in Bukhara, precious objects were given away, often of historical significance, and dealing with

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it got to the point that everyone who found himself in Bukhara considered it shameful not to take something "on memory".

Emir Said Alim fled to Afghanistan, and the Bukhara region until the early 1930s remained a hotbed of Basmachi and permanent uprisings. Ivan Belov and his successors, without delving into the intricacies of the East, chopped contra into cabbage. Commissar of the 1st Turkestan cavalry division I. Vinokurov report shaft:

"The current situation in Eastern Bukhara is extremely deplorable, theoretically we are consolidating Soviet power here, but in practice we are slaughtering the poor by the thousands... Now I have absolutely no idea what colossal work is needed to reconcile the population with us."

Knowing no rest, the Red fighters and commanders brought deliverance "from the threat of colonial imperialist slavery" and the bright ideas of communism to the "backward" and "dark" peoples of Central Asia, enslaved by feudal lords and the reactionary clergy: they burned mosques, set up barracks in them and stables, "used the sheets of the Koran for natural needs", raped Muslim women.

"Each of our campaign against the Basmachi," admitted one of the participants in the events, "usually was accompanied by murders and robberies of the civilian population."

In 1921-1922, Belov, commanding a rifle division, suppressed "kulak revolts" in the Kuban. Then he commanded a corps. In 1923 he graduated from the Higher Academic Courses of the Academy of the General Staff, improved his qualifications in Germany.

From November 1927, Belov headed the "restless" North Caucasian district. In this position, Ivan Panfilovich was mainly engaged in his favorite thing - the organization of punitive actions. The policy of forced "solid collectivization", the closure of mosques, the stupid tyranny of high-ranking Soviet and party cattle led to the fact that in September 1929 an uprising broke out that engulfed the whole of Chechnya and a number of mountainous regions of Dagestan.

You have to be a complete scoundrel and a provocateur,

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in order to force Muslims in the most religious regions of the Caucasus to engage in pig breeding or to convert mosques into barns, and then to call in troops to suppress "anti-Soviet speeches". And the troops were always ready. Under the leadership of Belov, two Chekist military operations were carried out, Shali was taken by storm with the use of artillery, but the uprising was suppressed only by April 1930.

Then Ivan Panfilovich visited Germany, where he learned from the experience of the Reichswehr. From 1931, Belov commanded the troops of the Leningrad, and from 1935, the Moscow military districts. For military distinctions he was awarded two Orders of the Red Banner. He left no military work.

Commander of the 1st rank Shaposhnikov Boris Mikhailovich was born in 1882 in the city of Zlatoust. In 1903 he graduated from the Moscow Military School and the Academy of the General Staff in 1910. He served in the Turkestan and Warsaw military districts in command and staff positions. Participated in the First World War, was the chief of staff of the Cossack brigade, the 2nd Turkestan division, the 10th rifle corps. Under the Provisional Government he received the rank of colonel. In December 1917 he was elected head of the Caucasian Grenadier divisions.

In March 1918, Chief Division Shaposhnikov was demobilized on an indefinite leave, in May he voluntarily signed up for the Red Army and was appointed assistant chief of the Operational Directorate of the Headquarters of the Supreme Military Council of the Republic, in October he headed the intelligence department of the Field Headquarters of the RVS.

In March 1919, Boris Mikhailovich was appointed first assistant chief of staff of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs of Ukraine, in August - head of the intelligence department, and in October - the operational department of the Field Headquarters. He was directly involved in the development of a plan for a counteroffensive against Denikin's troops in October 1919 and other strategic operations.

From February 1921 Shaposhnikov - first assistant

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Chief of Staff of the Red Army. For services to the Republic he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. In May 1925 he was appointed deputy, and from October commander of the troops of the Leningrad Military District. Exactly two years later, Shaposhnikov became head of the Moscow Military District. In May 1928, he became Chief of Staff of the Red Army. By the decision of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1930, he was admitted to the party without undergoing candidate experience. From April 1931 he commanded the troops of the Volga Military District. In April 1932, Boris Mikhailovich was transferred to the post of head of the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze.

From September 1935, he again commanded the troops of the Leningrad Military District. A highly professional staff officer, the author of the classic work "The Brain of the Army", Boris Mikhailovich enjoyed great prestige in the army and personally with Stalin.

The flagship of the fleet of the 1st rank Orlov Vladimir Mitrofanovich was born in Kherson in 1895. As a student at St. Petersburg University, he took part in the revolutionary movement and was arrested twice. In 1916, from the fourth year of the Faculty of Law, he was called up for military service, in October 1917 he graduated from the school of midshipmen of accelerated graduation and was appointed watch chief on the cruiser Bogatyr, stationed in Revel. After the Bolshevik coup, the sailors elected the politically savvy Orlov a member of the ship's committee.

After the breakdown of peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk in early 1918, German troops went on the offensive in the Baltic. The cruiser Bogatyr, along with other ships of the Revel base, by order of the Chief of Staff of the Baltic Fleet A.M. Shchastny made the transition to Gel Singfors, and then to Kronstadt. In total, from March 12 to April 22, in difficult ice conditions, the Baltics managed to withdraw about 250 warships and auxiliary vessels from their moorings in the Baltics, Finland and the Åland Islands.

For this feat, Shastny was accused of "preparing a counter-revolutionary coup and treason."

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no", by order of Trotsky, he was arrested right in the office of the People's Commissariat of Defense, convicted and shot. Which, in conjunction with some of the published documents, allowed historians to assert that Alexei Mikhailovich thwarted Lenin's plan to surrender the ships of the Baltic Fleet to the Germans.

And Vladimir Mitrofanovich Orlov joined the Bolshevik Party and went along the commissar line. Ships did not go to sea, and the Kronstadt sailors, taking care of their cultural leisure, organized a cultural and educational club, which turned into the Central Cultural and Educational Council of the Fleet by the end of 1918. Orlov was elected Deputy Chairman of the Board. There he did interesting things:

"The Board organized a number of groups in general education subjects, as well as schools for specialists — navigators, mechanics, courses for accountants. Lectures were given on socio-political topics, on literature and art. Sports were developed quite widely. By August 1918, sections of wrestling, gymnastics, boxing, fencing, football and athletics were working.

On February 15, 1919, all this amateur activity turned into a very serious institution - the political department of the Baltic Fleet, headed by Orlov. At the same time, he was the editor of the Red Baltic Fleet newspaper.

Until the end of the Civil War, Orlov and his colleagues laid the foundations of a sinecure for all subsequent generations of Soviet political workers: he placed commissars, strengthened party organizations, held rallies, issued leaflets, "raised morale, brought up love for the Motherland, hatred for enemies ". In May 1919, the destroyer "Gavriil" went to sea to shell the enemy coast, and the political department explained to the personnel "that ships whose crews show courage, skill and solidarity can honorably

fight any opponent." In June, the Krasnaya Gorka and Gray Horse forts revolted, Orlov admonishes the expeditionary detachments, instructs the commissars and communists. In October for

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Petrograd is attacked by General Yudenich, Vladimir Mitrofanovich "systematically informs" the political staff about the situation, talks with sailors and soldiers, organizes concerts for them.

In February 1920, the party sent Orlov to work on the restoration of water transport as deputy head of the Main Political Directorate (Glavpolitvoda) and at the same time head of Donkubanz-Chernomorpolitvoda, and then commissioner of the Baltic Sea Transport.

In December 1921, by decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Orlov was returned to the fleet and appointed assistant to the head of the Political Directorate of the RVSR for the maritime unit - head of the Naval Department. Since 1923, Vladimir Mitrofanovich headed the department of naval educational institutions. In 1926, after graduating from the Higher Academic Courses, he was appointed commander of the Black Sea Naval Forces.

Since June 1931, Orlov, a naval commander who never even commanded a boat, was the head of the Red Army Naval Forces and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR.

Fleet flagship 1st rank Viktorov Mikhail Vladimirovich was born in Yaroslavl into a noble family. In 1913 he graduated from the Naval Corps, in 1915 - the Mine class, in 1917 - the Navigator class. During the First World War, he served in the Mine Division of the Baltic Fleet, then as a senior navigator of the battleship Razhdanin (former squadron battleship Tsesarevich).

After October, Viktorov took the side of the Bolsheviks. He served as senior navigator of the cruiser Oleg, took part in the amphibious landing near Narva, commanded the destroyer Vsadnik, the battleships Andrei the First-Called and Gangut. In June 1919, he took part in the suppression of the rebellion of the Krasnaya Gorka and Gray Horse forts ("the forts cleared of counter-revolution were renamed Krasnoflotsky" and "Forward"), in military operations against the English fleet and the troops of General Yudenich.

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In March 1921, Mikhail Vladimirovich suppressed the Kronstadt rebellion, was awarded an order, and in April replaced Dybenko as senior naval commander of the conquered Kronstadt. In May, he was appointed head of the Naval Forces of the Baltic, from June 1924 - the Black Seas. In December, he headed the Hydrographic Department.

Since 1926, having completed the advanced training courses for senior officers, Viktorov again commanded the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea, from March 1932 - the resurgent Naval Forces of the Far East (then he was accepted into the party), in January 1935, renamed the Pacific Fleet.

An excellently educated, professional sailor Viktorov was considered one of the best commanders of the fleet.

Army commissar 1st rank Gamarnik Yan Borisovich was born in 1894 in Zhytomyr in the family of an employee. After graduating from the gymnasium, in 1913 he entered the St. Petersburg Psychoneurological Institute, a year later he transferred to the law faculty of Kyiv University. In 1916 he joined the Bolshevik Party.

In October 1917 he became a member of the Kyiv Revolutionary Committee, from March 1918 - a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Ukraine, in April-June - a member of the "Insurgent Nine". He was one of the leaders of the Odessa, Kharkov and Crimean underground party organizations. He worked on the deployment of the partisan movement. At the end of 1918, Gamarnik, being a member of the Revolutionary Committee, led an armed uprising in Kharkov against the Petliura Directory. Since May 1919 he was the chairman of the Odessa Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, a member of the Odessa Defense Council.

After the defeat of the Ukrainian Front, Gamarnik became a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Group of Forces of the 12th Army, together with Yakir, led it out of encirclement. In November 1919 - April 1920 he was the commissar of the 58th Infantry Division.

After [the civil war, Jan Borisovich continued his career as a party functionary: in 1921-1922 he was

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Chairman of the Odessa and Kiev provincial executive committees, in 1923-1928 - Secretary of the Far Eastern Territory Party Committee, member of the RVS (Siberian Military District. In 1928 he was elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus and a member of the RVS of the Belarusian Military District.

In October 1929, by decision of the Central Committee [Amarnik was transferred to work in Moscow and appointed, instead of Bubnov, head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army. At the same time, he became a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and the following year - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense. Under the direct supervision of this "bearded man with a gloomy face and kind eyes" in 1930, the armed forces were purged of former tsarist officers, "participants in the monarchist conspiracy."

Commander of the 2nd rank Vatsetis Ioakim Ioakimovich was born in 1873 at the Neugorf manor in the Courland province into a peasant family. He graduated from the school of the Ministry of Public Education, the Vilna Infantry School in 1897, the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff in 1909.

Member of the First World War. In the summer of 1915, to protect the Baltic states from the invasion of German troops, the formation of national units began. Thus, the Latvian Rifle Division (39 thousand people) appeared in the Russian army, in which Vatsetis commanded the 5th Zemgale Regiment. The division fought in the Riga direction and showed high training and combat effectiveness.

After the fall of the monarchy, the ideas propagated by left-wing socialists about the right of nations to self-determination found fertile ground in the Latvian regiments. Therefore, when the Bolshevik coup took place, the Latvian riflemen, by order of the Revolutionary Committee of the 12th Army, occupied the main strategic points in Latvia and Estonia, ensuring the "triumphal procession" of Soviet power in the Baltics. On December 22, 1917, the decree of the Central Executive Committee recognized the independence of Soviet Latvia, in which the implementation of the Decree on Land and other Leninist decrees immediately began.

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Colonel Vatsetis "resolutely" went over to the side of the revolution. In December, he was summoned to Mogilev and appointed head of the operations department of the Revolutionary Field Headquarters at the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and, at the same time, commander of the Latvian Rifle Corps. In January 1918, Vatsetis led the fighting against the rebellious Polish corps of General Dovbor-Musnitsky, another national formation of the tsarist army.

On April 13, 1918, by order of Trotsky, the formation of the First Latvian Soviet Rifle Division (the first division in the Red Army) under the command of Vatsetis began on the basis of the Latvian units. It was planned to have 9 rifle, | cavalry regiment,

divisions of light and heavy artillery, aviation detachment. In the middle of June 1918, the division had 8,151 men, 175 machine guns, and 25 guns.

In July, during the days of the Left SR rebellion, Vatsetis turned out to be virtually the only military leader who supported the Bolsheviks. He once again proved his devotion to power by shooting the headquarters of the rebels in the Morozov mansion from three-inch guns. Latvians played the first fiddle in the suppression of anti-Bolshevik uprisings in Yaroslavl, Murom, Rybinsk, Saratov, Novgorod, and the Penza province.

Lenin's instructions: "Hang up, by all means hang up, so that the people see ... see, ruffle, know" - were addressed to Evgenia Bosh, but it was not she who hung. As the chroniclers from the Academy of Sciences of the USSR say: "And again the shooters justified the trust placed in them" (however, the Czechoslovak inter- detachment was also noted for massacres in Penza). The Latvians shot down the Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Front M.A. Muraviev.

From July 12, 1918, Vatsetis, having loyal shooters at hand, commanded the Eastern Front, organizing military operations against the Czechoslovak corps. The front headquarters was created on the basis of the headquarters of the 2nd and 3rd Latvian rifle

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brigades, the 5th army formed by Vatsetis was more than half staffed by Latvians, and the commander of the 1st Latvian regiment P.S. Glorious. RI took command of the 3rd Army. Berzin.

In August, the "White Czechs" managed to capture Kazan, and with it - half of Russia's gold reserves. However, in early September, the Reds managed to organize a successful counteroffensive and defeat the enemy. Beloved by the commander, the 5th Regiment became the first Soviet military unit to be awarded the Honorary Revolutionary Red Banner for these battles. At the height of the operation, Vatsetis was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of LIKI. |

At this time, from all directions, the red Latvian regiments were transferred to the west. By the end of 1918, they were deployed into two rifle divisions, which formed the core of the Soviet Latvian Army. Vatsetis was appointed its commander, remaining part-time commander-in-chief. The invasion of native land began in December, and by the end of January 1919, most of the country was occupied. Riga fell on 3 January. Commander-in-Chief wrote:

"One of the most important tasks of the Latvian army was to clear the soil that had been watered with sweat, blood and tears for a long time from historical debris in the form of the rotten privileged tops of the old social order of the Baltic states and clear the ground for the power of the working people."

What follows is clear. In order to clean the soil from "garbage" in Latvia, a regime of the most severe terror was established for five months. The battalions of executioners could not manage to cope with their work. It was not until the beginning of summer that the "counter-revolutionary forces" recaptured Riga and drove out the "fighters for a just cause." The army of Soviet Latvia was renamed the 5th Army, and the Latvian shock division again spun off from it.

In the summer of 1919, Vatsetis' brilliant career in the Red Army came to an abrupt end. It all started with disagreements between the commander-in-chief and the headquarters of the Eastern Front. Considering that the main danger for the Soviet Republic on

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ripening in the south, Vatsetis proposed to suspend the successful offensive against Kolchak and transfer a number of divisions to the Southern Front. However, this idea was categorically opposed by Kamenev and his commissars. The commander of the Eastern Front promised to allocate the necessary

divisions, and finish off the enemy. Kamenev fulfilled his obligations in full, and the authority of the commander-in-chief was shaken. Then Vatsetis tried to remove Kamenev, but on July 8 he himself was removed from office.

Trotsky recalled:

"Both of them were colonels of the General Staff of the old tsarist army. There was an undoubted competition between them, in which the commissars were also drawn. It is difficult to say which of the two colonels was more gifted. Both possessed undoubted strategic data, both had experience of the great war, both were distinguished by an optimistic temperament, without which it is impossible to command. Vatsetis was more stubborn, more willful, and undoubtedly succumbed to the influence of elements hostile to the revolution. Kamenev was incomparably more accommodating and easily succumbed to the influence of the communists who worked with him.

The latter circumstance, coupled with the successes of the Eastern Front, proved to be decisive. Almost immediately after his resignation, Vatsetis was arrested by Chekists on suspicion of involvement in a "military conspiracy", but was soon released from the zindan and from August 1919 until the end of the Civil War he worked in the RVS of the Republic.

Since 1921, Joakim Ioakimovich has been teaching at the Military Academy of the Red Army.

Commander of the 2nd rank Dybenko Pavel Efimovich was born in 1889 in the village of Lyudkov, Chernihiv province, from peasants. He graduated from the four-year city school. He worked as a loader, construction worker. In 1911 he was arrested for military service evasion and sent to the conscription station. After graduating from the mine school, he served on the battleship "Emperor Pavel I" of the Baltic Fleet.

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At the height of the World War, the sailor Dybenko was engaged in anti-war propaganda "in the bowels of the tsarist fleet" and achieved considerable success. As soon as Nicholas II abdicated the throne, the propagandized chaps began to exterminate the officers. They were shot, hoisted on bayonets, beaten with butts and sledgehammers, drowned in holes. And in May 1917 Dybenko became chairman of the Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet - Tsentrobalt.

Actively participated in the preparation of the October Revolution in Petrograd, led the formation and dispatch of detachments of revolutionary sailors to the capital. The cruiser "Aurora" and other ships entered the Neva on Dybenko's orders. The day after the capture of the Winter Palace, the semi-literate Pasha Dybenko became a member of the Soviet government, People's Commissar for Naval Affairs and, as the official biography says, "one of the organizers of the Soviet Navy", as well as the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly and executions working demonstrations.

In February 1918, Commissar for Foreign Affairs Trotsky, throwing out the stupid slogan "No peace, no war", refused to sign the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. In response, the German command launched an offensive troops. In five days, from 18 to 23 February, without encountering any resistance from the Russian army decomposed by "pacifists", the Germans occupied Dvinsk, Polotsk, Minsk, Pskov, approached Petrograd. In the region of Narva, the Bolsheviks tried to organize a defense by the forces of the Red Guard.

An attempt was also made to divert from the fascinating occupation of expropriation and to enlist the Baltic sailors in defense of the revolution. People's Commissar Dybenko declared the Red Terror of the entire "German bourgeoisie" and, at the head of a consolidated detachment of 800 people (for comparison, 10,000 Balts came to Narva, bridges, post office, telegraph, etc. according to Lenin's list) set out to Narva with the intention drive the enemy all the way to Revel. However, the fuse of the "brothers", who absorbed rations in the deep rear throughout the war, was enough for one day of front-line life. According to the memoirs of M.D. Bonch-Bruyevich, instead of fighting German

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tsami "decomposed sailors took up a barrel of alcohol obtained on the way."

Already on March 3, Dybenko announced the head of the Narva combat section, former General D.P. Parsky as an enemy, who specifically put his heroic detachment in a "difficult position", and gave the order to retreat. The sailors accepted the order with enthusiasm and "ran to Gatchina", covering 120 kilometers in record time. Even those settlements where there was no smell of the German spirit were abandoned; they were then "recaptured" back by Russian telegraphers.

In mid-March, for the surrender of Narva, Dybenko was expelled from the people's commissars, arrested and put under investigation. But as soon as the detention was replaced by an undertaking not to leave, Pavel Efimovich gathered a train of sailors and departed to the east to fight the "counter-revolutionary wave". By order of Moscow, the echelon was detained already in Samara, the commander was returned back. The trial took place in May. The Revolutionary Tribunal acquitted the former people's commissar, but the Central Committee expelled him from the party "for dishonorable breach of obligation."

After the trial, Pavel Efimovich left for underground work against the "bourgeois-landowner dictatorship" of Hetman Skoropadsky in Ukraine and Crimea. In August 1918, he was captured in Sevastopol and imprisoned, but in September the Germans returned the "resident" to the Soviet government safe and sound. After that, he was engaged in the formation of rebel units in the "neutral" zone.

At the beginning of 1919, Dybenko surfaced as the commander of one of the partisan detachments in the Ukrainian Front, "created to assist the working people of Ukraine in liberation from the German-Austrian invaders and bourgeois nationalists", participated in the capture of Kharkov, which became the temporary capital of Soviet Ukraine, and the attack on Yekaterinoslav.

On February 21, he led the 1st Zadneprovskaya division. Pavel Efimovich also had colorful characters as brigade commanders - ataman N.A. Grigoriev and "father" N.I. Mah-but. Dybenko then commanded the Crimean army, which occupied Sevastopol on April 29. For a short term Dybenko

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again became a minister - people's commissar for military affairs of the Crimean Republic. However, in May, Grigoriev first raised an armed rebellion, then General Shkuro, a former commander of the Red Army who was arrested on charges of counter-revolution and miraculously escaped execution, defeated Nestor Makhno's brigade, which covered the Taganrog-Rostov sector, and at the end of June the Soviet troops were forced to leave the Crimea. They made a division out of the Crimean army, and Dybenko was sent to the Academy [of the General Staff.

In mid-June, the Whites took Kharkov. The "Special Commission to Investigate the Atrocities of the Bolsheviks" meticulously recorded traces of the vital activity of the horses:

"Having climbed into the temple under the leadership of Dybenko, the Red Army soldiers, together with their mistresses who had come with them, walked around the temple in hats, smoked, scolded Jesus Christ and the Mother of God in foul language, stole the antimention, the curtain from the Royal Doors, tearing it to pieces, church clothes, vestments, scarves to wipe the lips of those who take communion, overturned the Throne, pierced the icon of the Savior with a bayonet. After the outrageous detachment left, excrement was found in one of the vestibules of the temple.

Dybenko did not stay at the academy and again left for the front. From October 1919, Pavel Efimovich consistently commanded the 37th Infantry, 1st Caucasian Wild, 4th and 2nd Cavalry Divisions on the Caucasian and Southern fronts. In September 1920 he returned to study.

As a student of the academy, Dybenko was sent to suppress the Kronstadt rebellion. In the course of organizing the punitive forces, the Bolsheviks had serious difficulties: a number of military units refused to oppose the rebels. Under these conditions, non-party Dybenko

entrusted with the command of the Consolidated Division. The former chairman of Tsentrobalt justified the trust and distinguished himself by ordering to shoot at his own retreating soldiers at the critical moment of the battle. Commander of the 7th Army M.N. Tukhachevsky later wrote: "I was in the war for five years, but I can't remember ever witnessing such a bloody massacre." So Pavel Efimovich earned

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his first Order of the Red Banner - "for the heroism and courage shown during the suppression." A year later, commanding a punitive division "against Antonov's gangs," the second order was for similar feats.

Career took off again. In May 1921 - head of the Black Sea sector, in June - head of the 51st Perekop Rifle Division. In 1922, Dybenko was reinstated in the party with a credit for pre-revolutionary seniority. After graduating from the academy, the land sailor commanded the 6th, 5th, 10th rifle corps. On May 6, 1925, he was appointed head of the Artillery Directorate, and in 1926 - head of supply for the Red Army.

Since 1928, Dybenko commanded the troops of the Turkestan military district, fought with the Basmachi of Maksum Fuzaili and Ibrahim-bek, received another Banner on his chest. In 1930-1931 he was studying in Germany. From Berlin he returned to Central Asia, and in 1933 he headed the Volga Military District.

In his free time, he wrote and rewrote his memoirs about his exploits in the "bowels of the tsarist fleet" and the role of the Baltics in the victory of the October Revolution.

Commander of the 2nd rank Fedko Ivan Fedorovich was born in 1897 in the village of Khmelev, Sumy region, into a peasant family. After graduating from elementary school, he studied at a trade school for carpenters and cabinetmakers, and worked at a furniture factory. At the beginning of 1916 he was called up for military service, in July he was sent to the South-Western Front, and four months later he was seconded to study at the Kyiv school of ensigns.

During the October Revolution, Fedko became one of the leaders of the Revolutionary Committee in Feodosia, where he organized a detachment of the Red Guard, which later expanded into the 1st Black Sea Revolutionary Regiment. The victory of the proletariat was followed by massacres of classes with no prospects for a new life. Thus, in January 1918, in Yevpatoria, the revolutionary crew of the Romanian hydrocruiser drowned 46 officers arrested by the new government, one

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for the sake of it, burned it in the furnace of a steam boiler. In connection with the entry of German troops into the Crimea, Fedko led his detachment to the Kuban through Kerch.

In May-October 1918, he commanded the 3rd and 1st columns of the troops of the North Caucasus, who fought against Denikin. Since October 27, after the betrayal of I.L. Sorokin, temporarily served as commander-in-chief of the revolutionary troops in the North Caucasus. In November, he commanded the 11th Army, then he was an assistant commander and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the same army.

In May 1919, Ivan Fedorovich went to the disposal of the Ukrainian Soviet government and was appointed to help Dybenko as a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Crimean Soviet Republic and deputy commander of the Crimean army. At the end of June, going on the offensive from the Kerch bridgehead, Denikin drove the Reds out of the Crimea. This time Fedko left through Perekop. From the remnants of the Crimean army, the Crimean Soviet division was formed under the command of Dybenko, Fedko remained deputy. | In August, the division was renamed the 58th Rifle Division, and Ivan Fedorovich became its commander. The division defended Nikolaev, then, as part of the Yakira group, it emerged from the encirclement and in September connected with the main forces of the Red Army. For these battles, the divisional commander was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

In December 1919, Fedko went to study at the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army. After six months of study, in June 1920, he was seconded to the Southern Front as head of the 46th Infantry Division. During the defeat of Wrangel, he commanded the shock group of the 13th Army. For the battles on the Nikopol bridgehead and the courage shown at the same time, he was awarded the second Order of the Red Banner. In December he returned to the academy.

The division commander received the third order "for skillful command" of the 187th cadet brigade as part of the Dybenko Consolidated Division during the liquidation of the Kronstadt rebellion. In May 1921] Ivan Fedorovich, rooting for Soviet power, asked the head of the academy for leave and volunteered to put down the Tambov rebellion. commando

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shaft 1st combat area. For the distinctions shown in the fight against Santonovism, he was awarded the fourth order. In December, he returned to the academy to finish his studies.

In February 1922, Fedko was appointed commander of the 18th Yaroslavl Rifle Division. On April 25, 1925, an order was issued on his appointment to the Turkestan Front as commander of the 13th Rifle Corps.

For six months, Ivan Fedorovich was engaged in the liquidation of the Basmachi on the territory of Eastern Bukhara. For success in defeating the troops, Ibrahim-bek was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor of the Bukhara Republic. In November - the 2nd Rifle Corps, which he commanded for about two years.

From February 1927, Fedko was Chief of Staff of the North Caucasian Military District. In 1928 he traveled to [Germany, to the Reichswehr maneuvers. In 1929 he was seconded to the Far East, took part in resolving the conflict on the CER. From February 1931 he commanded the Caucasian Red Banner Army. In March 1932 he was appointed commander of the Volga Military District, in October 1933 - assistant commander of the Separate Red Banner Far Eastern Army. From June 1934, Ivan Fedorovich commanded the Primorsky Group of Forces of the OKDVA.

Commander of the 2nd rank Dubovoy Ivan Naumovich was born in 1896 on the Chmyrivtsy farm in the Chigirinsky district in the family of a miner. In November 1916 he was drafted into the army, graduated from the ensign school. Didn't make it to the front. Actively made a revolution in the Donbass.

From February 1918, Dubovoy commanded a Red Guard detachment in Bakhmut, then he was the military commissar of the Novomakeevsky district, commandant of the Central Headquarters of the Red [Guards of Donbass, assistant chief of staff of the 10th Army. Participated in the defense of Tsaritsyn.

Since 1919, Ivan Naumovich was the chief of staff of the group of troops of the Kyiv direction on the Ukrainian front. February 5, parts of the 1st Ukrainian Soviet division

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entered Kyiv. Subsequently, Dubovoy was chief of staff and commander of the 1st Ukrainian Army, head of the 3rd border division, assistant division chief at Shchors, since September, after his death, head of the 44th rifle division, which, being part of the 12th army, distinguished herself in the defeat of the Petliura and Denikin troops, the fight against the Poles and the elimination of "kulak banditry". For services to the revolution he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

After the end of the Civil War, he continued to command the 44th division, and in 1924 he became the commander of the 14th rifle corps. In 1926, Dubovoy graduated from the Military Academic Courses.

In October 1929 he was appointed assistant, and in December 1934 - deputy commander of the Ukrainian military district. From May 1935 Ivan Naumovich commanded

troops of the Kharkov Military District.

Commander of the 2nd rank Levandovsky Mikhail Karlovich was born in 1890 in the village of Nikolaevskaya Terek province. In 1912 he graduated from the Vladimir military school. Participated in World War II with the rank of captain.

In February 1918 he joined the Red Army, organized red detachments in the Grozny region. And here the Chinese could not do without: in the battles near Grozny, Nalchik and Kizlyar, the battalion under the command of Pakh Tisan distinguished himself. In July 1918, Lewandowski was elected People's Commissar for Military Affairs of the Terek Soviet Republic. He led the suppression of counter-revolutionary demonstrations in the regions of Vladikavkaz and Grozny.

In January 1919, Mikhail Karlovich became commander of the 11th Army. The army carried out an offensive operation in the direction of Yekaterinodar and Novorossiysk. However, it was defeated by Denikin's troops and an epidemic of typhus. Having lost two-thirds of its personnel, it left the North Caucasus and retreated across the Kalmyk steppes to Astrakhan.

Retreating, the army left behind traces of sa

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my sophisticated atrocity. Still would. With her bayonets, she ensured the activities of one of the most famous "monsters of Bolshevism" - Plenipotentiary Georgy Atarbekov. In Pyatigorsk, with a detachment of Chekists, he took about a hundred hostages to the cemetery and chopped them up with swords, in Armavir he machine-gunned a train with Georgian officers and sisters of mercy returning home, in Yekaterinodar he "slapped" about two thousand prisoners. So the former staff captain Lewandowski had a complete idea of the authorities he undertook to serve.

In February, the 11th Army was disbanded. Lewandovsky successively commanded the 1st Special and 7th Samara cavalry, 33rd Kuban rifle divisions as part of the revived and again disbanded 11th separate and 10th armies, operating against parts of the Baron's Caucasian army Wrangel in the Astrakhan direction. After the failure of Denikin's campaign against Moscow, the Reds returned to the North Caucasus in February-March 1920. Lewandovsky commanded the Terek group of troops, the most important task of which was to seize the oil fields. Lenin kept this question under special control, bombarding the Revolutionary Military Council of the front with telegrams:

"We desperately need oil, consider a manifesto to the population that we will slaughter everyone if they burn and spoil the oil, and vice versa, we will give life to everyone if Maykop and especially Grozny are handed over intact."

Even before the completion of the operation, Vladimir Ilyich set the command of the Caucasian Front the task of organizing an invasion of the Republic of Azerbaijan - there were also views on Baku oil. Therefore, throwing into the landfill the slogans about the right of nations to self-determination that had played their destructive role, Lenin returned the lost colonies:

"It is extremely necessary for us to take Baku. All efforts should be directed towards this, and it is obligatory to be purely diplomatic in statements and make sure to the maximum extent possible that the local Soviet government is prepared for a firm position. The same applies to

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Georgia, although I advise you to be even more careful with it..."

This is how the scenario that later became a classic was worked out: a bogus government asks the Kremlin for military assistance, which the Bolsheviks never knew how to refuse. The main role was assigned to the 11th Army, which was again led by Lewandowski. Azerbaijani government

Through diplomatic channels, he tried to find out from Moscow what the concentration of Soviet troops near the border meant, but received no answer.

On April 27, the intervention began. Two days later, Baku was captured by strikes from land and sea. A telegram from the Provisional Revolutionary Committee of Azerbaijan flew to the "leader of the world proletariat" with a request to "immediately provide real assistance by sending detachments of the Red Army" to repel the onslaught of "united bands of internal and external counterrevolution". At that time, the occupying troops spread across the country in all directions, without encountering any serious resistance, carrying out demonstrative actions of intimidation. In Baku, the "gangs" began to be shot on the very first night.

Lewandovsky in July 1920 took command of the 9th Army, which defeated the landing forces of General Ulagay on the Taman Peninsula and especially distinguished himself in the extermination of the Kuban Cossacks. As a member of the Revolutionary Military Council S.A. Anuchin, in July, the Revolutionary Military Council of the army, together with the Kuban Black Sea Committee of the RCP (b) and the Revolutionary Committee, formed shock detachments, which "shot more than one thousand opponents of the Soviet power and burned more than one village (more than one hundred houses). And this had an extremely favorable effect on the Cossacks, sobering them up.

In the spring of 1921, the 9th Army contributed to the establishment of Soviet power in the Transcaucasus, liquidating the "counter-revolution" in Georgia. From July to September, being the provincial military commissar of the Tambov province, Mikhail Karlovich devoutly crushed the "Antonovshchina", then served as the deputy commander of the district. In April 1924 he was appointed to the post of commander of the Turkestan Front and a year and a half

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reconciled the Basmachi in Central Asia. From November 1925 he was commander of the Caucasian Red Banner Army, at the same time from March 1928 he was authorized by the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs under the Council of People's Commissars of the Transcaucasian Federation.

From October 1928 - Head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army, from December 1929 - Commander of the Siberian, then Transcaucasian military districts. Since 1933, he again commanded the Caucasian army.

Commander of the 2nd rank Mikhail Dmitrievich Velikanov was born in 1892 in the village of Zimino, Ryazan Province, into a peasant family. He graduated from the seminary, worked as a zemstvo teacher. In 1914 he was drafted into the army and sent to the ensign school. He finished the war with the St. George Cross with the rank of second lieutenant.

In early March 1918, he joined the Red Army and was appointed to the post of company commander of the Lefortovo detachment. In May, at the head of the Consolidated Detachment, he was sent to fight the White Czechs in the 1st Army of Tukhachevsky. The detachment became part of the 24th Iron Division, Velikanov became the head of the 2nd Simbirsk regiment. In December, he took command of the 1st brigade, in February 1919 he temporarily acted as head of the 25th Samara division. In the spring of 1919, he commanded the Ufa shock group of troops, took part in the defeat of Kolchak's troops in the Urals, and led the defense of Orenburg.

On July 17, 1919, he was appointed head of the 20th Infantry Division of the 1st Army of the Eastern Front, which he headed until the end of the Civil War. In September, the division was transferred to the South-Eastern Front. As part of the 10th Army, together with the "Budyonnovists", she took part in the battle near Yegorlykskaya, as part of the 11th Army, she occupied Azerbaijan.

In May 1920, "the dark forces of the counter-revolution succeeded in provoking several major uprisings in Azerbaijan." It fell to the share of division commander Velikanov to suppress the Ganja uprising. In the autumn of 1920, they became agitated

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working people of Armenia. The Revolutionary Committee created by the Bolsheviks, meeting in the remote village of Dilijan, declared Armenia a Soviet Socialist Republic and immediately called for help "the heroic Red Army of great socialist Russia." The 11th Rapid Reaction Army moved to help the Armenian proletarians. Already on December 4, Velikanov was leading his division through the streets of Yerevan. It is interesting that the Soviet army helped the Armenians in cooperation with the Turkish one.

No more than two months passed, and the same incident happened in the fusion, on February 10, 1921 the Soviet troops had to be sent there as well. Velikanov commanded a group in the Tiflis direction. On February 25, after fierce battles with Georgian troops, a telegram arrived in Moscow: "The Red Banner of Soviet Power flies over Tiflis."

However, while helping the Georgians, in mid-February the restless Dashnaks recaptured Yerevan from the "Red imperialists". Velikanov had to return and restore order in Armenia with the use of artillery, airplanes and armored trains. Yerevan was recaptured only on April 4.

In 1922, the order bearer Velikanov graduated from the Higher Military Academic Courses for Command Staff of the Red Army three times and was appointed commander of the 1st Caucasian Rifle Division, then the 9th Rifle Corps. Since 1923, Mikhail Dmitrievich was an assistant to the commander of the district troops, an inspector of the infantry of the Red Army. Since 1933 - Commander of the Central Asian Military District.

Commander of the 2nd rank Kork August Ivanovich was born in 1886 in the village of Ardlan, Livonia province, into a peasant family. In 1906 he graduated from the Chuguev Infantry School, in 1914 - from the Academy of the General Staff, in 1917 - from the Military School of Observer Pilots. He served mainly in the headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel.

In July 1918, August Ivanovich joined the Red Army, worked in the Operations Department of the All-Russian Headquarters, from October he was the head of the headquarters of the Western

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front and head of the operational intelligence department of the headquarters of the 9th army.

The annulment of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk allowed the Bolsheviks to start implementing plans for the Sovietization of Estonia. In mid-November, the Revel (Tallinn) Revkom, formed by Kremlin envoys, called on the people to oppose the "self-appointed government of Pääs" and asked the working people of the RSFSR to help the Estonians with the troops of the Red Army.

In response to this request, more precisely, even earlier, the Soviet government concentrated the 7th Army near the Estonian border and the Estonian and Lettish units brought in from all fronts, and immediately launched them into the offensive. On November 25, they took Pskov, by the morning of November 29 - Narva. And already at noon in the building of the Narva City Hall, Estonia was proclaimed a Soviet Socialist Republic under the name of the Estland Labor Commune.

Cork received a position in the commune as a consultant to the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs. By the beginning of January 1919, Soviet troops occupied most of the territory of Estonia, only 30 kilometers before Tallinn, and with their bayonets ensured the unfolding "socialist transformations".

However, on January 9, the "Beloests", with the support of German, Finnish, Russian volunteer formations, launched a counteroffensive and ten days later were in Narva. The government of the labor commune moved to Pskov, then to Luga. It did not lose hope, and on February 18, 1919, with the approval of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), it began to form the Estonian Red Army, whose chief of staff was Kork. In March-April, another attempt to invade Estonia followed, but it also ended in failure. Moscow, distracted by Kolchak's successes in the east, could not help with additional forces. Moreover, in May it switched to

offensive formed on the territory of Estonia, the army of General Yudenich. On May 25, the "White Estonian troops" recaptured Pskov; by mid-June, the Whites were under the walls of Petrograd.

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The Estonian army had to be disbanded, its units merged into the Western Front. August Ivanovich was appointed assistant commander of the 7th Army, which in July managed to push Yudenich's troops to the borders of Estonia. In August 1919, Kork took command of the remnants of the defeated Soviet Latvian Army, renamed the 15th Army, and recaptured Pskov. In the autumn, Yudenich made a second attempt to capture Petrograd, but was defeated. A significant role in its defeat was played by the flank counterattack of Kork's army, and an even greater role was played by the general's refusal to recognize the independence of Estonia in case of victory. On October 31, Soviet troops returned Luga, on November 7 - [dov. For these battles, Commander-15 was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. On February 2, 1920, Moscow concluded a peace treaty with Tallinn; the Sovietization of Estonia had to be postponed for twenty years.

In the spring, the 15th Army was transferred to Belarus, where a war with Poland was brewing. On May 14, in order to help the Southwestern Front, which had surrendered Kyiv, the commander of the Western Front launched an offensive without waiting for the concentration of all his forces. A week later, Soviet troops occupied Molodechno and Borisov. However, on May 30, the Poles counterattacked and, with the help of the approaching reserves, restored the situation. Only the 15th army of Kork was able to hold a small foothold in the Polotsk region. In July, it took part in the campaign on the Vistula, was defeated, like the entire Western Front, two divisions of the 15th Army ended up in East Prussia. Nevertheless, the commander was awarded the second order.

From October 1920, Kork commanded the 6th Army of the Southern Front, which took part in the battle in Northern Tavia and stormed Perekop. For the capture of the Perekop and Ishun positions, Avgust Ivanovich was awarded the Honorary Revolutionary Weapon. In May 1921, the 6th Army was disbanded, its administration was directed to the formation of the Kharkov Military District. Kork took command of the district, then was assistant commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Crimea, assistant head of the Air Fleet Directorate of the Red Army.

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Since 1922, he commanded the Turkestan Front. In December 1923 he was appointed assistant commander of the Western Military District. Then, in February 1925, he became the commander of the Caucasian Red Banner Punitive Army of the Caucasus, led operations to disarm Chechnya that had not yet become routine. "In order to convince Urus-Martan," a report from the headquarters of the North Caucasus Military District said, "it took artillery shelling of 900 shells and aerial bombardment." Since November 1925, Kork commanded the troops of the Western, since 1927 - Leningrad military districts. During this period he joined the Bolshevik Party. In 1928 he was a military attaché in Germany, head of the Supply Department of the Red Army. In 1929, he took command of the troops of the Moscow Military District.

In 1935, Kork was appointed head of the Frunze Military Academy and a member of the Military Council under the People's Commissariat of Defense. Actively participated in the development of military-theoretical problems, was the author of a number of works on military theory and tactics: on military doctrine, strategy and tactics, on the operations of the Civil War.

Commander of the 2nd rank Kashirin Nikolai Dmitrievich was born in 1888 in the city of Verkhneuralsk in the family of a stanitsa ataman. In the Russian army he served in parts of the Orenburg Cossack army, graduating in 1909 from the Orenburg cadet school. He graduated from the First World War as a sub-cauldron.

In 1917, Nikolai Kashirin was elected chairman of the regimental Cossack committee. In March 1918, together with his brother Ivan, he formed the "first Soviet Cossack hundred" in Verkhneuralsk, with which he participated in the fight against General Dutov. As a result of the successful actions of the Kashirin detachment, the connection of the Orenburg and Orsk Soviet detachments was ensured.

Leading them, Kashirin came to the aid of the Samara Soviet army, breaking two Cossack regiments, and covered the withdrawal of the army. In July, the Orenburg detachment of Nikolai Kashirin, a partisan brigade

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Ivan Kashirin and Blucher's 1st Ural Regiment merged into the South Ural Army, which made its way to join the Red Army.

From September 1918, Nikolai Kashirin was an assistant chief, then head of the 4th Ural Division, later renamed the 30th Rifle Division. In 1919, Nikolai Dmitrievich was the commandant of the Orenburg fortified region, the head of the 49th fortress division of the Turkestan Front.

In 1920, as commander of the 3rd Cavalry Corps, he participated in the defeat of Wrangel's troops on the Southern Front. The corps under the command of Kashirin, acting as part of the 13th Army, inflicted a number of defeats on the enemy and, in cooperation with other formations, liberated Melitopol, Genichesk, and Kerch. After the defeat of Wrangel, Kashirin commanded the Alexander Group of Forces, which took part in the fight against the Makhnovshchina.

In 1923-1925 he was the commander of the 14th Rifle Corps, he was on assignment at the headquarters of the Red Army, the commander of the 1st Cavalry Corps of the Red Cossacks. In 1925-1931 - assistant commander of the Ural, Belorussian, Moscow military districts. In 1924 he graduated from the Military Academic Courses for the High Command of the Red Army.

From June 1931, for six years, Kashirin commanded the troops of the North Caucasian Military District. It fell to him to suppress the Chechen uprising of 1932, which broke out on March 23, prepared by the "kulak-mullah underground" and headed by Imam M. Shamilov, since the troops on their own did not cope with this task. The reports of the district headquarters noted "the organization of this speech, the exceptional fierceness of the rebels in battles, continuous counterattacks, despite heavy losses, religious singing during attacks, the participation of women in battles." Difficulties did not frighten Nikolai Dmitrievich, and already on April 9 he reported to Moscow that "the uprising must be considered suppressed." Rebel casualties

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333 killed, 150 wounded, punitive troops - 27 killed, 30 wounded.

Kashirin was awarded two Orders of the Red Banner and an Honorary Revolutionary Weapon.

Commander of the 2nd rank Sedyakin Alexander Ignatievich was born in 1893 in St. Petersburg in the family of a soldier. With the outbreak of World War II, he was called up for military service. In 1915 he graduated from the Irkutsk military school. He fought and rose to the rank of captain.

Since October 1917, he participated in the formation of Red [vardia. In the Civil War, he was commissar of the 2nd Pskov division, commander of an armored train, rifle regiment and brigade, assistant commander of the 13th Army, commissar of the headquarters of the Southern Front, commander of the 31st and 15th rifle divisions.

After the war, Alexander Ignatievich was an infantry inspector in the Petrograd Military District. During the liquidation of the Kronstadt rebellion, he commanded the Southern Group of the 7th Army. In 1921-1922 he commanded the troops of the Karelian region of the Petrograd Military District, fought against the Finnish detachments that invaded the territory of the Karelian Labor Commune, from December 1923 Sedyakin took over the 5th Red Banner Army. Graduated from the Higher Military Academic Courses.

In 1924-1927 he commanded the troops of the Volga Military District. Since 1927 - Deputy Head of the Main Directorate, then inspector of infantry and armored forces of the Red Army. In 1931-1932 he was the head of the Military Technical Academy of the Red Army. Dzerzhinsky.

Since 1933, he was Deputy Chief of Staff of the Red Army, led the Military Technical Academy, the Combat Training Directorate of the Red Army.

Commander of the 2nd rank Alksnis (Astrov) Yakov Ivanovich was born in 1897 in the Lifland province in the family of a laborer. In March 1917 he was mobilized into the army. After graduating from the Odessa military school, ensigns were sent to Za

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fall front. Conducted Bolshevik propaganda among the soldiers, participated in the creation of soldiers' committees.

After the revolution, he worked in the party and Soviet bodies, was the commissar of the Don region. In May 1919 he was appointed military commissar of the Oryol province, then commissar of the 55th Infantry Division. Participated in battles with Denikin.

In 1924 he graduated from the Military Academy of the Red Army. In August 1926, he was appointed deputy head of the Air Force of the Red Army. In November 1929 he graduated from the Kachin Aviation School and received the rank of military pilot. In June 1931, after a business trip to Germany, he became the head of the Red Army Air Force and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council.

The name of Alksnis is associated with many important measures to improve the organizational structure of the Air Force and equip it with new military equipment. On his initiative, mandatory periodic checks of piloting techniques for flight crews, pre-flight training of crews were established, instrument flights were introduced out of sight earth.

Commander of the 2nd rank Khalepsky Innokenty Andreevich was born in 1893 in the city of Minusinsk, the son of a tailor. Educated at the county city school. He worked as a telegraph operator.

At the beginning of 1918 he became secretary of the Central Committee of the trade union of postal and telegraph workers, in April he joined the Red Army and the Bolshevik Party.

During the Civil War, he fought near Narva as part of the Red Guard detachment. Then he participated in battles with the White Czechs and White Guards in the Urals, was the head of communications of the 3rd Army of the Eastern Front. Since October 1918, the Extraordinary Commissar for Communications of all fronts. Since March 1919, the People's Commissar of Posts and Telegraphs of Ukraine. In October 1919 - June 1920 - Head of Communications of the Southern, Southwestern and Caucasian fronts. From July 1920 he was an assistant, then a deputy chief, and from September he was the head of the Communications Department of the Red Army.

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In 1924-1929 he was the head of the Military Technical Directorate of the Red Army, since 1929 he was the head of the Directorate of Motorization and Mechanization, and since December 1934 - of the Armored Tank Directorate.

The flagship of the fleet of the 2nd rank Kozhanov Ivan Kuzmich was born in 1897 in the village of Voznesenskaya in the Kuban. In 1916 he was drafted into the Navy, graduated from the Separate midshipman classes, served on the cruiser Orel and the destroyer Bodry of the Siberian Flotilla. In 1917 midshipman Kozhanov joined the Bolshevik Party.

Since 1918, Ivan Kuzmich was the head of the Special Purpose Detachment under the People's Commissariat for Maritime Affairs, commanded the landing detachments of sailors on the river

ships and a group of warships of the Baltic Fleet of the Volga military flotilla. He fought with the "White Czechs" and the White Guards in the Volga region. For the battles near Yelabuga and his contribution to the defeat of Kolchak, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

In July 1919, the Volga flotilla became part of the Volga-Caspian military flotilla under the command of F.F. Raskolnikov, who assisted the ground forces of the Southern, Turkestan, and then Caucasian fronts. In the summer and autumn of the "heroic 1919", the flotilla and "Kozhanov's detachments" participated in the attack on Tsaritsyn, the defense of Astrakhan, the battles near Mariupol, in April 1920, in the capture of Baku, and finally in an attempt to start a revolution in Persia.

On May 18, the Red Fleet appeared at Anzali, the largest Iranian port on the southern coast of the Caspian Sea. After artillery shelling, amphibious detachments of sailors landed on the shore. The British garrison stationed in Anzali retreated to Rasht. Officially, the purpose of the operation was proclaimed "the return to the Soviet Republic of the ships taken away by the White Guards and interventionists." The deed was done, it would seem that it would be possible to return to Baku with victory.

However, "suddenly" it turned out that in the Gilyansk

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provinces of Persia began a revolution. Providing disinterested assistance to the Persian workers, the Soviet troops occupied the city of Rasht, in which on June 4 the government and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Persian Soviet Socialist Republic were formed under the chairmanship of Kuchek Khan. The newly-minted "Persian democrat" was given power over the captured settlements, supplied with weapons, and helped with instructors. Soviet ships under Azerbaijani flags were left on the Anzeli roadstead.

The Persian revolutionaries began according to Marxist recipes: commissars, expropriations, land confiscations, massacres, the desire to extend their power throughout the country.

In response to Tehran's requests, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin, made honest eyes and spoke about the non-interference of the RSFSR in the internal affairs of Persia. However, the "attempt to conduct a communist policy" in Gilan did not lead to successful results: the revolutionary shahs divided power and killed each other. A year later, the Gilan Republic collapsed, some of its commissars went over to the side of the Shah's troops, the other fled to Baku.

Kozhanov from September 1920 commanded an expeditionary naval division on the Sea of Azov, which acted against the troops of General Ulagay in the Kuban and the troops of Wrangel in Northern Tavia. In March 1921, he distinguished himself in the suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion and was appointed commander of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea. In July, Ivan Kuzmich was again transferred to the south, making him the head of the Caucasian defense sector of the Black and Azov Seas. From January 1922, he held the position of chief and commissar of the Naval Forces in the Far East until their liquidation.

In 1924, Ivan Kuzmich achieved a referral to the Naval Academy. After graduating in 1927, Kozhanov served as a naval specialist at the Soviet embassy in Japan. From March 1930 - assistant commander, from September - commander

destroyer

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"Uritsky". Since November 1930 - Chief of Staff of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea. Since June 1931 - Commander of the Black Sea Naval Forces, renamed in 1935 into the Black Sea Fleet.

The flagship of the fleet of the 2nd rank Lev Mikhailovich Galler was born in 1883 in St. Petersburg in the family of a military engineer. After graduating from the Naval Corps in 1905, he served on the ships of the Baltic Fleet: as a watch officer on the cruisers Asia, General-Admiral and the battleship Slava. In 1912, after graduating from the artillery officer classes, he got on the battleship "Andrew the First-Called", then was the flagship artilleryman of the 2nd brigade of battleships, senior officer of the battleship "Glory".

He met the October Revolution as a captain of the 2nd rank, being the commander of the destroyer "Turkmenets-Stavropolsky" and having the prefix "von" to his surname. In March 1918 he participated in the Ice Campaign.

During the Civil War, he commanded a destroyer, a cruiser, and was the chief of staff of the Active Detachment of Baltic Sea Ships. In April 1919, having taken command of the battleship Andrei the First-Called, Lev Mikhailovich took part in operations against the troops of Yudenich and the British fleet, bombing the forts Gray Horse and Krasnaya Gorka.

In 1921 he was appointed chief of the destroyer division, then chief of staff of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea. During this period, Haller was one of the organizers of the restoration of a combat-ready fleet in the Baltic. In 1926 he completed advanced training courses for senior officers at the Naval Academy. Since 1927, Haller commanded a division of battleships, supervised the transition of a detachment of ships as part of the battleship "Paris Commune" and the cruiser "Profintern" to Sevastopol.

In March 1932, Haller was accepted into the party and appointed commander of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea, since 1935 - of the Baltic Fleet.

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Let's mark the commissioners en masse. The commissar is the "ordinary commissar", the eyes and ears of the Party.

Army commissar of the 2nd rank Amelin Mikhail Petrovich (1896-1937), head of the Political Directorate of the KVO.

Army commissar of the 2nd rank Aronshtam Lazar Naumovich (1896-1938), head of the Political Directorate of OKDVA.

Army commissar of the 2nd rank Anton Stepanovich Bulin (1894-1938), deputy head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, head of the command staff department.

Army commissar 2nd rank Veklichev Georgy Ivanovich (1898-1938), member of the Military Council of the North Caucasus Military District.

Army commissar of the 2nd rank Grishin Alexander Sergeevich (1895-1938), head of the Political Directorate of the Baltic Fleet.

Army commissar 2nd rank Gugin Gligoriy Ivanovich (1896-1937), member of the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet.

Army commissar of the 2nd rank Ippo Boris Mikhailovich (1898-1937), member of the Military Council of the SAVO.

Army commissar of the 2nd rank Kozhevnikov Sergei Nikolaevich (1896-1938), head of the Political Directorate of the KhVO.

Army commissar 2nd rank Landa Mikhail Markovich (1890-1938), editor of the newspaper Krasnaya star".

Army commissar 2nd rank Mezis August Ivanovich (1894-1938), member of the Military Council of the BVO.

Army commissar 2nd rank Okunev Grigory Sergeevich (1900-1938), head of the Political Directorate and member of the Military Council of the Pacific Fleet.

Army commissar of the 2nd rank Gaik Aleksandrovich Osepyan (1891-1937), deputy head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army.

Army commissar of the 2nd rank Slavin Iosif Eremeevich (1893-1938), head of the UVVUZ of the Red Army.

Army commissar of the 2nd rank Smirnov Petr Aleksandrovich (1897-1938), member of the Military Council of the Military District.

Army commissar of the 2nd rank Shifres Alexander Lvovich (1898-1938), head of the Military Economic Academy of the Red Army.

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So, let's sum up some results. The five marshals included two locksmiths who graduated from elementary school, a self-taught sergeant-major, a second lieutenant with a two-year military education, and one colonel. Of the fourteen land commanders, seven graduated from military schools, four of them from the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff. There was also a violent tribe of "legendary" commanders and brigade commanders, mostly not at all burdened with education.

Joachim Vatsetis once said:

"If it depended on me, I would not give high posts to those who do not have at least three years of experience in commanding a regiment. Only this post develops in the commander an organizer, administrator, tactician and operator, strategist and politician, arbitrator and educator. An officer's academy is a regiment."

But there were only four or five people among the highest Soviet "generals", the rest almost immediately jumped into divisional commanders and commanders. For comparison: B.M. Shaposhnikov, having completed the basic and additional courses of the academy, was appointed only as a company commander and commanded it for two years.

It is clear that the proletarian revolution raised its own proletarian cadres to the very top. However, the rapid development of military affairs and military equipment in the 1930s made higher demands on the professionalism of commanders than the ability to ride "a hot warhorse", cut counters and poison the Tambov men with gases.

However, formally all the "prominent" military leaders had "academician" diplomas. Only now the quality of these diplomas differed significantly from the pre-revolutionary one due to the low general educational level of the trainees, as well as the deep contempt of a significant part of them for the bourgeois sciences in general. In addition, these sciences were taught by former tsarist generals and colonels "with a narrow military outlook" who, due to their "backwardness", did not understand the determining role of the class struggle.

The first enrollment of students to the Academy of the General

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headquarters of the Red Army was announced in November 1918. More than half of the applicants came from workers and peasants, of which 25% had only primary education. The main role in admission was played by the presence of the recommendation of two members of the RCP (b), their own party experience and experience of military work in the Red Army. The entrance exams for the petrels were simplified to the limit, essentially turning into a fiction.

Head of the Academy in 1919-1921 A.E. Snesarev wrote:

"... There are no languages, mathematics is for 4 classes, even military regulations are not required, politically valuable people are sometimes accepted with very poor knowledge. The center of gravity of the tests was transferred to "general development" - a term that is open to errors, but turned out to be the only expedient.

The term of study was set at six months (not much, considering that in tsarist times it was necessary to study for an "academician" for two or three years, having 12 years of general and military education behind them; entrance "tests" included exams in Russian and two foreign languages, general tactics, artillery, horseback riding, charters of military branches, mathematics, geography, general and Russian history), then it was increased.

Naturally, curricula and plans were rebuilt in accordance with the characteristics of the students. I had to start "from the most elementary steps of military knowledge." "Unnecessary" and indigestible subjects such as astronomy, higher mathematics, geography, geodesy, ancient history were thrown out, and the teaching of absolutely necessary courses on Marxism and tactics of revolutionary battles was established.

"But even for six months in a row, no one listened to the lectures," recalled the future marshal and chief of the General Staff K.A. Meretskov (1897-1968). "Usually, after studying for a while, people left for the active army in order to return later and finish their studies. That's what happened to me as well. Some had to ply so three or four times. Most often they studied in the winter, and fought in the summer ... "

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Therefore, the first release of the "Red General Staff" took place only in October 1921 of the year. The Academy was successfully completed by such well-known military leaders as K.A. Meretskov (four classes of a rural school), P.E. Dybenko (four-year city school), I.V. Tyulenev (five classes of a real school as an external student), I.F. Fedko (elementary school), V.D. Sokolovsky (teacher's seminary). Chief div V.I. Chapaev (according to the attestation, "almost illiterate") fled without finishing his studies, because, as he himself wrote in a report addressed to his superiors, "all this has already passed in battles."

By this time, taking into account the reduction of the armed forces, the educational institution was re-profiled for the training of personnel of the tactical level of management, turning into the combined arms Military Academy of the Red Army. The highest and senior command staff over the next fifteen years trained in various courses.

Young painters compensated for the gaps in education with the desire for knowledge and diligence in studies. As for the high-ranking order bearers, they were incurable in their militant ignorance. Here, for example, the red Cossack Dmitry Schmidt enters the academy:

"At the entrance exams, Schmidt was touchingly helpless ... Limping, with his huge saber at his side, he slowly approached the table.

"Name the years of the reign of Peter the Great," they asked him.

"I have no idea," he replied dryly.

Name the wars of Catherine II.

- I do not know them.

The generals looked at each other, and Martynov repeated the question:

- Give us the years of the reign of Catherine the Great and the year of her death.

— I was not in the world then, and it does not interest me.

... This blew up Martynov:

"Gentlemen, this is unacceptable!" I refuse to examine this candidate further.

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The commissar of the academy intervened, and this excellent cavalryman was admitted on the condition that he promise to take the exam later, when he had more time to study history, which practically meant never.

It's a pity that this "remarkable cavalryman" did not live to see 1941, he would certainly have kicked his tail [Judean].

There was little sense from studying at the Military Academy S.M. Budyonny, who "overturned the stereotyped theory of warfare". In general, it is difficult to imagine how one can immediately receive a higher military education at the age of 50, without having had any before. Yes, even without interruption from official duties "to introduce into the thick of the army the right views on ensuring the further growth of the cavalry" and cares for the "insemination of queens."

(Although it's not so difficult for us to imagine. Suppose today the commander of the Moscow Military District, three times Hero, with the rank of Colonel General, comes to the Academy to study.)

The wife of Marshal Yegorov spoke about the company that surrounded Semyon Mikhailovich:

"Comrades-in-arms in the Cavalry Army, veterans of campaigns during the [Civil War] gathered here: Apanasenko, Kosogov, Tyulenev, ShSchadenko, Timoshenko, Gorodovikov, Kulik. Dozens of times I heard retellings of each about personal valor and heroism in the field life. Vanity. A feigned pose, the desire to be in the public eye, jealousy for everything young that overtakes them were the characteristic features of this company.

Assistant Inspector of Cavalry B.K. Verkhovsky testified during interrogation:

"The system of servility was brought to the point that we not only allowed Marshal Budyonny to hit us in the face, but even exposed ourselves to the blows and then, as a sign of devotion, kissed his hands."

In the period from 1926 to 1933, a number of major Soviet military leaders went on a business trip to Germany to participate in Reichswehr maneuvers or study at the academy there. Among them were Tukhachevsky, Uborevich, Yakir, Feld

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mann, Egorov, Kork, Triandafillov, Alksnis, Eideman, Belov, Dybenko, Levandovsky, Dubovoy, Primakov and others - more than 150 people in all.

Those of them who wanted to learn, knew how to observe, thought about the coming war, managed to learn a lot from these trips.

"Looking closely at the Reichswehr," wrote the head of the Frunze Military Academy of the Republic of Poland in a report. Eideman in August 1928, we had the opportunity to make sure that we, perhaps without noticing it ourselves, already adopted quite a lot in the organization of classes, in matters of organizing combat and command and control from the Germans ... Not all, Of course, the Germans are perfect, but still the German army is an army that keeps in its command structure the best traditions of the world war...

The general orientation is toward mobile warfare. Struggle against manifestation of positional tendencies. From this basic course for maneuver warfare flow the requirements of tactics and technology, hence the emphasis on training a flexible command and control apparatus that quickly reacts to the situation (maneuvers are not so much for training troops as for the command and control apparatus), pressure on the technique of issuing orders and orders and command language.

On the contrary, the "honored revolutionary fighters" had a pleasant time abroad as well. Dybenko and Egorov used cognac for currency in company with the commander of the Caucasian army K.A. Avksentevsky. That is why TWICE the "academician" Pavel Efimovich never learned the "American" language, and Konstantin Alekseevich drank himself into a delirium tremens and out of habit tried to rape the landlady and all the servants in the house. The hero had to be packed and sent to Moscow at low speed.

The great strategist Tukhachevsky, who made a trip to Germany in 1932, did not find anything useful for himself and in his report addressed to Voroshilov gave an impartial assessment to the command of the German army:

"The leadership of the Reichswehr conceives the war in terms of the last, mobile period of the imperialist war. He is incapable of imagining new forms

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WE ARE battles arising from new weapons: aviation, tanks, automatic rifles and others."

These people developed military doctrine, mobilization and operational plans, ordered equipment and weapons, trained troops, and prepared the army for war.

To which? Yes, for the very one for which Marx-Lenin-Stalin tirelessly urged to prepare: for a war with the "backward" countries for the revolutionary falling away of the new countries from the system of imperialist states, for the rule of communism.

As A.A. Svechin, "strategy cannot exist in an airless space; it is doomed to pay for all the sins of politics." Even Frunze, laying the foundations of the Soviet military doctrine, demanded:

"Organize the work of military headquarters in such a way that the Red Army can fulfill its tasks in any operational direction and in any sector of a possible future front. The boundaries of this front are determined in the nearest future by the boundaries of the entire continent of the old world...

From this follows the need to educate our army in the spirit of the greatest activity, to prepare it for the completion of the tasks of the revolution through energetic, resolutely and boldly carried out offensive operations ...

Our command staff should be educated primarily on the ideas of maneuvering... This follows from the class nature of the workers' and peasants' army and at the same time coincides with the requirements of military art.

Discussing the nature of future wars, Mikhail Vasilyevich asserted with confidence that "they will approach our civil war in type. And if so, then in general, the methods of positional warfare will not be widely used.

The ideas of mobile warfare with extensive motorization on the ground and in the air were adopted. Soviet strategy initially focused on the fact that the new war would be world-wide; at the same time, "given the existence of two socially opposite systems, the coming world war was considered, first of all,

like a war of a coalition of capitalist countries against the Soviet Union". Therefore, military operations will require the participation of massive million-strong armies, the exertion of all economic forces and will be of a total character.

The war was planned as exclusively offensive, predatory, colonial. The war is not just for the sake of concluding a profitable peace by defeating the armed forces of the enemy, but for joining new lands and populations to the "brotherly family" of the Soviet peoples. The Communists, like the Nazis, constantly lacked "living space." That is why they were going to fight on foreign territory, or rather, for foreign territories:

"After occupation, each territory occupied by us is already Soviet territory, where the power of the workers and peasants will be exercised ... we, too, will expand into a socialist coalition when new socialist revolutions break out or when we have to occupy one or another area under the dominion of capital.

Tukhachevsky, the most "large-caliber" Red theorist, called this "the expansion of the socialist basis of war."

True, old professors like Svechin or Verkhovsky tried to raise the question of the advantages of a defensive course of action and even went so far as to assert that "it is necessary to be able to lose territory."

They did not understand the essence of "class strategy", and their views did not receive support. Only the "strategy of destruction" of capitalism made it possible to liberate the oppressed of all countries.

"We will not give up an inch of our land!" Stalin proclaimed, and you can't argue with him.

Since it was not possible to "crush" all the enemies at once, the theory of sequential operations was created. In 1923 Tukhachevsky wrote:

"A series of successively introduced annihilation operations, connected by continuous pursuit, can replace the annihilation battle, which was the best kind of engagement in former armies."

Thus, the following scheme was built: goals

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operations - crushing, complete destruction of the enemy's manpower; the method of action is a continuous offensive; the means is long-term operational pursuit, avoiding pauses and carried out by a series of successive operations, each of which is an intermediate link on the way to the final goal.

Soviet military thought recognized that the most effective way to conduct offensive operations was to strike the enemy with huge penetrating force throughout the entire depth of his formations. Delivering such strikes required concentrating on the chosen direction of the "all-destroying ram" - a mass of infantry, tanks, artillery in depth, supported by aviation, with simultaneous "aviation and combat" in the rear of the enemy and the use of chemical weapons.

After breaking through the defense, the "ram" makes a detour maneuver or pursues the enemy, "until he is backed up to some obstacle or to an area that he cannot leave." At the same time, "a counterattack to the enemy will be most beneficial to the victoriously advancing one, because it gives the latter the opportunity to break and destroy the enemy's counteroffensive."

Mikhail Nikolaevich did not draw any conclusions from the Polish campaign, when one short counterattack turned all his ram masses into an uncontrollable herd.

At the same time, the punitive commanders, the occupying commanders were convinced that the peoples of the USSR sang hymns from happiness, having such wise leaders as Stalin and henchmen, and such

outstanding military leaders like themselves, while the working people of all other countries groan under the yoke of oppressors and cannot wait for the Red Army to come. Therefore, it is worth starting a war, and the working class of the capitalist powers will stand in unison in defense of "their international socialist fatherland" and launch "an insurrectionary movement in the rear of our enemies"

"Moreover, we must not forget that in future clashes with the imperialist states, we will inevitably come across such a serious factor as social

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a listist labor movement in countries hostile to us..., prophesied Tukhachevsky in 1929. — In the course of the war, the position of the capitalist countries will worsen. The imperialist war will turn into a civil war.

In accordance with the "class strategy" beloved by Tukhachevsky, as the new regions were conquered by the Soviet troops, they would be steadily strengthened by the proletarians pouring into their ranks:

"The most profitable destruction (of a living armed force) is achieved by capturing the enemy, since, in addition to weakening the enemy army, prisoners economically strengthen the rear of the winner."

The idea of an active offensive method was reflected in the theory of a deep offensive operation developed in the Soviet Union. Its creators were V.K. Triandafilov, B.M. Shaposhnikov, K.B. Kalinovsky, A.N. Lapchinsky, V.D. Grendal and others. The theory provided for the simultaneous delivery of strikes to the enemy throughout the entire operational depth of his defense, for which it was meant to use the high combat capabilities of modern artillery, tank and mechanized troops, aviation and airborne formations.

The operation was carried out in order to solve two main problems. Firstly, to break open the front of the enemy defense with a strike of tanks, artillery, infantry and aviation to its entire tactical depth. Secondly, to develop tactical success into operational success by immediately introducing mobile troops into the breakthrough. It was recognized that the offensive operation is most fully developed on a frontal scale.

It was believed that for such an operation it was necessary to create at least a double superiority in forces and means over the enemy, to have at its disposal two or three shock and one or two conventional combined arms armies, a strong aviation group and a mobile group consisting of tank and mechanized formations. capable of developing success and independently holding important areas

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or objects in the operational depth of the enemy. The leading role in the front-line operation was assigned to the shock armies.

The depth of the front-line operation reached 250 km, and the width of the offensive zone was 150-300 km. The pace of infantry advance was envisaged at 10-15 km, and for mobile troops - 40-50 km per day. To ensure high rates of advance and ensure the ultimate goals of the operation, the troops of the front were built in two echelons. The tanks, supported by massed air strikes and parachute landings, had to break through the defenses and strike to a depth of 100-120 km. Combined-arms armies, which made up the second echelon, expanded the breakthrough and consolidated the success achieved. The frontal strike was supposed to develop into an operation to encircle and destroy the defending enemy.

The tactics of deep offensive combat were also developed. Its essence was the simultaneous massive use of troops and equipment to attack the entire depth of the combat

order of the enemy in order to encircle and destroy him.

Simultaneous suppression of the entire depth of the enemy defense was achieved by the continuous impact of aviation on the reserves and rear of the defending troops, the decisive advance of long-range tanks, the unstoppable advance of infantry with close support tanks, as well as the swift actions of mechanized and cavalry formations behind enemy lines.

Soviet military thought shrewdly assigned a special place to tank troops.

"Quickly and boldly penetrating into the depths of the enemy's marching formations, tanks along the way (without getting involved in a long battle) shoot down enemy reconnaissance and security forces, overturn batteries that had time to turn around in firing positions, introduce general disorder into the ranks of the deploying enemy, sow panic and disrupt the organization and control of the troops deployed for battle... A deep attack of tanks is carried out with all possible swiftness, A. Gromychenko taught in "Essays on the tactics of tank units."

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At the same time, in the first place was put "the need for deep tank operations across the entire location of the deploying enemy in order to paralyze his attempts to attack, snatch the initiative and prevent the organized deployment of his main forces."

From this it follows that the blow must be struck suddenly, at the enemy who did not have time to turn around.

The theory of deep operation attached great importance to gaining air supremacy in the initial period of hostilities. Since the "correct conclusion" was made that modern wars "will start suddenly, without a formal declaration of war," it was planned to achieve air supremacy by surprise attacks on enemy airfields. Accordingly, priority in the construction of the Air Force was given to medium-range front-line bombers and attack aircraft.

In February 1933, the Red Army received an official guide to action - "Temporary instructions for the organization of a deep battle."

Defensive actions in the operational-strategic plan were not considered even theoretically. According to Isserson, the defensive actions of the troops were developed only at the tactical level - the defense of the regiment, division, corps as part of a general strategic offensive. Talking about operational defense on an army scale "was somehow considered indecent and almost contradicted our offensive doctrine." Such a maneuver as a systematic retreat to previously prepared positions on the scale of a front or an army was considered harmful and simply impossible. Former Commander-in-Chief S.S. Kamenev stated:

"Planned retreat as such should not take place. The army, not to mention larger military formations, should, in the event of an unsuccessful course of the operation, make a more complex and more meaningful maneuver in terms of its final achievements, having as its task a counterattack with a transition to a decisive counteroffensive.

The idea of an active offensive method of warfare

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was reflected in all pre-war charters, as well as in the plans for operational-strategic games and exercises. These provisions were reflected in the Field Manual of 1936, developed under the direct supervision of Tukhachevsky and Egorov:

"Any attack on the socialist state of the workers and peasants will be repulsed with all the might of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union with the transfer of hostilities to the territory

attacked enemy. Combat operations will be conducted for destruction. Achieving a decisive victory and the complete crushing of the enemy is the main goal in the war imposed on the Soviet Union.

In accordance with the main provisions of the military doctrine, military construction was carried out.

During the period of rapid technical re-equipment and reorganization of the Red Army, Tukhachevsky got the opportunity to put his theories into practice. Even when he was the commander of the troops of the Leningrad District, in January 1930, Mikhail Nikolayevich submitted a note to the people's commissar, in which, in order to achieve victory in a future war, he proposed to significantly increase the size of the wartime army (up to 260 divisions) and the number of military equipment. nicknames; to create his favorite "ram masses", he requested 50 thousand tanks, and 40 thousand aircraft to them (in accordance with the program adopted by the Politburo, by the end of the first five-year plan it was planned to have 5500 tanks and 3500 aircraft).

Voroshilov, trying not to have his own opinion, gave the letter to Stalin along with the negative conclusion of the Headquarters of the Red Army. Iosif Vissarionovich, preoccupied with economic problems, twisted his finger at his temple and called Tukhachevsky's plan "clerical maximalism" capable of ruining the entire national economy, which Kliment Efremovich rejoiced a lot. However, in reality, Stalin was very sympathetic to the idea of "militaryization of the country", simply commensurate it with economic opportunities.

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The robbery of the countryside made it possible to acquire "big capital", and the first successes of accelerated industrialization were indicated. Already at the beginning of 1931, the program for the construction of the Red Army was revised in the direction of increasing the personnel and saturation of the troops with modern weapons (the estimate of the People's Commissariat of Defense, in comparison with the "pre-turning" 1928, increased by more than 10 times).

In July, Tukhachevsky was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and Chief of Armaments. Starting from 1932, "tractor" and "locomotive" factories have already produced more than three thousand tanks a year, about the same number of aircraft were produced by our "furniture factories".

Since 1933, the Headquarters of the Red Army planned its activities on "establishing in wartime such a scale of deployment in which the Red Army would be able to fight against any coalition of world capitalist powers and inflict a decisive defeat on the armies of these powers" and on "securing for the Red Army the first places in the world in all decisive types of means of struggle. The resolution of the Council of Labor and Defense of August 13 stated that the country "has created a production base for tank building, which already ensures the production of 11,000 tanks a year."

The 1934 mobilization plan provided for the deployment of armed forces numbering 4.8 million people (including 149 infantry and 22 cavalry formations of the first stage); the number of tanks in service was to be 9,000. The new mobplan (M-8), approved at the end of 1937, provided for an increase in the mobilized forces to 8.6 million people (including 6.4 million people in priority formations). The Red Army was the first in the world to start forming mechanized brigades and corps, aviation armies and airborne forces.

Of course, Tukhachevsky did not create a fundamentally new strategy, but he was interested in new trends in military theory, responded vividly to them, tried to introduce them into

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troops the most advanced technology. Together with Uborevich, he made a great contribution to the construction of a modern army. Of course, certain mistakes were made, so it's okay to start

had to be almost from scratch.

Mikhail Nikolayevich himself had a penchant for megalomania and was fond of all sorts of "military fashions" and technical innovations: universal guns and recoilless guns, polygonal shells and rockets, radio-controlled boats, tanks, aircraft, torpedoes. Quite exotic projects were also generously funded, such as an electromagnetic installation deflecting enemy projectiles, "death rays" or "underground

tanks."

But, firstly, not all of these developments were completely useless, for example, radar installations or radio-controlled landmines. Secondly, if Tukhachevsky alone is to blame for all the mistakes in military development, what was the cost of all the other leaders and commanders, in particular the people's commissar of defense, the heads of the Artillery, Armored and other departments?

Not in vain, and outside the country, the marshal was considered the most outstanding of all the leaders of the Red Army, and in the event of war, it was he who was seen at the head of the Soviet troops in the Western Theater.

The heroes of the Civil War, depending on under whose command they happened to perform their "legendary feats", were divided into peculiar clans - "cavalrymen", "chervonets", "infantrymen", "kotovtsev", "chapaevtsy". Each of them ascribed to himself an exclusive role in the victorious occupation of his own country and enthusiastically intrigued against competitors in the struggle for influence, positions, recognition of merit.

The most powerful grouping was made up of veterans of the First Cavalry Army. Comrade Stalin himself stood at the origins of its creation. He carefully selected, placed and protected "his cadres" both during the war years and during the period of the radical reduction of the Red Army, and contributed to their promotion to leading positions. These people were his reliable support.

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swarm during the period of the struggle with Trotsky, and they did not have the slightest desire to let strangers to the commanding heights. S.M. began their careers in the First Cavalry. Budyonny and B.M. Shaposhnikov, A.I. Egorov and G.I. Kulik, S.K. Timoshenko and I.R. Apanasenko, E.A. Shadenko and A.V. Khrulev, I.V. Tyulenev and A.A. Grechko.

The Red Cossacks, who formed the core of the military opposition, were relegated to secondary roles in the course of the struggle against Trotskyism, considered themselves offended—there was little power, few honors, few privileges—and desperately fronded.

The "infantrymen", although they were not such dashing grunts, and there were much fewer opportunities to distinguish themselves in the maneuverable Civil War, but they represented a more educated and thinking part of the command staff - Tukhachevsky, Kamenev, Uborevich, Kork, Yakir, Eideman. Among them were many officers of the tsarist army. They called the grouping of Budyonny, Belov, Yegorov and Timoshenko "routiners who do not understand modern military affairs enough", and insultingly called Kulik a "fireworker".

In turn, Voroshilov and Budyonny could not stand the "handsome nobleman" Tukhachevsky; It was on their initiative that in May 1928 Mikhail Nikolayevich was dismissed from the post of Chief of Staff of the Red Army and sent to command the Leningrad District. A nobleman, a wise guy, writes little articles, plays the violin, hobnobs with foreigners, and besides, he is Trotsky's nominee.

Stalin, having begun to form his team for the future Great War, took the side of the closer, proven and understandable to him cavalrymen. All other major military leaders, primarily those who enjoy authority in the troops, demonstrate independent thinking, dare to "have their own opinion", are simply "doubtful", were subject to liquidation,

according to the principle formulated by the ancient Greek tyrants: "No man - no problem."

For the NKVD, after the experience of conducting the Moscow political trials, it is difficult to "blind" one more case.

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they did not represent. All Trotsky's nominees, especially those who voted for him during the discussions of the 1920s, had long ago been filed with special folders, where every denunciation and every wrong word was neatly filed.

In the course of the investigation into the case of Kamenev and Zinoviev, the Chekists far-sightedly prepared dirt on the military with a "dubious political face." For example, participants in the "Parallel Trotskyist Center", the director of the Chamber Theater, Richard Pikel, and the deputy director of the Magnezit plant, Efim Dreitser, said that they allegedly united all the military who remained loyal to Trotsky into a single underground organization whose tasks were to kill Stalin and Voroshilov and carrying out a coup d'état in favor of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev. A lot of useful materials could be dug up from the facts of the old connections of the highest Soviet military leaders with the Reichswehr.

Actually, the case of the military-fascist conspiracy in the Red Army was already ready, it remained to knock out confessions from the conspirators and testimonies against other members of the organization.

The first to arrest in August 1936 were commanders V.M. Primakov and V.K. Putnu. They were charged with participation in a certain Trotskyist-Zinoviev "fighting group".

Primakov Vitaly Markovich was born in 1897. As a high school student, at the height of the First World War, he distributed anti-war leaflets among the soldiers of the Chernigov garrison, for which he was exiled to Eastern Siberia in the summer of 1915. After the fall of the monarchy, he returned to his homeland "for a serviced revolutionary", joined the Kiev Committee of the Bolsheviks and was elected a delegate to the 2nd All-Russian Congress of Soviets. In Petrograd, he was at the right time in the right place. In October 1917, Primakov commanded one of the detachments of the Red Guard during the capture of the Winter Palace and the liquidation of the Kerensky-Krasnov rebellion.

In January 1918, he formed a regiment of the Red Cossacks, which turned into a brigade, then into a division, then into the 1st Cavalry Corps. Fought in Ukraine with petliurs

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tsami, Germans, Denikin, Wrangel, Polish legionnaires and Makhnovists; in Central Asia, the Basmachi were pacified. They broke everyone. Having no military experience and military education, the half-educated schoolboy Primakov showed in battles "skillful command" and "personal heroism", marked by three orders of the Red Banner.

True, he was sometimes too cool and even landed on trial by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee for unauthorized executions of his own Red Army soldiers. And God bless them - People's Commissar Trotsky personally introduced decimations in the Red Army, and the political committee of the 46th Infantry Division, Mekhlis, practiced ramrod executions. But this time it was not in a combat situation and not in Central Asia, but near Shepetovka in the peaceful autumn of 1922. But Vitaly Markovich still couldn't stop. The prosecutor's check found out that the outrageous reprisals in the Red Corps are an everyday matter, a way to strengthen discipline. But everything worked out: the 25-year-old "red ataman", taking into account his revolutionary merits, was not judged, but sent to study at the Higher Cavalry School command staff.

From the summer of 1924, Primakov was in charge of the Higher Cavalry School, in 1925 he went to China, then commanded the 1st Rifle Corps. Belonged to the Trotskyist military

opposition, therefore, in 1927-1933, he served as military attaché in Afghanistan and Japan. Thinking for a moment, Vitaly Markovich "honestly, without double-dealing, without deceit" wrote a statement about the departure from Trotskyism.

He returned to military work, was commander of the 13th corps in the Volga district, assistant commander of the North Caucasian district, inspector of higher educational institutions of the Red Army, in 1931 he visited Germany.

In his spare time, he wrote memoirs about the glorious Red Cossacks and their heroic commander, poems about the wonderful life in the Soviet country, and fantasies about the "global conflagration". He was not fond of military theoretical research. In 1935, Vitaly Markovich was promoted to the rank of commander and appointed to the post of deputy commander of the Leningrad Military District. This attitude towards himself

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He considered it unfair and, as a sign of protest, instead of three Komkorov rhombuses, he wore the insignia of the commander of the 2nd rank.

Primakov was arrested on August 14, 1936.

Putna Vitovt Kazimirovich was born in 1893. From peasants. In the tsarist army, by 1917, he had risen to the rank of accelerated ensign, commanded a battalion, in which, of course, he "conducted revolutionary propaganda." He graduated from the Civil War as the head of the 27th Omsk Rifle Division. He fought on the Eastern Front against Kolchak and on the Western Front with the "White Poles", he earned two Orders of the Red Banner.

The third order was awarded "for exceptional military prowess and courage shown during the liquidation of the Kronstadt rebellion." Participated in battles with "bandits" on the Lower Volga.

In 1923 he graduated from the Higher Courses of Command Staff. In 1924-1925 he was an adviser in China. Then he headed the Department of Military Educational Institutions of the Red Army. In 1927, Vitovt Kazimirovich was appointed commander of the 2nd Rifle Corps, but in the same year he left for Japan as a military attaché, and from there to Finland. The service career was affected by participation in the Trotskyist opposition.

Immediately repented. In 1931-1934 he commanded a corps and the Primorsky Group of Forces of the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army. In July 1934, Putna was sent as a military attache to England. In August 1936, he was recalled to Moscow for an urgent report to the People's Commissar of Defense and arrested upon arrival.

In September, commander S.A. was put into circulation. Turovsky, deputy commander of the troops of the Kharkov district (comrade-in-arms of Primakov, former chief of staff of the Red Cossacks), division commander D.A. Schmidt, commander of the 8th mechanized brigade (also a red Cossack and an active Trotskyist, also considered himself undeservedly offended), commander Yu.V. Sablin, commandant of the Letichevsky fortified area (former Left Social Revolutionary, one of the organizations

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jams of the rebellion in July 1918), brigade commander M.Yu. Zyuk - commander of the 25th Chapaev division, Colonel I.L. Karpel, Chief of Staff of the 66th Infantry Division, Major B.I. Kuzmichev, chief of staff of the 18th aviation brigade (once he voted for Trotsky and was considered unreliable for a long time).

On the tenth day of continuous interrogations, twice the order-bearer Kuzmichev signed a testimony that in 1935, together with other Trotskyist agents, he participated in the preparation of an unsuccessful attempt on the life of Voroshilov during his visit to the Kiev Opera. The story invented by the Chekists was clearly based on the assassination of Prime Minister Stolypin. But on

"First Marshal" she made a terrific impression. So, indeed, all these Tukhachevskys and Yakirs are not just bastards and intriguers, but natural enemies!

Commander D.A. Schmidt, "a man of desperate courage," in 1927 publicly threatened to cut off Comrade Stalin's ears, but, once in a prison cell, he blasphemed for many years: "... with all my blood, with all my thoughts, I belong and are given only to the cause of the party, the cause of Stalin." Nevertheless, a month later he confessed that he was plotting to kill Voroshilov, and then the General Secretary himself—a dastardly double-dealer!

Primakov, Turovsky, and Putna did not at first realize their position and showed no inclination to cooperate with the "organs of Comrade Yagoda." The most they were willing to repent of was the fact that they did not love Voroshilov and Budyonny, LIS spoke hostilely about them.

The fact of the "non-consciousness of the defendants", together with a number of blunders in the destruction of the "Trotskyite Zinoviev center", further confirmed Stalin in the opinion that Genrikh Grigoryevich Yagoda (1891-1938) "turned out to be not up to the mark of his task" and in the need to seriously engage in "treatment of the KGB unit."

In the autumn of 1936, Yagoda was replaced as the main punisher of the country by the "iron commissar" Nikolai Yezhov, and soft-bodied interrogators in April 1937 were replaced by shock investigators A.A. Avseevich and 3.M. Ushakov. Already at the beginning of May, commanders

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"split" and signed protocols on their participation in the conspiracy, naming the names of sixty accomplices, including Tukhachevsky, Dybenko, Gamarnik, Kamenev and the "deeply conspiratorial Trotskyist" Yakir.

"Avseevich's work was held up by the leadership of the Special Department as an example to other investigators. After that, Avseevich became a standard in working with those arrested," recalled one of his colleagues.

Approximately on the same days, the former Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs G.E. Prokofiev and former head of the special department M.I. Guy, arrested as part of the purge of the vigilant department, gave the necessary evidence about the "criminal connections" of Tukhachevsky, Uborevich, Kork, Eideman, Shaposhnikov and other military leaders with the vile poisoner Yagoda, who at night sprayed the offices of loyal Leninists with some then with a terrible mercury poison and managed to kill Maxim Gorky, Vyacheslav Menzhinsky and Valerian Kuibyshev in such a villainous way.

A new wave of arrests followed. In April, the head of the department of organization and mobilization of the Academy of the General Staff, commander M.I. Alafuso; in early May - a member of the Military Council of the North Caucasus Military District, an army commissar of the 2nd rank of the GI. Veklichev and the commander of the Ural Military District three times hero [of the civil war commander B.S. Gorbachev, who also flaunted the commander's buttonholes (and in the neighboring cells of the Lefortovo prison for a month and a half the previous command of the district was sitting: commander I.I. Garkavy and his deputy commander M.I. Vasilenko).

Chekists worked briskly, cheerfully, according to the methodology developed by the masters of the Investigative Order and the Secret Office: "To begin with, the subject must be astonished." First of all, the insignia, orders were torn off the legendary commanders and brigade commanders and punched in the face. Regimental Commissar P.P. The investigator immediately explained to Lyubtsev: "Now you are not a commissar, but shit, if you want, you will kiss my ass, holding on to the investigator's pants, everything depends on us."

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On May 12, they took the commander of the 2nd rank A.I. Crust. He broke down on the second day of interrogation and wrote a statement addressed to Yezhov: yes, there is a plan to carry out a palace coup, created

operational headquarters consisting of Tukhachevsky, Putna, Uborevich, Eideman and August Ivanovich himself.

On May 15, a friend of Tukhachevsky, commander B.M., was arrested. Feldman, who had been appointed deputy commander of the troops of the Moscow Military District just a few weeks earlier, and deputy commander of the Transcaucasian District, commander I.K. Kutyakov. Two days later, commander of the Air Force of the Far Eastern Army commander A.Ya. Lapinsh and the head of the armored forces of the OKDVA divisional commander S.I. Dereventsov.

Feldman Boris Mironovich was drafted into the tsarist army in 1913. In May 1918 he joined the Red Army. He graduated from the civil division as head of the 55th rifle division. Since 1926 - Chief of Staff of the Leningrad Military District. In 1927 he went to study in Germany. Since 1934, Feldman was the head of the Directorate for the Commanding Staff of the Red Army.

Feldman, to whom the Chekists had no evidence, immediately demonstrated a desire for cooperation, "honestly admitted" that he was a participant in the military Trotskyist conspiracy, a seasoned spy recruited by Tukhachevsky in early 1932, called other members of the underground organization - Chief of Staff of the Transcaucasian Military District Savitsky, Head of the Engineering Academy Smolin, Deputy Head of the Armored Directorate Divisional Commander M.M. Olshansky - more than 40 commanders and political workers.

After Yezhov's report on the success of the investigation, the Leader gave sanction for the arrest of the main defendants. On May 21, they took the head of the Department - Combat TRAINING commander K.A. Tchaikovsky. On May 22, a commander of the Republic of Poland was pulled out of the presidium of the All-Moscow Party Conference. Eideman, comrade-in-arms of Primakov and Uborevich.

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Eideman Robert Petrovich was born in 1895, graduated from a real school, in 1916 - an accelerated course at the Kiev Infantry School, served as an ensign in a reserve regiment in Kansk, after the overthrow of the monarchy he played with fiery speeches in the Council of Soldiers' Deputies, like a true revolutionary, stubbornly avoiding being sent to the front.

In the Civil, he commanded divisions on the Eastern and Southern fronts, the 13th Army, the Right-Bank Group of Forces of the South-Western Front, which defended the Kakhovka bridgehead.

In 1921, as the head of the internal troops, he "directly" led the fight against "kulak-nationalist gangs" in Ukraine; in 1924-1925 - by the troops of the Siberian Military District. In 1925-1932 he was the head and commissar of the Frunze Military Academy.

In 1927-1928 he studied the experience of the Reichswehr, attended the course of the Higher Military Academy of the General Staff in Berlin "without interruption from his direct work."

For the last five years before his arrest, he headed the Central Council of Osoaviakhim. In addition, Eideman was a writer AND A POET.

"In his works, Robert Petrovich sang of the party, Lenin, the socialist revolution, the heroism and valor of Soviet soldiers in the Civil War." It turned out stilted, but with beauty. Like that:

We don't know rest, we don't know peace...

From hot thoughts we burn like torches.

Where we demolish the old, there the new grows. Another will fall on the way, but we are moving forward... In typhus, we burned, but did not burn.

We were warriors - we became stronger.

We are strong. Iron and granite.

("Bolsheviks")

Therefore, Eideman, "a talented military leader and devoted fighter of the Great Revolution," was also a member of the Writers' Union and the chairman of its Latvian section, where he nurtured poets to match. Just sing tova

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He did not guess Stalin's face and in his youth he managed to visit a member of the Maximalist Socialist-Revolutionary Party. When in 1929 Voroshilov's pamphlet "Stalin and the Red Army" was published and it became clear to everyone who was the organizer of all the victories and the defeat of Denikin, including, Robert Petrovich responded with the article "The Battle of Oryol" with a passage about Lenin's brilliant head, in which "politics and strategy, as it were, found their complete harmonious combination", but again, he did not remember anything about Stalin's genius.

On the same day, the head of military communications of the Red Army, commander E.F. Appogu and the head of the Artillery Directorate, commander N.A. Efimov. The latter testified against his assistant brigade commander Ya.M. Zheleznyakov and 25 other subordinates whom he managed to "recruit". Komkor Lapinysh spoke about the conspiratorial activities of Tukhachevsky, Gamarnik, Putna, Primakov and Meretskov. In the next office, helping the investigation, dictated the list of accomplices "patented German spy" iron granite Eideman.

Finally, on May 22, 1937, Tukhachevsky was arrested in Kuibyshev, who had been transferred from the post of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense to the post of commander of the Volga Military District. The marshal was interrogated by Yezhov himself, and Mikhail Nikolayevich, after one day of arguing, signed a confession that he was at the head of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist-right conspiratorial bloc and was spying for Germany. Yagoda, Feldman, Alafuso, Primakov, Putna, Eideman, Yakir, Kamenev, Uborevich, Kork, Gamarnik, Osepyan and many others took part in the conspiracy. Tukhachevsky also named the names of the former cavalymen Timoshenko and Apanasenko.

And the details? Yes, please: the commanders of the border districts, in collusion with Sablin, were going to surrender the Letiche fortified area to the Germans. Uborevich created a partisan network and prepared sabotage groups, also on the instructions of the Germans. Kamenev "on his own line" developed measures aimed at disorganizing the air defense of the railways in

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BVO and KVO, and thereby disrupt the strategic concentration of the Red Army. Tukhachevsky himself, knowing that there were not enough forces in the Western theater of operations, did not change the operational plan: "As a result of this, defeat is not excluded even without the presence of any sabotage."

A week later, the army commanders of the 1st rank Yakir and Uborevich, the commander of the 4th Cossack corps commander I.D. were withdrawn from their districts. Kosogov. They also gave confessions. Simultaneously with Voroshilov's parting words: "Take all the scoundrels," the purge of the Artillery Directorate began.

On May 30, the head of foreign relations of the headquarters of the Red Army, Commander A.I., was arrested. Gekker and Deputy Head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army Army Commissar of the 2nd rank G.A. Osepyan. On the same day, the Politburo decided to expel comrades Gamarnik and Aronshtam from the Revolutionary Military Council and remove them from military work. On May 31, the country's chief commissar, "entangled in his connections with anti-Soviet elements,"

shot himself. Head of the Political Administration of the OKDVA Army Commissar of the 2nd Rank L.N. Aronshtam did not want to shoot himself and was arrested. | June, having invited him to Moscow for a party conference, they took Blucher's deputy commander M.V. Sangursky.

After the first wave of arrests, Stalin and Voroshilov decided to hold an expanded meeting of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and explain the situation to the military. The meeting took place with | to June 4, 1937 in the Sverdlovsk Hall of the Kremlin.

First, the participants were introduced to the testimonies of the arrested military leaders. Then Kliment Efremovich read out the report "On the counter-revolutionary conspiracy in the Red Army uncovered by the NKVD bodies". The ultimate goal of the conspiracy was the assassination of "the leaders of the party and government", the liquidation of the Soviet Union and "the restoration of the yoke of the landlords and capitalists."

Stalin spoke on the second day of the meeting. He confirmed that there was a "military-political conspiracy about

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against the Soviet government, stimulated and financed by the German fascists", and in simple understandable language told how easily the red commanders are recruited by all kinds of intelligence services and foreign centers - "on the basis of the women's unit" and unsatisfied ambition. How was it not to believe the Leader and Teacher, because "there are so many testimonies of the criminals themselves".

The military elite of the country surrendered their colleagues without hesitation. 42 military leaders spoke at the meeting. All of them branded the gang of arrested enemies with shame, called scoundrels and fascists, some demanded that they be shot immediately. All the speakers, with the exception of eight people, soon turned out to be "enemies and spies of foreign intelligence services" themselves.

Comrade Stalin was a man of justice and respect for order. He believed that no matter how bad the conspirators were, they must first be convicted, and only then shot. It was decided to bring to trial the main "leaders of the traitorous gang"—Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Kork, Uborevich, Eideman, Feldman, Primakov, Putna.

On June 10, an extraordinary plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR determined the composition of the Special Judicial Presence, chaired by the 2nd rank military lawyer V.V. Ulrich. The military leaders of the highest rank were appointed as judges: marshals S.M. Budyonny and V.K. Blucher, commanders of the 1st rank B.M. Shaposhnikov and I.P. Belova, commander of the 2nd rank Ya.I. Alksnis, P.E. Dybenko, N.D. Kashirin, division commander E.I. Goryachev.

The valiant Chekists, meanwhile, were forging iron until it cooled down. On the very eve of the trial, the leader of the Red Cossacks, Primakov, with the help of the indefatigable head of the special department, I.M. Leplevsky, composed testimony against army commanders Kashirin, Dybenko, Shaposhnikov, commanders Kuibyshev, Gryaznov, Uritsky, Kovalev, Vasiliev and others.

The closed trial in the case of the "Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Military Organization" began on June 11, 1937 and ended on June 11 of the same year. Judges in interrogations show

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whether enviable activity. The defendants convicted each other of atrocities, all pleaded guilty, repented, confessed their love for the party and the leader of the peoples, Stalin, and were sentenced to "the highest measure of repression" with deprivation of military ranks and confiscation of property. They were shot right there, in the basement, on the night of June 12th.

Commander Belov outlined his impressions in a memorandum:

"... The eyes of this entire gang did not express anything that could be used to judge the bottomless meanness of those sitting in the dock. The seal of death was already on all faces... Tukhachevsky tried to preserve his "aristocratism" and his superiority over others...

Feldman tried to strike at complete frankness. He reproached his colleagues in the process that, as college girls, they were afraid to call a spade a spade, they were engaged in the most ordinary espionage, but here they want to turn it into legal communication with foreign officers.

Eideman. This guy looked more pitiful than everyone else. The figure softened, he could hardly stand on his feet, he did not speak, but babbled in a dull, spasmodic voice.

The bottomless meanness of Belov himself, as well as other members of the presence, also could not be distinguished by the eyes, but the stamp of death already lay on their faces. You shoot, they shoot you.

Other "treacherous carrion" from the gang of Tukhachevsky - commanders Alafuzo, Garkavy, Gorbachev, Gryaznov, Kuttyakov, Vasilenko and others - were wiped off the face of the earth in July 1937.

Everything was done for the benefit of the people, in the name of the people and with the blessing of the people. At numerous rallies that swept across the country, mechanics and tractor drivers, milkmaids and peasant women, housewives and cultural figures branded vile traitors, tearing themselves up in hysterics: "Shoot! Like rabid dogs!" Repression extended to wives and children convicted by the most humane court in the world. Family members of enemies of the people were arrested, sentenced to seven or eight years, and sent to camps. Children go to special orphanages.

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"What do women and children have to do with it?" Felix Chuev once asked Vyacheslav Molotov. "What do you mean by what? - the old ghoul was indignant. They must be isolated to some extent. And so, of course, they would be the distributors of all sorts of complaints... And decomposition to a certain extent."

To be sure, so that they would not complain and disintegrate, they were also shot later, for example, the wife of Tukhachevsky, Uborevich, Gamarnik.

Towards the end of the glorious meeting of the Military Council, Stalin invited all military personnel to join the process of exposing the enemies:

"I think that among our people, both on the command line and on the political line, there are still such comrades who are accidentally offended. They told him something, they wanted to involve him, they frightened him, they took him by blackmail. It's good to introduce such a practice that if such people come and say everything themselves, forgive them."

The joint order of Voroshilov and Yezhov No. 082 "On the release from liability of military personnel, members of counter-revolutionary and wrecking fascist organizations who repented of their crimes, voluntarily appeared and spoke openly about everything completely openly and about their accomplices" went to the troops. .

Of course, no one showed up voluntarily. But such appeals could not but arouse in the Soviet people, for twenty years already accustomed to scribbling denunciations, literally an explosion of enthusiasm. Statistics show that more than 90% of the arrests in 1937-1938 were initiated from below. This is the creativity of the masses that Lenin dreamed of.

Already nine days after the trial of Tukhachevsky, 980 commanders and political workers were arrested as participants in a military conspiracy, including 29 brigade commanders, 37 divisional commanders, 21 commanders, 16 regimental commissars, 7 brigade and 7 divisional commissars. Total with | April to June 10, 1937, 4370 people were fired from the Red Army for political reasons.

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On June 19, the head of the Political Directorate of the Kiev Military District, Army Commissar of the 2nd rank M.P. was arrested. Amelina; July 31 - Army Commissar of the 2nd rank B.M. Ippo, a member of the SAWO Military Council; August 3 - Head of the Air Force of the Kyiv District Divisional Commander A.M. Bakhrushin; August 9 - Deputy Amelin Corps Commissar M.L. Good.

On July 10, 1937, "Tukhachevsky's comrade-in-arms" was arrested. According to the conspiracy, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for the Naval Forces, flagship of the fleet of the 1st rank V.M. Orlov. In addition, in May, Vladimir Mitrofanovich went to Great Britain for the coronation of George W. There, naturally, British intelligence recruited him on the fly. Orlov almost immediately recognized himself as a conspirator, but denied participation "in terrorist and sabotage work."

Zyama Ushakov, already familiar to us, persistently urged the flagship to completely disarm before the party. A week after his arrest, Orlov wrote a statement addressed to Yezhov:

"I am on the verge of insanity. In a short time I will be, as Jimmy Higgins was, a mindless dog. But this can only be in a capitalist country and cannot be in our country."

Lies! Everything is the best in the Soviet country. Even "Papa Muller" was jealous that he did not have such specialists as Kolya Yezhov had.

Stalin, struck by the scale of the conspiracy, demanded the continuation of the purge in the armed forces. The understanding People's Commissar of Internal Affairs gave a targeted instruction: "A fascist military conspiracy must have a number of branches." They tried locally and found "branches" everywhere. The case was put on stream: denunciation - interrogation - twenty minutes for trial - execution. A member of the "Special Commission for the Elimination of the Consequences of Wrecking in the Troops of the Kiev Military District," Yefim Shchadenko, in full parka, drew a letter to his wife:

"July 18, 1937 ... There is so much work that I don't get out of the headquarters before 2-3 in the morning. The wrecking bastard has been spoiling for years, and we need it in weeks, a maximum of a month,

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not only to eliminate all the consequences, but also to move forward quickly..."

Almost everyone agreed. With regard to "obvious and undisarmed enemies of the people" who brazenly refuse to extradite the conspirators, the "method of physical influence" was successfully applied.

"It is known that all bourgeois intelligence services use physical force against representatives of the proletariat," Stalin explained. "The question is: why should socialist intelligence be more humane towards the sworn enemies of the working class?"

As a result, under the slogan "You can beat anyone and in any way", all
military leaders.

On August 5, 1937, Deputy Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army M.K. Aleksandrovsky testified against a whole group of enemies, including commanders Kashirin and Dubovoy. On August 7, Commander M.Ya., Deputy Commander of the Leningrad District, was arrested. Germanovich, 9th - commander of the 1st cavalry corps division commander M.A. Demichev, on the 10th - army inspector of the Belarusian Military District commander E.I. Kovtyukh, August 18 - for the substitute for Yakir, commander D.S. Fesenko.

After the trial of Tukhachevsky, Nikolai Kashirin was transferred to Moscow for promotion. In July 1937, he headed the Combat Training Department of the Red Army, and on August 19, with the personal sanction of the Leader, he was already arrested. Three days later, he admitted his participation in the "right-wing Trotskyist conspiracy", which carried out subversive work in contact with Tukhachevsky's military conspiracy. Testimony against Marshal Yegorov was knocked out of Kashirin:

"A group has formed around Marshal Yegorov Alexander Ilyich. This grouping was a military group of the right, a special military center, and conducted its counter-revolutionary activities simultaneously with the group headed by Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Gamarnik and others.

Kashirin named Budyonny, Belov, Dybenko, Khalepsky and others among the members of the "right group".

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The commander was shot on June 14, 1938. Two of his brothers were also shot.

On August 15, Commander J.P., Commander of the Urals District, was arrested. Gailit, military adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of the Mongolian People's Army, commander L.Ya. Vainer, Commander of the Central Asian Military District Corps Commander I.K. Gryaznov.

The latter in Central Asia led only two months. And before that, Gryaznov commanded the Trans-Baikal Military District for almost five years, where, as it turned out after careful questioning in the Lefortovo prison, he led a fascist military organization, worked for Japanese intelligence and trained a terrorist group to kill the leaders of the country.

The field session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court has urgently left for Transbaikalia. Only on October 2, 1938, she sentenced twenty commanders of district units and headquarters to death. The commander of the 15th Cavalry Division K.K. Rokossovsky, but he managed to transfer to the Leningrad district, and the punishing hand of the Soviet law overtook the divisional commander already there.

2] August, the commander of the troops of the Kharkov military district, commander of the 2nd rank I.N. Oak. He also named a number of people who were in the conspiracy, and even remembered how he shot the people's hero Shchors in 1919 in order to get command of a division. According to Dubovoy's testimony, 18 people were taken, first of all his deputies, however, this did not save the commander himself from execution.

Only Epifan Kovtyukh, who served as the prototype of the protagonist in A. Serafimovich's novel "The Iron Stream", courageously endured the torture and completely denied all the accusations.

On August 30, a member of the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet, army commissar of the 2nd rank G.I. Gugin, September 9 - Head of the Political Directorate of the KhVO, Army Commissar of the 2nd rank S.N. Kozhevnikov, October 5 — Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, flagship of the fleet of the 2nd rank

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I.K. Kozhanov and the head of the UVVUZ of the Red Army, army commissar of the 2nd rank I.E. Slavin.

Army Commissar of the 2nd rank A.S. Bulin, the head of the Command Staff Department, was arrested on November 5, 1937. He turned out to be the most dangerous conspirator. The circular letter of the Main Military Council of the Red Army stated:

"The enemy leadership of the PUR selected and placed their own people, hostile to our party, in leading positions in the Red Army. [the Amarnik-Bulin gang wiped out tens of thousands of commanders and political workers, capable and infinitely loyal to the party of Lenin-Stalin."

During interrogations, Bulin also recalled the participation of Commander Belov in the conspiracy.

On the same day (November 5), the editor-in-chief of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, army commissar 2nd rank M.M., was arrested. Landa. Mikhail Markovich did not lock himself up for a long time: already five days later, on Stalin's desk, there was a list of 90 people, leading political workers of the Red Army, who were part of the military conspiracy. Landa handed over all the employees of his

editorial staff, a number of members of the military districts, heads of political departments and deputy chief [of the headquarters of the commander K.A. Meretskoy.

On November 13, they took the commander of the 2nd rank I.A. Khalepsky, who "betrayed" more than a hundred of his accomplices in the conspiracy, and the army commissar of the 2nd rank A.L. Shifres, head of the Military Economic Department of the Academy of the Red Army.

In 1937, the shooting of yet another heroes of the Revolution began - the Latvian riflemen and other internationalists. Having applied to this case a cold Chekist head and not very clean hands, the former head of the UNKVD of the Moscow Region Alexander Pavlovich (Izrail Moiseevich) Radzivilovskiy testified:

"I asked Yezhov how to practically implement his directive on the disclosure of the anti-Soviet underground among the Latvians. He answered me that there was nothing to be embarrassed by the lack of concrete materials, but that several Latvians should be identified from among the members of the CPSU (b) and knocked out of them the necessary

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indications. Do not stand on ceremony with this audience, their cases will be considered in landscape order. It is necessary to prove that the Latvians, Poles and others who are members of the CPSU (b) are spies and saboteurs ... "

No sooner said than done.

Commander of the 2nd rank Alksnis, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Aviation, was arrested on November 23, 1937. After intensive processing, he signed a statement that he was an agent of Latvia and was the leader of an anti-Soviet Latvian organization.

A person can remember a lot of amazing things about himself, especially if there are, for example, four questioners, and in their hands, for example, rubber hoses. Or if you put the suspect on the leg of a chair. Or promise to come to grips with his family. One of the few who survived 1937, Commissar Ya.V. Volkov recalled:

"... He asked me to be shot as soon as possible so as not to torment me and not waste time, but I will not go for a provocation, no matter what it costs me. To this, Ushakov answered me that it was not like me, the fascist whore, that they split ... that they showed me only a preparatory class, in the future Moscow equipment would be shown, and no one was born who would resist this technique and not split... For the first week, and maybe more, Ushakov personally brutally beat me until I lost consciousness with a rubber truncheon... then he handed me over to beat me everywhere and

everywhere".

On November 26, they took a member of the Military Council of the Belarusian Military District, commissar of the 2nd rank A.I. Mesis; November 27 - Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, freshly minted army commissar of the 2nd rank Ya.K. Berzin (P. Kuzis), who had just returned from a business trip to Spain; November 29 - Professor of the Military Academy, commander of the 2nd rank I.I. Vatsetis, head of the Air Force OKDVA commander F.A. Ingaunis, Inspector of the People's Commissariat of Defense Corps Commander Zh.F. Zonberg.

The turn came to the great practice of the red terror Sudrabs-Latsis and other Peters.

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| On December 1937, a member of the Military Council of the Pacific Fleet, army commissar of the 2nd rank G.S. was arrested. Okunev. December 2 - Head of the Air Defense Directorate of the Red Army Army Commander 2nd rank A.I. Sedyakin. He confessed to having ties with Tukhachevsky and also testified against Yegorov.

Commander of the 2nd rank Velikanov was appointed in June 1937 to the post of commander of the troops of the Trans-Baikal Military District, he was arrested on December 20.

The commissar department was cleaned with special care. Iosif Vissarionovich decided to throw his former secretary, a proven, infinitely devoted and zealous cadre, into this responsible direction. At the end of 1937, by the Decree of the Politburo, the head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army instead of P.A. Smirnov, a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis, who previously held the posts of head of the press department and editor-in-chief of the Pravda newspaper, was approved. At the same time, he was awarded the rank of army commissar of the 2nd rank.

By this time, all army commissars of the "1935 model" had already been arrested, and subsequently shot, with the exception of the head of the Political Directorate of the Baltic Fleet, A.S., who committed suicide. Grishin and P.A. Smirnova. The latter was given the rank of army commissar 1st rank and made People's Commissar for Naval Affairs. He will be shot in a YEAR.

With the advent of Mekhlis to the PU of the Red Army, the work carried out earlier to expose the enemies of the people was recognized as insufficient. For the whole of 1937, only 870 army political workers were arrested. Lev Zakharovich immediately set about further shaking up the apparatus of the Political Directorate of the Red Army and the political staff in the main and central departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense, military districts, and military educational institutions. It is clear that all these organizations were stuffed with foreign residencies.

"Peculiarities of the work of pests in the Red Army," Mekhlis said at the All-Army Conference of Political Work

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kov in April 1938, - were affected by the fact that many different separate spy groups were operating here. They acted on the principle: "go apart, beat together." Each group held a stone in its bosom against the other. But they all had one thing in common - hatred for our Bolshevik Labor Party, for the working class and for the cause of socialism.

Mekhlis began the purge from the "scum" from the very Political Directorate, in the apparatus of which "right-wing Trotskyist spies were sitting." For less than ten days, the head of the personnel department, brigade commissar M.R. Kravchenko, and a month after his dismissal he was arrested as Bulin's accomplice in a conspiracy.

The political departments of the military districts also turned out to be neglected. In the Transcaucasian District, the former head of the Political Department, Razdolsky, "in the act of ostentatious vigilance" fired over 700 people, and in fact he himself turned out to be an associate of Gamarnik and Yakir.

In the Siberian Military District, N.A. Jung A.P. Prokofiev, G.F. Nevraev, I.D. Pavlov. Chekists "helped get rid of this dirt." In the Volga District, the head of the Political Administration, Cheremin, turned out to be a "right-wing Trotskyist spy." In the Kiev military district, Gornostayev, an active participant in the military-fascist conspiracy, worked with impunity for a long time as head of the political department.

A member of the illustrious Special Presence, Commander 1st Rank Belov headed the Belarusian Special Military District after Uborevich was sentenced by him. A "prominent figure of the Red Army", who turned out to be a "spy from the Socialist-Revolutionaries", was arrested on January 7, 1938.

He was interrogated by Stalin himself with Yezhov. At the confrontation, Belov was convicted by commissar of the 2nd rank Bulin and the former head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army commander S.P. Uritsky, who turned out to be "a full-time French spy with extensive work experience." The commander at first denied everything, but after

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repented that he was an agent of British intelligence, and signed everything that was demanded of him, including information about contacts with Marshal Yegorov's conspirators.

The turn of one of the most faithful, it would seem, Marshal Yegorov, was approaching. At a friendly carouse of the cavalry in December 1937 regarding the appointment of Shchadenko to the post of deputy people's commissar of defense, Alexander Ilyich relaxed in the circle of fighting friends and expressed his deep resentment that all the victories in the Civil War were undeservedly attributed to Stalin and Voroshilov, and he, Yegorov, the role is not appreciated. The marshal's drinking buddies, Shchadenko and Khrulev, immediately sobered up and, as soon as dinner was over, scribbled denunciations against Voroshilov.

There were other "signals". The Chekists presented "frank confessions" incriminating Yegorov by Kashirin, Belov, Orlov and People's Commissar for Finance G.F. Grinko. For the time being, the slanders of the enemies were not allowed to move, but to conceal a personal grudge against Comrade Stalin!

On January 25, 1938, the Politburo and the Council of People's Commissars stated: Yegorov ruined the work of the General Staff, was on friendly terms with conspirators and spies, and even tried to organize "his own anti-Party group, in which he involved comrade Dybenko and tried to involve comrade Budyonny into it. Yegorov was relieved of his job as Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and "as the last test" was appointed commander of the troops for the Caucasian Military District. The marshal held this position for less than two months.

By the same decree, Pavel Dybenko was dismissed from the post of commander of the Leningrad Military District, dismissed from the army, and appointed deputy people's commissar of the forest industry and sent on a business trip to the Urals.

At the same time, intensive development of Budyonny began. In February-March, after careful questioning on

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Commanders Belov, Sedyakin, and Kashirin, who had been arrested earlier, testified against him. So, Sedyakin testified that the late Tukhachevsky "built some of his own defeatist calculations on the personality of Budyonny." Kashirin said: "According to Yegorov's calculations, the anti-Soviet armed uprising will have to be supported by most of the cavalry of the Red Army, led by Budyonny himself."

Things were moving along in other directions as well. On February 1, 1938, a member of the Military Council of the OK-DVA commander of the State Duma was rowed up. Khakhanyan. In his testimony, for the first time, the name of Marshal Blucher surfaced. On February 2, Commander Nikolai Kuibyshev was arrested; he commanded the Transcaucasian Military District for only six months.

On February 8, 1938, Yegorov's wife, actress Galina Tseshkovskaya, was taken, she turned out to be a Polish spy, which she confessed to. And who else could she be with such a surname? Alexander Ilyich, vibrating with every fiber of his subtle organism, immediately renounced the "vile traitor" and wrote a tearful letter to Kliment Efremovich, begging his old friend to arrange a meeting with Stalin:

"I want to tell him in a personal conversation that all that bright past, our joint work at the front, continues to be the most precious moment in my life for me and that I never allowed anyone to denigrate this past, and even more so I did not allow and cannot allow me to betray this past, even in my thoughts, and become not only in deeds, but also in my thoughts, an enemy of the Party and the people.

Did not help.

On February 23, the commander of the Primorsky Group of Forces of the OKDVA, commander of the 2nd rank M.K., was arrested. Levandovsky, February 26 - former commander P.E. Dybenko.

Pavel Efimovich acknowledged the existence of a large group of military men closely connected with the "anti-Soviet right-wing Trotskyite bloc" of Rykov-Bukharin and the "military-fascist conspiracy" of Tukhachevsky:

"In the period of 1926, our group took shape, and we began to select our supporters in the army at the beginning under the banner of a group struggle against Voroshilov ... the struggle began

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began to become more and more aggravated and already in the period 1918-1929 our group became the center of the organization of the right in the Red Army.

At the head of the group, besides Dybenko himself, were Yegorov and Budyonny, who were "personally embittered against Voroshilov." Dybenko categorically denied the work imputed to him for the intelligence of the North American States (on the other hand, he "remembered" that he had allegedly been recruited by the tsarist secret police back in 1915 and betrayed revolutionary-minded sailors).

Mikhail Levandovsky gave similar testimony:

"For the first time I heard from Yegorov in 1931 that he and his friends had created an underground center for the military organization of the right, acting on the instructions of the right in the person of Rykov."

On March 27, 1938, two weeks after the trial of the "Trotsky-Bukharin saboteurs" Bukharin, Rykov, Yagoda and others, the "politically tainted" marshal was arrested. A day later, he confessed:

"I, Yegorov, together with Dybenko and Budyonny headed the leadership of the anti-Soviet organization of the right in the Red Army, which had its members in military circles. This anti-Soviet organization of ours was in a particularly secret position..."

Moreover, the conspirators made a special bet on Budyonny: in the event of an armed uprising, Semyon Mikhailovich was supposed to lead the "anti-Soviet elements of the cavalry of the Red Army" and therefore was actively recruiting his comrades-in-arms in the [civil war, who, in turn, prepared "counter-revolutionary formations" from the Cossacks - their parts.

Yegorov himself kept in touch with the Polish and German general staffs, supplied them with information and prepared "defeatist plans" in case of a future war. As Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Minister of Defense, Alexander Ilyich knew the entire command staff of the army. And he testified against everyone, for almost two years, until, having squeezed him dry, they shot him in February 1939, on the day of the anniversary of the Red Army.

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Following Egorov, they put all his deputies in the General Staff, who worked in a Stakhanovite way in favor of the German, Polish and Italian intelligence services at once - commander V.N. Levicheva, commander S.A. Mezheninov. Within a few months, heads of departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense, heads of the General Staff and commanders of military districts were arrested. Then the repressions seized the army, corps, divisional level, expanding in depth and breadth. Following the military leaders, their families were arrested.

A special department of the GUGB of the NKVD reported on almost four dozen conspiratorial groups and organizations "discovered" in the armed forces in 1937-1938: "military socialist-revolutionary organization", "anti-Soviet right-wing conspiracy", "terrorist group in the Political Directorate of the Red Army", "a sabotage spy organization in Voengiz", "terrorist group in the Central House of Arts", "monarchist officer organization", "conspirators from the Sanitary Administration", "reserve Trotskyist center in the Political Administration of the KOVO", "terrorist group in the Academy of the General Staff", "Ukrainian military-nationalist organization", "a branch of the conspiratorial organization in the 69th Infantry Division", "a group of Polish saboteurs in the military

KOVO messages)" and others. A social competition was unfolding between the special officers in terms of the number of arrests and confessions received.

In the meantime, commissioner P.A., inspired by the Leader's trust. Smirnov, who became the chief naval officer of the country, smashed the fleet with his characteristic energy, signing arrest warrants in batches.

On January 10, 1938, the commander of the Pacific Fleet, the flagship of the 1st rank, G.P. Kireev. March 19 - Commander of the Amur military flotilla, flagship of the 1st rank I.N. Kadatsky-Rudnev. On March 25, the head of the Naval Forces, flagship of the fleet of the 1st rank, M.V. Viktorov. A month later they came for him.

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On May 17, he was summoned from Polyarny to Moscow, but the head of the Political Directorate of the Northern Fleet, P.P., never returned. Bairakny. On May 23, on the way to Leningrad, the "railwaymen" arrested the commander of the Northern Fleet, a former sailor from the Aurora cruiser, a participant in the storming of the Winter Palace, the flagship of the 1st rank K.I. Dushenov and Deputy Head of the Nolitupravlenie P.M. Klipp, called by the people's commissar "to resolve urgent issues." Soon the Chief of Staff of the Fleet P.S. was taken into custody. Smirnov, chairman of the military tribunal Donchenko.

The "Moscow technique" was applied to Dushenov on the move and in full. In statement No. 267 addressed to Molotov, he wrote:

"After 22 hours of cruel physical methods being applied to me, I, almost in an unconscious state as a result of an internal hemorrhage, wrote a false statement under the dictation of the investigation that I was a conspirator and a pest. 5 days later, after the same methods, I signed a pre-written protocol, which indicated more than 30 people, allegedly my accomplices, who were later arrested without questioning me ... I ask you with all my heart if you can do this, so that they don't beat me anymore ... I ask you to shoot me, but don't beat me. If you do not find it possible to intervene in this matter, then I ask you to make sure that at least for this statement I will not be beaten. I fear that the investigation may consider it as a provocation."

Konstantin Ivanovich was "developed" for almost two years, and then they were awarded the long-awaited bullet in the back of the head.

On June 13, the head of the naval department of the Academy of the General Staff, the flagship of the 1st rank, E.S. Pantsezhansky and the head of the Naval Academy, the flagship of the 1st rank I.M. Ludry.

In a memorandum addressed to Stalin and Molotov dated June 17, 1938, the naval commander P.A. Smirnov reported on the results of checking the combat readiness of the Pacific Fleet and the Amur Flotilla:

"The clogging of personnel in the Pacific Fleet is very

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big. The enemies of the people turned out to be the chief of staff of the fleet, four commanders of the main naval brigades, three commandants of fortified areas, the head of the air defense department of the Pacific Fleet, the commander of the Vladivostok military port, the commander and head of the political department of the fleet. In aviation, both the commander of the Air Force and the military commissar both turned out to be enemies of the people. In all parts, the enemies of the people practiced drunkenness as a way of corrupting the personnel.

But by this time it became clear that Smirnov himself "turned out to be an enemy of the people." On June 30, they took him, accused him of preparing a conspiracy, and shot him six months later. In his place, having been awarded the rank of commander of the 1st rank, they appointed deputy Yezhov, commander of the NKVD troops M.P. Frinovsky.

Marshal Voroshilov also worked tirelessly, mercilessly cleaning the army ranks, "ruthlessly cutting off the infected parts of the body, to living, healthy meat, being cleansed of the vile treacherous rot." After each "heartfelt conversation with Comrade Yezhov's authorities," the people's commissar signed new and new execution lists.

The traitor Ion Yakir was replaced as Commander of the Kyiv Military District in 1937 by Army Commander Ivan Fedko. In 1938, he was made First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and awarded the rank of Commander of the 1st rank. On July 7, he was arrested, he also turned out to be an "infected part of the body", involved in conspiratorial activities as early as 1932. In September, Fedko testified against Blucher.

Cases of Belov, Orlov, Dubovoy, Dybenko, Levandovsky, Sedyakin, Velikanov, Khalepsky, Alksnis, Vatsetis, Gribov, Gryaznov, Kovtyukh, Kuttyakov, Ingaunis, Khripin, Kireev, Kadatsky, Okunev, Land, Yan Berzin, Pogrebny and others - entirely army commanders, corps commanders, army commissars and division commanders - were considered by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court under the invariable chairmanship of Ulrich on July 28-29, 1938. Managed quickly. All were sentenced to the highest measure, which was executed immediately.

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The day of July 28, 1938 deserves to be called Chekist Day. In just one day, the "organs of Comrade Yezhov" shot down 9 army commanders, one flagship of the fleet of the 1st rank, two flagships of the 2nd rank, three army commissars, 9 commanders and 6 commanders of divisions.

It is noteworthy that the executioners and shoulder masters were lowered into the execution "turpod" literally after, sometimes at the same time as their victims. But immediately the new heirs of Dzerzhinsky set to work even more zealously, and the machine of terror gained momentum. With vacancies regularly being vacated, the NKVD invariably felt the need for executioners, and with what readiness they signed up as executioners in the country of liberated labor and amputated conscience. This is because, reported Redens, a major Chekist, that: "People love work, love Soviet power, love our party and love Stalin."

The day was not far off when the organs of both Redens and Ushakov, and the "batyr Yezhov" himself, would be shot.

(The new generation of "employees for special assignments" with honor carried the baton, adopted from the legendary Chekists of the Civil War - a faithful revolver, which was not allowed to cool:

"We always had a bucket of vodka and a bucket of cologne at hand. Vodka, of course, they drank until they lost consciousness. Whatever you say, the job was not easy. They were so tired that they could barely stand on their feet. And washed with cologne. To the waist. Otherwise, do not get rid of the smell of blood and gunpowder. Even the dogs shied away from us."

It is known that many condemned died with the words: "Long live Comrade Stalin! Therefore, the executioners were instructed to "carry out educational work among those sentenced to death, so that at such an inopportune moment they would not slander the name of the leader."

When those of them who survived all the purges, and even Comrade Stalin himself, were imprisoned in 1957, they, naive Molotovites, desperately defended themselves: "Why are you judging me, and not judging Molotov, whose guilt has been proven and determined? He

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sent thousands of people to the next world with a stroke of a pen, but he is not judged.

Then, after serving fifteen years, they demanded their rehabilitation:

"We cannot be held responsible for violations of socialist legality, since we only carried out the task of our leadership and believed that we were fighting against the enemies of the party and the Soviet

states... Why did they punish us, a small group of Chekists? We ask you to return our honest names to us, to return us to Soviet society, so that we can join the ranks of the builders of communism."

And in this they are right, and Khrushchev, having violated Lenin's precepts, made a fatal mistake: it is impossible to build communism without such cadres and such methods.)

In the summer of 1938, due to the aggravation of the situation in the region of Lake Khasan, the Politburo sent the tireless Mekhlis to the Far East. On July 28, he telegraphed the "Father of Nations": "I fired two hundred and fifty political workers, a significant part of them were arrested. But the cleansing of the political apparatus, especially of the lower levels, is far from being completed by me."

The behavior of the commander of the Far Eastern Front, Blucher, did not inspire confidence in Lev Zakharovich either. The marshal, instead of following the Kremlin's instructions to defeat the "Japanese aggressors" without talking, launched his own investigation and argued that the Soviet border guards were responsible for the incident on the Zaozernaya height.

At the end of the conflict, Blucher was summoned to Moscow and at a meeting of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, held on August 31, 1938, he was accused of "deliberate defeatism", inability or unwillingness "to really organize the cleansing of the front from enemies of the people", "duplicity, lack of discipline and sabotage of the armed rebuff to the Japanese troops. By order of the People's Commissar of Defense, Blucher was removed from command of the Far Eastern Front.

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Vasily Konstantinovich was arrested on October 22 at the Voroshilov dacha "Bocharov Ruchey". Soon he, who decided to deny everything at face-to-face confrontations with his "accomplices" Fedko and Khakhanyan, was transferred to Lefortovo and beaten for two weeks until they were muzzled to death. But they managed to snatch out a confession that Blucher had sold the Far East to the Japanese, and that he was part of both a right-wing conspiracy and a military conspiracy. Two of the three marshal's wives were shot, and the third was sentenced to eight years in labor camps for failure to inform.

Well, there seems to be almost no one left. In February 1939, Yegorov, Fedko and Smirnov were shot. As Anastas Mikoyan proudly remarked: "... the apparatus that conducted this investigation passed the Bolshevik test of TRUENESS AND ACCURACY."

Of the cohort of "the best of the best, worthy of the worthy", the first in the country to receive the highest personal military ranks, only three survived - Voroshilov, Budyonny and Shaposhnikov.

"Comrade Stalin, like a caring gardener, raises and educates these cadres," Nikita sang like a nightingale.

Khrushchev.

At the Military Conference, the "caring gardener" reassured those who fell into thoughtfulness warlords:

"I see gloominess and some confusion on your faces. I understand that it is very hard to hear such accusations against people with whom we have worked hand in hand for decades and who have now turned out to be traitors to the Motherland. But you don't have to be upset. Although an unpleasant phenomenon, it is quite natural," and called for bolder promotion of new cadres devoted to the Soviet system.

What dizzying careers were made in those years!

On the wave of repressions, the "Budenovite" S.K. Timoshenko: in July 1937 he took command of the North Caucasian Military District with the rank of commander, in September, already

commander of the 2nd rank, accepted the Kharkov Military District, in February 1938 - the Kiev district, exactly a year later

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he was awarded the rank of commander of the 1st rank. In May 1940, Semyon Konstantinovich became marshal and people's commissar of defense.

Kombrig N.N. Voronov, sent to Spain from the post of head of the 1st Leningrad artillery school, upon his return received the rhombuses of the commander and immediately became the head of the artillery of the Red Army. Colonel I.T. Shlemin, who had previously commanded the regiment. Another "Spaniard", Yakov Smushkevich, from the brigade commander instantly became the commander of all military aviation. Ivan Peresyokin in 1937 was a senior lieutenant, in May 1939 he was the People's Commissar for Communications of the USSR. Major I.P. He completed the tall path from battalion commander to division commander in three months.

Colonel M.P. Kirponos in 1934-1939 was the head of the Kazan Infantry School. From there he was taken to the Finnish War to command a division. In June 1940, Mikhail Petrovich headed the Leningrad Military District.

It took a little more than a year for V.F. Tributsu, in order to move from the bridge of the destroyer to the office of the commander of the Baltic Fleet and receive the rank of vice admiral.

Squadron commander I.I. In 1938, Kopets was appointed deputy commander of the Air Force of the Leningrad Military District, and before the start of the war, commander of the Western Special Air Force.

Inspired by the confidence of the party, they did not hesitate to occupy the highest posts, automatically turning in their own eyes into "outstanding commanders."

Not the genius who became a colonel, but whoever is a colonel is a genius.

Marshal Konev, in an interview with Konstantin Simonov, said:

By the year 1937, Blucher was a man with a past but no future, a man who, in terms of his knowledge and ideas, had not gone far from the Civil War and belonged to the category that

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Voroshilov, Budyonny and some other former cavalymen, who lived by out-of-date, past views, represented themselves at the beginning of the war.

It is impossible to imagine that Blucher could cope with the front in a modern war. Apparently, he would have coped with this no better than Voroshilov or Budyonny. In any case, Blucher failed such a small operation as the Khasan events."

It may well be that it is so. Only Blucher was shot not for military backwardness and not for his addiction to drinking. At one time, Stalin defended Blucher:

"Here he is drinking. OK then. What else? Here he does not get up early in the morning, does not go to the troops. What else? Outdated, does not understand new methods of work. Well, today he doesn't understand, tomorrow he will understand, the experience of an old fighter will not be lost ... Put people in command positions who don't drink and don't know how to fight - it's not good ... He, of course, is more reasonable, more experienced than any Tukhachevsky, than any Uborevich who is an alarmist, and than any Yakir who does nothing in military affairs is different".

"There are no people without flaws," Iosif Vissarionovich informed the military. One likes to drink. For others, it turns into a disease. We treat such people, but we do not expel them from the party. We re-educate such people. Others love girls. This, too, is of little interest to us. Let them mess around with them as much as they like... There is nothing wrong with that."

The Leader treated such shortcomings condescendingly, he understood people who loved the simple joys of life. Such people are easier to manage. Just "very smart" he did not need. Blucher was killed for revealing that he had his own opinion in the case of the provocation started by the Soviet side near Lake Khasan and the desire to resolve the conflict in a civilized way instead of, as Moscow indicated, "really fight the Japanese."

And Konev, who graduated from three classes of a rural school and a "special group" of the Military Academy, was made commander of a military district not for military talents, but for several

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repeatedly shown "fidelity". Even in 1948, being a marshal of the USSR, Ivan Stepanovich did not forget to indicate in his autobiography:

"He took an active part in the struggle against Trotskyist-Bukharin enemies, agents of German-Japanese fascism, especially in Ukraine in 1923 and against the bandit Primakov and others. which I

commanded."

And at first, Konev coped with the front in the "modern war" no better than Budyonny: Ivan Stepanovich is ONE OF the "co-authors" of the infamous Vyazemsky cauldron. Together with the "nonsense" Eremenko (Stalin's definition), who in his reports smashed the "scoundrels Guderians" wholesale and retail.

Lieutenant Colonel L. Simon, reporting to Paris on the Tukhachevsky case, noted:

"The first consequence of this lawsuit is that the Soviet army has lost its future leader ... His disappearance has created a void that will be difficult to fill, since Tukhachevsky's successor will, in all likelihood, be inferior to him intellectually. This assessment is applicable even to Marshal Yegorov..."

One of the successors of Tukhachevsky and Egorov was G.K. Zhukov, who had four grades of elementary school in his luggage, nine months of cavalry courses and "organically hated staff work." The entire depth of Georgy Konstantinovich's intellect can be measured by his resolution alone. When he, the Chief of the General Staff, was put on the table a description of the Wehrmacht's French campaign with a detailed analysis of the reasons for the success of the "blitzkrieg" and the defeat of the French, Zhukov wrote: "I don't need this." It's not even "emptiness", it's a complete vacuum.

Instead of Belov, the Belarusian Military District was headed by the commander of the 2nd rank M.P. Kovalev. Zhukov, who served in this district, claimed that Belov was weaker than Uborevich, and Kovalev was weaker than Belov. And how "strong" was

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Pavlov, who replaced Kovalev, can be judged by the complete defeat of the Western Front in June 1941. Who today remembers the commander Kovalev, who guarded Transbaikalia throughout the war; he was not even entrusted with the army.

Let's look at the commanders who were the first to meet the German invasion, how were they better than Budyonny or Voroshilov?

Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov (1898-1961), commander of the Baltic Special District. Prior to that, he had not commanded anything larger than a regiment, he was in a teaching job. At the beginning of the war, he led the operations of the North-Western Front for only 11 days, completely lost track of the situation and found himself surrounded along with his headquarters. In early August, he managed to get out to his own, received a new front, then the 51st separate army, commanding which he surrendered Crimea to the Germans. Another year they tried to attach Fyodor Isidorovich, transferring from one position to another, and, finally, they pushed him to head the Military Academy.

Army General D.G. Pavlov (1897-1941), commander of the Western Military District. He graduated from two classes of the city school, courses and the Military Academy. In three years, he rose from the post of commander of a mechanized brigade to the commander of a border district. Stalin is said to have pinned "great hopes" on him. In his autobiography, the general wrote: "I have never been a member of any Trotskyist or other organizations, I have never wavered on any issues. There were no mistakes and deviations from the general line and could not be.

But he turned out to be a traitor. Under the command of Pavlov, the Western Front ceased to exist as an organized force after eight days of war. On the ninth day, the commander was recalled and removed from his post. The rapid rise ended with a "wall".

Colonel General M.P. Kirponos (1892-1941), commander of the Kyiv Special District. He graduated from the parochial school and the Frunze Military Academy. Commanding the most powerful of the fronts, having over the Germans

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multiple numerical advantage, especially in technology (nearly 9,000 tanks against hardly 1,000), lost outright to Kleist and Guderian. Died in the Kiev cauldron.

Lieutenant General P.P. Sobennikov, commander of the 8th Army. Former officer of the tsarist army plus courses for senior officers. He joined the army from the position of a teacher at the Military Academy. The Supreme Court of the USSR "estimated" the commander's success in military leadership at five years of corrective labor camps.

Lieutenant General V.I. Morozov (1897-1964), commander of the 11th Army. Education had two classes of a rural school and numerous courses. In the first two days of the war, his army was smashed to smithereens, Vasily Ivanovich himself from May 1943 taught others to fight in the rear.

Major General N.E. Berzarin (1904-1945), commander of the 27th Army. Finished his studies at the age of ten. He received his military education at the "Shot" courses. By all criteria, even from the point of view of common sense, Berzarin is zero.

Lieutenant General V.I. Kuznetsov (1894-1964), commander of the 3rd Army. Graduated from high school and courses, courses, courses. His entire army remained in the Volkovysk cauldron, Vasily Ivanovich managed to get out and received a new army.

Lieutenant General K.D. Golubev (1896-1956), commander of the 10th Army. He graduated from a trade school, the Frunze Military Academy, and the General Staff Academy. He got into the most powerful army of the Western Front from the teachers of the academy. In 1941, the army in full force was captured, Konstantin Dmitrievich left the encirclement. Stalin entrusted him with the 13th Army, after which the 43rd Army. But in May 1944, he was recalled from command and made authorized by the Council of People's Commissars for the repatriation of citizens.

Major General A.A. Korobkov, commander of the 4th Army. The army was defeated, at the end of July 1941 it was disbanded, Alexander Andreevich was shot in the "Pavlov case".

Major General M.I. Potapov (1902-1965), I command

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by the 5th Army. Education - three classes of a rural school and the Military Academy of Motorization and Mechanization of the Red Army named after. I.V. Stalin. He jumped from the post of commander of a mechanized brigade to army commander in less than two years. Together with the army in September 1941, he was surrounded and taken prisoner.

Lieutenant General I.N. Muzychenko (1901-1970), commander of the 6th Army. General education - two classes of teachers' seminary, military - continuous courses. In half a year he rose to the commandery from the position of a teacher of cavalry courses. In July 1941, he was taken prisoner near Uman along with the remnants of his army.

Lieutenant General F.Ya. Kostenko, commander of the 26th Army. He graduated from two classes of a rural school and, already in the rank of general, advanced training courses for senior officers at the Academy of the General Staff. Fyodor Yakovlevich "did not like to indulge in arguments if an order was received. He was highly appreciated for his firmness and accuracy in carrying out the decisions of the command." He died in 1942 in the Barvenkovsky "sack", where, together with Tymoshenko, he brought a quarter million of his subordinates.

Major General P.G. Ponedelin (1893-1950), commander of the 12th Army. Graduated from the Frunze Military Academy. Together with the army he surrendered in the Uman cauldron. For this, after the war, he was first imprisoned and then shot.

Another cavalryman, Colonel-General Ya.T. Cherevichenko (1894-1976) commanded the 9th Army. In his autobiography, he reveals the "secret" of a special faculty of the Academy, which he graduated from having two classes in a rural school: "In 1935, he passed the ten-year course at the Military Academy. Frunze. Since 1943 - rear general. In April 1945, the colonel-general was entrusted with "steer" the rifle corps in the Berlin operation.

Thus, by 1941, ALL Stalin's "nominees" had "failed". It couldn't be otherwise. Being just "cogs" and "gears" of the Soviet military

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machines, Stalin was interested in them solely from the point of view of "reliability". Complete unification. We have no irreplaceable ones!

"What is the strength of the army? Stalin asked a military audience in January 1938. And he himself gave the answer: "Some people think that the strength of the army lies in good equipment, that technology decides everything. The second think that the army is strong and all its strength is in the command staff. This is also wrong. The main strength of the army lies in whether the policy of the government in the country is right or wrong ... With the right policy, even average commanders can do much more than the most capable commanders of bourgeois states.

Compared to the executed military leaders, the new ones had only one advantage, and even then only from the dictator's point of view, they knew their place, they were frightened to death. Marshal Zhukov, who under Khrushchev told tales about how Stalin fought on the globe, and he, Zhukov, almost opened the door to his office with his foot, being retired, in a private conversation about the Supreme Commander honestly said: "He was scary".

From foreigners, the red commanders now shied away like hell from incense. At a meeting of the commanding staff in April 1940, the commander of the troops of the Leningrad district, Meretskov, complained that the commanders were refusing to perform reconnaissance missions abroad. And the Soviet officers were not afraid of the insidious enemy counterintelligence and not the dungeons of the Romanian Sigurans: "Commanders are afraid to go into such intelligence, because they say that they will write down later that they were abroad. The commanders are cowardly."

It became mortally dangerous to show any initiative. Initiative is a sign that you think differently than the boss, have your own judgment, or maybe you consider yourself smarter. But didn't your enemies make you think of distorting the "general line"?

As often happens, those who do not have sufficient experience, are not burdened by education, the precocious "Stalinist commanders", having taken general positions and received

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the corresponding material goods, for the most part, completely stopped in development. Believing that they deserved the highest positions, they did not want to learn anything, showing contempt for the "educated" in every possible way. The more primitive was the thinking of the strategist of the nugget, the stronger the desire to assert himself, humiliating the lower ones, jumped up in him. For example, Zhukov "did not graduate from the academies", but with pleasure he threw in the face of the graduate who arrived under his subordination: "I knew it. Whatever the fool, then the graduate of the academy.

By the way, in November 1936, the Academy of the General Staff was recreated for the cultivation of commanders and employees of the headquarters of the highest level of command. However, the training of her pupils suffered from significant gaps. Firstly, due to the fact that, as before, it was necessary to take into account the "features" of the trainees. Secondly, in view of mass early releases to fill vacant vacancies. Thirdly, during the years of the Great Terror, more than three thousand teachers of military educational institutions were repressed, which led to a decrease in the quality of NFL education.

For example, one of the students of the first set was enrolled without exams the commander of the 29th cavalry regiment of the 5th cavalry division M.I. Kazakov, who had already managed to surpass all sciences at the Frunze Military Academy with three classes of the parochial school. It is alarming that, even as an army general, Mikhail Ilyich thought that the Bolsheviks had invented the General Staff Academy:

"There were no such educational institutions in other armies ... As I already mentioned, there were no such educational institutions not only in our country, but also abroad (?), So everything had to start all over again, go the unbeaten path ".

He died without knowing that in Russia the Academy [of the General Staff had existed since 1832, in other countries even earlier.

Going "off the beaten track", an unparalleled educational institution tried to create a department of strategy, but quickly abandoned the idea due to the complete

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arrow of almost all military theorists in the country. In 1935, an attempt was made to organize a course of lectures on strategy at the Military Academy. Frunze, but she also failed. The deputy head of the academy, Shchadenko, put the head of the military history department in his place: "What kind of strategy course is this? Comrade Stalin is personally involved in the strategy, and this is not our business!"

The first months of study "were spent on repetition and replenishment of knowledge on the military equipment of the Red Army." In winter, Commanders Uborevich and Yakir managed to conduct two classes in operational art. They seemed too complicated and abstruse to listeners:

"Many expressed bewilderment: why did Uborevich complicate the operational situation so much and forced the troops of the Western Front to repel a counterattack by a powerful grouping of German troops from East Prussia? And in the classes that Yakir taught, something completely incongruous happened: our mechanized corps, which was part of the ERP, could not overcome the resistance of the German tank division. Why? .. Not everyone could understand: why on earth did the leaders of the classes reduce the offensive operations of our troops to such an unsuccessful ending ... "

After six months of intense study, in June 1937, they were released - there were no commanders left in the troops: colonels A.M. Vasilevsky and V.V. Kurasov - to the General Staff, Colonel A.I. Antonov - Chief of Staff of the Moscow Military District, Colonel M.V. Zakharov - chief of staff in the Leningrad military district of the rest - only deputies and heads of operational departments, but not for long. Kazakov became chief of staff of the Central Asian Military District already in March 1938.

As shown by the "unsuccessful finale of the offensive operations of our troops" in 1941-1942, the Soviet General Staff officers still preferred not to "complicate the operational situation" and were only able to draw brilliant plans to defeat the enemy, regardless of his intentions. So, on the night of June 28, 1942, the chief of staff of Bryansk

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On the front, General Kazakov was thinking hard about the plan of the Oryol offensive operation, and in the morning "everything suddenly changed dramatically": the Germans launched Operation Blau, a general summer offensive, and a week later they were in Voronezh. And why? The beaten strategist says:

"The main mistake was that until the very beginning of Operation Blau, few of us took seriously (did he even imagine the duties of the chief of staff of the front?) The possibility of the main German strike in the Kursk-Voronezh direction."

The main reason for the defeat "was the lack of experience in command and control in a complex operation." Difficult - this means the Germans are advancing and with one division they are no longer beating the mechanized corps (as the "enemy of the people" Yakir admitted in his lecture), but the 5th tank army of A.I. Lizyukov. Why? "... Headquarters of all levels of the 4th Army," wrote General L.M. Sandalov, "could be considered ready for command and control of the troops in the event of the development of events in a normal situation."

That is, they were ready to defeat any adversary, but on the condition that he would stand still and not resist much, without complicating, you know, the situation. How can one not remember the casually killed Vatsetis: "A stupid man decides for the enemy, and any military leader is obliged to imagine ten options for his possible actions."

During the five pre-war years (1937-1941), the Academy of the General Staff graduated more than 800 "highly educated commanders" who did not know how to manage troops.

God is with her, with the strategy, but the organization of communications in the academies also did not go through. The Soviet generals simply ignored radio communications, too tricky. They preferred to lead from a warm headquarters by telephone. If the enemy cut the wires, messengers were used.

Almost completely absent were the means of coding communications, radio intelligence, and encryption machines. They did not attach any importance to the development of communications; they did not like radio communications and were afraid of it. Sandalov testified:

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"The command staff and staffs of all formations, including the army headquarters, did not know how to control troops using radio and did not like this type of communication because of the difficulty of using it compared to wired communication."

Therefore, the Soviet headquarters immediately lost control, as soon as the troops started moving.

In 1932, the commander of the artillery regiment of the Moscow Proletarian Division N.N. Voronov, as part of a delegation, visited Italy for military maneuvers:

"I was struck by the abundance of field radio stations in the Italian troops. I liked the clarity of staff work, which significantly reduced the time for preparing combat documents..."

the division commander spent 50 minutes compiling a combat order, the regiment commanders - 30-40 minutes. Such promptness had to be learned."

The conclusions of the Soviet delegation are interesting: "The guns of the battery were of an old-fashioned type, from the time of the First World War, which did not represent any interest. Our military mission had a very low opinion of the fighting qualities of the Italian troops, especially the artillery. The Red Army was far ahead of them both in terms of the quality of weapons and combat training.

personnel."

In 1936, Nikolai Nikolaevich again visited Italy and was again "disappointed to the limit": "In general, there was little instructive for us in Italy. Once again we were convinced that the Italian army is far from meeting modern requirements." But at the same time, Voronov again noted: "During the maneuvers, I liked the widespread use by the Italians of radio stations for various purposes. It became a pity that in our homeland we did not achieve such a high quality of radio stations for all branches of the armed forces.

The acute shortage of modern means of communication meant not only the loss of control, but also the absence of any interaction between the military branches. It's not scary, but we overtook everyone "both in terms of the quality of weapons and combat training," and the strength of the army is in the "correct policy."

You can, of course, blame everything on Tukhachevsky. But under him, Soviet developments in covert communications and radar

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tions were the most advanced in the world. However, developers-pests were repressed after the marshal. From the middle of 1936, the People's Commissariat for Communications made high-ranking Chekists a place of exile before their destruction. At first, it was led by one of Yagoda's deputies, G.E. Prokofiev, then Genrikh Grigorievich himself, then Khalepsky, who was dismissed from the army, after him, the "all-camp chief", the builder of the great canals M.D. Berman. They were the least interested in communication, they uprooted all "sabotage".

But after all, the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, who was directly in charge of the Communications Department of the NPO, was surprised to find out only at the beginning of the war that he did not have a command post, his own lines of communication, and at least some news about the enemy could be found out only by calling the village councils on the phone: "Govarishch ! Are there Germans in the village?

Already in the middle of the day on June 22, 1941, the commander of the Western Front reported that out of the three (!) radio stations he had, two were broken, and the third was damaged. He was promised to send three new ones, but they never did. In the future, Pavlov not only did not manage anything, but did not even know where the front was, and the General Staff did not know where Pavlov himself was. In Moscow, Zhukov sobbed out loud when Stalin asked him a simple question: "Do you manage the fronts?"

But with what enthusiasm they were preparing to fight "on foreign territory." In May 1940, the commander of the 2nd rank Meretskov stated at a meeting of ideological workers:

"We can say that our army is preparing for an attack, and we need this attack for defense. This is absolutely correct... Based on the political conditions, we must attack, and the Government will show us what we need to do."

True, having occupied the chairs, apartments and dachas of the "saboteur strategists", the "nominees" did not come up with anything new. The "Considerations on the Fundamentals of the Strategic

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deployments" practically copy the "invasion plan" written by Tukhachevsky — the main strike from the area south of Polissya — to the center of Poland — only taking into account the borders that have changed as a result of the Liberation Campaign and the multiple increase in the forces involved.

In the summer of 1940, a decision was made to restore the mechanized corps. Under Tukhachevsky there were only two of them, 500 tanks each. It is claimed that these formations had a number of shortcomings: little infantry (two mechanized brigades, and one infantry brigades), primitive means of radio communication.

Timoshenko and Meretskov ordered 29 mechanized corps with 1,031 tanks each, but also without means of communication, "to deeply shock the enemy's front." How to manage them on the battlefield, no one thought. Most likely - to concentrate the ramming masses and indicate the general direction of movement: "Forward, to Warsaw! Forward to Berlin!"

The headquarters enthusiastically practiced "deep operations" with complete disregard for the organization of defense. |

"The whole system of our training next year," Marshal Shaposhnikov instructed the district commanders, "basically should be saturated not with defensive tendencies, but with the idea of an offensive operation. "Defense should be given attention insofar as it is."

During the exercises, the covering armies imitated the defense purely symbolically, "at the same time, they did not set up minefields, did not create trenches and communications, but only designated a cellular system."

Any operational games or maneuvers began with the standard introductory: we, of course, repulsed the encroachments of the "warmongers" to invade Soviet territory and go on the "counteroffensive". But the fact that "the enemy will concentrate such a mass of armored and motorized troops and abandon them on the very first day in compact groups in all strategic directions", such meanness, according to Zhukov, "did not count".

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The 1939 field manual read:

"If the enemy imposes war on us, the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army will be the most offensive of all armies that have ever existed. We will wage an offensive war, transferring it to enemy territory. The Red Army will conduct military operations for destruction, with the aim of completely defeating the enemy.

The ease with which it was possible to annex new Soviet republics to the USSR in 1939-1940 inspired new achievements. The realities of the Finnish war somewhat spoiled the impression, but it was declared "wrong", and some shortcomings were eliminated. At the meetings of the commanders, the marshals and generals assured the party and each other of their own invincibility. Potential opponents were treated like whipping boys.

A few excerpts from Mekhlis's speech at a meeting in the Kiev Special Military District:

"The country of socialism is dressed in steel armor and concrete. We do not feel weaker than our probable capitalist opponents and look boldly into the future... The second imperialist war, into which the fascist aggressors and their admirers are dragging mankind, will bury the world of capitalist robbery in its ruins...

If the second imperialist war turns its edge against the first socialist state in the world, then we will be obliged to transfer military operations to enemy territory, fulfill our international duties and multiply the number of Soviet republics throughout the world ...

..WE can state that the so-called "Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis" has a lot of ambition, but in a big war it will quickly be left without ammunition... Puffy Japanese samurai, puffed up to failure, like a frog from Krylov's fable, can crack under pressure...

While saber-rattling, the Hitlerite swindlers are afraid of a serious war, they are afraid and will not go to a serious war, to a war with a serious enemy. The Achilles' heel of the German army is an unreliable rear ... The Achilles' heel of the German

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army - lack of money, lack of a sufficient number of middle command personnel necessary for a big WAR ...

..we will and must follow the German tricks in Romania closely, and we must prepare so that in the event of a war being imposed on us, Romanian oil, on which the German fascists are so covetous, will flow in the direction we desire, and not the Germans ...

We have been given the strictest order - to smash and destroy the enemy on his territory and with little bloodshed. We must work in such a way that the enemy cannot come to his senses, so that the initiative from the first hour of the war belongs and is entirely in our hands.

What is there, we will throw hats. As B. Russell noted, those who accept Bolshevism are "unreceptive to the evidence of science and commit intellectual suicide."

They did not think about defending the Fatherland - the proletarians do not have it - but only about how they would bring happiness to the peoples of Europe and Asia on bayonets, how they would help the working people of Zimbabwe to organize the work of the Cheka and put hostile classes to waste, the peasants of Cambodia - to organize collective farms, the proletarians of Italy - to nationalize the factories and expropriate the exploiters. A certain Major A. Solovyov fantasized from the podium: "After all, someday our commanders will occupy the position of British officers in the world. So it must be and so it will be. We will teach the whole world."

The distortion in the brains, caused by the fear of being enrolled in the category of enemies and ideological pumping, did not allow the "red colonialists" to realistically assess the situation. Everything that did not fit into their ideas about the capabilities of the enemy, about the nature of the future war, was simply brushed aside as insignificant or non-existent. Marshal Shaposhnikov, after the victorious campaigns of the Wehrmacht in Poland and France, disparagingly noted: "In terms of strategic creativity, the experience of the war in Europe, perhaps, does not give anything new." There is nothing to think about when Comrade Stalin himself is "planning history."

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It turned out that not only he planned the story.

In the very first days of the war, Soviet military leaders demonstrated a complete lack of professionalism, an inability to manage large military formations in real conditions, and a disregard for all the rules of warfare. They threw troops into battle without preparation, without air reconnaissance, without air cover.

The troops, contrary to the requirements of their own charters, deployed and acted on broad fronts, in arbitrary directions, without interaction with each other. The defense was built on the principle of a cordon line, without proper depth, without taking into account the tactics of the enemy, the nature of the terrain and the importance of the defended areas.

The operational formation of armies was almost always one-echelon, forces and means in formations were also distributed evenly along the entire front. There were no reserves. The generals did not care about providing joints and flanks, blaming this headache on their neighbors.

In the course of defensive operations, there was no wide maneuver of forces and means at the expense of other, less active sectors. The withdrawal of troops from one defensive line to another was, as a rule, forced by the situation and carried out under strong enemy fire. Advance preparation of lines and organization of sustainable defense in the rear

rarely carried out. As a result, in the event of a forced retreat, it was not possible to gain a foothold on the new frontier.

Shaposhnikov's "in so far as" backfired, but basically it was just illiteracy, ignorance of the elementary foundations of military art, inability to predict the actions of the enemy. For some reason, the "unreliable rear" of the German army did not collapse, the European proletariat did not organize insurrectionary detachments, and everything turned out to be in order with the German ammunition.

Marshal A.I. Eremenko (1892-1970), who missed the strike of Guderian's tank group on Orel and was left without a front, shook his head in dismay after the war:

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"Looking back, now considering the situation with open maps, you are perplexed: how could we not then guess the intentions of the enemy? The way from there to Orel and Tula was the shortest. There is no need to force the gum. The Bryansk forests remain to the north. However, the command and headquarters of the Bryansk Front could not decipher this easy cipher.

It remains to be concluded that in September 1941 Eremenko still could not read a map.

Once surrounded, the Soviet commanders fell into complete prostration, because they simply did not know what to do in such a situation unforeseen by the charters. Some tried at all costs to hold the occupied area, others randomly and stupidly threw their fading forces into a breakthrough in various directions. Marshal Konev wrote:

"Our goal was not to allow the enemy to narrow the encirclement and, having a vast territory, to maneuver forces, to contain the superior forces of the enemy by active struggle. Of course, encirclement is a complex form of combat, and, as the experience of the war showed, we had to prepare for this type of action, which, unfortunately, was not done before the war.

In the end, both of them gave the order to the troops to break up into small groups and get out of the boilers on their own. Left without commanders, tens of thousands of Red Army soldiers surrendered, abandoning their weapons and equipment. Commanders of various calibers infiltrated east, accompanied by the closest circle of commanders and bodyguards, without trying to lead any unit: it was easier to slip through unnoticed.

General A.A. Vlasov left the encirclement twice, and each time the "breakthrough group" consisted of the general himself and another marching wife. If there was such an opportunity, our military leaders simply loaded onto planes and flew away, conveying fiery greetings to the remaining troops.

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and the last order: "fight to the last opportunity" or "advance with an inverted front."

It is impossible to imagine Paulus abandoning his 6th Army in Stalingrad, and it could not have occurred to Hitler to take the field marshal out of the cauldron. When the Fuhrer gave the order to leave the deadly place to the commander of the 14th Panzer Corps, General Hube, he "categorically refused to obey. He sent a message to Berlin that he had brought his soldiers to Stalingrad and ordered them to fight to the last bullet. And now he intends to show them how it's done."

Compare this with the flight of the Soviet command from Sevastopol in July 1942, when almost all the leaders of the defense - Admiral Oktyabrsky and General Petrov, their headquarters, all division commanders, all the party leadership and ranks of the NKVD - about 500 people - boarded

planes and submarines and departed safely, leaving a garrison of 100,000 to the mercy of fate. The concept of military honor was banished to them from a young age.

Stalin's generals were only preparing to attack, but, as it turned out, they also did not know how to attack. First, control was immediately lost; secondly, "there was not enough experience"; thirdly, the enemy interfered, creating a "difficult situation" by his actions. There are countless examples of this.

May 1942. The war has been going on for a year, the German army was defeated near Moscow, but survived. Perked up, Stalin ordered the end of the war in 1942. The two armies of the Southwestern Front, advancing on Kharkov, themselves climbed into the "bag" organized for them by the Germans. At the last moment, Marshal Timoshenko gave the order: to turn around with part of the forces and defeat the enemy who had come out to the rear with joint blows.

"You can't say anything," writes Marshal Moskalenko, who commanded the 38th Army, "the idea was bold and seemed simple and real to the authors. In reality, things were not so simple. First of all, it was necessary to regroup large masses of troops scattered on

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'big space. And we didn't know how to do it properly then."

June. Moskalenko himself was given a tank corps and ordered to counterattack:

"The tank brigades struck in the forehead. Meanwhile, detour maneuvers were quite possible, which, undoubtedly, would have given the best result ... Unfortunately, during the period of the war we are describing, we still did not always have such a skill and were still only accumulating precious experience ... Yes, We learned a lot during the May and June battles in 1942. We began to better see and predict the plans of the enemy, better plan and manage military operations.

Early July. Three Soviet tank corps in the area of Stary Oskol enter into battle with the 48th tank corps of the enemy and are defeated. "The commanders of tank corps," explains Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, - did not yet have sufficient experience ... "

THEY DIDN'T BE ABLE TO DO ANYTHING except to knock with their fists, demand to "stand to the death", threaten a tribunal, "inspire courage" in the troops with the help of barrage detachments and throw the enemy with the corpses of the Red Army.

In the summer of 1942, Stalin was finally convinced that he did not have "Hindenburgs". They couldn't be. In that Great War, which he prepared amateurishly, he did not need them. The commanders of the Patriotic War had to be trained during the war itself and personally, gradually mastering military affairs, write instructions for them: the need to use radio communications and have reserves, the use of engineering barriers, 00 "artillery offensive" and the concentration of forces, about interaction, about reconsidering tactics, and even about the need to take the initiative.

I had to pay for ignorance for a long time and with a lot of blood. Not mine, of course.

August 22, 1944 Marshal G.K. Zhukov wrote to the head of the Main Personnel Department: "What does our experience teach us?

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First, we did not have pre-selected and well-trained commanders of fronts, armies, corps and divisions. The fronts were headed by people who failed one thing after another (Pavlov, Kuznetsov, Popov, Budyonny, Cherevichenko, Tyulenev, Ryabyshev, Timoshenko, etc.), little-studied people were also placed in the army.

It could not have been otherwise, since there were no candidates trained in peacetime for the fronts, armies and formations. The people were not well known. In peacetime, the People's Commissariat of Defense not only did not train candidates, but even did not train commanders to command fronts and armies ... in short, each of us knows the consequences of the command of these people and what our Motherland experienced, entrusting its fate into the hands of such commanders and commanders...

All these commanders learned war in war, paying for it with the blood of our people."

Thus, Marshal Zhukov confirmed in writing all of the above. What impresses me in the character of Georgy Konstantinovich is his modesty. In the list of military leaders "who failed one thing after another", he identified himself under the pseudonym "et al."

Judging by the number of soldiers he expended, the "Marshal of Victory" was one of the most stupid. He had the Berlin offensive ahead of him; in terms of the rate of losses (16 thousand killed and wounded daily), it surpassed even the most bloody summer battles of 1943 (11-12 thousand per day). The war was almost over, and Zhukov, apparently, was in a hurry to fill in the gaps in his "education", paying in full with blood.

Part III COMMANDERS AND FIGHTERS

"Sending people to war without training is betraying them." Confucius

In July 1918, the Congress of Soviets, having approved the decision of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the introduction of universal military duty, specifically emphasized that the right to defend the Socialist Fatherland with arms in hand is granted only to workers. But in the chaos of the Civil War unleashed by the Bolsheviks, class purity of the ranks could not be maintained.

Trotsky wrote:

"The army was built under fire. Construction techniques dominated by improvisation were immediately tested in practice. The army grew in numbers extremely rapidly. This was explained, on the one hand, by the extreme length of the fronts, and, on the other hand, by the looseness of the military organization. Insufficient preparation naturally caused an excessive expenditure of human power. The rapid and semi-chaotic growth of the army was caused by the fact that in order to solve each new combat mission, new regiments had to be built from nothing and

divisions...

We were alien to pedantry and patterns, resorted to all sorts of combinations and experiments, looking for success. One army is commanded by a former non-commissioned officer under the chief of staff of former generals. The other army is commanded by a former general with an assistant from the partisans. One division is commanded by a former soldier, the next by a colonel of the General Staff. This "eclecticism"

imposed by the whole situation."

By the end of the Civil War, the strength of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army reached 5.5 million people. One by one, the fronts were liquidated. However, the revolution did not take place in Europe, the country lay in ruins, and

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to support and feed such an abyss of young, healthy and nothing producing men could not afford. Instead of fanning the "global fire", it was necessary to deal with the problems of economic restoration and "socialist transformations". Fortunately, external enemies - the entire capitalist world - licked the wounds inflicted by the world massacre, and did not plan a new intervention.

Therefore, from the beginning of 1920, the victorious proletarian armies, one after another, began to be turned into Marxist labor armies. According to the plan of Lenin and Trotsky, the soldiers of these armies with a rifle in one hand and a shovel in the other were to deal with the aftermath of the Civil War and

simultaneously fight the "internal counter-revolution" and generally be on the alert. In January-April, eight labor armies were formed: 1st Revolutionary Labor Army (former 3rd Army), Ukrainian Soviet (from the troops of the Southwestern Front), Petrograd Revolutionary (7th Army), 2nd Special Railway (4th Army), Donetsk and Siberian labor armies ...

The various labor formations included 2.5 million Red Army soldiers, that is, half of the armed forces. They were mainly engaged in unskilled labor: restoration of mines and railways, procurement of fuel and food, endless loading and unloading. In general, everything that will become the constant and main occupation of the Soviet soldier in peacetime. At the same time, by personal example and fiery speeches, the Labor Army soldiers carried out cultural and educational work among the natives.

When all the ditches were dug, 460,000 wagons were loaded and unloaded, and 66,000 cubic meters of firewood were harvested, it became clear that the labor armies were unprofitable. They were disbanded in 1922. At the same time, a global reduction of the armed forces began. First of all, former officers of the tsarist army and unrepentant Trotskyists were removed from the command corps.

On August 8, 1923, a mixed recruitment system was introduced by decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, which allowed

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to reduce the size of the army by an order of magnitude and cut spending on it to a minimum. The essence of the idea was that only a small part of the military formations remained personnel (for example, until 1931 the entire Far East was covered by 6 rifle divisions, 2 cavalry brigades and 6 squadrons of aviation, in which there were 42 thousand people), the rest were transferred on the territorial-militia recruiting system.

In peacetime, the territorial formations contained a minimum number of regular military personnel, mainly command staff, who were engaged in military training assigned to the formations of a variable composition. Under such a system, registered reservists living in areas of deployment of military units were regularly called up for training camps, where they underwent military training. Upon mobilization, all of them were obliged to arrive in their units, thus staffing them according to the wartime states.

The conscription of the rank and file was carried out on the basis of the Law on Compulsory Military Service, adopted on September 18, 1925. It established that the defense of the USSR is the responsibility of all citizens, but the defense of the country with weapons in their hands is entrusted only to the working people, "non-working elements are entrusted with the performance of other duties for servicing the defense of the USSR". Citizens fit for health reasons who had reached 2] years of age were enrolled in the army, and they were supposed to play in the armed forces for five years.

In personnel units, these years were made up of continuous service from 2 to 4 years, depending on the type of troops and specialty, and a stay on long-term leave of 1-3 years with involvement at this time in training camps with a total duration of no more than two months. . The variable composition of the territorial militia formations was regularly called up for training camps with a total duration of 8-12 months. During the period between training camps, reservists were registered in military units on vacation and could participate in the construction of socialism.

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Those part of the rural youth who wanted to break out of the village and move to the city willingly went to the personnel service. They tried to train junior commanders from the most literate Red Army soldiers in accelerated courses at battalion schools. At the same time, their service life was extended from two to three years. In the military schools, where the "red commanders" were trained, they tried to recruit workers.

In 1926, military training was introduced in general education schools, but it was of little use. In addition, "defense weeks" were held annually in the summer throughout the Soviet Union with the obligatory participation of the entire able-bodied population of the country. At the same time, a number of defense-patriotic societies were created, united in January 1927 into Osoaviakhim.

The total number of armed forces from 1924 to 1931 did not exceed 640 thousand people, and the number of commanding officers - 40 thousand.

Throughout the 1920s, the army simply fought for its survival. So, on January 20, 1924, Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council E.M. Sklyansky (1892-1925) reported to the Council of Labor and Defense:

"With the maximum salary for the junior command staff - 18 rubles, for the middle one - 40 rubles and for the senior one - 60 rubles, i.e. for the predominant category of military personnel, the maintenance they receive does not even amount to a subsistence minimum. Under modern market conditions, a salary cannot provide not only families doomed to all the hardships of a half-starved existence, but also themselves."

The summary of the Political Directorate of November 15, 1926 stated:

"The financial situation of command personnel, especially family personnel, remains unsatisfactory. The maintenance salary received barely covers the cost of food, rent and purchase of firewood.

The most painful place in the life of the command staff is the housing problem. Most live in private apartments.

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shooting galleries and pays 10-20 rubles a month. Such a high cost forces the family commanders often with a family of 3-5 people to huddle in one room. Municipal funds are often not enough to pay for an apartment. Many flats are UNSUITABLE for habitation...

The indebtedness of command personnel, especially family ones, is growing. Most of the content received is not enough. The purchase of clothing and basic necessities inevitably puts the commanding staff in front of the need to get into debt. Some commanders only sign when they receive their salaries... some officers of the command staff are credited from private merchants. In the 191st regiment, part of the commanding staff wears their belongings as a pawn to the usurer ...

Difficult living conditions, insecurity create a depressed mood of the command staff, reduce their ability to work. There is talk of a "beggarly existence".

Colonel General I.M. Chistyakov (1900-1979), who in 1922-1924 commanded a platoon in the 37th Rifle Regiment, recalled:

"A Red Army soldier was supposed to receive a pound of bread a day, but he was given only two hundred grams, because the remaining two hundred were allocated to orphanages ... The country did everything possible to alleviate the plight of children, and therefore the Red Army soldiers steadfastly endured a half-starved life. We ate nettles. They will weld a full cauldron of it, throw a mug of cereal or cornmeal into it, and that's welding.

(The established ration of a Red Army soldier invariably exceeded that of a worker. It is another matter what kind of products and in what form reached a real soldier. Thus, in the Western Military District, "corned beef was issued, which was salted with intestines and feces and emitted a disgusting smell. In many parts, raw bread was given out with an admixture of sand, surrogates, and often rubbish." And then the film "Battleship Potemkin" was shown in the barracks.)

I, the commander, like my subordinates, at that time walked in bast shoes. [Proudly walked! Nagant on one side, field bag on the other - the girls were watching! You come to the barracks, bast shoes

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hurry into the water, you know that the foreman is strict. He told the Red Army men: "Whoever wears out bast shoes before five days, I won't give new ones - trample in puddles." Indeed, we are marching in formation, and when we see a puddle, everyone is in a herd - we will trample, the bast shoes will get wet, which means they will not crack ahead of time, they will last longer. There were six commanders in a machine gun company... All of them had one pair of boots. We took the largest size to suit everyone. They made a schedule of when someone would go to the city in them."

At the plenum of the Central Committee in April 1928, People's Commissar Voroshilov complained about the difficulties in training command personnel:

"It is not easy to develop a commander out of a peasant, because we have to work him politically for so long and so seriously that this task sometimes becomes beyond our strength. We almost never get real proletarians into military schools. The living and other conditions in the Red Army are such that they cannot in any way serve as a bait for good proletarian cadres."

Gradually, the financial situation of the military, primarily the commanding staff, improved, but the housing problem remained "the most painful place in the life of the commanding staff." The Soviet Motherland has never spared money for the world's largest bomb or "sausage" missiles, while invariably saving on its defenders, at the same time assuring that the people took off their last for their sake.

The thesis was widely promoted that the new army was fundamentally different in spirit from the old one: "In the Red Army, the antagonistic class stratification that existed between the bars - commanders and the "serfs" - soldiers, with all the ensuing consequences By consequences."

However, class demagoguery could not hide the fact that the belligerently ignorant masters of the new life, who had risen to the top by virtue of their proletarian origin alone and seized upon power, in many respects managed to surpass the pre-revolutionary "bars". Oso

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This began to manifest itself most clearly at the end of the 1920s, as the screws were tightened against the peasantry.

"A serious reason for the dissatisfaction of the Red Army soldiers," the OGPU reported in: "Review of the Political and Economic Condition of the USSR, "is the growth of the old officer habits of the command staff (rudeness, drunkenness, swearing and clericalism), which have taken root in the attitude towards the Red Army even on the part of the political staff.. .

The exploitation of Red Army soldiers for personal needs is a mass phenomenon, observed in almost all districts; there are frequent cases of messengers being sent at the disposal of wives, mothers, etc. to do housework...

The rudeness of the command staff increases every month, taking the form of complete disregard for the Red Army masses, preferring repressive measures instead of moral influence on the Red Army soldiers and subordinates, and also exploitation of the Red Army soldiers ... "

Meanwhile, in the "class-stratified" tsarist army, since the time of Peter the Great, it was forbidden for an officer to give orders that were not related to official business. Moreover, the soldier was not obliged to carry out such orders and had to report the officer to the court.

According to the Military Article of 1715: "The command of an officer no longer extends over the soldiers, only as much as His Majesty and His State needs; and what does not concern His Majesty's service, then the position of a soldier does not require repairing either.

Scuffles and wholesale drunkenness blossomed in a riotous color in the Red Army:

"Drunkenness in units is progressing and is becoming characteristic of the life of army command personnel in a peaceful environment. In many cases, it is accompanied by debauchery and drunken revelry in restaurants, up to and including street shooting. In some parts, drunkenness undermines any authority of the command staff and represents a serious danger ...

The attitude of the command staff to their duties is negligent. The commanders do not attend classes for several days and are cut off from the Red Army masses. In some places the command staff

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represents a caste completely alien to the interests of the Red Army...

The decadence of mood among political workers of the army is especially observed in parts of the Caucasian army, where cases of suicide have recently become more frequent. From an anonymous questionnaire conducted by the party collegium of the 3rd division, it turned out that up to thirty percent of the communists of the division think or thought of suicide as a way out of a difficult situation ...

In the Volga Military District, the assistant company commander, in a drunken stupor, undressed himself, undressed a prostitute, with whom he began to dance the Russian. The rest started firing their revolvers, making a lot of noise...

In the Urals military district, drinking parties were in the nature of an orgy, where some of the wives of the command staff danced almost naked. There was a women's drinking party, which was attended by all the wives of the commanders of the 20th regiment. The booze continued with dancing, debauchery, swearing, and it got to the point that the commander who accidentally fell on the floor was knocked down, his trousers were lowered, and it cost him a lot of work to escape from there without being raped.

Despite this, as well as the dissatisfaction of the majority of the Red Army soldiers with the collectivization unfolding in the countryside, Voroshilov assured that "the army is strong, combat-ready and is a reliable support for the dictatorship of the proletariat." However, instead of combat training, the main emphasis was placed on the political indoctrination of the personnel, whose morale was extremely low due to the robbery of the village and the introduction of the card system. Of the ten hours of working time, almost half was spent listening to political instructors' tales about the wonderful life in the Soviet country.

"Happy is the man who was born in the Soviet century."

"Great victories await us ahead under the rays of the red star."

"Soldier's honor and glory are more precious than bread and fat."

The famous general P.N. Krasnov (1869-1947) in his

work "The Soul of the Army" argued: 314

"The higher the ideals for which the army fights, the more valiantly it behaves in the war ...

Everything spiritual is forbidden for a Red Army soldier. He has no memories of a glorious past, no hope for a brighter future. Life is today. Live and rejoice in HIM ... We cannot imagine what hopeless darkness, what violent horror reigns in the soul of the Red Army. This is such a void that you cannot flood with any moonshine, you cannot drown it out with any violence against women, any revelry. Their new songs are rough and wild, their

entertainment is base, they have nothing ahead of them. There is no future. Their glory is a dark, bloody glory, without a radiant fusion with the bright glory of their ancestors, without justification in the future. This is the courage of many of them and their military strength. This is the courage of despair, this is the strength of consciousness, terrible in its emptiness: "there is nothing left to do but to fight and die..."

In the very methods of military education, the Communists did not come up with anything new. They used the old ways of influencing the human soul: religion, patriotism, banners, slogans, close formation, music, singing, the appearance of the boss. Their religion is "Leninism", the Testaments of "Ilyich" are their commandments.

Thus, in the 1920s, the Soviet Union had a small, technically backward, illiterate, poorly funded, entangled in political control, and little combat-ready army. Some of these shortcomings can be corrected, but congenital defects remain incurable.

A radical change in the Soviet military-political doctrine occurred in 1932 after Stalin's protracted response to Tukhachevsky's note. Iosif Vissarionovich, in particular, wrote:

"There is no doubt that the character of the armies, which has changed in recent years, the growth of military transport technology and the development of aviation, the appearance of mechanized units and the corresponding reorganization of the armies create an entirely new situation, depriving the old disputes about a large number of

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divisions of decisive importance.... I think you will agree with me that an army of 6,000,000, well equipped with equipment and organized in a new way, will be quite enough to defend the independence of our country for all fronts without exception. And we are more or less capable of such an army."

For the Headquarters of the Red Army, the wishes of the Leader were a guide to action, although such an army was not needed to solve defensive tasks (in 1930 it was recognized that deploying an army of 3-3.5 million Human).

By the beginning of 1933, the number of armed forces had reached 800 thousand people, by the beginning of 1934 it had exceeded one MILLION.

In August 1936, the draft age was set at 19.

The 1938 mobilization plan already provided for the deployment of an 8.6 million army. | On September 1939, an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a new law on universal conscription. Since the exploiting classes were destroyed, the law proclaimed service in the ranks of the Red Army an honorable duty and a sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR, regardless of social origin and position. The terms of service were established: in the ground and internal troops for the rank and file - 2, for the junior commanding staff - 3 years; in aviation, coastal defense units and border troops - 4 years; on ships and units of the Navy — 5 years.

To provide the armed forces with command personnel of all specialties, a wide network of educational institutions was deployed. Thus, if in 1937 there were 75 military schools and schools in the country, including 7 naval and 18 aviation schools, then on May 1, 1941 there were already 255 of them, including 100 aviation and 16 naval schools.

When recruiting schools, preference was given to conscripts and over-conscripts under the age of 25; for civilian youth, the age limit

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limited to 22 years. The contemporaries of the Revolution, who grew up and educated under the Soviet system, went to military service.

It must be said that the Marxists attached paramount importance to the creation of a "new man", who alone is capable of living under the communism they conceived. The most bearded of the classics for the "production of comprehensively developed people" suggested using the factory labor of adolescents in combination "with teaching and gymnastics." Lenin, dreaming of "teaching communism" to all young people, proposed to educate them from the age of twelve "in conscious and disciplined labor" and develop in them "communist morality" subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat.

"Each member of society looks one after the other and is obliged to denounce," wrote F.M. Dostoevsky. Everyone belongs to everyone, and everything belongs to everyone. All slaves are equal even in slavery. In extreme cases - slander and murder, and most importantly - equality. First of all, the level of education, sciences, and talents goes down."

And just as soon as they conquered the country, the first thing the newly-minted educators began to burn were books.

In general, as historical experience shows, all revolutionaries, having come to power, become obscurantists. By force they seize power, by terror they bring the people into obedience, by force they lead the "exhausted mass" to universal happiness, waving a carrot of a bright future in front of their noses and putting the barrel of a pistol to the back of their heads. In order to quickly fool the people with their ideas, it is necessary to protect them from the pernicious influence of the ideas of outsiders.

In solving this problem, a major role was assigned to the People's Commissariat of Education, within the framework of which, on November 12, 1920, the Main Political and Educational Committee of the Republic was formed. The permanent chairman of the committee until 1930 was N.K. Krupskaya. The well-known historian Yu.V. Gauthier was once invited to a meeting of the "gorillas", after which made an entry in his diary:

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"I was taken to the Commissariat of Public Education for a meeting of the collegium of the Commissariat... N.K. Krupskaya-Ulyanova, 5 minutes to the Russian empress; I did not expect to see her as she is—old, terrible, with the stupid face of a stupid fanatic, and her ugliness is emphasized by a clearly expressed Graves' disease; the rest of those present were Posner, Shapiro, Marx and other representatives of the ruling

tribe...

It turned out that I did not need to come at all. I do not regret, however, that I have lost time here; the picture of poverty and the inability to do anything, except to drown in words, was so vivid that it left an indelible impression on me and convinced me once again that these creatures, having only an image from people, cannot create anything.

Nadezhda Konstantinovna, who in her youth enlightened the workers, finally found something to her liking. The instruction approved by her ordered to immediately begin work to cleanse the libraries of "harmful literature." Krupskaya's instruction formed the basis of the secret directive of the People's Commissariat of Education, signed in 1923.

According to it, literature of "the following "types" was subject to seizure and destruction: patriotic, Black Hundred, hostile to progressive ideas, religious and moral, historical fiction, idealizing the past, preaching petty-bourgeois morality, sentimental, "pale, not artistic", of a decadent mood, according to - vulgar humor, "literature of anguish and decadent mood", mysticism, adventure novels, etc. d.

The document further elaborated:

"Since almost all old literature can be subsumed under these headings, the Glavpolitprosvet develops approximate lists of seized literature, which will be sent periodically in the near future so that the places have more specific ideas about what is permissible in libraries ... These lists are approximate and therefore will by no means exhaust everything that needs to be withdrawn.

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Persons "guilty of concealing stocks of books" were subject to trial.

All philosophers, historians, psychologists, sociologists, and ethicists were the first to be listed among the authors interfering with "Soviet construction": Kant, Plato, Descartes, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Spencer, Solovyov, Mach. All of them were replaced by Marxism, which accumulated the entire "sum of human knowledge". Leo Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, Lazhechnikov and Zagoskin, Dumas Père and Mine Reed, Senkevich and Averchenko were banned next... Instead, the pamphlets "World October and Destroy the Louse", portraits of Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, Sverdlov were to be distributed.

To paraphrase the saying of Caliph Omar: "Why do we need libraries if we have Capital?" (When Lenin fell into insanity and decided to start breeding rabbits, the books had to be ordered from Germany.)

The entire old school, in Lenin's opinion, "which trained the servants necessary for the capitalists," and the old universities, which People's Commissar Lunacharsky declared "a pile of rubbish," were to be destroyed.

In pedagogy and education, the tasks of forming a class consciousness in the younger generation, almost from the cradle, were put forward in the first place. In the 1920s, kindergarten teachers and school teachers were required to carry out a "correct class policy" and inculcate in children hatred for "socially alien elements". The essence of the class struggle and the reactionary nature of the bourgeoisie were explained to children of three or four years old.

In schools, the commissions checked whether all students had collected signatures about not attending church, how the anti-Christmas campaign was going, whether "individual processing of children who are negatively disposed by the socio-political side" is being carried out. Shkrabs (teachers were renamed "school workers"), brought up in the pre-revolutionary era, were blamed for their excessive "enthusiasm for general educational tasks to the detriment of the interests of the proletariat

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ta." Statements such as "a teacher should teach" were regarded as enemy sabotage and "kulak" propaganda. Teachers were required not to teach, but "ideologically to instill in students enmity towards a class alien to them."

"Fighting for the pace of communist education," wrote V. Shulgin, an employee of the People's Commissariat of Education, "we must free ourselves from traditional excesses ... We must throw out everything superfluous from the programs, we must revise them from the point of view of accelerating the pace."

And reviewed and discarded. The Bolsheviks, having put forward the slogan of the elimination of illiteracy, did not at all intend to engage in enlightenment, which always poses a threat to dictatorship. Lenin, posing for the painter Yu.P. Annenkov, expressed himself quite definitely:

"In general, as you know, I don't have much sympathy for the intelligentsia, and our slogan 'eliminate illiteracy' should by no means be interpreted as a striving for the birth of a new intelligentsia. "Limitation of illiteracy" should be done only so that every peasant, every worker can read our decrees, orders, appeals on his own, without the help of others. The goal is quite practical, that's all."

As early as April 1918, a program of university proletarianization began to be implemented. To begin with, in August of the same year, the need for secondary education was abolished by a separate decree. From now on, everyone over the age of 16 received the right to enter higher educational institutions without presenting a diploma, certificate or information about the end of any school.

In October 1920, Lenin formulated the principles of higher education reform: 1) science is only for the poor; 2) no freedom of teaching; 3) increasing the material support of employees devoted to the Soviet regime. Applicants were selected on a class basis, regardless of their level of training and abilities. The "Regulations on higher educational institutions of the RSFSR" prescribed that all children of workers and peasants should be admitted to universities,

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having directions of party, Komsomol and trade union organizations.

The tasks of the Soviet student were voiced in 1924 by the leader's faithful militant friend Krupskaya: 1) to study Marxism and Leninism; 2) to supplement the proletarian origin with the assimilation of the proletarian ideology; 3) armed with ideology, transform life. And even if we lose in the qualification of "red specialists", we will have "a strong guarantee that the train will run on reliable rails and will not go downhill somewhere". The "red professors" trained in Marxism were to replace the bourgeois specialists.

The circular of the Central Committee of the Komsomol pointed out: "The main task of the universities should be the training of specialists devoted to the party and the Soviet government. This main task can be achieved if the sending organizations conduct a thorough selection of candidates for universities."

On June 8, 1922, at a meeting of the Politburo, the proposals of the Deputy Chairman of the GPU I.S. Unshlikht on the development of measures on the issues of "filtering students by the beginning of the next academic year", establishing "strict restrictions on the admission of students of non-proletarian origin" and "establishing evidence of political reliability". Soon, an addition appeared to these points: "Before the start of the academic year, all students (except members of the RCP and RKSM) are required to submit a review of the GPU at the location of the university about their loyal attitude to the Soviet government."

The entrance exams now had no meaning. The purity of the questionnaire and the blessing of the party and Chekist apparatus were important. In the presence of the first two conditions, a "proletarian" appearance and demeanor could become a great help. As M. Moskvina recalled:

"The more 'proletarian' you look, the rougher your speech and the dumber your answers, the more likely you are to gnaw at the granite of science."

It is also important the ability to swear, to hit "on the sopatka", but

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sew clothes in a proletarian way and "know that rudeness is not a vice, that violence is a virtue, and only then does a candidate for higher education become a particle of the material that proletarianizes universities."

Yes, he is a ready "red officer"!

By the beginning of 1925, in the country's universities, the proportion of graduates of workers' faculties among students was already 43 percent. The Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in July 1928 demanded that this figure be raised to 65 percent. At the same time, in the 1920s, educational institutions were regularly purged of "foreign elements." In 1925 alone, 40,000 students were expelled from higher education.

Curricula had to be adapted to catastrophically illiterate young proletarians. At the Moscow Higher Technical School, the course on the strength of materials was removed from the program so as not to burden students with the complexities of higher mathematics; faculties of physics and mathematics were completely abolished in a number of universities. As "obsolete and useless for the dictatorship of the proletariat", the law and historical-philosophical faculties were liquidated, the teaching of history was withdrawn from secondary schools. (The Bolshevik M.N. Pokrovsky, who rewrote Russian history from a class point of view, became the first Marxist historian and official head of Soviet historical science: "But the supporters of this science, apart from Pokrovsky himself, were only single historians from among the party members. Representatives of the old Russian historical schools did not recognize either the authority of Pokrovsky or his historical conception. In fact, this is why historical science had to be abolished for the time being in general in Russia.")

Tzetno appealed in his appeal to the Council of People's Commissars on February 8, 1922, the team of teachers of the Moscow Higher Technical School:

"The enrollment in schools of a mass of unprepared, sometimes almost illiterate people, who forced the staff of scientific workers, so few in number in Russia and therefore especially valuable for her, to squander their strength on elementary education.

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preparation of accepted persons and, moreover, undoubtedly with a worse result than a properly placed secondary school could do.

Old-time professors who imagined themselves to be "valuable personnel" were replaced by "red professors". One of them, one A.B. Salkind, in 1924 published The Twelve Sexual Commandments of the Revolutionary Proletariat, where, in particular, he wrote:

"The proletariat has every reason to intervene in the chaotic development of sexual life... All those elements of sexual life that harm the creation of a healthy revolutionary change, that rob class energy, fester class joys, spoil intra-class relations, should be mercilessly swept aside... Sexual attraction to a class-hostile, morally opposite, dishonorable object is the same perversion as a person's sexual attraction to a crocodile, to an orangutan..." Then came the nonsense about "class anti-sex pump", with the help of which it was proposed to "suck back the valuables" stolen from the proletarian organism.

The level of education naturally and steadily decreased, but even in the simplified version, the quality of assimilation of the material remained low. So, in 1926, 38 percent of students did not have time at the Moscow Higher Technical School, and out of 378 graduates, 262 were repeaters. In technical schools, repeaters accounted for more than 55 percent of all students. The leaders of the Soviet system of education themselves admitted that "universities train "defective" engineers and doctors, and their defectiveness is not noticeable because these engineers do not build anything, and doctors work in conditions of epidemics that mow down people."

Engineers who build nothing, doctors who do not treat anyone, military men who do not know how to fight - all this has become another persistent Soviet tradition.

Naturally, the most selective youth cadres were sent to military educational institutions. After all, they received weapons in their hands, studied "the best in the world" and the most

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secret technique. Therefore, the purity of the questionnaire was given special importance, and the concealment of "alien origin" was considered a serious crime and severely punished. Those who were unlucky with their origins had the opportunity to get into the service on condition of strong

expressed love for the Soviet regime and a public break with his parents, as, for example, did the son of a priest, the future marshal A.M. Vasilevsky.

Only in December 1935, after Stalin's famous "Son is not responsible for his father", the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars lifted restrictions "related to the social origin of persons entering educational institutions, or to restrictions on the rights of their parents." Formally. Since almost simultaneously a secret circular of the NKVD was issued, noting that the children and grandchildren of "former people" are a "counter-revolutionary reserve". The reason for the arrest could be not only a noble origin, but also the presence of a university diploma, knowledge of foreign languages, the ability to correctly speak and write in Russian!

However, now it was much more urgent not to fall into the category of "enemies of the people" or "family member of the enemy of the people."

By 1939, the bulk of young people entering military institutions - 43.9% - had an education of 7 classes, 17% - 10 classes, 14.5% graduated from workers' faculties and technical schools (at that time, this was a high level: young people who graduated from seven years, they themselves could be teachers in rural schools, as, for example, the future Colonel-General A.M. Kryukov).

For the huge number of schools and schools deployed in the country, neither the material part nor the teaching staff was enough.

So, on January 1, 1941, the air force schools and flight schools were staffed with teachers only by 44.1%. In the same educational institutions, instead of the 1276 SB bombers required by the state, there were only 535 available, and there were only 217 dual-control cabins instead of 743.

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Despite the fact that thousands of aircraft were built in the country every year, the "Stalinist falcons" were taught to fly on outdated equipment.

(This situation did not change in the course of the war. The emphasis was not on the high level of training of military personnel, but on their mass character. The former commander of the 4th Air Army, Marshal K.A. Vershinin, recalled how he accepted replenishment in during preparations for Operation Bagration: "Three air divisions arrived from the 1st Air Army. We learned that the 309th IAD was 60% staffed by young pilots who arrived from schools. 22 of them completed the flight program only the Po-2 aircraft and the combat aircraft were not flown at all. The situation was no better in the 233rd division. It included 22 young pilots. "Fighter pilots, who had never seen a fighter, were sent straight to the front, and ground attack pilots who were "no better" trained.)

Flight schools were provided with fuel by 41.4% of the need, respectively, and tank ones - Same.

The three-year term of study in almost all schools was reduced to two years, and its quality was constantly deteriorating, in simplification reaching primitivism. Together with the executed military leaders, the textbooks and instructions written by them disappeared. CM. Elizarov recalled: "In officer schools, we were taught the techniques of "beating off the cavalry on the right and left", meaningless stepping. And we do not see the textbooks created by the revolutionary generals have seen."

In April 1940, at a meeting of the commanding staff dedicated to the results of the Finnish War, a fact was announced that perfectly characterizes the quality of training of command personnel: in the 142nd Infantry Division, only 17% of the commanding staff knew the compass, map and knew how to walk in azimuth!

But in the curricula of all military and military-political schools, courses, military academies, divisional party and Komsomol schools, a special

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course "On methods of combating espionage, sabotage, sabotage and terrorist activities of the intelligence services of the capitalist countries and their Trotskyist-Bukharin agents."

Early releases were widely practiced.

During the three pre-war years, 48,000 red commanders were stamped in military schools.

As of January 1, 1941, the payroll of the command and command staff of the army and navy was 579,581 people, including 427,000 people serving in the ground forces, and 113,000 people in the air force. Of these, 7.1% had a higher education, 55.9% had a secondary education, 24.6% had an accelerated military education, and 12.4% had no military education at all.

Due to frequent movements, many officers before the war held their positions for a short time and did not have time to acquire the necessary experience. Up to half of the command staff had practical command experience from 6 months to one year. In all districts, due to the shortage of 77,000 career officers, 30-40% of the middle-level commanders were reserve officers with insufficient military training.

"Our academies, schools and courses taught command cadres incorrectly," Marshal Zhukov realized in 1944, "namely:

1) Theoretical training was clearly at the expense of practical training. The experience of the war showed that only those commanders turned out to be good commanders who grew up in the field, and not in the offices ...

2) Our commanders knew and know the equipment very poorly (aviation, artillery, tanks, etc.).

3) The strong-willed qualities of our commander - initiative, the ability to take responsibility - are clearly insufficiently developed, and this adversely affected the course of the war in the first period ... "

Six days before the German attack on the USSR, the staff of the US military attache in Moscow made up don

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message for the Department of Military Intelligence with an analysis of the state of the Red Army, in which, in particular, wrote:

"The leadership of the army consists of uneducated and even ignorant people. As a result of the purge of 1938, capable military leaders were expelled from the army, which made its current senior command staff qualitatively inferior.

The officer corps as a whole can be characterized in the same way, with the exception of the younger officers. The increased importance given over the past ten years to the military school system has raised the general educational level among half of the young officers, but much remains to be done in this regard.

Undereducated, underflying, undershooting, "incorrectly trained" freshly baked commanders went to combat units to receive equipment and favorite personnel ...

The Soviet "military doctrinaires" believed that an individual Red Army soldier was initially superior to any fighter of any capitalist power, because: "Class selection,

the class principle of educating the army and the class goals of the war of the proletarian state make the Red Army an incomparable force in the political and moral sense", and our tactical art develops "on the core of a high political and moral level, on the basis of mobility, courage and pressure. The force of class education carried out by our Party is a mighty force, and, moreover, the force of the Red Army alone."

True, Frunze, in addition to class education, also insisted on "the maximum mental development of the Red Army," and Tukhachevsky wrote that "a modern fighter must be highly cultured, must have the ability to expediently and productively use advanced technology".

But where was this "highly cultured fighter" to come from?

The main part of the Red Army mass was still made up of peasants who had gone through school
collectivism

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nations that survived dispossession, the death famine of 1932-1933, the famine of 1936 and 1937, intimidated by terror and forever assigned to collective farms. "Respected grain growers" were turned into disenfranchised slaves working for bread.

They grew up in a country where the writing of denunciations was elevated to the rank of high prowess, where the heirs of Pavlik Morozov, the pioneer "watchmen", gathered for rallies and told how their relatives were imprisoned for a spool of thread stolen from work, where doctors urged: "In the matter of disclosing wrecking, call the OGPU to the competition."

"Let Comrade Yezhov know that the Chekists of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs are not only those who work in punitive detachments, but also millions of working people who have learned Bolshevik vigilance, who have learned to expose the enemies of the people and make up the reserves of the NKVD," Pravda wrote on December 21 - October 1937.

From the point of view of foreigners, the happy Soviet collective farmers were reduced to a bestial state. Here is an example of a curious situation. During the forcible entry of the Baltic countries into the Soviet Union, part of the Baltic states, infected with the "bacilli of communism", actively contributed to this: they met the "liberators" with flowers, sought out class enemies, helped the NKVD in carrying out deportations and other socialist transformations. In the summer of 1941, they managed to escape, their families were sent to the rear. Not to a polar concentration camp, but to ordinary regional centers and villages: to fix frayed nerves. Once in the "international homeland", they experienced a new shock:

"Dear comrade Malenkov. At the 18th Party Conference you mercilessly exposed the shortcomings in industrial life. The same merciless attitude must be applied to collective-farm life. If you, comrade. Malenkov, if you lived on such a collective farm as I have to live in, your hair would probably stand on end - instead of a real socialist economy, you got some kind of

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ugliness. The mass of the peasantry lives in the great poverty (the main subsistence is bread and water, and even then there is not enough) because of the slovenliness, and, one might say, criminal leadership. I'll tell you the truth - in fascist Latvia, the workers lived in much better conditions than those here
collective farmers.

We, the newly arrived Latvians, active workers for Soviet power in the Latvian SSR, were so deeply disappointed that our faith in the viability of the socialist system received a significant bruise... After all, here, in the Gorky region, the land is with the right management, returns could well be tenfold. There is nothing to refer to underbirths

- culture does not know such... Isn't it a screaming fact that collective farmers have not achieved more during more than ten years of existence of collective farms | kilos of bread for a workday? And the appearance of our village is such that its people are preparing for death rather than for LIFE."

These are the ideals and such daily practice "on steel bayonets and Voroshilov volleys" they were going to bring to the peoples of Europe? "Liberators" under the supervision of guards?

(I remember how, during the passage of Soviet ships through the Black Sea straits, under the leadership of political officers, they organized a "vigilance watch": the sailors were driven into cockpits and to combat posts, and officers and midshipmen with machine guns were posted along the perimeter of the upper deck, so that no one escaped from our a socialist paradise - in some places only a hundred meters to the Turkish coast; and that was in 1989.)

The real successes of the Bolsheviks in the cause of the "cultural revolution" were greatly exaggerated. During the 1937 census, it turned out that even among young people aged 18-19 there were 8.5% of the illiterate, among thirty-year-olds every fourth was literate.

In the spring of 1936, Commander Uborevich, commander of the Belorussian Military District, reported:

"Each call of fighters from the village brings us to

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barracks 35 illiterate per hundred. But these "illiterate" people are, in fact, completely illiterate: they can barely write their last names and will read two pages in an hour. These are people who do not know who Stalin is, who Hitler is, where is the West, where is the East, what is socialism.

And in the army we suffer, we teach literacy for months. We have engineers, technicians who don't know what sauce they eat thermodynamics with, they don't know fractions, because the devil knows what was done in high school.

By 1939, 8.2% of workers and only 1.8% of collective farmers had an education of seven grades of secondary school and above. The eradication of illiteracy gave the overwhelming majority only a formal education, the ability to "read decrees" and scribble: "We are not slaves, we are not slaves."

Alexander Bazarov, having studied the documents of medical commissions stored in the State Archive of the Khanta-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug, published anthropometric data of conscripts of the "1941 model":

"I study the documents for all 279 people called up from my native region in the Trans-Urals: there the average height was 153 centimeters, the average weight was 52 kilograms. Throughout the region of the Urals and the Northern Ob region, the anatomical parameters of conscripts are approximately the same. A rare conscript goes beyond the dimensions of 160 cm 50 kg.

"With such a replenishment, you can move mountains and twist your cheekbones to all big and small boogers," Comrade Mekhlis broadcast.

Meanwhile, the weight load on an ordinary Red Army soldier, taking into account full combat equipment and winter uniforms, was 33.3 kilograms.

In the 1930s, talking and writing about the Soviet armed forces, created by the tireless care of the party, the government, and Comrade Stalin personally, was supposed to be only in the most superlative degrees. The country of victorious socialism surpassed all capitalist states, and its army was "the best in the world, the most organized, the most cultured and physically healthy." It created

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WE are "all the conditions that ensure a high standard of living and life for all fighters and commanders."

The main press organ of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda, wrote:

"A soldier of the Red Army who knows what he is fighting for, who feels the love and care of his homeland, cannot but be the best, most disciplined soldier in the world."

It was reported about exemplary barracks and canteens, the best units, excellent students in combat and political training, remarkably organized classes and magnificent maneuvers that plunged foreign delegations into amazement: "The Red Army is stronger than ever!"

In 1936, the range of Red Army rations was expanded. Each fighter per day was supposed to have 600 g of rye and 400 g of wheat bread, 150 g of cereals, 10 g of pasta, 175 g of meat, 20 g of animal fat, 30 g of vegetable oil, 35 g of sugar, 30 g of salt, 735 g of potatoes and vegetables, 1.6

hchaya.

Propaganda emphasized the virtues of the diet and its high calorie content. She claimed that "almost all young soldiers during their stay in the ranks of the Red Army gain weight and chest volume", acquire a "heroic" stature.

However, "in a number of parts" there were still "numerous facts" of individual "shortcomings".

These facts, cited, in particular, in a study by Natalia Kuleshova for 1938-1939, reveal a picture of the ever-present Russian mess, Asian savagery, Bolshevik indifference to an individual, completely refuting the nostalgic assertions that "there was order under Stalin."

"First of all, the difference between the prescribed and the real range of products received by military personnel is striking (for any Soviet citizen who served in the Soviet army, there is just nothing amazing in this). For example, in the Belarusian Special Military District (BOVO), soldiers complained about interruptions in the issuance of rations: oil, which they "should receive daily, was given immediately

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in 23 days", and at the courses of deputy political instructors, cadets invariably received mashed potatoes for lunch, dinner and breakfast.

The same constancy, however, in a different food variation, was also practiced in the 1st Separate Red Banner Army (1st OKA). There, in the morning and evening, buckwheat porridge was served for 10-15 days in a row, then salted fish for 10 days in a row. "The soup from this fish is boiled in the morning and in the evening, salty and very liquid, if you find 3 pieces of potatoes in the soup, it is happiness. In a word, the food is bad."

The absence of onions, carrots, tomatoes and potatoes in the dishes were reported from the Volga Military District (PriVO). It was stated that the fighters were dissatisfied with such food, but "no one takes any action on all signals ...". From the Kyiv Special Military District (KOVO), the Red Army drew attention to the fact that the food was prepared tasteless and monotonous: "Borscht is liquid, there is absolutely nothing in it, with the exception of pickles."

Well, this is familiar.

Often, instead of "pickles" or potatoes in food, one could easily find a wide variety of items and "food additives". So, from the Moscow military district in the summer of 1938 they reported: "On June 10, rotten sausage was served as the second course for dinner. Neither the commander nor the commissar paid any attention to this fact. 11| June, potatoes were served in kerosene for dinner, despite the fact that the day before the dining room attendant had forbidden potatoes of the same "quality" to be served for dinner. Nothing has changed. On June 15, in the second potato served, it was found

glass. A day later, a nail was found in the bread. On June 17, the sanitary commission found that the meat delivered for the canteen was smeared with manure.

In the Kalinin military district, pieces of barbed wire, wood chips, rags and other hardware goods were systematically found in food. The same situation took place in the Leningrad VO: "Bread is brought 4 days earlier, in

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the dining room is given in a frozen form ... you can still put up with this. But when the fighters find glass, horse teeth in bread, it already becomes intolerable."

It would seem that here they are the machinations of pest agents. However, everything is much simpler.

Red Army soldier N.N. Chernovol, describing the state of the catering unit, reported to his favorite newspaper: "I had to imagine such a canteen when I read a book about barge haulers - dirty, untidy. Moss has appeared where food is stored. And from here insects appear, such as, for example, cockroaches, which very often swim in food (borscht, soup, etc.)." And in all districts, everywhere it was the same thing: "There is a growth of dirt on the floor for two centimeters", "tables are dirty, stools are dirty, bowls are served dirty, potatoes can be planted in mugs ... Lunches are served in dirty canisters."

The dirtiest "place" was the catering workers themselves: "Not only is there dirt in the canteen, assistant head. the canteen himself always goes about dirty, without a dressing gown, he himself has to wash himself for 24 hours in a bathhouse and wash off the dirt on his hands."

Canteens were often located in unusable premises. During meals, plaster or water poured from the ceiling into the plates. Canteens were sometimes not heated, and in winter the temperature in them dropped below zero. Fighters from the Kyiv district wrote that the cold "reached 12-15 degrees, so that it was impossible to eat without gloves." The same signals were received from the Volga Military District.

There was no elementary order in the canteens, neither the commanders nor the commissars who watched over the commanders were completely interested in the "little things" of the soldier's life. Many fighters simply remained hungry. Because of the flea market, for example, in the rifle regiment of the Kharkov district, meals lasted 2-3 hours, for a mug of tea, the Red Army stood in line for about an hour. In many parts there were not enough lunches and dinners. So, from the Belorussian district it was reported that on January 5, 1939, "there was not enough dinner for 80 people -

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fighters. They had to wait until 12 o'clock at night, when the second stage dinner was prepared". In the Kalinin VO: "Breakfasts from breakfast to lunch are 10-11 hours, often without lunch People".

To avoid cases of food shortages, cooks simply reduced portions, and if there was a surplus, the "saved" was thrown into the trash. Half-starved fighters, leaving the dining room, said: "When will we eat our fill?" - and demanded "to end the soulless attitude towards the happiest fighter of the Red Army." Krasnaya Zvezda responded with an editorial about the methods of the "vile activity of fascist intelligence agents."

Theft flourished at all levels of the food chain. Fathers-commanders did not disdain to feed themselves and their families at public expense, then writing off the food as spoiled. It was all the more simple because the food festered in tons during storage and transportation:

"There are frequent cases when a wagon of flour or cereals is piled on a place where a wagon of scrap raw materials, alabaster, paints, etc., has just been lying, or in the immediate vicinity, close to

similar goods. It also happens that cereals that have arrived at the NPO warehouse and are not infected with grain pests are placed next to cereals infected with these pests."

The lack of glaciers for storing perishable foodstuffs in a number of military units and the careless attitude towards them led to the fact that the meat was lying on the dirty floor, or "torn overcoats, skis and other things" were thrown next to the food supplies.

In addition to the constant shortage of food, the soldiers suffered from the lack of the necessary amount of dishes in the canteens: spoons, bowls, teapots, plates. There were cases when there were only 25-30 spoons per 100 people, or there were none at all, and the fighters "ate all the thick and liquid foods over the edge of the bowl. Because of these spoons, the Red Army began to arouse discontent against the command of the unit. From the 1st Separate Red Banner Army, a correspondent, reporting a shortage of spoons and bowls, noted that

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You have to wait a long time, and after you wait, you take unwashed spoons. For if you give to wash, you will not receive any more. Similar letters were received by the editorial office of Krasnaya Zvezda on a daily basis, from all military districts. On April 4, 1939, the head of the Political Directorate, Lev Mekhlis, speaking to the activists of the Kiev Special District, gave an example when "there were 150 spoons for a whole regiment, and the Red Army soldiers stood in several lines to get a spoon, literally a spoon was taken from the battle."

Unsanitary conditions led to the fact that many servicemen suffered from stomach diseases. According to the data of the Political Directorate, only in January-February 1938, "twenty-one poisonings" were registered in parts of the border districts, as a result of which 1963 Red Army soldiers fell ill. The command, instead of taking measures - to stop theft, provide conditions for storing food, glaze windows, clean up the premises and wash the canteen workers - preferred to shut the mouths of the complainers in a universal way. "Some of the bunglers," Mekhlis reported, "when the Red Army men turn to them about an ugly cooked dinner, they bring this matter under the collective, teach them to punish the Red Army men for this, and not those people who treat them ugly. the Red Army."

All this happened in peacetime, not in fascist captivity, but in the "organized army" itself. During the Patriotic War, our suppliers will simply starve the soldiers. Treating their duties with the same disdain and the same heartlessness towards people, "some of the bunglers" will actually help the Germans to organize the Leningrad famine. The soldiers of the Kalinin and Stalingrad fronts will die of dystrophy without any blockade. Like, for example, the soldiers of the 66th Army of General Zhadov in October 1942:

"Due to poor nutrition - exhaustion of fighters, 23 deaths were registered in 587 and 692 SP, 212 SD. There were 9 deaths in 62 SDs. Medical commissions established that death was due to exhaustion and

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body fatigue. Despite the presence of signals, neither the command of the army nor the command of the front took the necessary measures through the rear institutions to organize a normal supply.

The command drove the army into daily attacks on German machine guns, and they were not accustomed to taking care of the "organization of supplies" for their subordinates. Although the generals themselves loved to eat.

Let's take a look at the application for the release of food products for the Military Council of the Western Front dated September 29, 1941:

"For a number of events by the Military Council of the Western Front, I ask for your order on vacation: 1. Various fruits (grapes, pears, apples, oranges, tangerines and

canned fruits). 2. Fish products (balyk, salmon, teshka, stellate sturgeon), caviar. 3. Canned fish (sprats, sardines, sprats, gobies). 4. Wine and vodka products for 3,000 rubles. 5. Confectionery products in assortment. 6. Beer and fruit waters. Secretary of the Military Council of the Western Front Battalion Commissar Astapov.

Exactly one day remained before the start of the German operation "Typhoon", during which the entire Western Front of General Konev would be completely destroyed, and his headquarters planned "events" with caviar and wine and vodka products (General Manstein complained in his memoirs that at his age it was difficult to gnaw the dry sausage given out in rations, and he was not supposed to have balyks).

The unpretentiousness of a cheap Soviet fighter caused surprise and envy of foreign generals and was considered his strength, largely compensating for shortcomings in preparation:

"In the Red Army, the rear services do not have to worry about providing military units with uniforms, tents, blankets and other items that are so necessary for the soldiers of the armies of the West. During the offensive, they can afford to forget about the supply of troops even with food, since the troops are on the "pasture". The main purpose of supply is

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delivery of fuel and ammunition, but even in this case, combat vehicles are often used for transportation. In a Russian motorized division, a soldier has no other "luggage" than what he has with him, and he manages to move around in a car, perched on boxes of ammunition or barrels of fuel.

This lack of vehicles has important tactical and psychological implications. Since the number of motor vehicles in a motorized division among the Russians is much less than in the same formations of the Western armies, the Russian division is more mobile (!). Such a division is easier to manage, it is easier to camouflage and transport it by rail."

A no less bleak picture was observed when the fighters came to their barracks, which the Soviet press compared with "palaces" in which "there is a lot of light, it is always warm and cozy." An inspection of the Oryol military district, carried out in 1938, showed that "in the hostel rooms, on the stairs, in the corridors, it is dirty, the washrooms are out of order. For several hundred people, there is one washbasin with eight taps, and 30 taps are clogged and do not work. There are not enough stools in the dining room, and the fighters dine almost standing up. The stools were used to make beds in the hostel."

The situation was no better in the Moscow District, where the roof was leaking in the barracks, the walls were damp and the personnel slept on trestle beds. An inspection that took place in December in all parts of the Leningrad District showed that the barracks "are not insulated ... the doors do not close, and, as a result, people freeze." In the Kiev OVO: "... for four months now, the fighters of two units have not been able to properly wash themselves. All fighters have 5 washstands. In the morning, in the tightness and crush, trying not to be late for the ranks, the Red Army soldiers barely have time to wipe their eyes with water. They don't have the opportunity to brush their teeth..."

At the same time, we can safely say that these soldiers

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I was still very "lucky" - far from all military units had barracks.

In the Leningrad Air Defense Corps, the fighters "lived in dugouts, without lighting, etc." But even such conditions seemed like a luxury to the soldiers of the Trans-Baikal District, who slept in torn tents, without blankets and without bunks, on bare ground at 12 degrees below zero. Soviet grouping on

Far East only from 1932 to 1934 increased five times in number. Divisions and brigades arriving from the European part of the Union were unloaded in an open field or at remote taiga stopovers. General I.M. Chistyakov recalled:

"In these places, as we said, it rains once: it starts in May and ends in August. Moreover, by August such downpours break out that it washes away both roads and bridges - you can't get through, you can't pass. Boots, if left for two days without care, were covered with greenery.

Generally healthy climate. They settled on the spot on their own, as best they could. It looked something like this:

"The divisional commander parted the bushes with a stick: "That's what ... You will be here, Chistyakov, commanding a regiment ..." Which regiment? More to command? Nothing around except bushes and grass and weeds. However, the commander was not joking. I had to accept the regiment, build temporary housing, a canteen and stables on a bare spot. The Red Army soldiers dug dugouts, put up sheds. They brought stones, made a barracks for five hundred (!) people.

Horses began to arrive in autumn. And suddenly (!) severe frosts hit. The horses were covered for the night with original blankets woven from reeds, but they still froze. I had to do this: when it was especially cold at night, I went to the secretary of the Komsomol organization of the regiment, Spiridonov, woke him up: "Raise the Komsomol ..." He already knew why. Our Komsomol members mounted a horse and drove them for several hours to keep warm, all measures were taken to save the horses, and it must be said that not a single one of them fell (the regiment commander does not mention what "clothes" his fighters covered themselves with). .. We didn't have much food, but the fish saved us a lot. In the autumn, chum salmon and pink salmon went along the river to spawn, and then we made large stocks.

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At the end of the summer of 1937, the leader Major Chistyakov was appointed commander of the 105th rifle division: "The village where the headquarters was located stood on a bare spot near the river, even the hills were empty, treeless here ... The regiments were poorly placed. Some units did not even have dugouts, soldiers and commanders lived in "fox holes".

And they continued to live in them in the autumn, and in the winter, and in the spring of 1938, when Marshal Blucher came to the division and asked to show him the location of the 314th regiment: "We got out of the car with him. All around the steppe, only pipes stick out of the ground.

— [Where is the regiment?

- In "fox holes".

- Well, play "alarm".

As soon as the first sounds of the trumpet were heard, the Red Army soldiers and commanders jumped out of the ground, like gophers, and instantly lined up. Blucher clutched his stomach and began to laugh. Indeed, the spectacle was very funny ... "

With a good owner, the dog lives better, and the marshal is having fun, he is not worried that the troops entrusted to him mow down colds, and in the spring - scurvy. The marshal gave a lecture on the international situation, urged "to be patient", then ordered the "gophers" to march on the hills, checked the shooting training and departed, very pleased, and then set the 314th regiment as an example to others. From this we can conclude that the conditions in which the regiment was stationed were not considered extraordinary, that there were enough such formations of red-star "Neanderthals" in the Far East. People in burrows are normal.

The head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army cited completely wild examples from the life of the Blucher province, when a Red Army soldier sent to guard a non-existent training ground "lived alone in a dugout for 13 months (!), everyone forgot about him and during this time no one

visited." Or sent for two days to ensure the upcoming exercises, the guard stayed in place "for 17 days without hot food and food, as a result of which there was an attempt to sell uniforms and protected property."

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True, they had nothing special to sell: potential buyers were not attracted by cast-offs of the "Chonkin soldiers" forgotten by God and the authorities. Many of them were given overcoats not appropriately sized, worn, torn, and even "sewn from multicolored pieces of material," as well as shoes with holes and canvas boots. Often there was no winter uniform. In particular, after an inspection of the 5th Motorized Mechanized Brigade at the end of January 1938, it was noted that 60 people did not receive winter uniforms: "who did not receive trousers, tunics and go in torn trousers and tunics ... what The fighters are showing their displeasure.

An audit of the Leningrad Military District showed that the district headquarters did not even know how many military personnel were in the district: "According to some sources, there are a shortage of 8,000 fighters, according to other sources, in excess of a set of 12,000 fighters. Therefore, in a number of units there is excessive uniforms in warehouses, and in a number of units some of the fighters walk around naked.

The fact that there were clothing items in the warehouses did not yet mean that the personnel would receive them. Uniforms fell into disrepair in rooms with leaking roofs, often they simply rotted in the open air, were stolen, sold or used "for other purposes". There was no control and accounting of material values, primarily on the part of commanders and political workers, and people's money was thrown to the wind.

On August 17, 1940, a group of fighters and commanders sent an anonymous letter to the first secretary of the Leningrad regional party committee.

"Tov. Zhdanov!

The situation in the Red Army became completely unbearable.

1. The service life has become the longest, they keep 3-4 years for the purpose of drilling ...
2. Food has become the most disgusting - equivalent on the battleship "Potemkin" in the old days.

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3. We dress like partisans, we walk around in anything.
4. Our families are also starving.
5. Order and discipline as in the old army, only one is missing, they don't hit in the face.
6. We work for 13-15 hours, but we have not yet been deprived of sleep for 6 hours.

Thanks to this, the Red Army and ml. The morale of commanders is the most disgusting, this was shown by the war in Finland, where our army showed its helplessness, many of our comrades surrendered to the enemy. It's the same mood right now. The soldiers openly protest and pour out their indignation in front of the middle commanders, they are silent and do not report to anyone, because. They themselves realize this and sympathize ...

The fighter, as a person, was humiliated to the point of impossibility; for the slightest thing they give a guardhouse and outfits, political officers and do not listen, because. they are considered empty shells, talkers, no one believes in their agitation.

We are aware that the economic situation in our country is difficult, therefore we ask:

- 1) let us go home;
- 2) shorten the service life, because a long term has a worse effect on morale;
- 3) equate a fighter to a person;
- 4) radically change the diet;
- 5) give good uniforms;
- 6) release from the disposition of the unit for at least three hours, you see what the results are when they do not release;
- 7) reduce the working day;
- 8) provide a meeting with relatives.

Believe me, Comrade Zhdanov, if this is done, then all the shortcomings in the army will be eliminated and morale will be high, and the soldiers will fight. We kindly ask you to do these things. You yourself know very well from the experience of the tsarist army - repressions, punishments of order are not will be restored."

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Having passed the path of a private, now professor of art history N.N. Nikulin said:

"If the Germans had filled our headquarters with spies, and the troops with saboteurs, if there had been massive sabotage and the enemies had developed a detailed plan for the collapse of our army, they would not have achieved the effect that was the result of the idiocy, stupidity, irresponsibility of the authorities and helpless the obedience of the soldiers."

Perhaps, having despised the little things of life and the scarcity of rations, the Red Army soldiers and commanders devoted all their time to preparing for the war against "brutal fascism"? Not at all. The Red Army practically did not engage in combat training at all, but only occasionally imitated it.

The cost of combat training in the estimates of the People's Commissariat of Defense was extremely low - 0.34-0.41 percent. Twice as much money was spent on political, cultural and educational work, because "the moral forces of the Red Army are the decisive means in organizing modern combat." Therefore, the time of political pursuits has always been a holy time.

Personnel political worker, General of the Army E.E. Maltsev (1910-1981) recalled how hard he had to work as commissar of the 72nd Infantry Division:

"Each commander and chief, no matter what position he held, was required to attend classes on Marxist-Leninist training and, according to a certain program, pass tests and exams, which were conducted very strictly. Their results were recorded in the personal files of the servicemen, and this gave the ideological and political hardening of the command cadres a strict plan and purposefulness..."

To be honest, I had a hard time as the division commissar. It was necessary to exercise qualified control over all forms of political study, to prepare for lectures for command personnel and fighters. Literally whole nights I had to sit over

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reading the works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, books, magazines, newspapers.

And yet, the main occupation of the Soviet fighter has always been, first, second and third, chores. Plus duty service. Even in the open Soviet press, attention was systematically drawn to the loss of study time due to the distraction of Red Army soldiers for construction, household, loading and unloading work. The army itself harvested timber and hay, made bricks, built barracks, warehouses, and training grounds for itself.

Therefore, the results of the competition of artillery batteries of the Primorsky Group of Forces of the OKDVA in March 1937 look like a logical result: "In divisional artillery, not one of the competing batteries of 76-mm guns was able to perform any of the firing! In the regimental artillery, out of 30 batteries, there were 27 of these! All the batteries were slowly deployed and prepared for firing, were poorly camouflaged, and poorly reconnoitered targets.

Nevertheless, a year later, in March 1938, in the battery of the 60th artillery regiment, "out of 134 training hours allotted for combat training, only 42 hours were used", in the platoons of the 49th regiment of the 17th rifle division MVO "out of 150 hours allotted for study in June, was used for its intended purpose" less than 50 hours. As a result, "the training program in tactics, bayonet fighting, fire training was poorly mastered."

In December, Mekhlis reported to the Military Council on the state of affairs in the Far Eastern armies:

"The combat training of units of the 1st and 2nd armies and troops of ZABVO is still at a low level ... Until now, many people in units are still distracted by all sorts of auxiliary work not related to combat training. Some districts are slowly liquidating subsidiary plots, especially ZABVO. One of the ZABVO divisions has up to 670 hectares of crops, a herd of cows and a thousand sheep.

As Krasnaya Zvezda was forced to state, the result of such combat training was "everywhere the same - failure to fulfill the training program." In one of the parts

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Belarusian District to the question of the Red Army: "Why do we still not have combat training classes?" The political instructor who conducted the political information answered: "First, we need to work, and then we will study."

According to unpublished letters from military correspondents, combat training in many units was unorganized and inefficient: either firing started 3–4 hours late due to the absence of duty officers and signalmen, or firing was fired for 3–4 hours. only 2-3 people, then instead of the three prescribed cartridges, each fighter was given one. It also happened that it was not possible to start shooting at all due to the fact that at the firing line it suddenly turned out that they forgot (?) to take cartridges or the weapon was faulty.

From the Kharkov district it was reported that during the stay in the camp there was only one shooting lesson, and even then from a small-caliber rifle. As a result, the Red Army soldiers "don't know how to shoot, they don't know rifles and gas masks". There were parts where, after a year of service, the fighters did not know how to properly saddle a horse, they could not shoot. From the 1st OKA they wrote indignantly that the commissar's wife went to the shooting range, and forced the Red Army soldier to wash the floors in their apartment, although in the unit some fighters "have never fired a shot in a year and a half."

In September 1938, the newspaper's permanent correspondent for the Leningrad Military District wrote: "It's ridiculous to say that the soldiers on the front line, where tomorrow they can be the first to fight, do not know how to shoot, throw grenades, and wield a bayonet. And they don't do it. There are no necessary weapons and ammunition there to immediately open fire."

The situation with the training of junior commanders was no better. Cadets of regimental schools were sent to work that took up about 80% of their training time. So, in the regimental school of the 50th rifle regiment, "out of the time provided by the program for the training of cadets, only 23 courses were used directly for classes.

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cent!.. The situation was the same with the organization of studies at the regimental school of the artillery regiment ... at the courses for junior reserve lieutenants in the 63rd regiment.

If classes were held, then, as a rule, more than half, and even up to 70% of the fighters were absent from them. Often, Red Army soldiers "as part of entire platoons break away from their studies." In the 37th Artillery Regiment, the winter training plan "absolutely did not provide for such a "little thing" as ... combat training of the regimental school."

In one of the parts of the Kharkov district, the radio operators of the artillery regiment did not engage in special training for five and a half months, in the other part - eight, in the third, classes with junior artillery commanders were not held for about a year.

It was like this everywhere and always like that: tankers did not study "theories and practices of new technology", other specialists did not study "engineering, light machine guns and hand grenades". Numerous appeals of the cadets themselves to the commanders and commissars had no effect. The answer was: "What else are you doing, there is no time (!)".

If this happened in combat units, then what can be said about the rear and business executives? One of them confessed: "I joined the ranks of the Red Army | October 1937 and during this time he was never in the classroom for combat and political training. Not only did I not improve my level of knowledge, but I also forgot what I knew before joining the unit.

Against this bleak background, the German army looked quite different, rapidly building up its muscles, preparing only for war, relying on high professionalism. In August 1928, the RP visited the Reichswehr maneuvers. Eideman, in his report he noted:

"The officer is physically enduring, well-trained, sixty-year-old generals gallop across the field like fandricks. Very hardy in the field. Always clear and minted (exceptions are rare) in his orders ...

Relationships with each other and with soldiers, especially in the field,

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simple, to a certain extent even democratic; there is not even the slightest trump card. Discipline high...

The basic requirement for an officer is knowledge. The manifestation of backwardness, violation of elementary requirements in the leadership of troops leads to resignation ...

The design of the training fields in Germany deserves attention; training fields (they also serve as shooting ranges) are equipped with communications, roads, observation towers. Good camp buildings. On the company - a barracks. Stone and wooden buildings. During the camp gathering, all officers are required to live within the camp without families. The camp has a number of amenities. There is even a swimming pool..."

October 7, 1930 I.P. Belov wrote from Germany to Voroshilov:

"When you look at how brutally the German officers work on themselves from second lieutenant to general, how they work on the preparation of units, what results they achieve, it hurts inside from the consciousness of our weakness. I would like to shout with a good obscenity about the need for the most intense study - a decisive alteration of all weak commanders.

In November 1931, commander B.S. Gorbachev took part in a field trip to Silesia:

"Truly, every German officer can be called a highly qualified specialist... Also very instructive are the conscientiousness and accuracy in the performance of their duties by all levels of the command staff and the great responsibility for the assigned work. Especially, what requires our closest attention is the organization and system of education in the German army and exceptional attention to the commander and student, and careful attitude to the material part ... "

However, in their homeland they decided to "remake" the commanders themselves, who adopted the experience of the Reichswehr. They were put to waste, and the reports and reports were put away in folders marked "Secret" and were not shown to anyone for sixty years.

The level of combat training of the Red Army dropped sharply and, as a result of the hunt for "harm" carried out in the army

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lei. In 1936-1940, about 10,000 commanding officers were repressed. Moreover, as follows from Voroshilov's report at the February-March plenum, at the beginning of 1937 there were only 107,000 of them.

"Before the Khasan events, I served in the 120th Infantry Regiment of the 40th Infantry Division," said S. Sharonov. "There was little combat training. In 1937-1938, many commanders were taken away. The command of the division was completely taken away: division commander Vasnetsov, commissar Rudenko, chief of staff Stahl, chief of artillery, chief medical officer and his wife, a medical officer, were arrested. In the shelf - the same picture. We, ordinary fighters, sometimes did not know who to believe. They were drawn only to the political instructor Matveev, a true Bolshevik, still of the Red Guard temper. He was also taken away, and then returned. We asked him when will we be throwing live grenades, all made of wood and wood? You could ask him such questions, we knew. And Matveev answered: "To throw a grenade for you, but for the state it will cost a cow." He thought about it and added: "Yes ... you will still fight ..."

In all districts, a decline in military discipline was recorded. Ordinary Red Army soldiers showed disobedience to "enemy orders".

In a memorandum to the People's Commissar of Defense, Mekhlis wrote:

"Criticism and self-criticism are misunderstood in some party organizations and, instead of being used to improve combat training and strengthen military discipline, they contribute to undermining the authority of the commanding staff. There are even wild cases.

The party organization of the transport company of the 301st regiment of the 48th rifle division, discussing the state of the horse composition, passed the following resolution: "The horses are in poor condition, the stables are not covered, oats are poured onto the ground, horses develop diseases and combs. Isn't it here on the part of the commanders of a company of enemies of the people? .. "

The commanders were confused and could not put things in order. A new amendment was made to the Disciplinary Charter position:

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"In case of disobedience, open resistance or malicious violation of discipline and order, the commander has the right to apply all measures of coercion, up to the use of weapons. The commander is not responsible for the consequences if he is forced to use force or weapons to compel those who disobey the order and restore discipline and order.

True, at the same time, on the orders of the People's Commissar of Defense and the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, personal weapons command staff was removed.

Drinking and unauthorized absences became a mass phenomenon in the army. The All-Army Conference of Political Workers in April 1938 stated: "Drunkenness has become widespread, in fact, an everyday phenomenon. The commissars and political workers are not waging any serious struggle against him."

What is natural: it is difficult to organize the "salvation of some alcoholics" by the hands of others:

"If until 1939 the main types of offenses for which the party was held accountable were political crimes, then in 1939 two types of offenses stand out sharply: official crimes (4261 people were brought to party responsibility) and moral decay (3138 people involved). Among those held accountable for these types of misdeeds, the majority are persons in command..."

Drunkenness continues to be the scourge of the army. Drunkenness among commanding officers takes especially ugly forms. The commander does not consider it shameful to appear drunk on the street, in the park, theater and cinema, which is incomprehensible to the population, which makes high demands on the Red Army and its command personnel. In restaurants, bosses and Red Army soldiers who sit next to each other often drink vodka.

The prevailing types of violations of military discipline are: skirmishes with superiors, violation of the combat charter, charters of the internal and guard service, careless attitude to the conservation of weapons and ammunition

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owls, unauthorized absences and desertion. The number of suicides, accidents and catastrophes has increased.

The French ambassador in Moscow remarked on the Great Terror: "In the West, such a situation would quickly lead to a revolution. Here, the people use the weapons of the weak - they do not work well."

Some commanders, trying to strengthen discipline, began to widely practice the "use of force", that is, to beat their subordinates. Others simply waved their hand at everything. The repressions caused in the commanding staff self-doubt and fear of any responsibility.

The future army general A.I. Gibkov, who was released early from the military school in 1939, recalled:

"Poorly trained commanders were placed in positions of different heights, many of whom did not meet the requirements of their position, but knew how to keep quiet. Such concepts as "think", "discuss" have disappeared from military use, and the phrases "it's none of your business" or "it's none of my business" have turned into a formula for life."

The festive parades and demonstration maneuvers carried out with pomp could not serve as an indicator of the real state of the Red Army, as well as proof of its high combat readiness, smart people understood this.

General P.N. Krasnov wrote back in 1927:

"The communist government arranges ostentatious maneuvers in front of a crowded crowd, a crowd of several tens of thousands of people. Gases are released, people in gas masks are rushing about, tanks are moving creaking and rattling, airplanes are flying in the sky, chains are sneaking in a smoke screen, cavalry is galloping, huge cannons are being pulled. All this is so absurdly staged that from a military point of view it is an unworthy farce. But this booth has an effect on the crowd, it instills in them the idea of Soviet power and the invincibility of the Red Army."

In the crowd they say: "Did they show this under the kings? Have we seen such things under the kings?"

Communists are great connoisseurs of crowd psychology. They tirelessly inspire the society of Russia they have enslaved that they are invincible, that their army is magnificent, that

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if they were defeated, then all who have land will lose it, will be punished for everything that has been done, and this fear of responsibility and an even worse future inspired by the masses makes it patiently endure all the horrors of the present.

The French military attaché assessed the January exercises of 1935 as organized for purely propaganda purposes and full of tactical errors, while a visit to the communications school in Leningrad in 1936 was a show organized for him.

At the maneuvers of the Kiev military district in 1935 (75,000 people, 800 tanks, 500 aircraft), Belorussian (85 thousand people, 1,136 tanks, 638 aircraft), Moscow, Odessa and other districts of 1936, they were checked for practice provisions of the theory of deep operation. During the exercises, which brought together the most prominent Soviet commanders and foreign military delegations, the following were practiced: breaking through a fortified defensive zone with infantry reinforced by tank battalions and artillery of the RGK, introducing a success development group into the breakthrough, maneuvering a mechanized corps and cavalry with the purpose of encircling and destroying the enemy, the actions of attack aircraft in combat formations, the use of airborne assault forces. "The maneuvers convincingly proved the enormous crushing power and exceptional maneuverability of the mechanized and tank formations", as well as the "high combat power of the Red Army, the good training of the Red Army men and the skills of the commanders", the troops of the "districts passed the maturity test with honor ". The events ended with speeches, parades and banquets.

The true results were summed up in a narrow circle: "The tactical training of the troops, especially the soldier, squad, platoon, vehicle, tank platoon, company is unsatisfactory.

The squadrons of bombers and attack aircraft, which were supposed to clear the way for the advancing tanks, essentially failed to do so. Their interaction with mechanized formations "failed", "was completely lost" or "was carried out sporadically"

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du inability to organize a stable relationship. The tankmen of Yakir and Uborevich were advancing blindly, since intelligence, according to the head of the Combat Training Department, Commander of the 2nd Rank A.I. Sedyakina, "was incompetent."

As a result, the 15th and 17th brigades of the KVO repeatedly struck "on an empty place", the 5th and 21st mechanized brigades could not detect enemy ambushes. In the BVO, the vehicles of the 1st Tank Brigade "suddenly" found themselves in front of a strip of tank traps and gouges and were forced to turn sharply to the side - into the swamp, where they got stuck. The tank commanders were not able to conduct observation in battle, the driver-mechanics were not able to maintain a given direction, as a result of which the battle formations of the attacking units "quickly broke down". The commanders of platoons, companies and battalions did not master radio communications and did not know how to manage their units. "The issue of the interaction of artillery with infantry and tanks" turned out to be unattainable "aerobatics" even in training conditions.

All interaction and control on the battlefield consisted of a loud command "Forward", repeated "by everyone from the battalion commander to the squad leader."

In his notes on the large maneuvers of the Moscow Military District, which took place in September 1936, Marshal Tukhachevsky noted that neither the training of the troops, nor the work of headquarters, nor the interaction of troops were at the proper level:

"The mechanized corps broke through the enemy's defensive lines from the front without artillery support. The losses must have been huge... The actions of the mechanized corps were sluggish, the control was poor... The actions of the mechanized corps were not supported by aviation... The aviation was not used purposefully enough... The communication was poor... The landing of airborne troops should have been provided by fighters... Paratroopers jump without weapons. This must be changed... The work of headquarters, in particular intelligence, is very weak in all parts..."

Cursing, drunkenness, lack of discipline, elementary gouging and eyewash flourished in the Red Army:

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"The scourge of the Red Army on the eve of 1937 was the low demands of commanders of all levels and the numerous simplifications and conventions in the combat training of troops due to it. The fighters were allowed not to disguise themselves at the firing line, not to dig in when the offensive was delayed; machine gunners were not required to independently choose a position for a machine gun before firing, a signalman was not trained in running and crawling with a telephone set and a communication coil behind his back ...

In the 52nd artillery regiment of the BVO in December 1936, they even studied the device of a rifle without the rifle itself, preparing the telephone for going into the field without the telephone itself... The junior commander of the Red Army also looked unsightly. Untight, unshaven, often in a tattered tunic, or even without insignia, he, in principle, could not be demanding, could not work out with the fighters all the details of their training. One could argue with such a commander, one could call him a "stupid" and use foul language...

Direct fraud also flourished, when the facts of accidents were hidden, the results of firing were "rounded off" and inflated, and the soldiers who were completely incapable of shooting were declared Stakhanovists in the reports.

Nothing has changed for the better after Tukhachevsky.

During the conflict in the area of Lake Khasan, the "hot phase" of which fell on July 29-August 9, 1938, both the neglect of combat training and Blucher's economic experiments came back to haunt. At a meeting of the command and political staff of the Posyet border detachment, dedicated to the results of the operation, Brigadier Commissar K.F. Telegin recorded for the speakers:

"We stretched out along the front, and during the battle they grouped in unequipped positions. Communication is only telephone, after losing it, a lot of manpower was used up ... There was no link between divisions, they even fired at their tanks ... The military commissar of the 40th rifle division was afraid to take responsibility for the mobilization of floating units

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for throwing cargo to the front ("what if I break Putin?"). The district sent F-1 grenades, but they could not use them ... The binoculars were 40 percent useless ... At first, the field units worked without a code. There is no direction-finding service... The field units from Novaya village to Zaozernaya abandoned their packs and machine guns. They neglected the bayonet fight. They did not engage in combat training, because they turned into economic commanders. We harvest hay, firewood, vegetables, we carry out construction, we wash linen.

Voroshilov's order No. 0040 dated September 4, 1938 stated that "the combat training of the troops, headquarters and command staff was at an unacceptably low level." The troops came to the border completely unprepared, the Soviet units were "torn apart and incapacitated", their supply was not organized:

"The heads of front departments and unit commanders did not know what, where and in what condition weapons, ammunition and other combat equipment were available. In many cases, whole artillery batteries ended up at the front without shells, spare barrels for machine guns were not fitted in advance, rifles were issued unshot, and many soldiers and even one of the rifle units of the 32nd division arrived at the front without rifles at all and gas masks."

A company of the 118th Rifle Regiment of the 40th Division arrived at the scene of hostilities with blank cartridges and wooden grenades. When combat grenades were delivered, it turned out that neither the privates nor the commanders knew how to use them. All branches of the military showed a complete inability to act in a real combat situation. The gunners did not know where to shoot, the tank units were used ineptly and suffered heavy losses. In addition, despite "huge stocks of clothing, many fighters were sent into battle in completely worn out shoes, half barefoot."

By the same order, Marshal Blucher was removed from command of the Far Eastern Front, and the front itself was disbanded into two separate armies. In Voroshilov's order, of course, there was no mention of the fact that

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Immediately before the start of the fighting, brigade commanders and battalion commanders were arrested - the Chekists worked according to their own plan.

Mekhlis, speaking in early December at the Military Council under the People's Commissariat of Defense, reported that during the events on Lake Khasan, shooters "who could not shoot a rifle and even open a lock" were assigned to the front lines, many Red Army soldiers arrived to smash the Japanese military "in such tattered uniforms that, in fact, they remained in their underwear."

As a result, in the course of a small clash with the enemy, who was motionless on the defensive, though still armed, with a fivefold superiority in manpower and absolute superiority in equipment (for example, on the Soviet side, in addition to the tanks of the 2nd mechanized brigade, there were 250 aircraft were involved, not a single one from the Japanese), our casualties amounted to 3,500 people killed and wounded, the losses of the Japanese troops amounted to 500 people killed and 900 wounded. The percentage of losses among the command and political staff turned out to be "unnaturally high" - about 40 percent.

At the same time, it was not possible to dislodge the Japanese units from the Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya hills, which became instantly famous, the conflict was resolved diplomatically, after which the Japanese cleared the heights themselves.

In the final part of the order, the People's Commissar of Defense set the standard task for the armed forces - to always be in a state of full combat readiness, and the head of the Political Directorate demanded that the commissars turn their faces to combat training:

"There is no more important matter for a commander and commissar than military and political training. If comrades do not want to quarrel with the command of the district, they must remember: everyone must be present at combat training classes, everyone without exception — all commanders, all commissars, all political workers, every single Red Army soldier, because classes in combat and political training is our sacred duty."

Guidelines were accompanied by the sound of victories

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great fanfare and habitual doxology to wise leadership:

"The victory at Hassan made the strongest impression all over the world. The test of strength of the Japanese military, who decided to test the firmness of the Soviet Far Eastern borders ... ended

shameful failure. Select units of the Kwantung Army were defeated and thrown out of Soviet territory.

True, at closed meetings it was admitted that "there were also negative moments," but in general, "our fighters and political workers showed the unsurpassed quality of Soviet patriotism and combat training," and the Japanese "shed three times as much blood as we did."

At the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in March 1939, Commander Stern, who replaced Blucher, who had been killed by guardsmen in the Far East, and then led the 1st Separate Red Banner Army, cheerfully reported:

"I must say a few words about our commanders. All sorts of hack writers abroad, for reasons that are understandable to you and me, are trying to portray the matter in such a way that because you and I destroyed a bunch of all sorts of rubbish - Tukhachevskys, Gamarniks, Oboreviches and similar bastards, we have in the Red Army there is no good commanding staff.

The Red Army has a sufficient number of remarkable people who command a platoon, a company, a battalion, a regiment, a division, and the highest military formations. The command staff of the Red Army was forged under the direct supervision of Comrade Stalin, Comrade Frunze, Comrade Voroshilov. (Applause.) All these people know their business, they have been tested not only in peacetime combat training and not only on Khasan. These people are devoted to their homeland to the end, ready at any moment to give their lives for the cause of the party, for the cause of Lenin-Stalin (applause) and will be able, if they need to give their lives, to do so in order to get ten lives earlier for one life of our precious man. (Applause.)

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VOROSHILOV. Ten is not enough, you need twenty. (Laughter, applause.)

STERN. I accept the correction. Please add it to the transcript (laughter)."

Grigory Mikhailovich will be recorded as "bastards" in June 194] of the year.

The invasion of the Red Army into Poland in September 1939 turned out to be "easy walk" from a military point of view, the Polish state, according to Voroshilov, "at the very first military clash shattered like an old rotten cart", but even then it perished and disappeared without a trace. red 1475 fighters and commanders. As one of the participants, specially called up from the reserve to participate in the Liberation Campaign, recalled:

"We crossed the border around September 20 without any weapons at all. They didn't give it ... That's when doubts arose. In terms of our preparation. I don't know how it was in other divisions, but even if it was so in only one, this already spoke of the troubles of warmia. It's good that we didn't meet anyone."

The Soviet leadership perceived the Polish campaign as a convincing confirmation of the combat power of the Red Army and a rehearsal for the future Great Campaign.

But little Finland turned out to be a hard nut to crack.

At a meeting of the commanding staff in April 1940, dedicated to the analysis of the actions of the Soviet troops in Finland, the commanders and commissars directly raised the question of the lack of training of the personnel. So, the military commissar of the 50th rifle corps Semenov said:

"I believe that the fact that untrained fighters were sent to the front was absolutely abnormal, their composition was high, reaching 20-30%. Such fighters were sent who did not have combat training, did not know how to handle a rifle. During the period of preparation for breaking through the fortified area, such unprepared people received two

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divisions 874 people, and later in the 100th and 123rd divisions received 4314 untrained Red Army men.

The commander of the 142nd Rifle Division, Pshennikov, reported that when checking the reinforcements received, "it turned out that up to 47% of the Red Army personnel did not know the material part of the weapons assigned to them. This mainly applied to heavy machine gunners and light machine gunners ... The division was completely unprepared for the nakboy.

The meeting noted the complete disregard of the fighters for camouflage, their ignoring or non-observance of discipline on the battlefield, their inability to hide from enemy air raids, and the poor physical and tactical training of all personnel. The staffs worked poorly, they got lost in a combat situation, they did not know how to organize reconnaissance and did not know the situation at the front. All management was carried out by telephone in clear text. Combined-arms commanders had a poor idea of how to use armored vehicles; The pilots were trained to fly only in good weather.

Ordinary soldiers did not understand the goals of the WAR started by Moscow and did not sympathize with them, they were prone to panic and often fled from the battlefield, dropping their weapons.

"The infantry," Voroshilov was indignant, "acts at the front not as an organized force, but dangles back and forth, like a mass almost uncontrollable by anyone, which, at the first shot fired, scatters in disarray through shelters and into the forest."

It turned out that the armed forces do not have accurate data not only about the enemy, but also about the number of their own fighters and commanders, which was confirmed by the head of the Supply Department A.V. Khrulev:

"With Comrade Timoshenko, we had differences of literally two hundred thousand eaters (!). We kept to our smaller figure. But I, comrades, had no confidence that I was right..."

And, finally, the Red Army entered the winter war in summer uniforms.

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However, all these are trifles, individual shortcomings and miscalculations of individual "bunglings". The main thing is that a new brilliant victory was won, and not only over Finland, God bless her, with the "Finnish booger", but almost over all of Europe. In his closing remarks, Comrade Stalin stated:

"Finns win - not God knows what a victory. We also defeated their European teachers — we defeated the German defensive technique, we defeated the English defensive technique, we defeated the French defensive technique. Not only the Finns, but also the equipment of the advanced countries of Europe. Not only technique, we defeated their tactics, their strategy. This is our victory!"

Nevertheless, in May 1940, Stalin removed Voroshilov from his post and appointed Timoshenko in his place, concurrently conferring on him the rank of marshal. Since there were suspicions that Kliment Efremovich had decisively fallen out of favor, a completely devastating "Act on the reception of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR" was drawn up, which, in particular, stated:

"The quality of command staff training is low, especially at the platoon-company level, in which up to 68 percent have only a short-term 6-month training course for junior lieutenant.

The training of commanders in military schools is unsatisfactory, due to the poor quality of the programs, the lack of organization of classes, and insufficient workload.

teaching time and especially weak field practical training. The improvement of the command staff of the cadre is not properly organized ...

Combat training of troops has major shortcomings. The orders on the tasks of combat training issued annually by the People's Commissar for a number of years repeated the same tasks, which were never fully carried out, and those who did not comply with the order remained unpunished. Military discipline is not up to the mark and does not ensure the exact fulfillment by the troops of the combat missions assigned to them.

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The main shortcomings in the training of troops are:

- 1) Poor training of the middle command staff at the company-platoon level, and especially poor training of the junior commanding staff.
- 2) Weak tactical training in all types of combat and reconnaissance, especially small units.
- 3) Unsatisfactory practical field training of the troops and their inability to do what is required in a combat situation.
- 4) Extremely weak training of the military branches in interaction on the battlefield: the infantry does not know how to cling to the fire shaft and break away from it; artillery cannot support tanks; aviation does not know how to interact with ground troops
- 5) The troops are not trained in skiing.
- 6) The use of camouflage is poorly developed.
- 7) Fire control has not been worked out ... "

And so on and so forth.

The order of the new people's commissar No. 120 dated May 16 on the combat training of troops for the summer period demanded a radical restructuring of it: "Teach the troops only what is needed in the war, and only in the way that is done in the war."

But although disciplinary battalions were restored in the Red Army on July 15, things did not get better from this. At the December meeting, Semyon Konstantinovich stated: "On the whole, firepower training did not give the proper growth and is assessed poorly." Head of the Combat Training Directorate, General V.N. Kurdyumov called the main reasons for this situation the lack of leadership and control on the part of senior commanders and their headquarters, a significant separation of personnel for household work, the systematic non-fulfillment of curricula "in all verified military districts", constant disruptions and rescheduling of classes " in most formations and units.

In general: "The dog barks, but the caravan goes its own way."

During the autumn inspection, only a few

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The other divisions were able to receive a positive assessment. For example, in the Western Special District, out of 54 units checked for firepower, only three received a positive assessment, in the Leningrad District, only five out of 30. The same picture was observed in other military districts.

Deputy commander of the troops of the Moscow district, General I.G. Zakharkin noted:

"There are cases when the commanding staff goes to fire training personally unprepared. Often there are no training cartridges. THEM are not there, not because they are not enough. They are not there because they were not taken from the warehouse. The unit commander does not know that he has thousands of rounds of ammunition in stock. When you get to the warehouse, pull them out, he wonders: "Where is this from?"

General Konev, who commanded the troops of the ZabVO, was forced to admit that there were facts "when the Red Army soldiers walk badly and slovenly dressed, are not trained, do not know how to shoot, and the commander does not take the necessary measures, does not do what the service requires of him - restore elementary order in your unit.

General Ya.V. Smushkevich made public the fact that the entire bomber aviation of the Leningrad Military District, in total, flew the norm of only three pilots. The high-minded generals who commanded these districts and aviation saw the main reason for all the shortcomings in the low qualifications of the overwhelming majority of the command staff of the Red Army.

After the meeting, a new order on combat training for 1941 followed. Nevertheless, combat training in the Red Army continued to "limp on both legs."

People's Commissar Timoshenko made military officers his enemies for the rest of his life, ordering them to be released from schools not as officers, but as sergeants. At the same time, Semyon Konstantinovich, a desperate grunt, solved the painful housing problem in one fell swoop.

Attending a meeting in December 1940

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commander of the 43rd aviation division G.N. Zakharov recalled:

"I said that, although the division passed all inspection checks, its combat readiness leaves much to be desired due to the extremely difficult everyday situation of the personnel. In the air town located not far from the airfield, at that time there lived numerous families of servicemen who in the fortieth year had no relationship with the division.

At the same time, the pilots were forced to settle in the surrounding villages, scattered around within a radius of five to six kilometers. There is no reliable communication with them. It is impossible to meet the standards set aside for bringing the division on combat readiness. The pilots arrive at the airfield very late, and in winter they run through the forest on skis, get into the cars sweaty, hot, many, of course, catch a cold. Often there is a situation in which the machines are ready to fly, but the pilots are not. The command of the division cannot change this situation, therefore, as a commander, I am asking for assistance ...

I summed it all up in one fell swoop. Stalin nodded and immediately interrupted me with a gesture... The commanders of many other newly formed units and formations experienced similar difficulties. |

Shortly after we left for our units, a special order was issued, the number of which I remember to this day. It, in particular, spoke about the need to transfer personnel to the barracks position.

The leaders of the Air Force, unlike ordinary pilots, were delighted. General Ya.V. Smushkevich stated:

"The order of the People's Commissar is the main condition for the improvement of our air force ... The only and, perhaps, the main reason why the combat training of the air force is at a low level is that in aviation there were no privates (?), all were commanders. Pilots aged 17-19 acquired

families, and all the attention of years-

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The majority of the staff was spent not on the growth of combat training, but on family and domestic issues.

He was echoed by General P.V. Levers:

"The young pilot and technician, burdened with a family, lost all maneuverability in the event of movement of the unit. In addition, a pilot connected with a large family loses combat effectiveness, courage and wears out physically prematurely (!). The order of the People's Commissar of Defense eliminates the existing shortcomings in this regard, creates normal conditions for the operation and growth of the air fleet, which, with a common understanding of use, will bring many victories.

Brilliant! Just a signature on the order - and the combat readiness was raised, and they saved on officer salaries, and on the uniform, and the women of the pilots no longer "wear out".

The French military psychologist Mocor identified five dangers that threaten to reduce the "ability to win" in an individual soldier: 1) sexual abstinence; 2) separation from family; 3) distrust of their superiors; 4) skepticism towards military establishments; 5) fear of death. According to bourgeois experts, the development of a set of measures to reduce the impact of these factors on the psyche of a soldier made it possible to increase his stamina in battle. All FIVE acted on an ordinary Red Army soldier and a sergeant.

Stalin was not interested in the refinements of psychology and the subtleties of an individual approach, he needed a submissive, obedient, unreasoning mass. Psychology, including military psychology, was strangled in the USSR back in 1930, a little later, in 1939, commander G.D. was shot. Khakhanyan, who wrote the wrecking "Issues of Military Psychology". Only psychiatric hospitals remained in the USSR.

With the outbreak of war, emphasis was placed on fighting the "fifth danger" by instilling in the soldiers "contempt for death" and imposing "iron discipline":

"Such unrelenting military discipline—which, I am sure, no other army could have endured—transformed an unorganized mob into an unusually

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powerful weapon of war. Discipline is the main trump card of communism, the driving force of the army.

But it is impossible to foresee how a Red Army soldier will act in the absence of traditional Soviet "disciplining factors" — commissars, special officers, tribunals: "You can never say in advance what a Russian will do: as a rule, he shirks from one extreme to another. ... There were cases when Russian units, selflessly repulsing all German attacks, unexpectedly fled in front of small assault groups."

And what is the use of a "disciplined" fighter pilot, if he only saw his "horse" at the front for the first time.

In the Soviet Air Force, due to the haste and simplification in the training of pilots, throughout the entire pre-war decade, the highest level of accidents was maintained.

So, on June 21, 1932, Voroshilov wrote to Stalin:

"Now I literally can't find a place due to accidents in the Air Force. Not a day goes by without receiving information about accidents and even the most serious catastrophes with human casualties, first in one district, then in another. Suffice it to point out that only from June 5 to June 20, eleven planes were destroyed and thirty people died ...

The cadres of the flight and technical staff have grown, although they are staffed by our own, politically reliable, staff, they are extremely young, inexperienced (which is natural), and

most importantly, truly undisciplined. Roaring manners, flaunting their flight exploits, the low authority of the young command staff - these are the main sources from which our misfortunes come ... "

It has always been like this: either the composition is young, or "rapid growth", or the development of new technology.

On April 9, 1941, the resolution of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars "On accidents and catastrophes in the aviation of the Red Army" was issued. The resolution stated that "because of laxity, every day we die in accidents and catastrophes.

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two or three planes, which is six hundred to nine hundred planes a year. It would be interesting to calculate: if we produce 600 fewer planes (and we already had two planes for each crew), how many smart pilots can be properly trained with this money?

In 1944, losses in combat aircraft amounted to 24,800 aircraft, the maximum for the war. But something else is shocking: of this number, only 9,700 died in battle, and 15,100 are non-combat losses. On the one hand, the Soviet military acceptance at the factories turned a blind eye to marriage, and real "flying coffins" often arrived at the front: for example, the Yak-3, "the best fighter of World War II", due to the fragility of the design, themselves - in battle, pieces of skin were torn off or wings were broken off, and a 40-kilogram motor-gun was often torn off by recoil right in the pilot's chest. On the other hand, the low level of flight

training "Stalin's falcons".

German aircraft factories in 1941 and in subsequent years produced two to three times fewer combat vehicles than ours, and the Luftwaffe had enough of them to gain air supremacy.

And why do we need so many planes if there is nothing to refuel them. A special order introduced restrictions on the consumption of fuel intended for combat training.

As a result, on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, in the first three months of 1941 of the year, the pilots of the Baltic Military District managed to fly an average of 15.5 hours, the Western one - 9, Kiev - 4 hours (German pilots underwent a training of 450 hours, after which they went to the front, but did not take part in the battles on the move - at first they watched from the side and gained experience). During the war, Soviet pilots will be trained even faster: "take-off and landing" and - in combat.

The majority of Soviet pilots did not know how to operate in difficult weather conditions, had a low level of fire and reconnaissance training ("most crews do not know how to find targets even at large points"),

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they did not know the silhouettes and combat characteristics of either German or their own vehicles (the latter applies to all armed forces: fighters and anti-aircraft gunners recklessly fired at everything that flew, artillery with infantry shot and threw grenades at their tanks or, conversely, joyfully greeted the German red Nazi flags on the towers).

In addition, due to frequent accidents, engines on some types of aircraft were prohibited from being used at full power. According to V.F. Golubev, pilots had the right to fly on a number of series of I-16 fighters and "seagulls" "only if the roll is not more than 45 degrees, the speed does not exceed 400 kilometers per hour, the dive angle is not more than 35 degrees. Aerobatics and air combat were strictly prohibited. They were limited to flying in a circle and shooting at a cone.

On aircraft of new designs, many pilots have never taken to the air at all. Not every "falcon" had enough qualifications for this. General G.N. Zakharov shared his impressions of the MiGs that came into service:

"Meanwhile, this aircraft had a number of properties, which in the end were identified as design flaws ... The Mig was too heavy for a fighter. He did not forgive mistakes during piloting, he was designed only for a good pilot. The average pilot on the Mig automatically passed into the category of the weak, and even the weak simply could not fly on it.

By the beginning of the war, in the neighboring division at the airfield near Bialystok, "there were already about two hundred MiGs, but, except for regimental commanders and some squadron commanders, no one had yet flown them. The machine was mastered slowly and in sudden connections.

Both old and new cars did not have radio equipment. So, on the first 1000 serial "yaks" radio stations were not installed at all, and on subsequent transmitters only every 15th plane, the rest are just receivers.

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Soviet pilots, in accordance with pre-war theories, were mainly trained in strikes against ground targets and were poorly prepared for air combat. The squadrons went in tight formations, which also corresponded to the tasks of the attack, on the one hand, on the other, it was caused by the lack of radio communications. For air combat, these "swarms" were of little use; in the confusion of the battle, the pilots quickly lost visual contact with each other and acted independently, without interaction and mutual cover.

The main tactical unit in fighter and attack aviation was a flight of three aircraft. Having no connection between themselves, the pilots kept compact in flight, wing to wing, carefully observing the actions of the flight commander. He also managed subordinates on the principle of "do as I do." Such a formation hampered maneuver, did not allow continuous observation of the air situation, and limited the initiative. According to the observations of the enemy:

"In air battles, Soviet pilots showed themselves to be aggressive, brave, but they often acted recklessly and straightforwardly, they lacked flexibility. As an individual fighter, the average Soviet pilot lacks personal initiative; however, in group battles, his high discipline was most welcome.

The German pilots operated in pairs — the leader and the follower. The presence of radio stations on board allowed them to disperse over considerable distances and quickly approach if necessary, exchange information about the situation, carry out complex combat maneuvers, interact with each other and other pairs, provide assistance - act intelligently and tactically in battle. competently. Ground guidance points helped them to quickly find the enemy in the air, to take a more advantageous position in relation to him.

The fighters kept in touch with the bombers during joint actions with them, the bombers - from on

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earth troops. All Me-109s were equipped with a short-wave radio station with a range of up to 100 km, and Me-110s had two stations, one of which was long-wave, covering a distance of about 300 km. The Germans also had ultra-short range stations that allowed access to the landline telephone network.

All this, both technical equipment, and a well-functioning organization, and adequate tactics, had yet to be created in the Soviet Air Force, and during the fighting, at the cost of the lives of pilots who were being prepared for a completely different war.

Only at the end of August 1942, a GKO decree was issued on equipping all manufactured fighters and attack aircraft with transceiver radio stations and receivers at the rate of 1:5, and later 1:3. The resolution still had to be implemented, the pilots had to be trained to

forcibly, providing secrecy of control, use communications. Meanwhile, even the Air Force Headquarters published a book of call signs only in the middle of the war.

German General F.V. Mellentin wrote about the combat activity of Soviet aviation:

"The effectiveness of the actions of Russian aviation did not correspond to its numbers. Losses in experienced personnel, suffered in the first months of the war, were never made up, and mass-produced aircraft were much inferior in quality to our aircraft. Senior officers, apparently, could not master the principles of combat aviation operations in modern conditions.

The Russians had virtually no strategic air force, and the few strikes their long-range air strikes did not cause us any damage. Reconnaissance aircraft sometimes penetrated 50-100 km into our position, but fighters and bombers rarely flew more than 30 km beyond the front line. This was a great relief for us, because even in the most difficult periods of the war, the movement of troops and cargo in the rear areas was unhindered.

Russian aviation was used mainly for solving tactical tasks, and starting from the summer of 1943, aircraft

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Russians hung from morning to evening over the battlefield. The organization of interaction between aviation and ground forces was continuously improved; at the same time, the qualitative superiority of German aviation was gradually disappearing. But in tactical terms, the Russians were always inferior to us, and their pilots could not compare with our pilots.

Similar problems were experienced by all types of troops. For example, tank crews had radio stations only on commander's vehicles, and there were none on line vehicles, which made it much more difficult to control the battle.

There were not enough crews for the newly formed tank formations. Commanders and soldiers from other branches of the ground forces were urgently retrained as tankers. At the same time, only 5 hours were allotted for the practical training of a driver, but many had only 1.5-2 hours of driving practice, while in the Wehrmacht - at least 50 hours.

As a result, due to the inexperience of the crews in forced marches, there were frequent breakdowns that no one could fix; in short breaks between battles, officers had to teach tankers the most elementary skills, such as driving a combat vehicle and firing a cannon. We tirelessly increased the production of tanks, and the Germans raised the level of crew training.

If samples of armored vehicles were removed from service, the production of spare parts for it immediately ceased. In general, it was unprofitable to produce spare parts in Soviet production, and they didn't ask for it. For this reason, many military vehicles were simply abandoned.

The combat regulations provided for only one type of combat for tank units, both in the offensive and in defense - attack. Shooting from a place in the defense was allowed in exceptionally rare cases. And hundreds of light tanks rushed into the oncoming battle or under the aimed fire of anti-tank artillery. Soviet armored vehicles were used without reconnaissance of the area, without the support of artillery, infantry, aviation, without taking into account their combat capabilities and purpose.

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Thus, the situation dictated appropriate tactics for the weakly armored BT-7 - conducting firefights from ambushes, using natural and artificial shelters, which made it possible to reduce the likelihood of enemy shells hitting and at the same time

but they allowed the enemy tanks to get closer, at a distance when even 30-mm armor would not have saved from a 45-mm projectile.

It was this tactic that the British used in North Africa. And the conditions were similar: the same tanks on the part of the Germans and almost complete analogues of the BT-7 - cruiser tanks - on the part of the British. The latter even had a number of advantages over our machine: a larger crew, good observation devices and means of communication. However, the Germans outnumbered the British cruiser tanks in the same armor protection. The British used shelters made of sandbags, heaps of stones, sometimes they simply buried the tanks in the sand up to the turret and got the desired effect - they suffered much less losses in defense. We switched over to the tactics of tank ambushes only in the autumn of 1941, after 90% of Soviet tanks had been knocked out.

General Mellenthin left a description of the tank battles of the initial period of the war:

"In 1941 and 1942, the tactical use of tanks by the Russians was not flexible, and the units of the tank troops were scattered along the entire huge front ... Junior and middle commanders showed a particularly poor understanding of the methods of conducting tank battles and insufficient skill, they lacked courage, tactical foresight, the ability to make quick decisions.

The first operations of tank armies ended in complete failure. Tanks were concentrated in dense masses in front of the front of the German defense, in their movement one could feel uncertainty and the absence of any plan. They interfered with each other, ran into our anti-tank guns, and in the event of a breakthrough of our positions, they stopped moving and stopped, instead of developing

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success. During these days, individual German anti-tank guns and 88-mm guns were most effective: sometimes one gun damaged and disabled over 30 tanks in one hour. It seemed to us that the Russians created a tool that they would never learn own..."

As a result, the Soviet mechanized corps were unable to solve the tasks thoughtlessly assigned to them and were defeated in the very first days of the war.

The army entered the war with outdated charters. During the course of study, such types of combat operations as withdrawal and combat in the environment were not practiced. The soldiers did not know how to dig in, the commanders did not know how to choose convenient positions, taking into account the features of the relief.

In the offensive, dense, deep-echeloned battle formations were used - the same ram attack of infantry masses. The pinnacle of the battle, our generals saw a bayonet fight: "The German is afraid of the bayonet."

One of these frontal attacks in August near Kiev, undertaken by the 37th army of Vlasov, was captured by a German officer in a letter to his relatives:

"From a distance of 600 meters, we opened fire, and whole squads in the first wave of attackers fell to the ground ... The surviving loners stupidly walked forward. It was terrible, unbelievable, inhuman. None of our soldiers would move forward. The second wave also suffered losses, but closed ranks over the corpses of their comrades who fell in the first wave. Then, as if on cue, the chains of people began to run. With their approach came a discordant booming: "Hurrah-ah-ah!" ...

The first three waves were destroyed by our fire... The onslaught of the fourth wave was slower: people made their way along the carpet of corpses... The machine guns became hot from continuous fire, and it was often necessary to stop firing to replace the barrels... Number, duration

The vigor and fury of these attacks completely exhausted us and brought us to a stupor. I will not hide, they frightened us ... If the Soviets can afford to spend so many people trying to

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trying to eliminate even the insignificant results of our offensive, how often and with what number of people will they attack if the object is really very important?

Such attacks, designed to exhaust the enemy, to overwhelm him with the corpses of the attackers, were a common occurrence in the 41st, and in the 42nd, and after. Often, crowds of conscripts were driven into battle without even giving them uniforms and weapons. Thus, on the Volkhov front, the Red Army soldiers stormed the enemy's strongholds with sticks, on which bayonets were attached, and with wooden rattles. The slogan became relevant: "You will get weapons in battle!"

Naturally, such attacks led to huge losses. In mid-January 1942, German intelligence issued a bulletin titled War Experience in the East, which summarized the main features of the Russian attacks:

"The attacks of the Russians, as a rule, following this scheme once and for all - by large masses of people and are repeated several times without any changes. The advancing infantry leaves their infantry positions in compact groups and rushes to the attack from a long distance with a cry of "hurrah". Officers and commissars follow behind and fire on the stragglers. In most cases, an attack is preceded by reconnaissance in force on a broad front, which, after a breakthrough or infiltration into our positions, turns into a decisive attack from the rear and flanks.

Artillery preparation for an attack is rarely used, but the Russians are very willing to use at night, before the attack, short but strong harassing fire from long distances, constantly changing their firing positions.

The Russians begin their attacks at dusk or dawn. Taking advantage of the darkness, fog, blizzard or rainy weather, the Russians take up starting positions for the attack. Repulsed attacks are repeated again, sparing no effort and changing nothing. It is difficult to assume that during one day of fighting the advancing unit will in any way change the scheme of the attack. So to reflect

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Russian attacks need strong nerves and the knowledge that our excellent small arms are able to withstand the massive Russian offensive.

For the Germans, such tactics were beyond comprehension, so the Russian attacks were engraved in the memory of literally every front-line soldier:

"The conduct of hostilities by the Russians, especially in the offensive, is characterized by the use of a large amount of manpower and equipment, which the command often brings into battle recklessly and stubbornly, but succeeds. Russians have always been famous for their contempt for death; the communist regime has developed this quality even more... The attack twice undertaken will be repeated for the third and fourth time, regardless of the losses incurred, and the third and fourth will be carried out with the same stubbornness and composure.

Until the very end of the war, the Russians, not paying attention to losses, threw infantry into the attack almost in close formation. The herd instinct and the inability of junior commanders to act independently always forced the Russians to attack massively, in dense battle formations. Due to the superiority in numbers, this method made it possible to achieve many major successes (this is the main tactical technique of all Soviet commanders, there was no time to learn everything else)...

The area in front of the defending front was suddenly filled with Russians in the blink of an eye. They appeared as if from under the ground and it seemed impossible to contain the impending avalanche. Huge gaps from our fire were immediately filled; waves of infantry rolled in one after another, and only when the manpower reserves dried up could they roll back. But often they did not retreat, but rushed forward uncontrollably. Repelling this kind of attack depends not so much on the availability of technology, but on whether the nerves can withstand it. Only battle-hardened soldiers were able to overcome the fear that gripped everyone.

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Only in October 1942 did the Supreme Commander-in-Chief issue an order providing for changes in the tactics of battle:

"The practice of the war against the German fascists shows that some points of our charters have already become obsolete and require revision. Of course, the statutes as a whole bring and will bring great benefits to the Red Army. But a number of points in these regulations are so outdated that they will bring great harm to the Red Army if they are not canceled immediately. We are talking about the shortcomings of our regulations on such issues as the formation of battle formations during an offensive, the provision of subunits and units with fire weapons, the organization of fire, the role of commanders in an offensive.

What are these shortcomings? Here are the main ones:

First drawback. In accordance with the requirements of our regulations, our troops, organizing offensive combat at all levels from a rifle platoon to a division, build their battle formations in depth. As a rule, a rifle division, given an offensive zone of one or one and a half kilometers along the front, builds its regiments in two echelons, two of them in the first and one in the back of their heads; a rifle regiment advancing in a zone of 750-1000 m is also forced to have, at best, two battalions in the first and one in the second echelon, most often three battalions behind the head; Exactly the same echelon disposition of subunits is envisaged in the battalion, company and platoon.

Thus, a rifle division built for an offensive is forced to have only eight rifle companies out of 27 in the first echelon to attack the front line of the enemy's defense. The remaining 19 companies, located behind the first echelon to a depth of 2 km, cover the battlefield with solid battle formations and completely deprived of the opportunity to use their firepower.

As a result of this, we have, firstly, exceptionally large, unjustified losses in personnel and firepower from artillery, mortar and aircraft fire.

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enemy positions, which are carried primarily by subunits of the second and third echelons even before they enter the battle, which is why the offensive often bogs down in our country at the very first stage, and, secondly, the forced inactivity of more than a third of all infantry fire weapons of the division - machine guns, light and heavy machine guns, mortars and regimental artillery, not to mention rifles.

At the same time, units of the second and third echelons will be forced to remain inactive and take on the main fire of mortars, artillery and enemy aircraft; in order not to suffer heavy losses, they are forced to cling to the echelons in front, and then, for the same reason, join their battle formations. And this leads to the inevitable mixing of the battle formations of the first echelon with the subsequent ones, to turning them into a crowd and making it impossible to control them.

According to the charter, Soviet commanders were obliged to raise and lead their fighters to the vataka. Often, headquarters and commanders of battalions and regiments were placed in the chain in full force, obliged to personal

an example to ensure the fulfillment of the set task at any cost. On the Nevsky Piglet, the generals had to personally lead divisions into battle. Hence the disproportionately large, senseless losses in the officer corps, and in the most competent and promising part of it. In 1941 alone, 50,000 commanders were killed and another 80,000 went missing.

They tried to make up for the shortage by training junior lieutenants at three-month courses, although before the war it was believed that even six months was not enough to train a platoon commander. Military schools churned out accelerated graduations, the training program for infantry officers fit into a "wide range" from drill to bayonet combat. Former cadet of the Ordzhonikidze Military School, Colonel A.Z. Lebedintsev, who was released in December 1941 recalled:

"We did not have a single lesson in organizing enemy units and formations, their weapons and tactics, we did not even know the organization of our own rifle regiment.

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We didn't see a tank or a plane. There weren't even pictures to show. And this is in the school, which in the pre-war years challenged the superiority of the Moscow and Odessa infantry ... "

Even greater idiocy was the formation of cadet regiments, which were sometimes senselessly annihilated in one attack, the first and last in their lives.

And in this matter, Comrade Stalin decided to put things in order:

"Second flaw. According to the requirements of our regulations, commanders of a rifle platoon in an offensive battle must be in front of their battle formations and personally lead their subunits into battle. In addition, cases are often observed when the commanders of rifle companies and battalions from the beginning of the offensive also stand in front of the battle formations and from here try to organize the control of the battle of their units.

As a result, the commander of a platoon or company is deprived of the opportunity to personally observe the course of the battle, to influence the battle order of the platoon and company as a whole, to correctly use his own and attached fire weapons, loses contact with the battalion commander, and all company management is reduced to they are given the command "company, follow me, forward", which, moreover, as a rule, is perceived only by that part of the company's battle formation, in which the commander is located. At the same time, we suffer unnecessary losses in commanders, which often leads to disruption of battle formations.

It follows from this that the requirement of our regulations in this area does not correspond to the interests of our army, proceeds from an underestimation of the role of the commander as the organizer of the battle, from a misunderstanding that the commander is the central figure in battle formations, that the preservation of the commander is the key to success in battle, and vice versa, the failure of the commander leads to a decrease in the possibilities of our success.

The provisions of the much belated Stalinist order were absolutely correct, but with the "extensive" method of warfare adopted in the Red Army, they were practically impossible to implement. Dismemberment of battle formation

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kov required a well-trained initiative fighter and competent management. Meanwhile, the replenishment immediately rushed into battle, sometimes not even knowing how to shoot and not knowing their commanders, so the units could only operate in the formation of the "crowd", to which the chief indicated the direction of movement, and the machine guns of the barrage detachment "gave courage". Management, for a long time, was limited only to setting a combat mission: "forward" And "at any cost."

For example, the "commander" General V.N. Gordov (1896-1950), who commanded armies and fronts, and in the autumn of 1943 issued orders like these:

"Place the entire officer corps in battle formations and pass through the forest in a chain, appointing small detachments to smoke submachine gunners out of their nests ...

Immediately send all control of the body to the circuit. Leave only the head of the operational department at the headquarters...

It is better for us to be killed today than not to complete the task ... "

They didn't know how to fight any other way. Moreover, many of the proud have long lost the ability to learn.

During the four years of the war, the irretrievable losses of the commanding staff exceeded one million people, it would be enough to equip twenty officer armies.

Assessing the combat capability of the Red Army, on June 16, 1941, the US military attache's office in Moscow reported: "Compared with the highly motorized, combat-ready, modern armies that have already been created or are being created in various countries of the world, the combat capability of the Red Army is currently at a relatively low level."

The "enemy of the people" Tukhachevsky, although he also dreamed of "the era of wars and revolutions", however, in his report "Issues of modern strategy", he warned: "... we must prepare for a long war", a stubborn and bloody war.

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which, quite possibly, will be accompanied by "individual failures of our Soviet Union".

But is it really possible to inspire the people for liberation campaigns with such prospects? In the second half of the 1930s, the Soviet mass media and proletarian artists enthusiastically propagated the coming war "for the freedom and happiness of all working mankind", for the World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This war was sung in verse and prose, novels were written about it, films were made, people shouted into their ears through loudspeakers, they dreamed about it: "as soon as the enemies climb on us," we, with a cheerful song and a drum, "will move on a glorious campaign." And we will definitely win, "because history is behind us and we have millions of people who know what they are fighting for, and who know that they are defending the right to happiness." The war was depicted as fleeting, victorious, without much sacrifice and difficulties, almost bloodless.

The plot of all these masterpieces of socialist realism was monotonous: first, the enemy treacherously invaded our land and immediately got hit in the teeth, then the Red Army delivered a crushing retaliatory blow, Red Star aviation smashed the airfields, headquarters and communications of the German and Japanese aggressors to dust, People's revolutions broke out in their rear, and Soviet paratroopers dropped on European capitals immediately took command of the rebel detachments. |

V. Kirshon in the play "The Big Day" defeated Germany in two days, N. Shpanov in his story "The First Strike" repulsed the enemy attack in a few minutes and finally dealt with the "fascists" within twelve hours. All battles were fought exclusively on the territory of other countries and ended with the widespread establishment of Soviet power. Shpanov's "science to win" was published in mass circulation in the "Officer's Library" series.

In the public mind, an idea was formed about the war as a completely safe and heroic occupation, confidence was laid that the war would begin when we wish, and end when we want it.

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A military psychosis was inflated in the country, lured troubadours were languishing with impatience: "When will Comrade Stalin send us into battle ?!"

The war broke out suddenly, like winter or a sowing campaign. Not at all what you dreamed of...

All plans collapsed overnight. On the fifth day of the war, German tanks ended up in Minsk. 1,200 "best in the world" planes burned down at the airfields, and German pilots continued to shoot them down by the hundreds. The bulky and senseless 1000-tank corps disappeared, as it was not. Entire armies perished in gigantic cauldrons. Red Army soldiers in tens of thousands, abandoning their weapons, deserted and surrendered. The Lithuanians and Ukrainians "made happy" by the Soviet power shot at the back of the Red Army. Komsomol members and party workers went to serve the occupiers. And no revolutions broke out in the German rear.

Soviet generals, Stalin's nominees fully demonstrated their mediocrity and lack of professionalism, which they tried to compensate for with Bolshevik firmness in achieving their goals and ruthlessness towards their own troops.

"And only one method of war is known to them - to crush with the mass of bodies. Someone will kill the German. And slowly but surely, the regular German divisions are melting away. But it is good if the colonel tries to think over and prepare an attack, to check whether everything possible has been done. Often he is simply mediocre, lazy, often drunk. Often he does not want to leave the warm shelter and crawl under the bullets ... often the artillery officer did not sufficiently identify the targets and, in order not to take risks, shoots from a distance, at the squares, well, if not at his own, although this happened quite often .. Sometimes the major went astray and, according to the compass, led his battalion to the wrong place at all ...

Confusion, confusion, imperfections, eyewash, failure to fulfill duty, so characteristic of us in civilian life, here, in war, are manifested more clearly than ever. And for

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all one pay - blood. Ivans go on the attack and die. And he who sits in a shelter drives everything and drives their".

By December 1941, the regular Red Army practically ceased to exist: only 8% of its personnel remained. The war was eventually won by the reservists.

Vyacheslav Molotov, in a report dedicated to the 28th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, said: "It is our happiness that in the difficult years of the war the wise and experienced leader of the Soviet Union, the Great Stalin, led the Red Army and the Soviet people forward."

"Great Stalin" framed the country like no one else. Nearly a hundred years before June 22, 1941, General Antoine Jomini wrote: "It is hard to imagine that an army placed in front of the enemy did its duty so badly that it would allow the enemy to attack itself by surprise." Intoxicated with unlimited power, blinded by his doctrine, Stalin himself created the conditions under which the German attack became sudden, and a huge feudal army, which turned out to be unable to fulfill its duty. Comrade Stalin gave the enemy millions of square kilometers of territory and tens of millions of Soviet citizens, declaring them then as traitors. Comrade Stalin brought the people to such a moral state that at first they did not even know whether it was worth fighting for this exterminating power, for the "advantages of the socialist system" and even for their own country.

And what would we do without Comrade Stalin! A monument should be erected to Comrade Stalin. On Poklonnaya Hill. With a bloodied ax in his weary hand, with a broom and a dog's head belts.

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Vladimir Beshanov

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